The Discursive Legitimation of New Ideas. Emergence and Diffusion of the Industrial Research Laboratory in the United States, 1870-1930. by Pithan, David M.
Doctoral Dissertation in the Department of Sociology
The Discursive Legitimation of New Ideas.
Emergence and Diffusion of the Industrial Research Laboratory in the
United States, 1870-1930.
to obtain the academic degree Doctor of Philosophy 
at the School of Human and Social Sciences of the University of Wuppertal
Submitted by
David M. Pithan
February 2019
The PhD thesis can be quoted as follows:
urn:nbn:de:hbz:468-20190918-113030-1
[http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn=urn%3Anbn%3Ade%3Ahbz%3A468-20190918-113030-1]
DOI: 10.25926/jc8t-8098
[https://doi.org/10.25926/jc8t-8098]
iTable of Contents
List of Abbreviations...................................................................................................................................... iv
List of Illustrations.......................................................................................................................................... v
1) Introduction................................................................................................................................................ 1
2) Theory......................................................................................................................................................... 4
2.1) Diffusion of Innovations.................................................................................................................... 4
What a Diffusion Perspective Can Add............................................................................................... 4
Translating Ideas to Make them Fit...................................................................................................... 8
2.2) Idea Translation in Organizational Fields........................................................................................ 12
Of Organizational Fields and Institutions.......................................................................................... 13
From Institutions to Isomorphism..................................................................................................... 16
2.3) Making the Case for Discourse......................................................................................................... 19
What Discourse is, and What it is Not............................................................................................... 20
Towards an Operationalization of Discourse..................................................................................... 25
2.4) The Gist of It..................................................................................................................................... 27
3) The Innovation: Industrial Research Laboratory.................................................................................... 30
3.1) Where It Originated From................................................................................................................ 30
3.2) How it Proliferated........................................................................................................................... 35
The Problem with Mapping R&D Growth....................................................................................... 35
Sketching the Growth of Industrial Research Laboratories...............................................................36
3.3) The Research Pioneers...................................................................................................................... 45
1900: General Electric......................................................................................................................... 45
1902: Du Pont..................................................................................................................................... 51
1907: AT&T....................................................................................................................................... 57
1912: Eastman Kodak......................................................................................................................... 62
General Themes & Concepts.............................................................................................................. 68
3.4) Preliminary Findings from the Research Pioneers...........................................................................73
General Explanatory Notions............................................................................................................. 73
The Role of Agency............................................................................................................................ 78
The Move Towards Science................................................................................................................ 79
The Status of the Pioneers................................................................................................................... 82
4) The Organizational Field: US Chemistry, 1870-1930.............................................................................83
4.1) Chemistry as Academic Science: Scientific Societies, Journals, and Chemical Education.............85
Scientific Societies and Related Organizations................................................................................... 85
Chemical Journals............................................................................................................................... 91
Chemistry in Higher Education ......................................................................................................... 95
4.2) Chemistry in Industry: Companies, Products, and Processes.........................................................98
The Development of the Chemical Industry..................................................................................... 99
ii
Employment Trends of Chemists in Industry................................................................................. 102
Trade Associations and Other Organizations in the Chemical Industry ........................................103
4.3) Chemistry and Politics: World War I, Boosterism and the New Landscape of Federal Support for 
Science.................................................................................................................................................... 106
Chemists in Federal Employment .................................................................................................... 107
The Effects of World War I.............................................................................................................. 109
5) Capturing the Discourse about Industrial Research in US Chemistry, 1870 – 1930...........................117
5.1) Methodological Considerations..................................................................................................... 117
How to Capture Discourse & Where to Start.................................................................................. 117
From Field to Speaker....................................................................................................................... 118
From Speaker to Corpus................................................................................................................... 121
5.2) Dataset Overview............................................................................................................................ 124
Popular Journals ............................................................................................................................... 127
General Science Journals................................................................................................................... 128
Chemistry Journals........................................................................................................................... 129
Industrial Journals............................................................................................................................. 129
Governmental Journals..................................................................................................................... 130
5.3) An Event-Based Analysis................................................................................................................ 130
Events as Focal Points in Discourse.................................................................................................. 131
Texts as a Unit of Analysis................................................................................................................ 138
5.4) On Quality Control in Discourse Analysis.................................................................................... 141
Challenges to Conventional Approaches to Quality Control.........................................................141
Four Criteria for Quality Control in Discourse Analysis.................................................................143
6) Analyzing the Discourse ........................................................................................................................ 146
6.1) Interdiscursivity.............................................................................................................................. 154
Specialization..................................................................................................................................... 154
Conservation Movement.................................................................................................................. 155
Efficiency........................................................................................................................................... 157
Research Landscape.......................................................................................................................... 159
Preparedness...................................................................................................................................... 161
Popularization................................................................................................................................... 162
Legislation......................................................................................................................................... 163
Postwar Normalcy............................................................................................................................. 164
Chemical Education.......................................................................................................................... 166
6.2) Concepts......................................................................................................................................... 167
Concepts, 1: Science, Research, and Industrial Research................................................................168
Concepts, 2: Chemistry.................................................................................................................... 175
Taking a Step Back: Science, Research, and Chemistry in the History of Science..........................179
6.3) Objects............................................................................................................................................ 180
Objects: The Laboratory................................................................................................................... 180
iii
Taking a Step Back: The Laboratory in the History and Sociology of Science...............................190
6.4) Subject Positions............................................................................................................................. 194
Subjects, 1: The Chemist.................................................................................................................. 194
Subjects, 2: The Chemical Engineer................................................................................................. 206
Taking a Step Back: Scientists and Chemists in the History and Sociology of Science...................212
6.5) Summarizing Results...................................................................................................................... 216
6.6) Ensuring Quality in the Analysis of the Industrial Research Laboratory......................................221
7) Discussion & Conclusions...................................................................................................................... 222
7.1) Summary......................................................................................................................................... 222
The Industrial Research Laboratory as Seen through Discourse.....................................................222
7.2) Discussion....................................................................................................................................... 229
Implications for the Diffusion of Innovations, Sociology of Organizations, and History of Science
........................................................................................................................................................... 229
7.3) Research Desiderata........................................................................................................................ 236
Three Questions................................................................................................................................ 236
Three Desiderata............................................................................................................................... 241
References.................................................................................................................................................... 246
Archival Sources..................................................................................................................................... 259
Discourse Analysis Corpus.................................................................................................................... 259
Declaration of Authorship.......................................................................................................................... 266
iv
List of Abbreviations
AAAS American Association for the Advancement of Science
ABT American Bell Telephone Company
ACS American Chemical Society
AES American Electrochemical Society
AIC American Institute of Chemists
AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers
AJS American Journal of Science
AT&T American Telephone & Telegraph Company
CDA Critical Discourse Analysis 
DIR Directors of Industrial Research
EGE Edison General Electric
GE General Electric
IUPAC International Union of Pure and Applied Chemistry
JACS Journal of the American Chemical Society
JIEC Journal of Industrial & Engineering Chemistry 
MCA Manufacturing Chemists' Association
NAM National Association of Manufacturers
NAS National Academy of Sciences
NCB Naval Consulting Board
NRC National Research Council
NRE National Research Endowment
ODA Organizational Discourse Analysis 
R&D Research and Development
SoCI Society for Chemical Industry
STS Science and Technology Studies
TH Thomson-Houston
USDA United States Department of Agriculture
WU Western Union
WWI World War I
vIllustrations
Figures
Figure 3.2.1: Laboratories Founded By Year, 1890-1940.............................................................................39
Figure 3.2.2: Cumulative Growth of Industrial Research Laboratories, 1890-1940..................................40
Figure 3.2.3: Total Staff Growth.................................................................................................................. 41
Figure 3.2.4: Staff by Scientific Disciplines Employed in Laboratories, 1921-1938...................................43
Figure 4.1.1: Annual Membership of the ACS, 1876-1930.........................................................................87
Figure 4.1.2: Bachelors, Second-level Degrees, PhDs in Chemistry, 1890-1930.........................................95
Figure 4.1.3: Bachelors, Second-level Degrees, PhDs in Chemistry as Percentage of all Degree Conferrals, 
1890-1930...................................................................................................................................................... 96
Figure 4.1.4: Doctorates Awarded by Universities, in Per Cent..................................................................98
Figure 4.2.1: Number of Chemical Establishments, 1870-1930................................................................100
Figure 4.2.2: Outputs of Chemical and all Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1929...................................101
Figure 4.2.3: Capital Investment in the Chemical Industries and in Total Manufacturing, 1879-1929..102
Figure 4.2.4: Average Number of Wage Earners & Census Chemists, 1870-1930...................................103
Figure 4.3.1: Chemists in Federal Government, 1879-1930......................................................................106
Figure 5.2.1: Dataset Overview, 1870-1930................................................................................................ 124
Figure 5.3.1: Number of Publications per Author..................................................................................... 135
Figure 5.3.2: Number of Articles per Speaker Group and Event...............................................................136
Figure 5.3.3: Article Types per Event......................................................................................................... 137
Figure 6.1.1: Percentage of Texts Referring to Certain Discourses...........................................................153
Tables
Table 3.3.1: Overview Pioneering Laboratories .......................................................................................... 69
Table 4.1.1: Foundations of Chemistry-related Scientific Societies and other Professional Associations, 
1870-1930...................................................................................................................................................... 86
Table 4.1.2: Specialty Divisions of the American Chemical Society, 1870-1930........................................88
Table 4.1.3: US Chemical Journals, 1870-1930........................................................................................... 93
Table 4.2.1: Foundations of Trade Associations and Other Professional Organizations, 1870-1930......104
Table 4.3.1: Foundations of Governmental Organizations Related to Chemistry, 1870-1930................107
Table 5.1.1: Search Terms Used for Corpus Assembly.............................................................................. 123
Table 5.2.1: Dataset Overview.................................................................................................................... 125
Table 5.3.1 Discursive Events..................................................................................................................... 132
Table 5.3.2: Example of Schema Used for Analysis...................................................................................139
Table 6.1: Overview of Results................................................................................................................... 150

11) Introduction
But if you look at the history, modern chemistry only starts coming in to replace alchemy
around the same time capitalism really gets going. Strange, eh? What do you make of that?
–Thomas Pynchon, Against the Day
This is a book about the history of ideas, and about one idea in particular: setting up a laboratory within
the confines of a business enterprise, bringing the material locus of science into a world that seems to be
pursuing entirely different goals, subject to an alien logic. When untangling the complex web of traces
that ideas leave when they travel, one will quickly notice that the history of the industrial laboratory is also
a history of science. And a history not only of its contents, practitioners, and institutions, but of the many
meanings associated with the concept of science over the centuries. These meanings transformed what
practicing science – and practicing science in industry – signified at different times,  and in different
contexts. While the industrial laboratory may be taken for granted today, conjuring images of eponymous
triumphs,  chemists  clad  in  white  coats,  or  where  superheroes  and  -villains  are  made  in  our  fiction,
understanding it as a specific materialization of the practice of science clearly highlights its contingent
nature.  But this  is  not a  book about laboratory lives  and the very nature  of the scientific  enterprise.
Instead, it is about how the laboratory came to be so pervasive and taken for granted. In this way, a third
kind of history is revealed: that of organizations. Modern society is increasingly characterized as pervaded
by organizations, so it is only fitting to scrutinize one of those organizational entities often seen as a prime
example  of  modern  corporations  and  their  complex  interrelations  with  each  other  –  and  their
environments – from a sociological perspective on organizations. 
Of course, numerous scholars have already covered the histories of the early R&D laboratories in various
levels of detail. Several waves of scholarly interest have swept over corporate archives, ranging from early –
rather celebratory – histories, to the organizational histories of the 1980s, focusing on the most prolific
and illustrious laboratories.  Each wave reframed these labs,  uncovering new aspects of laboratories in
industry, the inner workings of science, and big corporations. This is why so much is known about some
of  the  early  labs,  such  as  their  specific  triumphs  and  failures,  and  their  structural  shifts  and
transformations. But, as Lucier notes,  interest in corporate labs has recently ceased: “Perhaps it was a
sense that there was nothing left of theoretical interest to say about industrial research …, which along
with other institutional histories have looked rather dull and outdated since the cultural turn in history”
(Lucier 2016, 25). So, since so much appears to be said already about this topic, what exactly warrants
another look at this kind of laboratory?
2The perspective this book takes is  effectively informed by an interest in the diffusion of innovations,
combined with a sociological hunch: that in order to spread successfully, new ideas need to be legitimated
in some way. Legitimacy, here, means appearing congruent – fitting and natural – with the existing order.
Of course, ideas do not travel on their own, and similarly, they need actors championing their acceptance.
Hence, diffusing ideas are subject to a multitude of transformations and translations that fundamentally
change both their form and content in order to fit new environments and organizational contexts. It is
precisely this intersection within which the main analytical thrust of this study lies: how new ideas are
made to fit  – through individual acts of translation – to greater collective layers of meaning, thereby
providing legitimacy, which I call discourse. These discourses construct social reality in the first place: its
categories, actors and possibilities for agency. Thus, to understand how scientific laboratories found a
place in industrial corporations, it first needs to be known what the laboratory, science, and the scientist
meant  to  organizational  actors  of  the  time.  How  these  concepts  were  translated  –  discursively  re-
constructed – in order to fit different local contexts and grander discursive shifts and transformations is at
the heart of this successful process of diffusion.
In  this  unique  convergence  of  the  history  of  ideas,  science,  and  the  sociology  of  organizations,  the
constructive  effects  of  language  on  organizational  reality  are  key  to  the  way  that  this  new  idea  was
naturalized  and  made  salient.  Foregoing  grand  explanations  that  see  the  industrial  laboratory  as  an
inevitable organizational outcome of modernization and the general rationalization of economic life, the
goal here is to combine detailed history with contextual factors in order to paint a more complete picture:
“Because laboratories are so integrally a part of their times and places, lab history is of necessity also social
history” (Kohler 2008, 765). A theoretical framework combining organizational theory with discursive
methods is  used,  working towards a  cultural  explanation of how laboratories  in industry came to be
institutionalized.  Hence,  going  beyond  existing  studies  on  corporate  R&D  that  center  around
organizational, technical, or legal aspects, my study will include the ideational environment of chemical
corporations and how its characteristics conditioned organizational agency. In order to gain access to
historical scholarship on the topic, as well as texts that were later used in the discourse analysis, I spent
four months at the Chemical Heritage Foundation in Philadelphia, PA, in the fall of 2016. During this
time I also visited the Du Pont archives at the Hagley Museum and Library in Wilmington, DE, as well as
the Kodak archives at the University of Rochester and the George Eastman Museum in Rochester, NY.
These research visits proved instrumental in filling some holes in the histories of the “research pioneers”,
as well as adequately mapping the field's discourses. 
This book will focus on industrial research laboratories in the United States only, and specifically in the
US chemical industries. In the beginning, the hypothesis arose that the adoption of R&D in America was
3the result of the highly successful German template of laboratories in the chemical industries. But soon
after it was revealed that American firms followed their own paths in this venture, nullifying explanations
based  on  visibility  and  mimesis.  A  comparative  study  surely  would  have  been  interesting,  but  the
exploratory approach and hybrid method employed here set limitations.  Mapping two organizational
fields'  discourses  with wildly different  histories  would have been excessive and may have  diluted the
analytical  clarity  of  either  analysis.  Consequently,  focus  was  shifted towards  the  unique economical,
political and cultural situation in the United States. 
Anyone familiar with previous scholarship on industrial research laboratories and the history of American
science will know how their stories are often informed by perspectives interested in the types of science
done within the laboratories.  These types may be called pure or applied science, or basic and applied
research,  amongst  many  other  descriptors.  Discussions  found  within  such  approaches  are  often
concerned with the relationships between these types, or how pure science could be practiced in impure
places, such as anywhere outside of academia. Using an analytical perspective here that steers clear of any
such preconceived notions was a conscious, purposeful decision. Any assumptions regarding the types of
science,  the  motives  of  its  practitioners  and  their  “proper”  locations  presupposes  science  in  fixed,
distorted ways  that  would  run counter  to a  framework and epistemology that  puts  the  constructive
effects  of  language front  and center.  In addition,  focusing on an ontology of  science  and its  related
ideologies would run the risk of obscuring what actually happened, as Gieryn put it very succinctly: “The
sociological question is not whether science is really pure or impure or both, but rather how its borders
and territories are flexibly and discursively mapped out in pursuit of some observed or inferred ambition
– and with what consequences,  and for  whom?” (Gieryn 1999,  23).  Hence,  when mapping out  the
pathways the laboratory took from organizational  novelty to institution,  no presumptions about any
types of science involved shall be made, instead, the actors of the time who were involved in its spread
shall be heard.
Lastly, a note on designations. In the following, I will variously speak of laboratories, industrial research
laboratories, R&D labs, and other labels. As the history of organized research in industry in America laid
out below will illustrate, a plethora of terms existed for the organizational unit, and categories such as
“research”  and  “development”  were  in  no  ways  fixed  (or  even  in  existence)  at  the  beginning  of  the
twentieth century. Different names for these laboratories will thus only be used for stylistic reasons unless
otherwise noted, and in no way to make assumptions about what kind of work was done there. In the
end,  what this  book is  interested in is  how modern corporations came to have a  distinct  unit  called
“research laboratory”, no matter its place in the organizational structure or what specifically happened
within its laboratory walls.
42) Theory
2.1) Diffusion of Innovations
In  the  following,  I  develop  a  theoretical  framework  for  analyzing  the  emergence  and  spread  of  the
industrial  research  laboratory,  which  brings  together  various  perspectives  on  innovations  and
organizations from different strands of sociology. These perspectives serve not only to put the diffusion
of  ideas  into  a  conceptual  model,  but  also  to  provide  a  methodical  starting  point  for  the  discourse
analysis. Of course, many other framings for understanding R&D laboratories could have been chosen,
but combining diffusion with organizational theory adds a new angle to both the story of the industrial
laboratory and to the diffusion of innovations in organizational fields by focusing on the role that an
innovation's fit within the surrounding environment plays. To understand how new ideas, practices or
things spread successfully, one needs to account for cultural variables that serve as anchoring points for
traveling ideas. Building a theoretical framework for such an analysis will be undertaken in three steps:
First, I examine historical and conceptual developments in the literature of diffusion of innovations, with
a  particular  focus  on  cultural  variables  in  social  systems  in  order  to  better  understand  either  how
innovations fit or are made to fit. Second, since the history of the R&D laboratory is about organizations,
I use elements from organizational institutionalism to expand the toolkit of diffusion studies, especially
by  using  the  organizational  field  concept  that  improves  our  understanding  of  what  conditions
organizational agency within organizational fields. Third, the concept of discourse – and the method of
discourse analysis – will be introduced as a way to analyze the layers of meaning in a given field. After this
theoretical triple jump, the research program that follows the theoretical framework is outlined. 
What a Diffusion Perspective Can Add
What do the theoretical perspective and methodical toolkit of diffusion studies add to the understanding
of the emergence of the industrial research laboratory – and, vice versa, how can this example contribute
to the already extensive body of literature on diffusion? As it turns out, the curious case of the birth of the
organizational entity that is known today as the Research and Development Laboratory (or R&D Lab,
for short) has already attracted considerable scholarly attention, having been addressed from a variety of
angles.  Historians of science and technology (e.g.  Reich 1980; Wise 1985; Hounshell  & Smith 1988)
explored the  singular  histories  of  the  pioneer  laboratories,  their  eponymous directors,  their  scientific
triumphs, and the external and internal resistances – ranging from a rapidly changing legal and economic
environment to the challenges of doing “scientific research” in an industrial setting – that needed to be
overcome  in  order  to  shape  a  space  for  science  in  the  modern  corporation.  In  contrast,  economic
5sociologists (e.g. A. Chandler 1977, 1990b; Fligstein 1990) put the R&D Laboratory in the context of the
larger shifts of corporations' structures and managerial logic happening at the time, linking environmental
pressures  to  the  internal  demands  of  the  giant  corporations  that  ultimately  brought  about  an
organizational  structure  that  included  a  laboratory  –  structure  following  strategy,  an  expression  of
managerial ideologies. Furthermore, innovation economists (e.g. Mowery 1981; Lamoreaux & Sokoloff
1999) added to our understanding by including quantitative indicators in a framework of transactional
costs and (technological) markets, underlining the roles played by factors such as sector, firm size, and
capital in the establishment of laboratories. Theoretical perspectives on corporate research laboratories are
disassembled  and  their  various  explanatory  parts  scrutinized,  in  a  history  of  the  early  US  R&D
laboratories sketched below, in Chapter 3. 
Clearly,  previous  scholarship  can  answer  the  question  “What  happened?”:  The  Industrial  Research
Laboratory was created within large American corporations around 1900, primarily in the chemical and
electrical industries. The laboratory as an organizational entity then spread through these and adjacent
industries,  such  as  the  pharmaceutical  industry  (Liebenau  1985;  Furman  &  MacGarvie  2007).  This
process  can  certainly  be  regarded  as  an  account  of  organizational  change,  yet  change  that  was  not
triggered by new legislation demanding the establishment of laboratory facilities, but rather by a unique
combination  of  factors  making  the  spread  of  this  organizational  entity  through  a  population  of
organizations  possible.  Explaining  the  advent  of  industrial  research  as  a  diffusion  process  means
understanding it as a cascading mechanism that led to corporations adopting laboratories even though
their positions or resources were unchanged, whereas structural explanations would search for alterations
of preferences and opportunities caused by changes in available resources or the positional structure of
the field (Palloni 2001, 68). As such, the emergence and spread of the industrial research laboratory can
be framed as a process of diffusion – diffusion being “the most general and abstract term we have for this
sort of process, embracing contagion, mimicry, social learning, organized dissemination, and other family
members” (Strang & Soule 1998, 266). In particular, this framing adds the analytical categories developed
over decades of  diffusion research to describe the emergence and spread of  R&D laboratories  not as
heroic entrepreneurs enacting change from within organizations, as the historic accounts would suggest,
or as field-level conditions forcing an inevitable outcome. Instead, the toolbox to be utilized here (cf.
Rogers 2003, also Mahajan & Peterson 1985; Palloni 2001; Wejnert 2002) offers ways of accounting for
individual  action  within  a  larger  environment  that,  when  viewed  a  posteriori,  takes  the  shape  of  a
cascading mechanism, of something spreading throughout a social system. 
To  use  this  toolbox,  some  terminological  groundwork  is  called  for.  Traditionally,  diffusion  studies
include  four  elements  in  their  analytical  framework:  an  innovation,  that  spreads  via  channels  of
6communication, over time, throughout a social system (Rogers 2003, 1ff). The element of time is defined
by the empirical reality of the spread of R&D, which happened in the first three decades of the twentieth
century. The specific channels of communication themselves are of lesser interest to this study for two
reasons: First, they are subordinated to a social structure that will be scrutinized in detail – patterns of
communication now a by-product of patterns of interaction.  Second, when analyzing texts  and their
respective  speakers  methodically,  channels  of  communication  are  included  in  the  three-dimensional
approach to discourse utilized here. Some definitional trouble starts when accounting for the specific
item that diffuses.  In Roger's authoritative review of diffusion research (2003), that item is termed an
innovation – indeed a term usually  occurring in conjunction with diffusion: “The home territory of
diffusion is the innovation” (Strang & Soule 1998, 267). Innovation is defined as “an idea, practice, or
object that is perceived as new by an individual or other unit of adoption” (Rogers 2003, 12). Particular
emphasis is laid on the perception of novelty, regardless of “objective” newness. The notion of innovation
encompasses a variety of items, such as ideas or practices as noted above, but also material things such as
technologies (for an introduction, see Fagerberg 2005). 
Of course, specifically when dealing with a historically diffuse concept such as “innovation”, a word of
caution is in order. The corporate R&D laboratory can be deemed an innovation only with the benefit of
hindsight – by virtue of analyzing its spread more than a hundred years later. Today, it is known that the
laboratory became an institutionalized part of the modern corporation. Yet terming the R&D lab an
innovation from the outset may occlude the reasons for its successful diffusion on a conceptual level by
assuming inherent qualities that assured its diffusion. Furthermore, one runs the risk of falling prey to a
pro-innovation bias that has plagued the scholarship of innovation: since only those ideas, practices, or
things that “make it” can be analyzed, any hypothetical sample of things that diffuse is heavily skewed
towards successful innovations. Accounts of failed diffusion – and failed innovations – are few and far
between  (cf.  Rogers  2003,  1-5  &  8-11;  R.  Bauer  2006;  Jonsson  2009;  Croidieu  &  Monin  2009),
circumventing the goal of thoroughly understanding the diffusion of an innovation as an instance of
technical  and social  change that  goes beyond the attributes  of the innovation.  Thus,  by terming the
spread of corporate research an innovation, it shall by no means be assumed that the actors involved in its
creation and diffusion perceived it as such. As historical cases show, there was an abundance of testing
and control laboratories long before the first research laboratory was established. Additionally, one may
also ask what exactly was diffusing: the physical object “laboratory”, the floor plans of laboratories, the
practice of doing research within a corporation, or an even more hazy idea of the benefits of science and
research – with the diffusion of immaterial practices or ideas being heavily dependent upon their material
means of travel, the profile their diffusion takes often depending on who arrives first, “the merchant or
7the missionary” (Katz 1999, 151; cf. Czarniawska & Joerges 1996, 36; Rogers 2003, 13f). This issue is
further complicated when asking whether it was in fact the same practice spreading through the field of
interest, with the variety of forms that industrial research laboratories took, and past research detailing the
importance of partial diffusion and re-invention throughout the diffusion process (Rogers 2003, 180ff;
Alasuutari 2015). Since the detailed accounts of the R&D pioneers convincingly illustrate the differing
ways that corporate research was undertaken, the item diffusing here is the  practice of establishing an
industrial research laboratory as a new organizational entity, whatever form it may take and wherever it
may  be  located  within  the  organizational  structure.  For  our  purposes,  we  will  regard  the  industrial
research laboratory as an organizational novelty that became an innovation once it was widely accepted
and incorporated in large firms.
As these deliberations upon one of the key terms of diffusion studies illustrate, centering our explanation
for the successful spread of the corporate lab around it being an innovation for actors of its time would
obscure many of the factors involved in its diffusion (see Djelic 2008, 545), namely contextual variables
that are not only outlined theoretically in diffusion research, but also hinted at in the existing histories of
various early laboratories. Ideas, practices, and things obviously do not spread in a vacuum, unhindered
by time and space. Rather, the answer to why some ideas spread far and wide, while others disappear, can
be found in the various local and temporal contexts these ideas move through: 
A fundamental element in adoption theory is recognition that innovations are not independent of 
their environmental context but that they rather evolve in a specific ecological and cultural context 
and that their successful transfer depends on their suitability to the new environments they enter 
during diffusion … . (Wejnert 2002, 310)
What  Wejnert  calls  context  can  be  found  under  various  designations  in  diffusion  studies,  such  as
environment or social system, which in Roger's analytical scheme means “a set of interrelated units that
are engaged in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal” (Rogers 2003, 23), with its units
variously being individuals, organizations or societal subsystems, and their interrelations forming a social
structure that yields points of contact and communication. As Palloni notes, a proper explanation of a
diffusion process needs an understanding of the structures involved: “Some of the best original work on
diffusion processes emphasizes that social diffusion is an analytically sterile construct if not cast against a
social  structure  ...”  (Palloni  2001,  73).  But  as  Strang  and  Soule  note,  merely  accounting  for  social
structure  is  not  enough  to understand  why the  industrial  research  laboratory  emerged and diffused:
“Structural  opportunities  for  meaningful  contact  cannot  tell  us  what  sorts  of  practices  are  likely  to
diffuse,  and such opportunities  may lead to conflict  or  boundary  formation as  well  as  to diffusion”
(Strang & Soule 1998, 276).  This  indicates that there are more than just  patterns of interaction that
8influence successful diffusion. 
In  Roger's  categorization  of  the  four  elements  of  diffusion,  the  above  mentioned  social  system also
contains system norms as established behavioral patterns, that tell system members how to act – in the
case of diffusion whether to adopt or reject (Rogers 2003, 26).  Wejnert (2002, 312ff) refers to belief
systems or socialization, whereas Katz,  Levin, and Hamilton speak of value systems (Katz et al.  1963,
249ff), and Palloni (2010, 73) adding “repertoires of feasible behaviors and preferences” that guide action
within  the  social  structure.  Thus  the  many  ways  that  social  structure  has  been enriched by  cultural
variables in diffusion theorizing accentuate its importance in the spread of ideas, practices, and things,
even though a common theoretical and methodical approach is lacking. This emphasizes, though, that
what matters is not only the innovation itself and the social structure that influences who hears about it,
who has the means to adopt it, and their ability to influence others, but also the meanings assigned to
(and transformed by) the ideas, practices, and things (and adopters) in the process of diffusion on the one
hand, and the way those ideas manage to fit with these cultural attributes of the social structure on the
other. Needless to say, diffusion will vary according to shifting spatial and temporal factors, as ideas will
be interpreted differently in different places and at different times. The idea of what a laboratory is and
looks like today evokes distinctly different images than one in the United States of the Progressive Era,
and the practice of establishing industrial research laboratories looked decisively different in 1900 and,
say, the 1980s, when the thought of investment into uncertain scientific innovation was challenged and
ultimately delegitimized (cf.  Mowery & Teece 1996; Bridenbaugh 1996;  Slaughter  & Rhoades  2002;
Carlson 2007). Similarly, the earliest instances of the establishment of industrial research laboratories can
be found in the German dyestuffs industry, between 1877 and 1882, illustrating a different interplay of
economic,  political,  and cultural  factors  than in the US chemical  and electrical  industries  (Homburg
1992). This brings me to the core argument of this book: the meanings assigned to an innovation, and the
larger, surrounding system of meaning that inform action, influence the diffusion of ideas, practices, and
things,  and need to be taken into account  in order  to explain diffusion mechanisms and the unique
patterns diffusion processes exhibit. 
Translating Ideas to Make them Fit
Of course, the argument elaborated upon above has been made before and put to test in a variety of ways
both within diffusion studies – often to measure the “compatibility”, “fit”, or “appropriateness” of an
innovation and the surrounding social  system – and in other branches of sociology. Let me first stay
within  the  confines  of  diffusion  studies  –  what  can  be  learned  from  these  efforts,  and  what  new
perspectives shall be added here?
9As  the  seminal  theorist  of  diffusion,  Rogers  emphasizes  the  necessity  of  fit  in  his  discussion  of
compatibility as “the degree to which an innovation is perceived as consistent with the existing values,
past  experiences,  and  needs  of  potential  adopters”  (Rogers  2003,  240),  with  higher  compatibility
decreasing  uncertainty  and  in  turn  increasing  the  tendency  of  adoption.  He  further  distinguishes
compatibility with system-level values and beliefs, as well as previously introduced ideas. A range of cases
illustrate this compatibility, from water-boiling practices in Peru (ibid., 241; also 1-5) to IBM's bar-code
readers (ibid., 242) or tractors in northern India (ibid., 244). Ultimately, though, according to Rogers,
relative advantage proved to be the strongest predictor for the rate of adoption, (i.e. how an innovation
spread) rather than compatibility (ibid., 233). Croidieu and Monin (2009) put this to the test in their
analysis  of  the  (non-)diffusion  of  entrepreneurial  innovations  in  wine  making,  finding  that  effective
practices  can  fail  to  diffuse  if  deemed  inappropriate,  and  noting  how  “potential  adopters  assessed
appropriateness first, and then effectiveness” (ibid., 320). They further extend the notion of compatibility
by underscoring how fit is always locally and temporally dependent. In a similar vein, Soule (1999) shows
how the protest practice of building shantytowns on college campuses, though ineffective, diffused due
to appearances of appropriateness, thus being compatible. In his analysis of the evolution of the hostile
takeover  in  businesses  in  the  United  States  between  1960  and  1985,  Hirsch  showed  how  language
associated with such takeovers changed to more benign terms over time: “The expansion of language
patterns  to  accord  greater  respectability  to  takeovers  as  the  practice  diffused  and  attained  more
widespread adoption correlates cultural symbols with structural movements.” (Hirsch 1986, 814).  He
argues that for hostile takeovers to diffuse as a business practice, they needed to be related linguistically to
widely known terms and genres – such as the Western or the Romance – in order to reduce unfamiliarity
and supply normative frames,  with popular discourse supplying meaning to the practice (ibid.,  824).
Hirsch illustrates how ideas, practices, and things that may not be compatible with the larger cultural
variables of a given social system can be  made compatible, by building bridges towards that which is
already known and widely accepted, in this case shared terms, metaphors, and narratives.
These empirical, case-based findings are further underscored by Strang and Soule's review of diffusion
research (1998),  where  the  authors  discuss  what  they  call  cultural  bases  of  diffusion.  They find  that
“[j]ointly, the argument is that practices diffuse as they are rendered salient, familiar, and compelling”
(ibid.,  276).  Fit  or  compatibility  is  indeed  essential,  and  those  practices  that  “accord  with  cultural
understandings of appropriate and effective action tend to diffuse more quickly than those that do not.”
(ibid., 278; cf. Wejnert 2002, 313). As it turns out, legitimacy and perception of appropriateness is more
important for central actors than for those who are marginalized at the fringes of a field (Strang & Soule
1998, 279; see also Menzel 1960; Leblebici et al. 1991). In addition, they find that practices themselves do
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not diffuse, but rather “theorized models and careful framings” of these practices do (Strang & Soule
1998,  277),  further  emphasizing  the  necessity  of  interpretive  work  in  diffusion.  This  argument  is
extended by Strang and Meyer (1993),  who outline how “theorizing”, as the development of abstract
categories and cause-effect relations (ibid., 492), aids diffusion. 
In summary,  compatibility,  fit, or  appropriateness with cultural attributes of the social  system play an
important role in the diffusion of an innovation. It is clear that these are not fixed categories – ideas,
practices, and things can be made compatible and made to fit in the process of their diffusion. This active,
constructive  element  is  captured in the  notion of  translation.1 Originally  going  back to the  work of
Michel Serres (1992), translation came to represent not only the linguistic meaning of translating words
between languages, but the added dimension of the transformation of objects and material things. Widely
used by scholars in the fold of Actor-Network-Theory such as Latour and Callon, who emphasized the
nature of translation as collective action (cf. Callon 1980, 1986; Latour 1986), the concept came to be
incorporated  into  a  body  of  new  institutional  scholarship  often  referred  to  as  Scandinavian
Institutionalism (Wæraas & Nielsen 2016). Out of an interest in global and local change processes, these
researchers  combined  new  institutional  tenets  with  French  constructivism.  Even  though  no  general
theoretical  lens  and  methodological  approach  exist,  Scandinavian  Institutionalist  research  often  asks
questions of local  change processes,  organizational  practice,  and fashions,  while  utilizing interpretive,
qualitative  approaches  to data-gathering and analysis  (cf.  Czarniawska & Sevón 2003;  Engwall  2003;
Boxenbaum & Strandgaard Pedersen 2009; Mica 2013).
But how do translation and diffusion differ?  In the (original) formulation of the diffusion perspective,
ideas, practices, and things spread unchanged, with innovators adopting the same item as laggards, no
matter  the  time  or  place  (cf.  Mica  2013).  Translation  shifts  the  perspective  to  show  who  does  the
translating, what exactly is being translated, and why. The concept of translation thus adds several facets
to this analysis. As Scandinavian Institutionalism's scholarship has illustrated, in the case of organizational
forms it is not the one form that spreads: “What is being transferred from one setting to another is not an
idea or a practice as such, but rather accounts and materializations of a certain idea or practice“ (Sahlin &
Wedlin 2008, 225). These generalized models are then incorporated by organizations as a whole, in parts,
or merely as a label in the case of associating new practices with already legitimized concepts (Solli et al.
2005). The previously passive actor is no longer merely an “adopter”, instead becoming an active “editor”
(Sahlin & Wedlin 2008, 227ff).  With the editing of ideas not being open-ended and completely free,
1 Alasuutari (2015, 179) remarks how there are multiple concepts tackling similar issues, such as creolization, glocalization, 
indigenzation, or localization; but as translation is widely used in organizational scholarship, it shall be utilized here instead 
of these other notions. 
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translation is tied back to compatibility and fit as introduced above: editors have to obey certain editing
rules (ibid., 225ff) for their translations to become successful. Editing rules are assumed to arise from the
cultural  attributes  of  the  social  system,  which are  vaguely  described and only  very  hazily  defined by
notions such as “master ideas” (cf. Czarniawska & Joerges 1996, 36f), or the rationalistic values associated
with the Western project of progress (Meyer 1996, 250). Yet it remains rather unclear and undertheorized
how exactly culturally constructed meaning, collectively shared by members of a social system, influences
the translation process – answers are still lacking both in diffusion research, as well as in the translation
literature that builds on organizational institutionalism's core tenets. 
The idea  that  there  is  more  to a  social  system or  any given society  than patterns  of  interaction and
communication  is,  of  course,  not  unique  to  diffusion  studies.  Specifically  the  conception  of  an
interdependency between cultural variables and the material world could be seen as one of sociology's
core  interests,  and  can  be  found  in  various  formulations  in  macrosociological  works,  from  Marx's
dialectical materialism to the contributions of today's sociology. Let me briefly outline the theoretical,
and especially methodical problems that need to be remedied when analyzing the co-construction of the
cultural and the material, and what this book plans to add to this discussion. For example, Hirschman's
“The Passions and the Interests” (1977) poses a very similar question to the one of interest here – How
did an idea succeed? How was it translated over time? – but eschews any clear theoretical model when
tracing the history of an idea, namely that of capitalism. While carefully probing how the passion of self-
interest came to be regarded as an important stabilizing principle in the successful spread of capitalism, he
traces arguments of how justifications for and against capitalism, linked to central assumptions about
human nature, shifted by the time capitalism had triumphed. He does this by looking at the reflective
thinkers'  writings  of  the  time,  i.e.  philosophy  and  social  theory.  Even  though  his  nuanced  analysis
illustrates how ideas are mediated and disseminated collectively by the intellectual elite, no methodical
insights  can be  gained.  In Münch's  analysis  of  the  transnational  integration of  the  European Union
(Münch 2008), we find a similar idea to the cultural variables of a social system, in the dynamic between
societal semantics and material reality. Münch argues that semantics make societal order meaningful in
the  first  place,  but  that  they  have  to  correspond  to  the  structural  conditions  of  society,  e.g.  the
institutional and material order, in order to not be questioned and remain stable (ibid., 346) – in other
words,  semantics can not be arbitrary.  While  analyzing the distinct national  semantics of France,  the
United  Kingdom,  Germany,  and  the  United  States  by  proxy  of  important  authors  such  as  Locke,
Rousseau, or Kant, the exact ways in which societal semantics and the institutional-material reality are
intertwined remains questionable. Semantics are constructed through intellectual discourse (ibid., 13),
yet how, and by what methodological means they may be analyzed is left unclear. 
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Of course, both of these contributions are thematically distant from the spread of R&D laboratories. Yet
they were chosen to illustrate on the one hand how the ideas of fit and compatibility are formulated in
other sociological perspectives, and the ways in which the history of an idea may be traced on the other.
Evidently,  the  idea  that  the  institutional-material  order  (as  the  concrete  configuration  of  European
juridical integration, or as the establishment of a research laboratory in a corporation in the chemical
industry) needs to be connected to an ideational layer, be it called societal semantics or a social system's
given culture, holds merit. Yet there is a pressing need to reach a more accurate definition of what that
elusive cultural element of a social system is, and how it goes about constructing and lending meaning to
reality. The methodical strategy of assuming a pars pro toto relationship of only a few seminal authors
whose contributions represent the whole history of an idea falls short of capturing the intricate workings
of the cultural layer that I will call discourse below. Similarly, the translation literature hailing from an
institutionalist  background  that  updates  diffusion  scholarship  in  regard  to  fit  and  compatibility,
especially through emphasis on how the cultural variables condition translation via editing rules, lacks
clear  concepts  to  theoretically  and  methodically  capture  these  relationships  on  their  own.  These
shortcomings shall be remedied in this book, by extending the translation-framework of diffusion studies
with  a  clear  theoretical  strategy  of  delineating  a  social  system's  cultural  attributes,  as  found  in
organizational  institutionalism's  concept  of  the  organizational  field.  Finally,  by  understanding  the
cultural attributes as discourse, a methodical approach is developed that captures most of the dimensions
of a field's discourse. 
2.2) Idea Translation in Organizational Fields
Since the diffusion phenomenon of interest here resulted in organizational change, it makes sense to turn
towards organization theory for further elaborations on how organizational change processes operate and
what conditions organizational behavior. A few words on organizational institutionalism2 are necessary,
to underline how some of its core tenets enrich the theoretical framework of diffusion studies and to
sharpen the thrust of the analysis into the origins of early research laboratories. 
The question of what makes organizations act the way they do is front and center in this line of thought.
In  the  1970s,  organizations  were  “largely  portrayed  …  as  agentic  actors  responding  to  situational
circumstances” (Greenwood et al. 2008, 3) by frameworks such as resource-dependence theory, ecological
theory, and behavioral theories. From these perspectives, the executives of organizations decided – more
2 This strand of organizational thinking today goes by many names: sociological institutionalism (Hall & Taylor 1996), new 
(or neo) institutionalism (Brinton & Nee 1998), or organizational institutionalism (Greenwood et al. 2008). In the 
following, the term organizational institutionalism will be used.
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or less rationally – how to react to their environments, which were defined as their respective markets.
These assumptions were challenged by the foundational texts of organizational institutionalism (Meyer &
Rowan 1977; Zucker 1977; DiMaggio & Powell 1983; cf. Walgenbach & Meyer 2008, 22ff; Greenwood
et al. 2008, 3ff). With regard to institutional theory, it can be argued that organizational institutionalism
arose primarily from challenging the distinction between rationality and culture (Hall & Taylor 1996,
946;  Nee  1998).  While  other  institutionalisms,  such  as  historical  institutionalism,  focus  on  power
struggles  as  mediated  by institutions  present  in  political  and  economic  structures,  or  rational  choice
institutionalism,  which  assumes  rational  actors  whose  collective  action  problems  are  solved  by
institutions (Hall & Taylor 1996, 946; J. Campbell 1998), organizational institutionalism broke with a
focus on power and assumptions of rationality: “Anyone who has waited at a traffic light when no-one
else was around, however, has to admit that there are dimensions to the relationship between institutions
and actions that may not be highly instrumental or well-modelled by rational choice theories” (Hall &
Taylor 1996, 951). Instead, new institutionalist scholars point out how agency is always dependent on a
cultural repertoire of possible,  legitimate actions (cf.  Green & Li 2011, 1667) – a repertoire they call
institutions.  In  the  end,  the  goal  of  such  an  analysis  shifts  towards  understanding  how  institutions
condition organizational behavior not only in terms of “dos and don'ts”, e.g. by imposing sanctions, but
also by highlighting the ways in which the possibility of action and the organization itself are rendered
possible in the first place. What does this mean for my analysis of the origins of corporate R&D? It aids in
generating  a sensitivity  to the  contingency of  organizational  decision-making  beyond  assumptions  of
managerial strategy and rationality on the part of corporate leadership, most of whom required a lot of
convincing to actually establish laboratories. It also underlines the need to probe the institutions involved
– those elusive cultural variables that will be analyzed using the concept and methods of discourse – that
fill concepts such as the laboratory, research or corporate innovation with meaning. 
Of Organizational Fields and Institutions
As a first step towards circumscribing the reality that chemical corporations found themselves in at the
turn of the twentieth century when the first laboratories were established, some boundaries need to be
drawn since it would be foolish to attempt to include the totality of the social world in this analysis. I
expanded upon the diffusion framework by using an institutionalist lens because the organizational field
supplies  a  perspective  that  can offer  ways of  capturing an organization's  environment  beyond overly
simplistic notions such as sector or network. Moreover, it  also enables the drawing of clearer lines of
demarcation  around  the  early  corporations  that  were  establishing  research  laboratories,  and  more
precisely than assuming they are in a mutually-shared social system whose cultural variables condition
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their  decision-making.  With  the  organizational  field,  organizational  institutionalism  offers  a  well-
developed vocabulary to account for just these factors. What, then, is an organizational field? 
Organizational  fields  were  introduced  by  DiMaggio  and  Powell  (1983)  in  one  of  the  seminal
contributions of organizational institutionalism: 
By organizational field, we mean those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized 
area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and 
other organizations that produce similar services or products. (ibid., 148)
Several of the features introduced here are key in outlining organizational environments. As the authors
note, the existence of a field depends upon their institutional definition or “structuration,” consisting of
the interaction between organizations, patterns of domination or coalition, increased information loads,
as well as a mutual awareness between field members (ibid.). This means that for an organizational field to
exist, i.e. to be recognized, it is necessary for organizations to interact in various ways and to be aware of
these interactions. Scott further elaborates on this by noting how organizations within a field interact
more with each other than with organizations outside the field,  while sharing a “meaning system”, as
institutionally  legitimized  guides  for  action  and  reality  perception  (Scott  1995,  56;  cf.  Wooten  &
Hoffman 2008). 
DiMaggio  and  Powell's  concept,  and  its  later  extensions  by  other  authors,  allows  for  capturing
organizations'  environments  in  a  way  that  lies  transverse  to  other  such  attempts.  Instead  of  using
preconceived notions of industry (such as “the chemical industry”) or sectors organized around common
technologies or markets, and instead of letting competition be the structuring force (cf. Walgenbach &
Meyer 2008, 34), organizational fields account for the “totality of relevant actors” (DiMaggio & Powell
1983, 148), replacing geographical boundaries with cultural ones (cf. Scott 1994, 206). When looking at
the organizational  field of those firms that have established industrial  research laboratories,  the focus
shifts  beyond  just  firms  having  a  laboratory.  Now suppliers  of  raw materials  and  consumers  of  end
product  are  included,  while  the  agencies  imposing  regulations  upon  these  corporations  need  to  be
accounted for as well. And the notion of field goes even further, since those organizations supplying staff
and expertise  – such as  universities  and colleges,  scientific  and professional  societies,  or  independent
laboratories – form a recognized part of institutional life as well. 
A field's boundaries are not fixed but permeable – both analytically and empirically. Analytically, since, as
Sahlin-Andersson remarks, fields are “demarcated by the eye of the observer” (Sahlin-Andersson 1996,
73f),  and  their  borders  are  dependent  upon  research  interest  –  a  study  based  on  the  same  set  of
corporations  but  asking  the  question  of,  say,  tariff  legislation  impacts,  will  draw  wholly  different
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boundaries.  Fields  are  permeable  empirically,  as  Davis  and  Marquis  point  out,  as  the  “players  that
populate fields and the nature of their play can change over time” (Davis & Marquis 2005, 337). Their
review of field-based research emphasizes how the notion of organizational field can be especially helpful
when industries transform and their boundaries shift and change (ibid.).
Later work using organizational fields as units of analysis enriched the approach by composing fields as
not  simply  the  transactions  between  organizations,  reacting  to  criticism  of  organizational
institutionalism's difficulty in explaining endogenous change, i.e. change going beyond exogenous shocks
such as economic crises (cf. Walgenbach & Meyer 2008, 73ff). Hoffman (1999) in particular extended the
notion of field by centering organizational fields around issues, as “centers of debates” (ibid., 351) that
bring together a  variety of  field constituents  having wildly different stakes in the discussion,  thereby
making fields much more like arenas of struggle and change than in the original conception by DiMaggio
and  Powell  (cf.  Wooten  &  Hoffman  2008,  134f).  In  the  end,  understanding  the  field  of  R&D
laboratories as being organized around the issue of corporate innovation aids in capturing all possible
relevant actors and themes. Of course,  such considerations, as informed by the histories of the R&D
pioneers (see below) need to remain fragmentary for now since the contents and structure of a field have
to be investigated empirically, not a priori (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 148), making field assembly and the
charting of its elements and boundaries important parts of the analysis of the diffusion process at hand. 
Organizational institutionalism posits that within an organizational field there are not only organizations
that  interact  with each other  in certain,  patterned ways,  thereby yielding  a  social  structure,  but  also
institutions that essentially form the cultural variables identified by diffusion research as playing a large
part  in  successful  diffusion.  Yet,  looking  back  at  forty  years  of  theorizing  within  organizational
institutionalism, it  may seem surprising how its key concept, the institution, remained ill-defined and
fuzzy in early contributions. Later work remedied these shortcomings somewhat, allowing Greenwood et
al. to formulate an apt summary of what an institution is:
… more-or-less taken-for-granted repetitive social behaviour that is underpinned by normative 
systems and cognitive understandings that give meaning to social exchange and thus enable self-
reproducing social order. (Greenwood et al. 2008, 4f)
With this broad definition, institutions do not only include procedures and norms, but also cognitive
scripts and moral templates, providing frames of reference for meaningful action (Hall & Taylor 1996,
947). In contrast to the conception of institution as explicit rules or conventions, as found in historical
institutionalism, for sociologists, the world is full of institutions, ranging from “handshakes to marriages
to strategic-planning departments” (DiMaggio & Powell  1991,  9).  Institutions can thus be found on
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various levels. On the individual level, where they may take the form of handshakes; on the organizational,
as structural elements such as equal opportunity commissioners or practices such as accounting; on a field
level reflected in status hierarchies between occupations; or even on the societal level, such as the idea of
national sovereignty (Greenwood et al. 2008, 5). 
Institutions are purported to possess a certain durability – the power to stay and resist change or attempts
at modification – aiding in the reproduction of social behavior and reality definitions, i.e. situations are
understood in the same, shared way, and action follows along the same, expected lines. Moreover, out of a
rejection of any assumptions of rational-actor models, in this perspective institutions are no longer the
product  of  conscious  design  or  even  purposive,  instrumental  planning,  as  other  schools  of
institutionalism would argue (DiMaggio & Powell 1991, 8). This is where the oft-mentioned taken-for-
grantedness  comes  in  –  “We've  always  done  it  like  this!”  –  as  institutions  exist  in  shared  bodies  of
knowledge,  providing typologies  for actors  and scripts  for action (Berger & Luckmann 1967; Zucker
1977; Barley & Tolbert 1997; Walgenbach & Meyer 2008, 60f). But taken-for-grantedness goes further
than  being  a  result  of  the  sedimentation  of  repeated  action,  by  having  institutions  define  reality:
“Institutions influence behaviour not simply by specifying what one should do but also by specifying
what  one  can  imagine  oneself  doing  in  a  given  context”  (Hall  &  Taylor  1996,  948).  As  a  result,
organizational actorhood and the concept of rationality itself is a consequence of the institutional (and
with it, discursive) setup of the social world. 
From Institutions to Isomorphism
Where does the addition of the organizational field and its institutions to the theoretical repertoire leave
me in the quest to understand the origins of corporate R&D? In regard to the organizational field, it
outlines boundaries and gives a clear guide for a research strategy, while underscoring how important it is
to go beyond the confining laboratory walls of the R&D pioneers that will be discussed in detail below,
and towards their organizational environment. Supplanting the previously used variable of social system
with  the  organizational  field,  an  organization's  surroundings  are  elevated  from  passive  to  active  by
highlighting how “environments operate to enact [socially construct] organizations” (Scott 1994, 208).
Instead  of  scrutinizing  individual  laboratories  and  the  internal,  individual  decisions  that  led  to their
establishment and continued existence, this analysis turns outwards – because answering the question of
why chemical firms around 1900 chose to establish laboratories within their walls means understanding
these firms' organizational reality as being made up of not only competitors, suppliers, universities, and
inventors, but by notions – i.e. institutions – of proper corporate strategy, what a laboratory is, and so on.
While in historical scholarship (e.g. Carlson 1997; see also Chapter 3) the singular, heroic actor is often
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put front  and center,  making the seemingly large shift  in corporate innovation solely  the product of
individual action, here, the explanatory mechanism is shifted from an individual level towards a field-
level.  Empirical  scholarship  in  this  tradition  has  offered  various  ways  of  operationalizing  the
organizational  field in different settings (amongst  them similar  settings to the one analyzed here,  e.g.
Mody 2011, 2016, 2017; Hallonsten & Heinze 2015). 
By adding  the  concept  of  institution,  it  has  also  developed a  sensitivity  for  the  impact  of  field-level
mechanisms such as isomorphism. Institutional isomorphism, as the homogenization of organizational
structures, arises due to organizations reacting (or being made to react) in similar ways to environmental
conditions, i.e. what is happening in the organizational field (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 149). Generally,
three mechanisms producing isomorphic change are distinguished analytically: coercive isomorphism, the
forcing of organizations to change due to formal or informal rules; mimetic isomorphism as imitation due
to uncertainty; and normative isomorphism due to increasing professionalization in modern societies,
with professional values creating ideas of what is proper (ibid., 150ff; Mizruchi & Fein 1999; Walgenbach
&  Meyer  2008,  35ff;  Boxenbaum  & Jonsson 2008).  In  this  way,  organizations,  in  reacting  to  other
organizations who summarily form an organizational field, change according to field-level institutions
that circumscribe what is rational, proper or necessary. But organizational institutionalism's insights on
isomorphism serve not only to show the effect of a field's institutions upon organizational behavior, but
also to illustrate a key goal of said behavior as an answer to why organizations are influenced by the field at
all: the striving for legitimacy (cf. Deephouse 1996).
Previous scholarship shows how isomorphism and diffusion processes are related, such as Tolbert and
Zucker (1983),  who illustrated how the reasons for adoption in the diffusion of civil  service reforms
changed during the diffusion process, with later adoption being subject to isomorphic pressures, whereas
Greenwood et al.  (2008, 11f) noted how the mere diffusion of any idea or practice does not have to
signify isomorphism since the motivations for adoption can go beyond concerns for legitimacy. With the
entanglement of diffusion and isomorphism proving to be more complex than one might initially assume,
far be it from me to simply posit field-level effects resulting from the organizational quest for legitimacy as
the  answer  to  successful  diffusion.  Instead,  this  analysis  aims  for  a  more  subtle  illustration  and
understanding of isomorphism. 
In focus here are normative and mimetic isomorphism, since the third kind, coercive isomorphism, is
usually characterized as coercive measures applied by the state in the form of new laws and regulations. As
the history of the early research laboratories shows, regulation and state-level actors played no role in their
emergence beyond antitrust legislation. But,  as is  shown below, understanding the birth of the R&D
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laboratory  as  a  simple  and  direct  consequence  of  business  strategy  shaped  by  legislation,  misses  key
elements  in  its  formation.  Furthermore,  coercive  isomorphism  in  such  an  organizational  field  can,
historically, only be identified at a later date, arguably with the advent of the national science landscape
that took shape around World War II. So what about the other two types of isomorphism? Mimetic
isomorphism is a result of uncertainty, such as in situations of ambiguous goals or poorly-understood
technologies, leading to organizations modeling themselves “after similar organizations in their field that
they perceive to be more legitimate or successful” (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 152). Of course, this begets
the question of who – or what – is perceived as successful, and whether said success or legitimacy is an
organizational attribute, or instead constructed collectively. This holds true for normative isomorphism
as well, which is a product of increasing professionalization. The creation of a formal knowledge base, as
well  as  professional  networks,  lead  to  the  diffusion  of  professional  norms  that  even  go  beyond  the
attempts of the profession to define the boundaries and content of their work, and towards common
styles of dress, behavior, and vocabularies (ibid., 153; Walgenbach & Meyer 2008, 38). How these norms
arise and are communicated is itself a process of construction of what it means to be a professional, what
the role entails, and so on. Simply ascribing both processes of construction – who is successful and what
does it mean to be a professional – to the institutions of a field would fall short of the analytic goals of this
study,  which  is  why  institutional  isomorphism,  as  a  field-level  mechanism  guiding  the  behavior  of
organizations, shall be understood as mediated by discourse. In short, isomorphism can be understood as
the mechanism that translates the reality-setting aspect of institutions into the concrete demands made
upon organizations, namely the need to attain legitimacy in the eyes of others. What legitimacy entails –
what is perceived as legitimate – is dependent upon the organizational field's institutions, and, as I argue,
constructed collectively, which can be analyzed as the discursive construction of institutions. 
Before I proceed to what discourse is, it is imperative to outline where the link between institution and
discourse lies, and why such an understanding is pursued here. On the one hand, adding the notion of
institution to the theoretical ensemble has helped somewhat to clarify what the cultural attributes of
social  systems,  as  identified  by  diffusion  research,  may  be.  These  cultural  attributes  hone  the
understanding  of  what  happens  in  organizational  fields  as  well  as  just  how  much  of  organizational
behavior can be ascribed not to rationality, but to reactions to man-made institutions that have become
reified and taken for granted via institutional  effects such as  isomorphism. But the fundamental and
subsequently most important aspect of institutions is how they go beyond mere rules and constraints on
action and towards the definitions of reality itself – constructing what is possible and conceivable in the
first place. From this perspective, in order to understand the successful diffusion of the R&D laboratory
as a new organizational entity, simply looking into what concrete pressures and constraints influenced the
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decision-making is not enough. Rather, an understanding must be determined by looking at how research
was institutionally mediated, what a laboratory was to organizations of the time, who the professional
scientist claimed to be, and how these chemical corporations perceived their institutionally-delineated
fields of action. This brings me to the other hand: Even though the concept of institution aids in better
accounting for organizational behavior and reality, reconstructing precisely which institutions played a
role, where they came from, and how they were transformed in the first decades of the twentieth century
is a task for which organizational institutionalism offers little help. Even though decades of scholarship
was conducted on the ways that institutionalization and institutions work (as found in Scott's model of
the  three  pillars  supporting the  institutional  order,  cf.  Scott  1995),  and on institutional  change  (e.g.
Leblebici et al. 1991; Greenwood & Hinings 1996; Seo & Creed 2002; Tolbert et al. 2011), there is little
guidance on how to proceed methodically, due to the theoretical vagueness of the institution itself. Other
sociological schemes suggesting a similar relationship between the material and the ideational,  such as
Münch's semantic (2008), suffer from similar problems. Hence, this analysis sets out to contribute to the
ongoing  debates  in  institutionalism,  and  to  develop  a  new  way  of  operationalizing  institutions  and
making the more-or-less subtle ways that institutions delineate reality while causing field-level effects in
isomorphism visible for the case of the industrial research laboratory. To do this, I turn to a new concept:
discourse. 
2.3) Making the Case for Discourse
So far, the argument for how best to trace the diffusion of the industrial research laboratory has mostly
remained within conceptual lines. Now it is time to get closer to the subject matter by proposing a way of
analyzing  an  organizational  field's  institutions  that  manifest  in  isomorphic  pressures  –  by  way  of
discourse analysis. In organizational institutionalism, a multitude of methodologies have been used for
scrutinizing fields and institutions (cf. Greenwood et al. 2008). Combining the study of organizations
with conceptions of the nature of language use and reality is a relatively new way of attacking the problem
of institutional change (cf. Phillips & Malhotra 2008). Even though no clearly defined procedure exists,
mainly  due to the  many varieties  of  discourse,  the  concept  of  discourse  has  found fertile  ground in
organization theory in the last twenty years, producing a body of literature referred to as organizational
discourse analysis (ODA) (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000b; Hardy 2001; Phillips & Malhotra 2008). But
discourse has also found use in institutional scholarship called discursive institutionalism (cf. Schmidt
2008, Alasuutari 2015) and expressing similar ideas as ODA. However, it is less focused on organizations,
instead diving into the relationship between discourse and institutions. In the following, the questions of
what discourse is and why it makes sense to analyze institutions as discourse shall be answered, with a
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discourse analytic methodology, before taking the first steps towards an operationalization. 
What Discourse is, and What it is Not
Before delving into the details of discourse analysis  – which always incorporates theoretical ideas about
what discourse is – and what it does, the relationship between institutional and discourse theory needs to
be clarified. Why add another concept to the theoretical model of ideas being translated throughout an
organizational field? Does discourse add what institution currently lacks? 
The key argument for how adding discourse enhances the understanding of institutionalization can be
found in Phillips et al.  (2004). The authors emphasize that organizational institutionalism focuses too
much on institutions and too little on the actual actions involved in the process of institutionalization,
ignoring the cognitive foundations of institutions (cf. Phillips & Malhotra 2008). To remedy this, Phillips
et al. argue that institutions are, essentially, text-based entities (Phillips et al. 2004, 638). They illustrate
the  relationship  of  action  and  text  with  the  advent  of  the  multidivisional  form  adopted  by  US
corporations. Instead of witnessing the actual organizational restructuring “in action”, executives read
about it in books and magazines, heard stories about it, saw organizational charts, and consequently acted
upon them (ibid., 639). In this way, the multidivisional form came to be an institution (as a certain from
of organizing), not because of sedimentary, repeated action, but because of action that was materialized in
texts and thereby made iterable, transferable, and repeatable. What becomes relevant, then, is not “simple
imitation of an action by immediate observers” (ibid.), but the creation of supporting texts that make up
and are influenced by discourse. From the discursive perspective, institutions are understood as enacted
discourse, shaping action and, in turn, text-production, shifting focus from what is “doable” within an
institutional order, towards what is “sayable”, i.e. what can be put into text. This change of perspective is
the  key  contribution  of  ODA  to  an  institutionalist  research  program,  offering  the  possibility  to
understand institutions that are made up of collections of texts. Now the analysis of institutionalization
and organizational change becomes a question of discursive effects, i.e. which texts that are produced
stick, and why (Phillips et al. 2004, 640).
Bringing  text,  and  with  it  language,  to  the  center  of  institutional  analysis  and  emphasizing  the
constructive effects of language itself, are a consequence of the linguistic turn in the social sciences in
general, and in organizational studies in particular (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 12f; Deetz 2003). This breaks
with the assumption that language is a representation of reality, and posits against “a conventional view of
language as a transparent medium for the transport of meaning” (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000a, 141).
Instead, language is now seen as ambiguous, context-dependent, repressing hidden meanings, and built
upon  unsure  foundations  in  general  (ibid.).  In  rejecting  the  so-called  language-as-mirror  logic  (ibid.,
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138f), the constructive effects of language come into focus: “It constructs reality in the sense that every
instance of language use is to some extent arbitrary and produces a particular version of what is it [ sic]
supposed to represent“ (ibid., 142). If language does not represent reality, but constructs it in the first
place,  then what becomes important is  to analyze how this happens: how exactly a certain version of
reality  is  made  by  language,  manifested  in  texts,  who  is  involved,  and  how  competing  realities  are
excluded. This is explicitly pointed out by Deetz, who laments that the linguistic turn in organizational
analysis often shifted attention from language being the mirror of nature and towards merely analyzing
said mirror as an object, scrutinizing “texts and talking rather than looking through discourse to see the
specific ways the world is produced.” (Deetz 2003, 425). This involves analyzing how actors draw on and
transform  discourses  which  constitute  a  specific  social  reality,  as  well  as  analyzing  how  meaning  is
negotiated, made intelligible, or ruled out (Grant & Marshak 2011, 207f). 
What is the relationship, then, between discourse and institutions, and what does this conceptual shift
add? Institutions are made up of action condensed in texts, i.e. in language, and language is not merely a
representation of said action, but always puts the action in a certain context, and constructs a certain
reality in the process. The bodies of texts making up an institution are called discourse. Consequently,
discourse is not an intermediary concept, lying “between” the actors in the organizational field and the
institutions, but rather a way of conceptualizing what institutions are made up of – texts – and how they
exert  their  pressures  and  reality-building  effects:  by  delimiting  what  is  sayable,  and,  at  its  core,
determining  what  things  are in  the  first  place.  First,  discourse  analysis  offers  a  sensible  framework,
especially since the act of translation is often a textual practice, and second, a pragmatic avenue of inquiry
had to be chosen in order to analyze a diffusion process that took place more than one hundred years in
the past – a process that is not observable anymore, but one that can be read about. 
Having illustrated at what point discourse enters the institutional framework, this heavy emphasis on text
and textual practices finally brings us to exactly what discourse is. Similar to discourse analysis'  many
meanings (Alvesson & Kärreman 2000b,  1127),  discourse itself  is  a  concept that  offers  a  plethora of
definitions, often differing according to each theoretical perspective and intended use. The approach to
discourse  developed  here  ultimately  dates  back  to  Foucault's  historical  analyses  (1981),  in  which  he
advanced the idea that language constructs the social world, giving rise to certain subjectivities and social
practices  (cf.  Alvesson  &  Kärreman  2000b,  1127f).  Building  upon  this  foundation,  ODA  takes
inspiration from Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) in the way discourse and its effects are defined (cf.
Fairclough 1992; Wodak & Meyer 2001; Wodak 2011).3 Even though ODA does not share CDA's strong
3 Of course, as is often the case in discourse analysis, CDA cannot be seen as one conjoint method of operationalizing 
discourse. Studies identified as CDA often share an interest in power struggles and the constructive effects of discourse, 
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focus on relations of power and how control is exerted discursively, the inspirations taken from CDA's
approach have served to include the social context, going beyond the discursive realm and managing to
mold discourse into a multi-dimensional concept. 
ODA  defines  discourse  as  “an  interrelated  set  of  texts,  and  the  practices  of  their  production,
dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being” (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 3). This sentence
contains all  relevant ingredients encapsulating what discourse is  about. First,  discourse is  made up of
multiple texts. Coming from a perspective heavily influenced by French post-structuralism, a broad view
on what “text” means is taken. Hence, text not only refers to the written word, but also contains speech
acts,  pictures,  artifacts,  or symbols (Phillips  & Hardy 2002,  4; Grant & Marshak 2011, 208).  Yet,  to
become  texts,  anything  written or  said  must  be  inscribed,  taking  on a  material  form and  making  it
accessible and transferable beyond the immediate situation (Phillips et al. 2004, 636; cf. Fairclough 1992;
Chalaby 1996). But a text as the basic discursive unit is not meaningful itself, instead discourse refers to
interrelated, structured sets of texts. This means that texts need to be seen, heard, or read to become
meaningful, and that they need to relate to each other in some way – be it by describing a shared topic,
drawing upon the same discourses, explicitly referencing each other, or their conditions of production
and reception (Phillips et al. 2004, 636).4 Thus, discourses are neither random collections of texts, nor
diary entries or other invisible texts. 
Second, texts always need to be situated within their context: “Discourse is not just ideas or 'text' (what is
said) but also context (where, when, how, and why it was said)” (Schmidt 2008, 305). Context comes into
play in several forms. Especially in regard to practices of production, dissemination, and reception, texts
need to be situated within their temporal, historical, and social contexts (Grant & Marshak 2011, 208; cf.
Chalaby 1996, 688ff; Van Dijk 1997). Fairclough (1992, 71ff; 73, fig. 3.1) elaborates on this, noting how
both discursive and social practices influence the production and reception of texts. Discursive context
means not only the necessity of analyzing how texts relate to discourses and each other (cf. Wodak 2001),
but also how discourses influence the form and content texts can take, by shaping “what can be said and
who can say  it”  (Grant  & Marshak 2011,  208).  Obviously,  there  is  a  multitude of  actors  within  an
organizational field, structured by both status and communication. Thus, it matters who says what, i.e.
produces certain texts, since actors have different means of making themselves heard. Phillips et al. (2004,
643) characterize this as positions warranting “voice”, legitimate speakers who can make their texts “stick”
via  resources,  coercive  means,  or  by  being  centrally  positioned  in  an  organizational  field.  Examples
while varying in their approach to textual analysis (Machin & Mayr 2012; cf. also Phillips & Hardy 2002, 25f). 
4 As Chalaby (1996, 689) remarks, in a sociological definition of discourse texts become interrelated due to extra-discursive 
reasons (contrary to Foucault's conception), emphasizing the need to include external (social) conditions of production 
when speaking of interrelated texts, e.g. by accounting for speaker or field as a possible means of relation between texts.
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include experts who are perceived to have authority over a certain topic, such as a psychologist on the
topic of sanity (cf. Munir & Phillips 2005, 1668), which gives them “voice”. Large, wealthy corporations
have the means to make texts stick due to the power they exert over suppliers and competitors, while
being highly visible and possible targets for mimesis. Furthermore, texts need not only be related to actors
and their respective relationships, but also to events shaping what is being talked about, as well as field-
level institutions conditioning the ways texts are produced. In this way, a collection of texts making up a
discourse  always  needs  to  be  understood  within  this  three-dimensional  conception  of  discourse,  i.e.
within a textual, a discursive, and a social dimension (Fairclough 1992, 73; Phillips & Hardy 2002, 4). 
Third, discourses bring objects into being. Due to discourse theory's inherent assumptions about the
nature of language,  discourses  are not  of interest  because they are somewhat structured sets  of texts,
produced by various actors in differing situations; they are interesting due to their constructive effects –
discourses are not just a certain thing, they do something as well. The concise definition from Phillips and
Hardy only mentions objects, but discourse also constructs ideas and identities (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 4;
Grant & Marshak 2011, 208; cf. Potter & Wetherell 1987; Fairclough 1992), in the end constructing
reality itself, “giving it meanings that generate particular experiences and practices” (Phillips et al. 2004,
636).  Hardy  et  al.  (2005,  60)  give  several  examples  of  the  constructive  effects  of  discourse,  such  as
managerial  discourse  creating  ideas  like  “strategic  planning”  shaping  business  practices,  whereas  the
Western discourse on AIDS constructed the actor of the “patient-activist”, in addition to, of course, the
patient, or specific iterations of concepts such as health, sickness, etc. (cf. Phillips & Hardy 2002, 50f).
Hardy argues that concepts such as “the organization” are discursively shaped, “by fixing their identity so
that it becomes possible to talk about them as if they were naturally existing social entities” (Hardy 2001,
28, emphasis in original). Even material objects are made meaningful through discourse itself. The goal of
discourse analysis, then, is to make visible the various ways in which reality is produced. Ideas, concepts,
and things  are  constructed  and  made  meaningful  in  practices  of  text  production,  and  are  translated
according to discursive, i.e. institutional, editing rules, ruling in and out not only action, but also speech. 
Fourth, and last, discourse cannot be studied directly. Instead, “they can only be explored examining the
texts that constitute them” (Phillips et al. 2004, 636). The text as basic discursive unit also serves as its
material  manifestation  (Chalaby  1996,  688).  Heracleous  and  Barrett  circumscribe  the  relationship
between text and discourse as akin to that of action and structure: “Just as the structural properties of
social systems are, according to Giddens, instantiated as social practices, so the structural properties of
discourse are instantiated in daily communicative actions” (Heracleous & Barrett 2001, 758). This means
that, while discourse is manifested in individual texts, it also exists beyond these texts, with each text being
a trace of  one or  several  discourses.  The methodological  implication follows that  analyzing discourse
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means  systematically  studying  multiple  texts  to  understand  the  ways  in  which  discourses  construct
meaning and, accordingly, reality. 
After defining precisely what is meant by discourse, some cautious notes are necessarty to limit the notion
and show when discursive effects do not apply – what discourse is not. Alvesson and Kärreman (2000a,
2000b, 2011a, 2011b) caution against a definition of discourse that is either too vague or too muscular.
Reviewing recent work in ODA, they lament that many authors ground their works on a very loosely-
defined concept of discourse: “'blow the concept up, use it ambiguously to say everything and nothing'
sometimes appears to be the guideline” (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a, 1195). This deteriorates discourse
into a re-labelling of existing concepts such as culture and ideology, at times “capturing almost the entire
sphere of the social and cultural” (ibid.). Thankfully, such a pitfall can be avoided by clearly defining the
concept, as was done above, and by locating it within clear theoretical boundaries – in my case discourse
as textual expressions of institutions. In this way, discourse as a theoretical concept (and as a method) can
be  combined  with  the  conceptual  arsenal  of  organizational  institutionalism  and  several  of  its  well-
developed notions such as the organizational field. Here, discourse is not “everything social”, but sets of
textual materialization of actions that are shaped by discursively constructed institutions. Furthermore,
the fact that discourses do things (construct reality) needs to be investigated, and not posited as a starting
point of an analysis that then goes on to explain everything by way of discourse (Alvesson & Kärreman
2011a, 1199; Iedema 2011).  Alvesson and Kärreman advise against this by emphasizing how taking a
discourse's power (what they call “muscularity”) for granted may lead to an “inclination to overplay the
discourse card (explaining everything) rather than to use the concept to explore (the limitations of) its
constitutive powers” (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011b, 1133). Elucidating the junctures of discourse and
practice, i.e. text-production in an area of conflict over what is sayable and what is not, should be the goal
of any serious work utilizing the concept of discourse. 
In the end, it helps to ask “how”-questions in order to avoid letting discourse become the be-all and end-
all  of  sociological  explanations.  How did  action  captured  in  texts  produced  by  organizations  in  the
contested field of US chemistry contribute to any overarching discourses, e.g. on corporate innovation?
How and why did the ideas or objects constructed by these texts garner staying power? How was the idea
of an industrial research laboratory – the “text” of interest to this study – translated not only by those
spreading it from corporation to corporation, but also by discursive institutions setting expectations and
limits to the editing of an idea? These questions are reformulations of the original questions – how do
ideas  spread,  and  specifically  how  did  the  idea  of  corporate  R&D  laboratories  spread  –  within  the
proposed  theoretical  model  of  idea  translation  in  organizational  fields.  In  the  following,  some
operationalizations are necessary, to figure out a good place to start finding answers. 
25
Towards an Operationalization of Discourse
Similar to the many definitions of discourse, many different approaches to actually analyzing discourse
exist, informed by theoretical perspective and methodical toolbox, leading to a large variety of research
that calls itself discourse analysis, yet often with few common features (cf. Potter & Wetherell 1987; van
Dijk 1997; Keller et al. 2010). Even within ODA, as a loose set of scholarship focused on the effects of
discourse on organizations and organizing, there is no shared procedure with regard to operationalizing
discourse and assembling a corpus of texts for analysis (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011b). This is due to the
fuzziness of discourse as a concept, but also the many different ways of approaching textual data, ranging
from  genre  to  narrative  analysis,  and  from  linguistics  to  ethnography  (Phillips  &  Hardy  2002,  9).
Furthermore, the best way to analyze texts is often highly dependent upon the types of texts – be they
archival  records,  interviews,  novels,  or cartoons – as  well  as  the research question guiding the whole
inquiry, and the nature of the organizational field in which the discourse of interest is materialized. That
is to say, there is no clear sequence of discursive methodology to follow, and many of the decisions on
how to analyze the discourse in question can only be answered once the organizational field and the
nature of text and text-producing entities are known. As such, the goal of this chapter was to introduce
discourse as a theoretical concept at the intersection of diffusion and institutionalization, and now it is to
break the concept down in a way that is meaningful to the research question. The actual, hard work of
assembling a corpus and developing a schema for analysis can only be done after more is known about the
history of the early R&D laboratories, and this will be thoroughly described in Chapter 5. 
A first  step towards  an operationalization is  to locate the question of  the  diffusion of  the industrial
research laboratory within the usual range of discourse analysis, as captured in the schema discussed by
Phillips and Hardy (2002, 18). They propose that, at the beginning, researchers doing discourse analysis
need  to  decide  whether  they  are  more  interested  in  questions  of  power  or  social  construction,  and
whether they want to focus more on individual texts or the surrounding context. Studies putting the
central emphasis on individual texts will often favor linguistic microanalyses of a few texts, whereas those
focusing on context  will  highlight  the  way social  and other  conditions  of  production and reception
influence texts. The difference between a constructivist and a critical approach boils down to whether the
analysis is more interested in the constructive effects of discourse leading to the creation and reification of
ideas and objects (Hardy 2004, 416), or in the use of power as made possible by language, as akin to
Foucault's work. 
What  does  this  mean  for  this  analysis?  An  idea  traveled  through  an  organizational  field,  the  R&D
laboratory was translated into varying contexts, and became normalized as an expected prerequisite in
corporate innovation. Obviously, an interest in the discursive construction of reality lies at the heart of
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these questions. Even though they could be framed as questions regarding power – the power of large
corporations, the power of groups vying over epistemic authority – ultimately, the constructionist pole
predominates, since in this diffusion process we are less interested in specific situations where power was
exerted, and more in how an idea came to be materialized and changed due to its surrounding discursive
context. Within this choice of constructivism over critique lies a preference for context over text, given
both by research interest and theoretical framework. Research interest is geared towards understanding
how ideas spread and become institutionalized, a process that can only be understood within its context.
The  theoretical  framework  of  combining  basic  assumptions  from  diffusion  research  with  concrete
notions  from  organizational  theory  in  order  to  get  a  clear  delineation  of  a  social  system  –  an
organizational field – and what is in it – institutions that are products of action-as-text – also offers the
means to provide the three-dimensionality that Fairclough (1992, 73) demands. While microanalyses of
select texts may offer clues of how the concept was translated, in the end it is the overarching, grander
discourses around the turn of the nineteenth century5 that are assumed to have influenced how the idea
of a corporate laboratory was made resonant. These discourses need to be identified analytically.
Due to the  constructive  orientation,  the way that  social  reality  is  generated by discourse  is  in focus.
Following Fairclough (1992) and Phillips and Hardy (2002) to break construction further down, it is
useful to distinguish between three types of entities constituted by discourse: concepts, objects, and subject
positions. Concepts are “culturally and historically situated frames for understanding social reality – ideas,
categories and theories through which we understand the world” (Maguire & Hardy 2006, 13). Munir
and Phillips (2005, 1168) give the example of “endangered species” as a concept – the idea that an animal
or a population of animals can be in danger due to poaching or environmental changes. Other examples
would include managerial strategies, such as Total Quality Management, as ideas about how to lead and
organize work and communicative relations between members of an organization. Thus, concepts reside
“in the ideal” (ibid.) and refer to sensemaking and ways of making reality meaningful. Objects, in turn, are
things that are made meaningful only through concepts. They have an “independent physical or material
existence” (Maguire & Hardy 2006, 13), such as – with reference to the example of endangered species – a
Snow Leopard. Far be it from discourse theory to negate a leopard's existence in a material way, but, by
constructing it as endangered, the Snow Leopard becomes an object – the materialization of a concept.
Of course, many different objectifications of leopards are possible, and while becoming an object may
influence  a  Snow  Leopard's  reality  (e.g.  due  to  bans  on  hunting,  etc.),  its  existence  is  in  no  way
5 At this point, it needs to remain an assumption what discourse(s) played a role in the diffusion of the industrial research 
laboratory in Gilded Age America. Simply presuming that any discourse (e.g. on corporate innovation, on business 
practices, on science, …) was relevant would risk the pitfall of ascribing too much muscularity to discourse, instead of 
finding out which discourses were important, and in what way. 
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presupposed by discourse. Similarly, managerial practices are objectified in charts, plans, guidelines,  or
presentations. The main difference between concepts and objects is the material aspect of objects.
Lastly,  subject  positions  are  “locations  in  social  space  from  which  more  or  less  well-defined  agents
produce certain kinds of texts in certain ways” (Munir & Phillips 2005, 1668). The example cited here is a
psychiatrist certifying someone as insane – producing a special kind of text (a diagnosis), which is only
possible due to the position inhabited by the psychiatrist. In a related vein, one needs a certain place in
social structure – what sociology would call a role – to decide and communicate that Snow Leopards are
endangered. Subject positions thus enable actors to produce texts in a legitimate way, while also being
effects of discourse themselves, which means that who is a legitimate speaker on what topic is discursively
constructed in the first place by attributing authority or expertise. 
These three features fit well within the framework of discursive institutionalization presented by Phillips
et al. (2004) and the surrounding institutionalist ideas presented above, offering positions for actors that
have “voice” and are able to make texts “stick”, without denying material reality and making everything
discursive. Additionally, they serve as anchoring points for the two kinds of isomorphism of relevance
here, with concepts and objects offering an avenue into what the organizational reality was made up of,
and what could be perceived as legitimizing practices, e.g. predominant concepts about business strategy,
or materializations of such concepts in the ways organizational structures were realized. Subject positions
can show how professional identity and its respective domain were constructed and subsequently carried
into organizations in the first place. Moreover, capturing discourse along these lines offers clear guides for
handling texts  in individual analysis,  while also making it  possible  to relate the findings to the larger
framework of the translation of an idea and the subsequent production of institutions – How was the
concept of the industrial research laboratory constructed, materialized in an object, and by whom?
2.4) The Gist of It
Let me now review the theoretical elements presented so far, in order to outline the next steps taken in
analyzing the discourse surrounding early US industrial research laboratories. From cursory reading, we
know that  the  practice of  establishing research laboratories  in US corporations  started around 1900,
mainly in the chemical and electrical industries. The organizational entity that came to be known as the
R&D laboratory then spread rapidly throughout these and other industries. Thus, we have an instance of
the diffusion of an innovation: a new element of the modern corporation made its way through many
sectors of the American economy. From the long history of diffusion research we know that it is not
necessarily  innovativeness,  efficiency,  or  relative  advantage  that  makes  actors  adopt  a  spreading  idea.
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While the perceived attributes of an innovation – if it may even be called that – do certainly play a part in
the process of diffusion, what came to be known as the cultural variables of the social system need not be
missed. In other words, the surrounding social as well as cultural structures heavily condition successful
diffusion: for ideas, practices, and things to travel successfully, they need to fit with established norms,
values,  and  predominant  cultural  models.  Furthermore,  “fit”  is  not  fixed,  as  later  scholarship  on
translation emphasized – ideas change and are changed in the process of their diffusion, and are made to
fit, or translated, into a variety of new contexts. Thus, in order to understand how the industrial research
laboratory came to be translated successfully, the research question needs to be reformulated towards an
analysis of the social system surrounding the corporations who established such laboratories. 
In a second step, a vocabulary for delimiting the social system and understanding how it would and could
affect  organizations  was  needed,  hence  the  turn  to  organizational  institutionalism.  With  the
organizational  field,  this  perspective  on  organizations  offers  the  ability  to  capture  the  corporations
establishing  laboratories  beyond  the  crude  or  imprecise  assemblages  such  as  an  industry  or  a  sector.
Instead, the field surrounding these corporations is composed of all relevant organizations, from suppliers
to vendors, from universities to regulatory agencies, from testing laboratories to independent inventors;
all  centered  around  the  issue  of  corporate  innovation  –  how  to  improve  existing  products,  to  stay
competitive? But organizational  fields are more than a mere assembly of actors,  they are also host  to
institutions.  With  the  conception  of  institution  as  cognitive  scripts  and  normative  understandings,
resulting not only in repeated, taken-for-granted actions, but also in conditioning an understanding of
agency  and  reality  itself,  organizational  institutionalism  offers  clues  as  to  what  drives  organizational
decision-making in a field. Three types of isomorphism – coercive, normative, and mimetic – are the
mechanisms  in  which  institutional  reality-setting  manifests  concretely  in  organizational  practice.
Organizational  institutionalism thus  offers  tools  for  circumscribing  the  field  around  the  early  R&D
laboratories without resorting to vague, undertheorized concepts that hamstring diffusion studies and
other approaches utilizing similar understandings of the material and the ideational.
Of course, this formulation of institution and its connection back to the field through the isomorphic
mechanism is lacking in clarity, which is why, in a third step, discourse was introduced for analyzing the
empirical  expressions  of  a  field's  institutions  that  drive  isomorphism.  Since  institutions  arise  from
repeated action, and the aforementioned action is seldom observed, what is relevant, then, are recordings
of these actions in texts, e.g. in rules, plans, or reports. Discourses, as sets of interrelated texts, constitute
reality and shape what is  sayable and, subsequently,  doable.  Thus, acts of text-production within the
organizational field need to be scrutinized in order to understand how the industrial research laboratory
was talked about, how it was translated, and what exactly it was made fit to – what bridges of resonance
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were built.  In a  first  attempt at  operationalizing discourse,  emphasis was put on what concepts  were
involved in legitimizing the laboratory and how the  laboratory  itself  was conceptualized,  how it  was
materialized in objects, and what subjects were involved and constructed in the process of its diffusion.
With these three categories, isomorphism can be grasped more clearly, since they illustrate what – and
who – is  sayable and doable and subsequently perceived as  legitimate,  while  the way these concepts,
objects, and subject positions are constructed in individual discursive texts and made to fit shows the role
of fit and appropriateness with existing institutions of an organizational field.
The individual steps of the research program follow from these conceptual developments. Chapter 3 will
disassemble the existing history of R&D laboratories in the United States by charting their growth and
then diving into the histories of the so-called research pioneers: General Electric, Du Pont, AT&T, and
Eastman Kodak. The histories of their individual laboratories will serve to assemble a first collection of
organizations, events, and individuals involved in the emergence and spread of research laboratories, as
well as to scrutinize the theoretical hints that can be learned from the four pioneers. One key aspect from
these stories is the role that the emerging idea of “science” plays in American society of the time, with
scientific disciplines gradually professionalizing and imprinting their promises and feats within the public
consciousness, and with it – presumably – discourse. Thus, focus is laid on what ideas of science and the
scientist were present in the field, i.e. what science means to organizations that establish a laboratory and
how the institution of “science” impacts this process of organizational change. The assembled collection
of organizations is utilized to further outline the organizational field in Chapter 4. It was chosen mainly
to focus on chemical corporations for reasons that will be discussed below. Charting the organizational
field involves analyzing US chemistry in academia, business, and politics. Armed with a clear delineation
of the field and its relevant actors, events, and themes as compiled in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 will serve to
further  the  operationalization  of  discourse  by  showing  how the  field's  actors  were  transformed  into
speakers, how access to the texts they produced can be gathered, and how a strategy for analyzing these
texts  –  and  with  it,  the  discourse  –  was  formed.  Chapter  6,  then,  will  illustrate  the  analysis  of  the
discourse on science in the organizational field surrounding the early corporate laboratories, spanning
roughly  thirty  years.  Breaking  the  discourse  down  into  concepts,  objects,  and  subject  positions,  the
analysis will show which conceptions of science, research, the laboratory, the scientist, and the chemist
predominated, and how they changed and were translated over time to fit  new business contexts and
societal challenges such as World War I. Lastly, Chapter 7 will offer a summation of results, bringing
them back into the fold of diffusion theory to see how the story of the industrial research laboratory is
enriched by an institutionalist, discourse-centric approach. Furthermore, the results will be discussed in
the  larger  context  of  theory  building,  discourse  analysis  as  a  method,  and  historical  and  sociological
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research in general. 
3) The Innovation: Industrial Research Laboratory
3.1) Where It Originated From
The second half of the nineteenth century saw great transformations within American society – and it
was  this  environment that  housed the  corporations that  first  invested in research laboratories.  These
specific  configurations of  firms with their  environment,  which formed important factors  in bringing
about research laboratories in industry, need to be scrutinized. Several facets are of key importance: the
emergence  of  the  large,  fully  integrated,  multi-divisional  corporation,  how  these  corporations  were
impacted by the legislative environment, and the expansion of higher education and professionalization
in science.
The seeds for the birth of the giant corporation were laid in the dramatic expansion towards the west
coast of the American continent, which necessitated both transportation and communications that could
bridge an entire continent. Soon, railroads and the telegraph emerged as answers to these challenges (A.
Chandler 1965; Israel 1992). While the Colonial Era saw enterprises hampered by transportation and
communication problems, which kept them small in size, the post-Civil War Era saw the rise of large-scale
organization fueled by societal and technological changes (Galambos 1975, 6ff), and it was this Second
Industrial Revolution that in turn lead to the Gilded Age. As a result, corporations could now serve a
rapidly expanding nationwide market.  Concurrently with market growth, society became increasingly
urbanized, which advanced the shift from an agrarian economy towards a manufacturing one, that was
characterized  by  mass  production  (A.  Chandler  1959,  2ff).  This  new  setting  imposed  itself  on  the
organization of  businesses  and led to increasing bureaucratization,  specialization,  the development of
managerial hierarchies and the multi-unit enterprise, which eventually resulted in what is known today as
the  large,  vertically  integrated  corporation  that  Chandler  scrutinized  in-depth  (A.  Chandler  1977;
Galambos 1984, 472ff). Thus, most organizational characteristics associated with large-scape enterprise
were in existence by the 1880s (Galambos 1975, 6). With the merger movement of the 1890s and the early
years of the twentieth century (Lamoreaux 1985; A. Chandler 1977, 331ff),  the markets saw another
shakeup: Caused by mass-production, rapid growth since 1877, and the ensuing depression of 1893, a
wave of consolidations followed to combat sinking prices. These newly consolidated firms had a strong
grip on their  respective industries,  resulting in oligopolistic  market structures.  The merger movement
shows how economic changes were not the only factor creating the specific scenario in which corporate
R&D was born (cf. Lamoreaux 2003). The wave of mergers from 1895-1904 can be seen as a result of the
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passing of the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890, illustrating the need to include the legislative context of
business. 
In this context,  two areas are of prime importance: antitrust and patents.  Prior to the passing of the
Sherman Act, corporations were colluding, fixing prices, and using cartels or other forms of combinations
and market sharing agreements to come out ahead of competition. After Sherman, with their previous
business strategies being outlawed, firms merged horizontally. Combining into “single, legally defined
enterprises”  (A.  Chandler  1977,  333)  was  the  only  possibility  for  avoiding  prosecution and  keeping
control of markets.  As Mowery (1995, 157) points out,  US firms found themselves in a unique legal
environment, which strongly influenced business strategies (see also Freyer 1995). The development of a
system of intellectual property protection was the other area in the legal framework that can be seen as an
important factor characterizing the environment of the first R&D laboratories. The US patent system
initially only allowed the assignment of a patent to an individual, who subsequently could sell or license
their patent rights to a corporation, a practice that came to be increasingly widespread with the end of the
nineteenth century (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff 1999, 22; Noble 1974, 133; see also Fisk 2009, 75ff for the
gradual evolution of invention from individual towards corporate property). In addition, a strong system
of patent protection lead to the creation of a market for technology with its own organizations, such as
patent agencies and specialized trade journals tasked with the diffusion of new technological knowledge
(Lamoreaux & Sokoloff 1999, 22ff). As Noble (1974, 133f) points out, while the earliest patent pooling
agreement was in place by 1856, patents only became a key element in business strategies at the turn of
the century. 
Changes in legislation influenced not only the world of business, but also another rapidly emerging and
transforming sector of American society: higher education and science. With the passing of the Morril
Act in 1862, federal lands were given to states offering study programs in agriculture, home economics,
and the mechanical arts,  the latter usually interpreted as engineering (Rosenberg & Nelson 1996, 89;
Reynolds 1991a, 21; R. Bruce 1987, 330; Cohen & Kisker 2010, 105ff; see also Geiger 1998). These new
agricultural schools came to be known as “land-grant universities”, further strengthened by the Hatch
Act of 1887, in which federal money was given to establish agricultural experiment stations, which were
usually  tied  to  the  land-grant  colleges.  This  illustrates,  on  the  one  hand,  an  increase  in  the  federal
patronage  of  knowledge-production,  as  further  exemplified  by  the  1863  creation  of  the  National
Academy  of  Sciences  (Kevles  2013).  And,  on  the  other,  it  shows  how  knowledge-production  was
pragmatic and application-driven, as these newly minted universities were to apply their expertise to the
needs of the community (Rosenberg 1976, 150ff). Furthermore, it served to strengthen the position of
the emerging universities in the system of American higher education, as the land-grant colleges turned to
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universities for scientists.
Indeed, the fundamental transformation in American education from 1850 onwards proved to be the
ascent of the university to a position of dominance in regard to the production and diffusion of scientific
and technical knowledge, made especially evident by the establishment of graduate programs and the
subsequent increase in graduate- and PhD-level scientists (R. Bruce 1972, 88f; Kohler 1990). While prior
to 1860 the “learned world” lacked distinct organizational features and most intellectual life took place
outside of universities (Shils 1979, 21), the land grants soon shook up the landscape, and not just directly
through  funding  the  founding  of  universities,  (agricultural)  colleges,  or  technological  schools.  Their
effects reached beyond that, with private funds further intensifying the “boost” (Cohen & Kisker 2010,
115; R. Bruce 1987, 330) and many universities being established in the years to follow, such as Johns
Hopkins  (1876),  Clark  University  (1887),  and the  University  of  Chicago (1890).  As  a  consequence,
traditional, long-established liberal arts colleges such as Yale, Harvard, Dartmouth, and Princeton could
not ignore the move towards science and technology fueled by the new agricultural colleges,  in turn
adding programs of their  own in the natural  sciences (Bartlett  1941, 485;  Jewett  2012, 28ff;  see also
Brubacher & Rudy 2008, 143ff on the early universities and the transformations of older colleges). 
Simultaneously,  engineering  education  aggressively  expanded,  and  this  academic  variant  ultimately
triumphed over the apprenticeship-type system of training new engineers (Reynolds 1991a, 22). Over
time, universities began combining teaching and research into a dual function. Originally their purpose
was  mainly  pedagogical,  with the  teaching function differentiating the university  from other  learned
organizations of the time (H. Hawkins 1979, 288). The formation of combined teaching and research is a
highly complex topic, as its emergence depended on a variety of factors such as the return of graduate-
level scientists from Germany, who experienced the German culture of conducting research at universities
and stipulated changes towards a similar mission for their American counterparts (Dennis 1987, 493ff; cf.
Kohler 1990), as well as the fight for the hegemony of ideals of pure science. At the end of the nineteenth
century there stood the unquestioned dominion of the university as the producer of knowledge and the
organizational home of the scientist, as universities had effectively become a synonym for science in the
public  eye  (Shils  1979,  32).  At  the  same  time,  science  itself  became  popularized  through  popular
magazines such as Scientific American and similar periodicals (Bensaude-Vincent 1997, 320ff). 
Within  the  universities,  science  as  well  as  engineering  grew  increasingly  specialized,  as  new
(sub-)disciplines led to the establishment of new study programs (cf. Galambos 1979, 269). While around
1850 the earth sciences – such as geology or mineralogy – dominated, the next decades saw enrollment
and graduates in the natural sciences – e.g. physics and chemistry – expand dramatically, eclipsing the
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earth sciences by the 1880s (R. Bruce 1972, 69, see also tables 2, 3). Moreover, networks of scholarly
communications  and  the  institutional  structure  of  science  grew  in  size  and  differentiation,  the  late
nineteenth century seeing a high number of scientific societies founded and scientific journals publishing
their first issues (Shils 1979, 40; Bates 1945, 28ff). Professional organizations were established not only in
science but also in engineering and the American society as a whole, illustrating an increase of professional
consciousness and fragmentation into specialized groups (Rae 1979, 252; Galambos 1975, 8; Galambos
2010; R. Bruce 1972, 91ff). Ultimately, the years from 1850 to 1900 saw the expansion of science as an
institution, the advent of the science-based university, and the professionalization of the scientist and the
engineer  (Owens 1997).  For  the first  time in American history,  the university  produced a surplus of
graduates,  not  all  of  whom could  be  absorbed  into  the  expanding  system of  higher  education,  thus
leading to a large number of highly trained scientists that were available for work in industry. 
To  conclude  this  brief  foray  into  the  transformations  of  the  Gilded  Age  society,  one  last  question
remains: What kind of relationship existed between academia and industry, if at all? Evidence for these
interrelations is anecdotal and cursory at best, with many of the same names being echoed throughout the
historical literature, such as Samuel L. Dana, who seems to have been employed as a company chemist in a
textile mill where he worked on improvements in the bleaching process as early as 1834 (K. Taylor 1976,
273), or the chemist C. B. Dudley, who in 1876 seems to have been the first chemist employed by the
Pennsylvania Railroad (K. Taylor 1976, 273; Hounshell 1996, 17). Other firms appear to have employed
chemists or other scientists, such as Carnegie & Company in the steel industry (Bartlett 1941, 492ff). It is
generally  assumed that  these scientists  were tasked with routine analyses,  standardization,  and similar
occupations (Wise 1997, 220; Hounshell 1996, 18), whereas product development and improvement at
this time seems to have been the province of the skilled mechanic, the gadgeteer, and the inventor, who
boasted hands-on knowledge gained from years of work in the machine shops of the railroad and the
telegraph. In this “Golden Age of Invention” (Carlson 1997) inventors such as Edison, Bell, and Tesla,
reigned supreme, not only in the market for technological improvements and novelties that corporations
turned to,  but  also  in  the  public  mind (Hughes  1989;  Hounshell  1984;  Usselman 1992).  The most
famous of these, Edison, even gave his inventorial and entrepreneurial endeavors an organizational home
in Menlo Park, established in 1876, where he united a diverse group of scientists, engineers, machinists,
and other skilled workers to focus on the business of invention (Carlson 1997; 2007).6
Another new organization emerged towards the turn of the century: the scientific consultancy. The most
famous is without a doubt AD Little of Boston, established by the MIT chemists Arthur D. Little and
Roger Griffin in 1886 (Kahn Jr. 1986; Rhees 1987, 34ff). AD Little and the similar organizations that
6 On the relationship of Menlo Park and the early R&D laboratories see below: 3.3 and 3.4. 
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followed  suit  offered  chemical  analyses,  standardization,  and  quality  control,  as  well  as  product
development to a certain degree. Painting a detailed picture of the time is a difficult undertaking, since
many historical accounts imply a distinct division between science and the industrial enterprise, not only
organizational  or  social,  but also in the tasks and practices  performed in the laboratories  or  machine
shops. Since the kind of knowledge used – whether craft knowledge honed for a long time, or scientific
principles applied to industrial problems  – can hardly be distinguished at this time with the accounts
available, and furthermore any historical account being affected by the theoretical perspective and basic
understandings  of  science,  engineering,  invention,  and  so  on  (Dennis  1987,  484ff),  any  conclusions
drawn from the  situation described need  to be  tentative.  Relevant  to  the  question of  the  industrial
research laboratory is the following: Inventors were the primary means for corporations to attain new
products  and  processes  –  inventors  who  boasted  a  considerable  prestige  in  the  public  eye.  Yet  the
separation between the  university-trained  scientist  and the  corporation was  not  as  vast  as  sometimes
claimed, with men of science finding their way into industry in a variety of positions on the one hand,
and on the other organizations employing scientists and offering science-based inquiries emerging in the
last two decades of the nineteenth century. Many of those university-trained scientists had done their
graduate work in Germany and brought with them the knowledge, and sometimes direct experience, of
organized research in the chemical  industries.  In fact,  the industrial  research laboratory existed in the
German chemical industry as soon as the late 1870s, with many of the major firms such as Bayer, BASF,
and Hoechst employing groups of scientists and, by 1882, the research laboratory having “emerged as a
clearly distinguishable organizational concept” (Homburg 1992, 110).7 It remains to be seen what role the
news of such an organization that came with the German-trained scientists to the United States played.
In  summary,  American  society  transformed  considerably  from  1850-1900:  the  West  was  unlocked,
markets and cities grew, and the large corporate organization emerged. The university became the primary
institution  of  higher  education,  with  the  sciences  and  professions  now  growing  and  differentiating
themselves. Scientists moved towards jobs in industry, taking their notions of the scientific method with
them. Some points touched upon, such as the inventor's prestige or the nature of corporate innovation,
will concern us later when the discourse on science and the first R&D laboratories is scrutinized. These
7 As Homburg outlined, the creation of the German industrial research laboratory was driven by two major factors: the 
Reichspatentgesetz (Patent law of the German Reich) of 1877, the first patent law of Germany that enacted patent 
protection for the first time, as well as creating a market for patents, and the growing number of academic chemists as along
with inter-firm competition that led to an increase in discoveries and inventions, thereby creating a need for in-house 
laboratories that could evaluate patents in order to remain competitive. As Homburg stresses, in addition to these main 
factors, “local factors” (Homburg 1992, 110, emphasis in original) differing between companies led to the different shapes 
and characteristics these laboratories took. (Homburg 1992; see also Meyer-Thurow 1982; Hounshell 1996, 19ff; 
Murmann & Homburg 2001).
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transformations  put  into  place  the  environmental  conditions  that  set  the  stage  for  the  birth  of  the
industrial research laboratory. In the next step, to understand how the laboratory spread successfully in
this environment, the process of diffusion shall be analyzed with the help of quantitative indicators.
3.2) How it Proliferated
The Problem with Mapping R&D Growth
How did the industrial research laboratory proliferate throughout American industry – an institution
entirely new in 1900, but described as “firmly established” by contemporary writers in 1913 (Electrical
World 1913, 877). Before diving into the available data accounting for the growth of industrial research
laboratories, a few words of caution are necessary, since both the “R” and the “D” in R&D prove to be
slippery concepts. “Research” itself is not the ahistorical concept it is sometimes made out to be, but a
category whose meaning is highly dependent on the time and context surrounding it (Godin & Schauz
2016), especially when used to measure research activity in industry. As Godin explains, before research
was  defined  properly,  when  trying  to  measure  its  spread  a  general  strategy  to  deal  with  the  unclear
boundaries of the concept was to exclude “routine activities or by supplying a list of activities designed
solely to help respondents decide what to include in their  responses to questionnaires” (Godin 2006,
648), offering categories such as basic and applied research, engineering, testing, or design. The impetus
was to find out where research happened, not necessarily what kind in particular (ibid., 648f). Soon, the
old dichotomy of pure and applied research was subject to the efforts of categorization and measurement,
but early attempts were hamstrung often by a lack of data,  the need to use proxies,  or troubles with
drawing clear delineations between pure and applied research (ibid., 649; Godin 2003). Eventually, a great
number of taxonomies came into being, utilizing plenty of synonyms for research: applied science, basic
science, pure research, fundamental research, etc.  (Godin 2006, 650, table 1). Thus, any definition of
research is strongly tied to underlying models of knowledge creation and the utility and application of
science, such as the linear model or the ideology of pure science (Kline 1995; Lucier 2012; Godin &
Schauz 2016). 
Similarly,  “development”  is  a  concept  that  underwent  changes  in  definition  and  meaning  over  the
decades. In its early years, development was a subcategory of research, while still a distinctively industrial
practice,  only  shifting to a  separate  category  after  1945 (Godin & Lane  2011,  5).  Still,  research and
development are commonly measured collectively, joined in the new abbreviation of “R&D”, for two
reasons: Firms did not have detailed accounting practices separating the two categories since they were
thought of as interrelated, and a merger of these two practices increased the amounts of money devoted to
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research,  with research expenditures  having become a highly politicized topic (ibid.,  6).  Indeed, both
concepts  had  become  connected  to  questions  of  identity,  with  academic  and  industrial  scientists,
engineers, and other professions all vying for interpretive hegemony. Moreover, policy was informed by
commonly  shared assumptions  of  what  R&D is  and how research and development,  or  science  and
technology, relate to each other (Pielke 2012). 
Further problems arise when shifting focus to the companies housing laboratories: As the history of the
four  research  pioneers  below  will  illustrate,  many  laboratories  grew  organically  out  of  previous
departmental  arrangements  for  testing  and  product  improvements,  making  it  hard  for  companies
responding to official inquiries charting R&D growth to pinpoint when their research ventures started.
With corporate laboratories becoming somewhat of a “must-have” for big companies following World
War I (WWI), it is reasonable to assume that some simply started to refer to their machine shops and
testing laboratories as proper research laboratories, regardless of what was happening inside. 
Luckily,  the  symbolic  and  political  struggles  between  different  understandings  of  research  and
development are not of special concern at this point, since the goal here is simply to get an idea of how the
industrial research laboratory spread and came to be accepted as an organizational entity, and not what
special brand of research was possibly conducted. Of course, the fashion of research poses a challenge for
assessing laboratory growth, but in itself can serve as a result: Corporate R&D had become normalized
and expected, an outcome informed not only by an increase in corporate establishments that did research,
but also by cultural  and discursive shifts  in the meanings of science and the scientist.  In the end,  all
quantitative measures discussed in the following need to be considered with reservation  with regard to
their contextual sensitivity, their method of data-gathering and their underlying definition of research
laboratory. 
Sketching the Growth of Industrial Research Laboratories
Few data points exist for the early years of organized R&D. The major source that quantitative studies
draw on when outlining how industry transformed, are surveys carried out by the National Research
Council (NRC). These surveys were conducted for the years 1920, 1921, 1927, 1933, 1938, 1940, and
1946 (NRC 1920/218, 1927, 1931, 1933, 1938, 1940a, 1946), based on questionnaires sent to directors of
industrial research laboratories. Of course, the NRC faced the problem of identifying these directors in
the  first  place.  To  compile  lists  of  laboratories,  scientific  societies  and  their  respective  journals  were
consulted,  as  well  as  trade  associations  such  as  the  National  Association  of  Manufacturers  (NAM).
8 The 1921 survey is a “revised and enlarged” version of the 1920 one (NRC 1921, 1). All publications that utilize the NRC 
surveys use the 1921 survey. 
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Furthermore,  trade  journals  and  industry  catalogs  were  examined  as  well  (NRC  1921,  2).  In  the
questionnaires, the respondent was asked to provide data on the founding date of the laboratory, the
parent  firm  of  the  laboratory,  the  location  of  the  laboratory  within  the  firm,  and  the  number  of
employees (both scientific and non-scientific) and their respective disciplines, as well as information on
what kind of research work was undertaken and whether the scientists worked full- or part-time, and with
what kind of equipment (NRC 1920, 47; Mowery 1981, 48). The surveys mainly covered laboratories of
manufacturing companies, yet some independent contracting laboratories were included as well. 
But what specific notion of “research”, or rather “research laboratory”, was used in the gathering of this
data? The NRC simply let the companies themselves classify what they understood as research (Perazich
& Field 1940, 2; see also Godin 2006, 647f), adding the following caveat: “Most of them devote but a
portion of their effort to research, and a number are probably not research laboratories, under a strict
definition  of  that  word”  (NRC 1920,  45).  This  is  justified  by  the  unclear  boundaries  of  science  in
industrial employ:
Research is sometimes differentiated into 'scientific' and 'industrial.' Scientific research comprises 
investigation directed toward the discovery of new truths for the sake of increasing human 
knowledge. Industrial research is the endeavor to learn how to apply scientific facts to the service of 
mankind. Many laboratories are engaged in both industrial research and industrial development. 
These two classes of investigation commonly merge so that no sharp boundary can be traced 
between them. … Furthermore, in practice it frequently is difficult to keep clear the distinction 
between scientific and industrial research. (NRC 1920, 45f)
The first-hand information supplied by the companies was not checked for accuracy: “No investigation
has been made to ascertain the character of any laboratory listed, nor the quality of the work done” (NRC
1920, 46). The various issues of trying to define “research”, as outlined above, add a large amount of
fuzziness  to  the  data,  especially  in  regard to  the  question of  whether  the  surveys  really  measure  the
diffusion of industrial research laboratories or just the spread of the name for any kind of department that
did any kind of research, testing, engineering, or development work. As Cooper (1940, 173) notes, “the
individual returns reflect the diversity of research activity throughout the country, and illustrate, among
other things, the looseness of definition of the term 'research'”. 
Apart from the definition of research, there are further problems with the NRC data. The degree of
coverage varies over the years, especially for the first survey conducted in 1921, but is considered complete
for the surveys since 1927 (Perazich & Field 1940, 2). Smaller, harder to find laboratories are possibly
omitted (ibid.),  skewing the data towards large  laboratories.  Due to the nature  of  the  questionnaire,
differences in reporting of data are known, particularly concerning the different types of staff, such as
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technical, non-technical, scientific, etc. Lastly, the earliest surveys do not give the foundation dates of the
laboratories. These dates were only reported in the surveys from 1940 onwards, possibly subject to the
“vagaries of corporate memory” (Mowery 1995, 153n8). As Mowery (1981, 48) notes, the number of
laboratories appearing in the 1920-33 surveys that are missing from the ones in 1940 and 1946 are 909, or
12.4% of the total 7334 laboratories reported. It is obvious, then, that the NRC survey data has to be
assessed carefully and in no way can be used to paint an accurate picture of diffusion. Still, they can surely
be useful in charting scientific employment in industry, as well as the spread of the notion of “research”. 
In summary, several layers of quantitative data exist. First of all, there are numbers for existing research
laboratories  as  reported  by  each  individual  of  the  six  NRC  surveys.  Second,  the  NRC  surveys  list
laboratory foundation dates since 1940, adding another possibility of mapping laboratory creation by
year. Cooper (1940, 273), using the NRC survey data, has a complete dataset of laboratory creation per
year from 1890 to 1940, though it is not clear how he compiled the numbers for the early years. To add a
last layer, the Annual Directory of Chemistry lists research laboratories as well for the years 1918 and
1919 (Lovelace & Thomas 1919; 1920), though the definition of “research laboratory” used and how the
data was gathered is unknown. 
When wading into the jungle of literature on industrial research laboratories, one can uncover a further
layer of what may be called “qualitative” data on laboratory foundation. On the one hand, there are
reports compiled of industrial laboratories, similar to the idea underlying the NRC surveys yet far smaller
in scope, that describe industrial  research as exemplary and in-depth rather than giving an exhaustive
picture of the entire United States (e.g. Fleming 1917; Angell 1919; NRC 1940b). On the other hand,
much  of  the  academic  literature  on  the  origins  of  industrial  research  mentions  the  diffusion  of
laboratories in some way or another, as well as early adopters of in-house research, apart from the research
pioneers (see below). Usually, key companies are named, but the beginnings of their research efforts vary
widely from publication to publication, as well as the numbers reported (see e.g. Hounshell 1996, 21, 36;
A. Chandler 1977, 375; Weart 1979, 306; Tackray et al. 1985, 114; Sturchio 1981, 87f; Carlson 1997,
217).9 Other sources that shall be named for completeness' sake are publications that compile writing on
these laboratories. As an example West (1930) can be named, who compiled “a reading list of selected
articles from the technical press” for the Division of Engineering and Industrial Research of the NRC,
with the goal of offering insights into how laboratory research should be organized and what results can
be expected (ibid., 5). The fact that large bodies of literature were written – and compiled – on industrial
9 Hounshell (1996, 59n16) notes that he only listed laboratories that were in turn listed by A. D. Little, a contemporary 
witness and strong promoter of industrial research, as exemplary – nicely illustrating how especially during the advent of 
the phenomenon no clear definition or organizational template for an industrial research laboratory existed. 
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research certainly speaks for the organizational entity gaining visibility and acceptance. What then can be
learned from the NRC survey data and respective quantitative analysis undertaken? Since the discourse
analysis will  focus on the discipline of chemistry, special attention shall be given here to the chemical
industry. 
Laboratories and Their Parent Companies
Source: Cooper 1941.
As can be seen in Figures 3.2.1 and 3.2.2, the different publications report strongly varying numbers,
leaving the exact number of laboratories founded between 1900 and 1930 up in the air. Yet clear trends
can  be  recognized.  The  number  of  industrial  research  laboratories  grew  steadily  in  the  five  decades
between 1890 and 1940, with the strongest growth occurring between 1919 and 1928, right after WWI
and roughly to the beginning of the Great Depression, which ended the postwar surge. The chemical
industry accounts for one fourth of all  laboratory foundations between 1899 and 1946, and the very
“research-intensive”  industries  of  chemicals,  glass,  rubber,  and  petroleum  founded  about  40%  of  all
laboratories  in  the  period  (Mowery  &  Rosenberg  1989,  61;  Mowery  1981,  53f).  Contrasting  other
manufacturing sectors, the chemical industry proved to be a leader in research across all time periods,
Figure 3.2.1: Laboratories Founded By Year, 1890-1940
40
whereas other sectors – such as instruments, transportation equipment, and machinery – got a late start
(Mowery & Rosenberg 1989, 61).
Sources: Cooper 1941; NRC 1920, 1921, 1927, 1931, 1933, 1938; Mowery 1981; Lovelace & Thomas 1919; 1920.
Which companies chose to invest in their own in-house laboratories? Generally, large amounts of capital
are  seen as  a  prerequisite  for  the  establishment  of  laboratories,  but  as  Mowery  (1983b,  965)  shows,
outside of chemicals, large firms were not disproportionately intensive employers of scientific personnel.
Instead, he found that large, non-chemical firms employed significantly fewer research professionals than
small firms, relative to their respective sizes.  In contrast,  in the chemical industry, large firms had the
biggest laboratories and proved to be the most research-intensive from 1921 to 1946, likely due to the
nature  of  the  chemicals  business.  The  high,  fixed  costs  of  chemical  research,  the  large  portfolio  of
diversified companies,  and the absence of price competition lead the largest firms to invest heavily in
research before anyone else. But declining research intensity even for the large chemical firms suggests that
while  the  founding  of  laboratories  sped  up  in  other  sectors  in  the  1920s,  the  laboratory  as  an
organizational entity had already diffused to smaller firms in the chemical industry, with the threshold
size  of  firms investing in research declining (ibid.,  964,  967).  This  leads  to the conclusion that  large
chemical firms were the earliest adopters of industrial research, which then spread to smaller chemical
Figure 3.2.2: Cumulative Growth of Industrial Research Laboratories, 1890-1940
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firms and larger firms in other industries (ibid., 966; see also Mowery 1981, 177ff). So big business did
play a role by making large firms the first movers – albeit at different times depending on the industrial
sector – with small firms then following in their footsteps. 
Another  facet  of  note  is  whether  companies  still  bought  outside  services  for  research once they  had
established  their  own  laboratories.  With  the  steady  growth  of  industrial  laboratories,  the  share  of
contractual research being done by independent research institutes outside of the firm declined. Firm size
had a significant,  positive  influence  on the  probability  that  research would be done within the firm
(Mowery 1983a, 369). This shows that firms with in-house laboratories were not the primary clients for
contract  research  organizations  (ibid.,  363),  yet  it  seems  like  sometimes  both  services  were  used,
suggesting that in-house research complemented rather than supplemented contract work (ibid., 363ff),
with many contract  laboratories  doing standardization,  testing,  and quality  assurance,  while  in-house
laboratories were concerned with development. 
Staff, Scientific Disciplines, and Expenditures
Sources: Mowery & Rosenberg 1989; Perazich & Field 1940; Thackray et al. 1985, 347, table 5.5.
Between 1921 and 1946 the number of scientific personnel increased sharply, with the greatest increase
Figure 3.2.3: Total Staff Growth
42
happening between the years 1921 and 1927, concurrent with the boom in laboratory foundations after
WWI. Only the Great Depression put a temporary damper on personnel growth, which regained traction
after  1933. Several factors need to be taken into account when looking at the increase in staff (Cooper
1940, 175; Mowery 1981, 77). First, the growth in staff is due to the increase in personnel employed at the
existing laboratories. Second, new laboratories were created leading to staff growth as well. Third, since
the coverage of the NRC surveys improved in the later years, some of the staff growth can certainly be
attributed  to  this.  Fourth  and  last,  recent  surveys  included  additional  classifications  for  research
personnel, further inflating the staff numbers. Still, even with some of the growth accounted for as data
artifacts, a clear trend of increasing research employment can be seen. Furthermore, the employment of
part-time  researchers  declined.  Perazich  and  Field  hypothesize  here  that  research  turned  from  an
expensive  luxury  to  a  necessity,  making  fully  employed  science  workers  out  of  researchers  who  had
previously devoted only parts of their time, e.g. during universities' summer break, to research (Perazich
& Field 1940, 5f).
While  the  growth  rate  of  newly  founded  laboratories  declined  over  time  (see  Fig.  3.2.1),  research
personnel kept increasing. This is  most likely due to only a finite number of companies existing that
would organize their own laboratories. Thus, once a certain “saturation” of laboratories in industry was
reached,  laboratory foundation petered out while  the existing laboratories  kept growing (cf.  Mowery
1981, 63ff). The Great Depression strongly impacted research personnel, the numbers showing a decline
in the years 1930 to 1933. But research staff were still less impacted than normal wage earners by cutbacks
(Cooper 1940, 174; Perazich & Field 1940, 64; Mowery 1981, 63). The concentration of staff rose over
the years and the largest laboratories (with more than 50 employees) grew faster than the group of small
laboratories (less than 11 employees) (Perazich & Field 1940, 66; Mowery 1981, 76f). This effect may be
due  to  poorer  coverage  of  smaller  laboratories  in  the  early  years  of  the  NRC survey.  Breaking  staff
increases down into individual industries reveals a similar trend to that of laboratory creation: Chemicals,
petroleum, rubber, and electrical machinery proved to be highly research-intensive across all years, with
chemistry exhibiting the strongest growth pattern overall (Mowery 1981, 61f).10 
Breaking down research employment into different disciplines reveals some interesting trends, illustrating
the  differentiation  of  science  at  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century.  Overall,  physicists  and
metallurgists  gained  strongly  in  the  period  from  1921  to  1946,  while  the  share  of  engineers  slightly
declined. Biologists rose to prominence as well, most likely displacing some chemists (Mowery 1981, 79).
The group of highly research-intensive industries (chemicals,  petroleum, rubber,  electrical machinery)
shows  a  slight  increase  in  chemists  and  a  similarly  strong  increase  in  biologists  as  observed  for  all
10 Research intensity is defined as “scientific personnel per 1000 wage earners in a given industry” (Mowery 1981, 59). 
43
manufacturing. This may be due to the strong growth of pharmaceuticals (ibid., 80). Overall, the life and
materials sciences clearly gained ground in research employment, while chemists and engineers retained
roughly the same proportion of total scientific employment (ibid., 89, table 2.21). 
Sources: Left bars: Perazich & Field 1940, 78, table A-19, right bars: Thackray et al. 1985, 347, table 5.5.
Unfortunately, as there exists no direct data on research expenditures, estimates can only be inferred from
staff numbers as some authors do. Perazich and Field (1940, 14) report that 58 companies detail their
total expenditures at about $12 Million, the average laboratory worker thus making about $3500 a year.
Cooper  (1940,  184)  determines  $4000 per  man-year  and correlates  such expenditures  with sales  and
income data from Moody's Industrials, showing that research expenditures are directly proportional to
both net income and sales. 
The Decline of the Independent Inventor 
Before taking a detailed look at the pioneering corporate laboratories, another indicator that is considered
to  be  highly  related  to  industrial  R&D  shall  be  briefly  scrutinized:  the  independent  inventor.  It  is
generally assumed that the era of heroic invention ended with corporate laboratories (Hughes 1989, 138f;
Noble 1974, 151ff), as the university-level scientist replaced the self-trained inventor. Does the literature
Figure 3.2.4: Staff by Scientific Disciplines Employed in Laboratories, 1921-1938
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support this? Hintz uses statistics on the number of patents issued to independent inventors versus those
issued to corporations as a measure to gauge the fate of independent invention. As his time series from
1901-2000 shows (Hintz 2011, 734, fig. 1), the demise of the independents was not as fast as generally
assumed, with the number of patents taken out by corporations only overtaking individual patentees in
1933. Until the 1950s, independent inventors still accounted for a major share of the patents assigned,
and only then did corporate dominance of patenting begin.  Thus the independent inventor was not
abruptly displaced by the corporate laboratory, rather a long transitional period began at the turn of the
century (cf. Wise 1992). Nicholas corroborates these findings, as his dataset shows a steady decline of
independent patentees since the 1880s, yet even in the first three decades of the twentieth century – when
corporate  R&D is  considered to have  “taken off”  – a  considerable  share  of  patents  was  assigned  to
independents (Nicholas 2010, 58, fig. 1). Interestingly, focusing on chemical and electrical patents reveals
those corporations already overtaking independents by the late 1920s (ibid., 77, fig. 3). Nicholas' data
leads to the conclusion that firms utilized independent inventors as complements to their own R&D
(ibid., 78), and in a similar way to contractual research, as was discussed above.
Lamoreaux and Sokoloff take a more nuanced approach to the question, differentiating to whom patents
were issued to between 1870 and 1911: an individual, a partner, a corporation with a similar name, or a
corporation that was known to have a laboratory, amongst others. The latter two categories allow the
distinction between what is often called the inventor-entrepreneur, who chose to go into business with
their  own  inventions  as  a  principal  rather  than  an  employee,  and  the  inventor  who  worked  for  a
corporation with a research laboratory (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff 2009, 63f). Constructing an elaborate
dataset,  they  found  that  over  time  the  association  between  specialized  inventors  and  company
assignments strengthened (ibid., 66), indicating the growing importance of R&D laboratories. But not all
results match this pattern: Over time an even greater proportion of patents was assigned to companies
bearing the inventor's name, illustrating that work in a company laboratory was not the only option for
inventors at the turn of the century. Yet the contractual mobility of inventors declined, which means that
inventors tended to stay with one company throughout their career. This suggests that inventors deemed
it necessary to form long-term attachments for a variety of reasons.
To summarize, the end of the era of heroic invention proved to be a slow, drawn-out process, rather than
a revolution brought about by big business. The results from the studies cited above show that there was
more  to  their  decline  than  simply  a  new  mode  of  corporate  innovation  immediately  replacing  the
inventor with the scientist. A cultural dimension was strongly involved in this process, pitching the genius
inventor  against  the  scientist,  each  with  their  respective  promises  regarding  their  benefits  for  the
company, with the scientist's reputation slowly building. Over time, but also in historical literature, the
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scientists seem to have played the winning game (Hintz 2011). It is precisely this dimension of identity
ascribed to the scientist, or more specifically the corporate scientist, that shall be investigated through
methods of discourse analysis in order to further elucidate how and why the patterns we perceive in the
quantitative data were produced. 
3.3) The Research Pioneers
Of the  plethora  of  industrial  research  laboratories  established by 1930,  four  came  to be  regarded as
pioneers. These were the laboratories of General Electric, Du Pont, AT&T, and Eastman Kodak. These
laboratories, established within the first 12 years of the new century, became highly visible and successful
due  to  scientific  breakthroughs,  cultivating  archetypal  actors  of  heroic  scientists  and  gifted  research
administrators in their wake. They also became the best-studied in the literature, for reasons that will be
discussed below.11 While all these laboratories were established around the same time, a variety of reasons
exist and differing strategies were chosen to create those in-house R&D efforts, sometimes from scratch,
and  sometimes  from  the  gradual  growth  of  existing  arrangements  for  product  innovation  (Kline  &
Lassman 2005, 605). Furthermore, some authors argue that, in a way, each of these firms re-invented
managerial strategies as to how to lead and structure a corporate R&D laboratory (Dennis 1987, 488).
This is precisely why a closer look at those highly publicized pioneering efforts is needed – to see what can
be learned from them before tackling the cultural dimension that is lacking in most explanatory models,
especially since many important concepts,  topics and issues of the day will  be introduced with these
examples. For each company, we are interested not only in the factors involved in the creation of the
laboratories, but also in general explanations for their emergence found in historical scholarship on those
topics, so as to assess the level of current scholarship and provide opportunities for possible blind spots to
emerge, as well as to underline the importance of the perspective and methodical tools this book adds. 
1900: General Electric
In the literature on the genesis of industrial R&D laboratories, General Electric is generally considered to
be the trailblazer for all the companies that followed suit in the first two decades of the twentieth century.
In order to fully comprehend the circumstances that led to the establishment of this laboratory, two
important building blocks are of relevance: the situation and currents of the electrical industry in which
the General Electric Company (GE) was founded, as well as GE's organizational structure that served as
the cradle of the laboratory.
11 Plenty of authors speak mainly of the big four when discussing the phenomenon of industrial research, these laboratories 
having become somewhat synonymous with early research efforts in industry. Cf. e.g. Carlson 2007; Jenkins 1975, 305; 
Hounshell 1996, 21ff; Sturchio 1985; Birr 1979, 199; Smith 1990; Weart 1976. 
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The Electrical Industry in the Late Nineteenth Century and the Birth of GE
The electrical industry went through its formative period from 1880 onward (Bright 1949, 70ff). It was
characterized by rapid technical change due to many competing lighting technologies and lamp designs,
as  well  as  continuous improvements to existing technologies  and manufacturing techniques.  Next to
competing lighting models, a “war of the currents” (Reich 1985, 46; Carlson 1991, 283ff) was fought for
the standardized current of electric power supply (AC vs. DC). Patent struggles amongst a multitude of
competing manufacturers put a damper on technological development – thus, with established design
standards, production and marketing played a vital role.  The companies themselves utilized buy-outs,
mergers, legal suits, and collusion as means to suppress competition (Reich 1992, 307; cf. Carlson 1991,
278ff). 
The inventor-entrepreneur played an important role in this industry, in a time sometimes referred to as
the “Golden Age of Heroic Invention” (Carlson 1997, 206ff; Hounshell & Smith 1988, 3; cf. Usselman
1992; Wise 1992), which is most commonly associated with the figure of Thomas Edison, who was a key
player  in  the  formation  of  GE  and  the  founder  of  Menlo  Park,  the  “invention  factory”,  in  1876
(Hounshell & Smith 1988, 3).12 In 1889, the Edison General Electric Company (EGE) was founded by
reorganizing Edison's many distinct companies into one single corporation. Two other important actors
in the electrical industry emerged at this time: Elihu Thomson and George Westinghouse. The latter
entered  the  field  in  1896  with  an  alternating-current  system  (Reich  1985,  46;  on  Westinghouse  cf.
Usselman 1992; Kline & Lassman 2005), becoming the main competitor of GE in its early years. The
former, Elihu Thomson, became one of the founding members of GE. 
Elihu  Thomson,  a  chemistry  teacher  from  Philadelphia,  was  one  of  the  most  prolific  inventors  in
American history (Carlson 1991, 1). Previously a professor of chemistry at a college in Philadelphia, a
radical change of profession to invention (ibid., 53) saw him, together with Edwin J. Houston, develop a
system  for  lighting  (Carlson  1997,  208).  After  these  first  failed  business  experiences,  the  Thomson-
Houston Electric Company (TH) was founded in 1882, by “a group of shoe manufacturers in Lynn,
Massachusetts, to exploit the inventions of Elihu Thomson and Edwin J. Houston” (Carlson 1995, 61).
Led by Charles A. Coffin, an expert at marketing, Thomson could concentrate on inventing, leading to
the development of new products, such as AC and DC incandescent lighting systems, but also motors
and  streetcars  that  subsequently  allowed  the  company  to  expand  and  compete  with  EGE  and
Westinghouse Electric (Carlson 1997, 209). 
12 In some accounts of the genesis of industrial R&D, Menlo Park is seen as the first R&D laboratory (cf. e.g. Rae 1979, 259; 
Israel 2002). Other authors rightly point to the differences between Menlo Park and later laboratories: Menlo Park was not 
integrated into the Western Union corporate structure and bears more similarity to R&D consultancies such as AD Little. 
Cf. Carlson 1997, 207f; Friedel 1992, 19; Reich 1985, 43; Reich 1987. 
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EGE's and TH's competitive activities ultimately led to their merger in 1892, forming GE with its head
office in Schenectady, NY. The merger was seen as a lucrative move due to both companies' strong patent
positions and their complementary manufacturing lines, as well as EGE's capital and TH's managerial
capacities (Birr 1957, 30; Carlson 1991, 299; Carlson 1997, 209). Edison soon pulled back from business
operations  (Reich  1985,  48),  and  the  managerial  group  of  TH  then  comprised  almost  the  entire
management of GE, with Coffin becoming the company's first president (Carlson 1991, 296f). Coffin
took the company's organizational “building blocks” of EGE and TH and merged both into a unified
structure, its hierarchy resembling that of a large railroading company (ibid.). 
The newly formed company soon became known as the “electric trust”, due to its strong position in the
market  (ibid.,  50)  and  its  anti-competitive  activities  (Reich  1992,  306).  By  the  mid-1890s,  GE  and
Westinghouse  controlled approximately  75% of  the  electrical  industry  (Reich  1992,  308;  cf.  Carlson
1991, 274 fig.  6.1 on the evolution of both companies).  Their  main tactics against competition were
pricing and patent infringement suits that were ultimately put aside in a licensing agreement between
both companies in 1896, further strengthening GE's market position (Carlson 1991, 278). In 1897, GE
organized a cartel, the Incandescent Lamp Manufacturers Association, which allocated 50% of the market
to GE and allowed for easy control and little need for improvements in the company's technological base
(Reich 1992, 308). 
Shifting our perspective from the market environment of GE towards its organizational structure, it is
important to understand where product and process improvements took place. The company engineers
were  organized in  different  groups,  and  at  Schenectady,  a  group called  the  “Works  Laboratory” did
materials testing. In 1893, GE bought the company belonging to Charles P. Steinmetz, an “engineering
genius”  (Reich  1985,  59)  who came to GE's  attention due to his  papers  being  presented before  the
American Institute  of  Electrical  Engineers  and his  highly  innovative  work for  a  New York electrical
manufacturer.  Steinmetz  joined  the  Calculating  Department  where  he  brought  “the  theories  of
electrophysics  to  bear  on problems  in  engineering  design”  (ibid).  The Standardizing  Laboratory  was
established in 1896, and its role expanded in the following years towards the design of new instruments
and the creation of new manufacturing standards. As can be seen, many different groups worked on
routine  tasks  as  well  as  continuous improvements – an organizational  setting befitting the corporate
strategy for innovation of the time. Patents and inventions were bought from outside inventors, and their
services were only used temporarily without any fixed or continuous arrangement (Reich 1985, 61). 
But large transformations were inbound, heralded both in- and outside the company. Thomson, working
as  an  inventor  within  GE,  and  being  an  important  voice  as  one  of  its  founders,  grew  increasingly
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frustrated with the way that product development was handled and started to advocate for the hiring of
specialists,  whilst  proposing  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  department,  isolated  from  day-to-day
operations, in order to coordinate resources (Carlson 1997, 211). On the outside, GE's secure grip on the
market was about to slip away: the expiration of all of GE's electrical patents by the end of the century
loomed large.  European inventions also threatened GE's market position (Reich 1985, 61),  as well  as
continuing competition with Westinghouse and the ubiquitous danger of new, more efficient lighting
devices coming to market (Carlson 1997, 212; Wise 1987, 396).
Pushing for Change: Establishing the Laboratory
The story of the laboratory's establishment is a story of actors in the organization attempting to advance
their interests. Chief engineer Steinmetz was well aware of technological developments in the field, and in
1897 proposed organizing a chemical laboratory to investigate new, competing devices, possibly informed
by his  experiences  studying in Germany and Switzerland.13 This  request  was ignored by GE officials
(Carlson 1997, 212), a similar plea in 1898 did not yield the desired result either (Reich 1985, 65). After
his  first  two requests  fell  to deaf ears,  he enlisted support  for his  plea:  Albert  G.  Davis,  GE's  patent
attorney,  and  Edwin  W.  Rice,  the  vice-president  in  charge  of  manufacturing  and  engineering.  Both
Steinmetz and Davis wrote urging letters to Rice, who used these to convince GE president Coffin and
the board of directors of the need for the new department (Reich 1985, 66; Carlson 1991, 336f). Davis
argued from an economic angle: “'If someone gets ahead of us in this development [the mercury-vapor
lamp] we will have to spend large sums in buying patents … whereas if we do the work ourselves this
necessity will be avoided'” (Davis, quoted in Reich 1985, 66). In his letter, Steinmetz described a detailed
research plan for  the  laboratory,  and suggested the  laboratory  be  separated from manufacturing  and
production problems  and  directed by a  “practical  chemist”  (ibid.).  Their  advance  gained  even more
traction, once Thomson threw his weight behind the proposal,  voicing his support to Steinmetz and
Rice. In his letter to Rice, he stressed that the company should research the application of new principles
and even the discovery of those principles as well (ibid., 67), devising a broader mission for the laboratory
than Steinmetz. 
The coalition of interest managed to convince the executives, and the Board of Directors approved the
plan under the condition of finding the right man: “'With such a man this may be a fine thing, without
him, it may simply be a machine for spending money'” (GE Board of Directors, quoted in Reich 1985,
67).  Rice picked Willis  R. Whitney, a professor at MIT who had done his doctoral work in Leipzig,
13 As Dennis (1987, 488) notes, there is no textual or archival material available that confirms whether Steinmetz was aware of
German corporate research laboratories, and he did not mention any German examples in his proposal to the Board of 
Directors. 
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Germany under Wilhelm Ostwald, one of the fathers of physical chemistry (Wise 1983, 10ff), and who
had some experience with scientific work outside of academia: He had done some scientific consulting in
the  1890s  (Wise  1985,  58).  After  being  interviewed  by  Thomson,  a  compromise  was  worked  out:
Whitney would remain at MIT due to his strong devotion to teaching, but spend two days a week at GE
during  the  school  term,  earning  the  salary  equivalent  of  a  full  professor  (Reich 1985,  69).  By 1901,
Whitney had requested a leave from MIT to become the full-time director of the laboratory. Ultimately,
he would become the archetypal research director (Wise 1985; Reich 1985, 97ff; cf. Broderick 1945). The
laboratory was erected at GE's Schenectady plant, virtually “from scratch”– as Kline & Lassman (2005,
605) note, with neither Edison's laboratory nor Steinmetz's engineering department serving as templates
for the research laboratory. In its annual report for 1901, GE officially heralded the new laboratory, with
Rice stressing the laboratory's exclusive devotion to original research: “'It is hoped by this means that
many profitable fields may be discovered'” (GE Annual Report 1901, quoted in Reich 1985, 71).
The First Decades of the General Electric Research Laboratory
The newly created laboratory grew quickly: its staff numbered about 50 employees in 1905, about 100 in
1910, steadily climbing to a peak in 1929 of about 520 employees, before the Great Depression forced
staff cutbacks, down to about 280 in 1932 (Wise 1985, 246, fig. 2). Laboratory expenditures described a
similar trajectory after a slow start, doubling roughly every four years and peaking in 1929 at about $2.6
Million (ibid., 246, fig. 1).
In its early years, the research laboratory struggled to produce major breakthroughs, yet fulfilled several
corporate needs by working on special development requests made by the manufacturing and engineering
departments  (Reich 1985,  70f);  by  1903 Whitney and his  group had carved out  a  “reasonably  well-
defined – if not necessarily secure – niche in the GE corporate structure” (ibid., 73). Differing approaches
to research work led to a control struggle between chief engineer Steinmetz, in charge of the oversight
committee, and research director Whitney. In 1905, William Coolidge was hired, who had graduated
with a B.S. in electrical engineering from MIT, and a PhD in physics from the University of Leipzig,
Germany. A high salary offer and opportunities to spend one-third of his working hours on his own
research swayed him to start at the GE laboratory (Reich 1987, 345ff; Wise 1983). GE was fully engaged
in  a  race  against  European  inventors  and  Westinghouse  to  develop  better  and  more  durable  lamps.
Results were requested from the laboratory, which reported its first success when Coolidge managed to
show how tungsten could be  made ductile,  but  this  achievement  only  came after  GE was  forced to
acquire German patents for a tungsten-filament lamp in 1906 (Carlson 1997, 213). 
These troubles, as well as a market panic in 1907, led president Coffin and vice-president Rice to cut the
50
laboratory budget by 41%, thereby terminating one-third of the professional staff of 44, which caused
Whitney to suffer a nervous breakdown and Coolidge to take over the reins during the former's recovery
(Reich 1985, 79; cf. Wise 1985, 245, fig. 1, 2). Still, the lab's development of the ductile tungsten filament
could be regarded as the fulfillment of the “basic mission for which it had been established” (Reich 1985,
82).  With  the  newly  gained  advantages  that  the  laboratory  brought,  GE  continued  its  control  of
competition during the early twentieth century, even though the other major competitor, Westinghouse,
had ceased to pose a serious threat to GE since its bankruptcy reorganization that was brought about by
the Panic of 1907 (ibid., 313). 
Of the many scientists and engineers working in the laboratory over the years, one other figure stands out:
Irving Langmuir, who was hired in 1909. Langmuir graduated with a B.S. in metallurgical engineering
from Columbia University, doing his graduate work in physical chemistry at the University of Göttingen,
Germany. Langmuir's work led to breakthroughs in lamp efficiency, later spearheading the company's
forays into x-ray and radio,  and eventually culminated in a  Nobel Prize in chemistry for research on
physical processes at the surface of incandescent filaments for Langmuir (Reich 1987, 347f;  cf.  Wise
1983; Reich 1983). To lure brilliant young researchers such as Langmuir into industry, Whitney offered
significantly  higher  wages  and  better  equipment  than  academic  institutions.  Publishing  results  was
allowed  but  only  after  patent  applications,  and  joining  scientific  and  engineering  societies  was
encouraged,  with both Whitney and Langmuir  later  serving as  presidents  of  the American Chemical
Society (ACS) (Reich 1985, 108ff; Birr 1957, 80; Wise 1997). 
Examining GE's organizational structure during those years, a number of other laboratories can be found:
the Standardizing Laboratory (later merged with Steinmetz's group to become the General Engineering
Laboratory), the Schenectady Works Testing Laboratory, the Illuminating Engineering Laboratory, the
Insulations Laboratory, and the Consulting Engineering Laboratory (run by Steinmetz from 1909-19),
whilst others were established as needed, e.g. the Radio Engineering Department that started work in
1918 (Reich 1985, 104). These additional departments relieved the research laboratory of most of the
routine investigations and development work.
From roughly from 1911 onwards, the research laboratory's work diversified into many different project
areas,  but  the  staff  remained  “on  call”  to  solve  problems  occurring  in  engineering  or  production
departments (ibid., 91; cf. Carlson 1997, 216; Birr 1957, 51). Defensive research aided GE in covering the
market and keeping other companies from catching up to its technological base (Reich 1985, 86). 
After the United States entered WWI in 1917, the research laboratory was engaged with wartime research,
such as work on submarine detection and other projects (ibid., 93; Birr 1957, 63ff). Whitney served on
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the Naval Consulting Board as a representative of the ACS, not shying away from advertising the efficacy
of industrial research, and in the process brought the laboratory to the attention of many other business
executives and managers, but also the public (Reich 1985, 94). Science's newfound popularity was soon
exploited by GE as an advertising opportunity: the research laboratory became known as the “House of
Magic”, permanent science exhibits were set up and public tours were organized (ibid.; Wise 1985, 214f;
L. Hawkins 1950, 78; see also Nye 1985). 
1902: Du Pont
Chronologically, the next company to establish a laboratory was Du Pont. To understand how Du Pont
got to have not one but two laboratories, a detailed discussion of the company's leadership and structure
is necessary, which sets the stage for the laboratories' successes and later shift to “fundamental research” in
the late 1920s.
The Field of Chemistry and Du Pont's Organizational Antecedents
Founded in 1801, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. had a long pre-history as one of the leaders of the
American gunpowder industry (Wilkinson 1984; A. Chandler 2005, 42). The company's transformation
started in 1902 with the death of Eugene du Pont, the company's president. Prior to 1902, Du Pont had
existed as a family partnership essentially made up of many different powder plants that received little
oversight or administration, and hardly any attention was paid to “costs, to improving processes, or to
developing  more  systematic  purchasing  and  marketing  techniques”  (A.  Chandler  1990a,  54).
Improvements  seem  to  have  been made  through  experimentation  and  hands-on-work  at  the  various
plants,  and  there  are  no  records  that  indicate  any  organized  research  prior  to  the  company's
reorganization.  In the  resulting  struggle  for  control  within  the  family  after  Eugene du Pont's  death,
Alfred I.  du Pont emerged, who would lead the company with his cousins Pierre S.  du Pont and T.
Coleman du Pont. With all three having studied chemistry or engineering at MIT, they had gathered
practical,  managerial  experience  in  various  plants  and  powder  mills.  The  three  du  Ponts  pursued  a
strategy of consolidation and centralization for the various companies controlled by Du Pont, at the same
time creating an administrative structure to oversee the newly incorporated E.I. du Pont de Nemours &
Company in 1902. In the reorganization, T. Coleman became company president, Pierre S. vice-president
and treasurer, and Alfred I. assumed the duties of general manager.
The three cousins were guided by their  mentor,  Arthur J.  Moxham, who had gathered management
experience in the steel industry. Moxham convinced the cousins to stop the practice of buying a majority
interest in other explosives companies and running them as separate entities,  and instead to purchase
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companies outright and build a multidivisional structure under the guidance of an Executive Committee
(Chandler & Salsbury 1971, 125ff).  Thus the Executive Committee was established in 1903, initially
comprised of the president and the department heads.  The Committee would coordinate the various
departments, set policy, and approve expenditures. Alongside the cousins, Francis I. du Pont, Moxham, a
sales  expert  named J.  Armory Haskell,  and a veteran of the explosives  business  named Hamilton M.
Barksdale formed the Committee (cf. Hounshell & Smith 1988, 19, fig. I.I). Furthermore, Moxham was
chosen to head the new Development Department, tasked with improving products and processes – an
organizational  element  having  “no  predecessor  in  the  explosives  industry”,  as  Chandler  notes  (A.
Chandler 1990a, 57). It was then decided that the companies routine concerns should be dealt with by an
Operative Committee, while the Executive Committee would focus on long-term planning, steering clear
of departmental day-to-day operations. The organizational structure created in this way remained mainly
the same until the end of WWI, save for the creation of some auxiliary departments (A. Chandler 1990a,
62, chart 2).
Establishing the Laboratories
Today  two  names  have  become  synonymous  with  Du  Pont's  early  R&D  operation:  the  Eastern
Laboratory, and the Experimental Station. In 1902, Repauno, a Du Pont subsidiary, founded the Eastern
Laboratory – named after its  parent holding company, Eastern Dynamite.  Repauno's managers  “had
realized  that  'chemical  work'  was  necessary  to  maintain  and  improve  product  yields  and  quality”
(Hounshell & Smith 1988, 19f). Oscar R. Jackson, a Harvard and German-trained chemist, became the
new plant superintendent, subsequently hiring academically trained chemists to do some experimental
work. The research happened in a “works laboratory”, which was not separated from manufacturing. Its
positive results convinced Repauno's management – amongst them Barksdale and Haskell, who went on
to form part  of the Executive Committee – to establish the Eastern Laboratory. Both Barksdale and
Haskell were of the conviction that chemical work was worth the effort to keep a leading position in the
explosives industry (ibid., 21). 
Thus  the Eastern Laboratory  was born,  and its  “broad mandate” (ibid.,  19) was  made explicit  in its
mission:  improving  products  and  processes,  discovering  new  explosives,  keeping  in  touch  with
developments in the industry, as well as training chemists and technical assistants (ibid.). It was divorced
from the day-to-day manufacturing operations of Repauno, but was expected to do inquiries for all the
plants under Eastern Dynamite's roof. To direct the laboratories operations, Charles L. Reese was hired, a
University of Virginia graduate, who had done his PhD work in Göttingen and Heidelberg, Germany. It
was Reese who established the Eastern Laboratory's research policy, instituting a report system and hiring
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the early laboratory staffers (cf. ibid., table 1.1). Under Reese's direction this group of scientists could
record early successes, demonstrating the usefulness of the laboratory (ibid., 26).
Du Pont's other laboratory, the Experimental Station, originated from an entirely different point in the
organizational  structure:  the  Executive  Committee.  It  was  Moxham,  in  charge  of  the  Development
Department, who convinced his colleagues to create a General Experimental Laboratory under his care in
1903. To do this, he first had to establish a broad base of support within the company (ibid., 29), forming
an “Experimental  Committee” that  was staffed by himself,  Alfred I.  and Francis  du Pont,  as  well  as
Barksdale. In this Committee, he proposed a clearly outlined research project with obvious benefits to Du
Pont's  business,  also  referencing  successful  laboratories  in  Germany  and  England,  which  ultimately
garnered the necessary support from his colleagues. At first conceived to do “original research” (ibid., 30),
it was Barksdale – seing this new laboreatory as a direct threat to Eastern – who urged the Executive
Committee to restrict the new laboratory's domain to the screening of outside inventions (ibid.). It would
take outside intervention to refocus the new laboratory. Late in July of 1903, Francis I. du Pont informed
the Executive Committee about the Navy establishing a smokeless powder plant and providing R&D
facilities. Due to Du Pont's attempts at consolidating its hold on the industry, both the Army and the
Navy  –  some  of  Du  Pont's  most  important  customers  –  had  grown  suspicious  of  Du  Pont's  anti-
competitive activities. Francis argued the need to have research done by experts, so as to increase products
as well as soothe relations with the government, and display Du Pont's “progressiveness” (ibid., 33). The
Executive Committee approved, and the original mission of the General Experimental Laboratory – later
renamed the Experimental Station – broadened again.
The boundaries drawn between both laboratories would soon face another challenge, in 1904, when a
subcommittee was tasked with investigating research management. The main questions tackled were the
assessment  of  the  differences  between  a  departmental  laboratory,  such  as  Eastern,  and  the  General
Experimental  Laboratory,  as  well  as  their  rivalry.  Whilst  the  success  of  the  Eastern  Laboratory  was
generally acknowledged, the department heads for smokeless and black powder recognized no need to
start  their  own  departmental  laboratories,  instead  supporting  Francis'  plan  of  a  general,  centralized
laboratory. In turn, Barksdale argued that Eastern's success was in part due to its association with a plant
and providing access to raw materials as well as training for plant managers. He further emphasized that
the question should not be whether to do research or not, but rather how to utilize research expenditures
efficiently (ibid., 28). In the end, this debate was not resolved by the questions regarding what kind of
scientific work was being done at the laboratories, but rather the costs and appeals to business sense. It
was  decided  essentially  to  embrace  both  decentralization  and  centralization,  keeping  the  central  and
departmental laboratories (ibid., 29). 
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Francis I. du Pont, a Yale graduate in chemistry and inventor who had gathered practical experience as a
plant superintendent, was hired as the Experimental Station's first director. Though, as Hounshell and
Smith (1988, 35) point out,  he “fitted the mold of lone inventor far better than that of credentialed
chemist”, turning out to be a rather poor research manager.
From World War I to “Fundamental Research”: The Laboratories' Early Decades
The early  years  of  both laboratories  are  characterized by growth and expansion,  but  also managerial
struggles. When a financial panic hit in 1907, leading to layoffs at the Station, an Experimental Board was
founded  to  oversee  the  Station's  work,  which  had  fallen  into  disarray  due  to  Francis'  leadership.
Allocating research resources and instituting sounder management practices, the Station soon found itself
under the leadership of Pierre S. du Pont, Barton, and the Experimental Board, as well as the head of the
Development Department, Irénée du Pont. Fin Sparre, a Norwegian chemist and engineer with academic
training in Germany, was promoted to chief chemist.  He expanded the Station's  staff,  employing 35
chemists  by  1911,  many  with  “excellent  academic  credentials”  (Hounshell  &  Smith  1988,  49).  The
Station's “long shot” (ibid., 47) kind of research proved hard to quantify, as evidenced in 1910, when the
Executive Committee requested a report to find out whether the Station “paid its way”. Irénée struggled
to come up with any kind of supporting numbers, yet the Executive Committee exhibited a continued
commitment to research. 
Compared to the Experimental Station, the Eastern Laboratory's clearly defined mission and successful
work  on  product  and  process  improvements  allowed  it  to  generate  impressive  profits.  Reese  was
eventually  promoted  to  director  of  the  new  Chemical  Division  of  the  High  Explosives  Operating
Department, leaving Arthur M. Comey in charge. Comey, having done graduate work in Heidelberg,
Germany, had served as a professor at Harvard and Tufts as well as a consulting chemist. His splendid
reputation  helped  attract  academic  chemists  to  the  laboratory  (ibid.,  52).  By  1911,  the  Eastern
Laboratory' staff numbered about 80 employees, 27 of which were academically trained chemists, many
boasting PhDs from German universities (ibid., 53). 
In the following years, the organizational form of the laboratories was directly influenced by corporate
strategy.  This  became  evident  when reorganization  towards  greater  centralization  was  undertaken  in
1911,  leading to the creation of  the  Chemical  Department and putting Reese  in charge of  both the
Eastern  Laboratory  and  the  Experimental  Station  (ibid.,  58).  Once  again,  quantifying  the  value  of
research became a problem, with Reese arguing for a different kind of profit  to be produced by the
Station: a good reputation and relationship with the Army and the Navy. Yet Reese not only had to fend
off inquiry from the Executive Committee, but also attacks from the Department Heads, who, in the
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move to centralize R&D, felt Du Pont's research organization had become unresponsive to their practical
problems  (ibid.,  56)  and  so  lobbied  for  the  creation  of  departmental  laboratories.  In  the  wake  of
structural changes following an antitrust suit in 1912, the Executive Committee was reconstituted in
1914. Eventually, in 1915, E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Company was incorporated and it purchased all
assets from the previous Du Pont Powder Company, becoming the sole parent company. 
The outbreak of  WWI in Europe led to great  transformations  that  manifested in two areas:  a  rapid
increase in demand for smokeless powder, as well as a dyestuffs shortage due to the British blockade of
German-produced products. Du Pont reacted by rapidly expanding smokeless powder plant capacity, but
also by moving into the dyestuffs business – a decision justified not only by strategy, but also political
necessity  (A.  Chandler  1990a,  85f;  Hounshell  & Smith  1988,  77).  Sparre  headed  the  diversification
efforts. Tensions between managers and researchers arose: The lesson learned by management from the
move into dyestuffs was to buy firms and improve their products through their own R&D program,
since the venture into dyestuffs had a slow and straining start and the Chemical Department did not
prove responsive enough. Researchers,  on the other hand, had wanted to “home-grow” the dyestuffs
business, and convinced management to do so with initially poor results. In the end, this episode lead to
managers being suspicious of researchers' opinion in the years to come (Hounshell & Smith 1988, 77, 97).
During those years, Du Pont looked not only inward to its R&D organization for the tasks at hand, but
also outward, seeking to build relationships with universities to ensure a continuous stream of the best
graduates and professors to act as consultants, as well as the latest scientific news (Steen 2014, 261; Rhees
1987, 71). From 1918 onwards, Du Pont funded fellowship programs for graduate research at prestigious
universities – amongst them Harvard and MIT.
The  1919-21  postwar  recession  hit  the  company  hard,  causing  losses  especially  for  the  dyestuffs
department (A. Chandler 1990a, 104). By 1921, the Executive Committee had to react, responding to the
rough situation by adopting a multidivisional, decentralized structure, with the individual departments of
explosives, dyestuffs, etc. run as separate businesses (ibid., 106ff; A. Chandler 2005, 43ff). This ultimately
lead to the Chemical Department's decentralization – its inflexibility during war times being one of the
major causes,  and the departmental  managers  desire  for divisional laboratories  another (Hounshell  &
Smith 1988, 107f)  – which left the Chemical  Department “dismembered” (ibid.,  109).  As the newly
allotted budget was only a fraction of its prior size, the remaining group of scientists was tasked with
general  chemical  research.  Still,  the  divisional  squabble  for  control  over  research  illustrates  just  how
ingrained the culture of R&D at Du Pont was at the beginning of the 1920s, with the divisional managers
arguing: “… the improvement of our products through research … are so vital to most of our industries as
to be the deciding factor in determining success or failure” (Patterson, quoted in Hounshell & Smith
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1988, 108). The reorganization set the stage for Du Pont to become a company based in a broad range of
chemical industries. Yet the company did not conquer the market through R&D, but rather through the
acquisition of competitors and patents  – the departmental research laboratories being used to fit new
technologies  and  products  to  emerging  markets,  which  was  led  by  Sparre  and  the  Development
Department (ibid., 119). 
Why was the Chemical Department not abolished completely,  but instead transformed into a central
research  organization?  For  one,  while  closer  to the  needs  of  the  manufacturing  divisions,  the  highly
specialized research at  the departmental  laboratories  did not allow for  general  or long-range projects.
Second, the Executive Committee's decisions were swayed by a strong proponent of research: Charles M.
A. Stine (Hounshell & Smith 1988, 125). Stine joined the company in 1907 as a chemist in the Eastern
Laboratory (ibid., 51), later ascending to supervise the organic research work of both laboratories (ibid.,
86), and ultimately becoming assistant director of research for the Chemical Department in 1919 where
he actively spread his “enthusiasm for science” (ibid., 126). But it was only after Reese stepped down as
research  director  in  1924  that  Stine  managed  to  convince  the  Executive  Committee  that  a  science-
oriented central research organization was needed. After a failed attempt at doing joint research with
General Motors (ibid., 126ff; cf. Chandler & Salsbury 1971, 433ff), Stine shifted strategy, exploiting the
growing diversification of the company by building alliances with the departmental laboratories, since
almost all of the Chemical Department's budget came from doing contract research for the industrial
departments. Stine successfully argued that the Chemical Department needed to stay in touch with the
departmental laboratories on the one hand, but on the other would need a large increase in money and
manpower to come up with anything big (Hounshell & Smith 1988, 135f).
No discussion of the early decades of Du Pont's R&D efforts would be complete without mentioning
“fundamental research”. It all started with a memorandum by Stine sent to the Executive Committee in
1926, titled “Pure Science Work”. In it, Stine advocated for undertaking “fundamental research work”
(ibid., 223) without products or processes in mind, but rather the discovery of new scientific facts. These
new facts would serve as the “raw materials” (ibid.) of applied research, a metaphor he reinforced by
conjuring Herbert Hoover's image of the depleting reserve of scientific knowledge (Hoover 1926). He
further referred to the successful examples of such projects in Germany and at GE to substantiate his
claims (Hounshell & Smith 1988, 223; Sturchio 1984). Four reasons were listed to undertake this new
venture: First, it would bring prestige not only in academia but also in the eyes of the general public by
shaking off the company's “merchant of death” image (Cerveaux 2013, 267).14 Second, purely scientific
14 When Du Pont failed to shake off the derogatory label, its advertising group instituted a radical change in the 1930s, 
birthing the now famous “Better Things for Better Living … through Chemistry” advertising campaign. Stine's research 
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research would improve morale and aid in recruiting. Third, results could be used as bartering chips when
trying  to  get  information  from  other  research  organizations.  Fourth,  and  last,  new  products  or
applications  might  come  forth from the  project  (Hounshell  & Smith 1988,  223;  Sturchio  1984).  In
Stine's detailed proposal of 1927, after consulting with – amongst others – Whitney of GE, he dropped
the notion of “pure science work” for the label “fundamental research”, though it is not entirely clear as
to why  he  switched.15 Stine  argued  that,  while  a  gamble,  the  new program could  aid  in  discovering
principles  that  would  allow  materials  to  be  approached  in  a  more  scientific  way.  The  Executive
Committee passed the proposal, probably due in large part to Stine's “salesmanship” (Hounshell & Smith
1988, 226). Early in 1928, Stine hired Wallace H. Carothers, and around him a group of PhDs from
prestigious universities such as MIT, Princeton, Harvard, and Johns Hopkins. The brilliant Carothers
would lead the research team that produced the breakthroughs that Du Pont R&D is most famous for:
neoprene and nylon (ibid., 229; Smith & Hounshell 1985). But commercial success with nylon only came
after  Stine  yielded  his  position  as  research  director  to  Elmer  Bolton,  moving  up  to  the  Executive
Committee himself. Bolton, a “pragmatic research director” (Hounshell & Smith 1988, 237) reorganized
the Department after the Great Depression and pushed Carothers' group towards the development of
nylon  as  a  commercial  fiber.  It  was  these  successes  that  ensured  Du  Pont  R&D  –  and  the  label
“fundamental research” – places in history. 
1907: AT&T
The  Bell  Telephone  Laboratories,  incorporated  in  1925  as  AT&T's  research  organization,  quickly
became  one  of  the  most  famous  and  most  visible  industrial  R&D  laboratories  (Reich  1980,  506f;
Lipartito 2009, 132). To understand where the eponymous Bell Labs came from, a similar approach to
what has been discussed regarding GE and Du Pont will be taken: First, the organizational framework and
its  struggles  in  a  rapidly  changing  telecommunications  industry  will  be  explored,  before  shifting
perspective towards the detailed happenings within AT&T, then to the establishment of the company's
first laboratory which ultimately became Bell Labs. 
Bell Telephone and the Business of Telephony
The  organizational  history  of  Bell  Labs  begins  with  Alexander  Graham  Bell's  work  on  harmonic
telegraphs in the 1870s and the invention of the telephone, which patents were granted for in 1876 and
program helped shift the public image towards a science-based corporation, organizing exhibits such as “Wonder World of 
Chemistry” for the 1936 Texas Centennial Exposition (Cerveaux 2013, 267f; Sturchio 1981, 42; see also Rhees 1993b). 
15 Hounshell & Smith (1988, 224) suspect that managers were more familiar with the term “fundamental research” than 
“pure science”. The term “fundamental” certainly was part of the discourse on industrial research (see e.g. Nutting 1917, 
250). Both terms went on to be used synonymously in industry in the following decades (Cerveaux 2013, 269). 
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1877. After being turned down by Western Union (WU), the dominant communications company of
the  time,  Bell  and  his  partners  organized  the  Bell  Telephone  Company  in  1877,  soon  becoming  a
successful business by renting telephones, which elicited competition in the form of a WU subsidiary, the
American Speaking Telephone Company (Lipartito 2009,  133).  In a  1878 reorganization of the Bell
Telephone company, Theodore N. Vail, the previous manager of the Railway Mail Service Commission,
became general  manager.  Renowned financier  Jay  Gould,  owner  of  the  American Union Telegraph,
planned to purchase Bell and combine his companies into a telephone-telegraph system, a direct threat to
WU, which in turn decided to strengthen Bell to fend off Gould. WU sold all of their telephone-related
patent rights to Bell, including rights to long-distance telephony, in 1879 (ibid., 134). Consolidation and
another bout of reorganization followed, and the American Bell Telephone Company (ABT) was born in
1880. 
The 1880s were characterized by moves to build a monopoly. In an effort to increase manufacturing
capacities, the growing ABT company purchased the Western Electric Company of Chicago in 1882 in
order  to  act  as  their  manufacturing  arm.  Competition was  fended off  by  continuous  purchasing  of
patents, ensuring not only a sound technological basis, but also high barriers for entry into the market for
any inventor who may have wanted to capitalize on an invention (Reich 1985, 137). To focus on long-
distance  telephones  a  subsidiary  was  founded:  the  American  Telephone  and  Telegraph  Company
(AT&T)16, which took over as the parent company of the Bell System in 1899 (ibid., 139). But even the
steep gain of customers and major growth could not stop an imminent power struggle that started when a
banking syndicate, led by New York financier J. P. Morgan, purchased a massive share of AT&T stock in
1902. Morgan used his leverage to bring back his confidant Vail, who had left the company in 1887 to
pursue his  own business  ventures.  The Panic of 1907 was  the final  straw that  tipped the balance of
executive control of AT&T into Morgan's favor, with Vail as the new president following the resignation
of his predecessor and parts of the board of directors. The pivotal year of 1907 brought not only great
transformations for the future of the telephone business, but also how AT&T would handle science and
invention.
Before the managerial and structural reshuffling that brought about Bell Labs is discussed, it is imperative
to  understand  where  product  and  process  improvements  at  AT&T  and  its  predecessor  companies
originated from. As several authors note (Reich 1985, 142; Wasserman 1985, 35), AT&T's main area of
revenue – telephones – were put on a shaky technological basis from the start, as well as the impending
threat of the expiration of the underlying patents in 1893/94 (Reich 1977a, 20). Technical functions such
as improvements and testing were first  performed by Thomas Watson,  minor experimentation being
16 From here on, AT&T shall be used synonymously with any previous incarnation of the company unless noted otherwise.
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done by new hires. In 1880 William Jacques, one of America's first science PhDs, having received his
honors  in Johns  Hopkins'  physics/electrical  engineering degree program,  joined the  company (Reich
1985, 143). He became head of AT&T's first formal laboratory, the Electrical and Patent Department in
1881. The department was under the direct oversight of Vail who was a strong proponent of its services.
Yet in his stint at AT&T Jacques seems not to have influenced the company's research policy in any
lasting manner (Hoddeson 1981, 520). In 1883 the Experimental Shop was founded as a “supplementary
research  organization”  (Reich  1985,  143),  and  renamed  the  Mechanical  Department  in  1884.  The
department's  director  Hammond  V.  Hayes,  boasting  a  PhD  in  physics  from  Harvard,  was  strongly
supportive of scientific studies, especially since many contemporary technological problems were hard to
solve without recourse to scientific basics, but when Vail quit in 1887 he was left without support on the
managerial level (ibid., 144). Indeed, the Mechanical Department had to concentrate on daily problem-
solving for other departments to such a degree, that Hayes soon scrapped any plans of doing independent
research,  in  turn  suggesting  doing  joint  research  with  students  at  MIT  and  Harvard  –  a  plea  left
unanswered by company president John Hudson.
Come  1893,  the  Mechanical  Department  was  absorbed  into  the  Engineers  Department  under  the
direction of chief engineer Joseph P. Davis (Reich 1985, 145). Hayes still managed to retain a certain
degree  of  autonomy,  with  the  Mechanical  Department  now  focusing  on  the  development  of  new
apparatuses.  At  that  time,  19  engineers  were  employed  at  the  Department,  few  of  whom  had  any
advanced degrees, and most having started at the company as technical assistants and worked their way up
(ibid.,  147).  The Department grew rapidly, as the staff increased to 148 men with advanced training,
amongst them Frank Jewett, a physics PhD from the University of Chicago with teaching experience at
MIT. 
By 1905, the department was placed under Hayes' sole leadership as chief engineer (ibid.,  148; Reich
1977a,  20).  But  interestingly  enough,  Hayes  proved  not  to  be  very  assertive  of  in-house  research
(Hoddeson 1981, 527). In his reports, he deemphasized the role of original invention and scientists, even
in the face of successful research projects such as the loading coil,  stating that the department would
instead  focus  on  incrementally  perfecting  existing  technology,  and  that  employing  “men  of  unusual
scientific attainment” would be an “expensive and probably unproductive undertaking” (Vail, quoted in
in  Reich  1985,  149).  Hoddeson  (1981,  527f)  theorizes  that  Hayes  simply  responded  to  managerial
attitudes that were skeptical of the values of science and the place of research, while Reich notes a general
conflation of the roles of inventors, scientists, and engineers symptomatic of American culture at the turn
of the century (Reich 1985, 149; see also Reich 1977a, 19). As a consequence of this research policy, the
company had to rely on the incremental increase of purchased patents from outside inventors, a strategy
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that proved mostly successful due to AT&T's strong patent position (Wasserman 1985, 42). But before
the transformations of 1907, the need to reconsider product innovation, and the coordination of design
and manufacturing, became apparent (ibid., 38). 
Establishing the Laboratory
The birth of AT&T's research organization occurred in the two pivotal years of 1907 and 1911, with
1907 bringing a reversal in corporate policy, and 1911 heradling the establishment of the company's first
official research branch (Reich 1977b, 212). The 1907 Panic brought not only a reshuffling of AT&T's
leadership,  but also severe cuts  to staff  and the demand to keep spending to a minimum. To reduce
expenses, Vail consolidated the company's engineering in New York at Western Electric (Reich 1985,
151). After Hayes' retirement, John J. Carty ascended to the leadership of the newly consolidated research
effort. Carty, having no scientific training, started at the company as a switchboard operator, receiving
training-on-the-job during his time at Bell. In the meantime, Vail started to build, extend, and protect a
“truly integrated national system” under his famous motto: “One Policy, One System, Universal Service”
(ibid.,  152f).  With  AT&T  buying  many  of  its  smaller  competitors  in  the  years  1907-13,  Vail  even
anticipated federal involvement, cultivating a relaxed attitude towards regulation and attempting to build
a benevolent relationship with the government for the Bell System (ibid., 154). 
Since the Bell System was based entirely on wires, the newly emerging technology of “wireless” – radio –
was starting to become a huge threat to AT&T's core business. In 1907, drawing on reports from Carty
and  chief  patent  counsel  Thomas  Lockwood  (ibid.,  155),  Vail  declined  to  buy  radio  patents.  Yet
awareness of the threat posed by radio grew, and both Vail and Carty decided to keep abreast of current
developments. By 1909, radio had become a “very real” threat, especially to AT&T's stockholders who
inquired  about  possible  consequences  (ibid.,  157).  Carty  focused  work  on  the  development  of  an
electronic repeater to boost signals  and succeeded in convincing Vail  that  this  repeater would be the
solution for their troubles with long-distance telephony, as well as for controlling radio. In turn, Vail
donned his broad support for a research program, approving laboratory investigations (ibid., 157f). Carty
proved to be a splendid spokesman for scientific research, convinced that science would lead to “mastery
of  the  forces  of  nature”  (Carty,  quoted  in  Hoddeson 1981,  529),  in  what  can be  seen as  a  distinct
rhetorical shift from Hayes' directorship to Carty's (Hoddeson 1981, 530). He even went so far as to
announce publicly that a transcontinental telephone line would be a reality by 1914, a bold claim that
boosted the company's reputation. 
For about a year, Carty and Jewett's research failed, which lead Jewett to studying possible avenues of
inquiry and what kind of staff would be needed for such work, coming to the conclusion that scientists
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with  advanced  degrees  were  needed  to  investigate  “areas  of  the  physical  sciences  germane  to
communications technology” (Reich 1980, 512). Bringing this proposal to the board of directors, the
creation of a small research laboratory within the Western Electric Engineering Department was approved
and integrated into the branch organization: the Research Branch was born, and it was tasked with doing
the “highest grade laboratory work” (Hoddeson 1977, 24). As both Vail and Harry Thayer, the president
of Western Electric, were very technologically oriented and sympathetic to the endeavor, both boards of
directors expressed strong support (Reich 1985, 159). The transformation of AT&T's approach to R&D
was now complete: as a 1911 report stated, the cut-and-try-era was over, and “fundamental principles”
were being investigated (ibid., 160). 
Bell Labs: The “Idea Factory”
The new laboratory grew quickly in personnel and allotments: increasing from 20 members in 1912 to
about 45 in 1914 and 106 in 1916, while the budget increased by a factor of three (Reich 1985, 176;
Hoddeson  1981,  534).  Even  though  cutbacks  were  made  in  other  parts  of  the  company  due  to  an
impending  antitrust  lawsuit,  the  Research  Branch  –  and  branches  working  closely  with  it,  such  as
Development and Transmission – got increased support, having become even more attractive in the wake
of the antitrust investigation. Research on the Audion triode lead to the successful inauguration of the
transcontinental telephone line in early 1915, making Carty's bold promise come true. For this project,
the Research Branch had not only worked on the theory and application necessary for boosting signals,
but also developed manufacturing methods. 
In those  years,  Carty served as  a  connector  between the laboratory  and the board of  directors,  both
lauding  the  laboratory's  achievements  and  channeling  management's  expectations  to  the  researchers
(Reich 1985, 167). Having only limited scientific capabilities himself, he personified AT&T's research
effort.  Jewett  oversaw  the  Research  Branch  and  concerned  himself  mainly  with  recruiting  and
coordination, while the actual overseeing and directing of research was done by H. D. Arnold, a former
student  of  the  famous  physicist  Robert  Milikan  (ibid.,  168).  They  all  “took  every  opportunity  to
demonstrate that it [the Research Branch] contributed significantly to the Bell System's welfare” (ibid.,
169), legitimizing growing expenses for research by referencing their highly conspicuous achievements.
The  laboratory's  gospel  was  also  used  in  a  highly  strategic  way  in  shaping  the  company's  public
perception: For example, radio was depicted as a means to reach inaccessible places only, showcasing it as
a technology that could not subvert the telephone, which kept subscribers and stockholders at bay (ibid.,
175).
The war  brought  several  organizational  changes  to the  laboratory:  Carty  went  to serve  in  the  Army
62
Signals  Corps,  and  Jewett  and  Arnold  were  promoted  to  chief  engineer  and  director  of  research,
respectively.  The  Research  Branch  staff  developed  radio  for  the  war  effort  and  instructed  military
personnel on radio equipment use.  When the war ended, Carty went on to become vice-president in
charge of R&D at AT&T (ibid., 180), a position that allowed him to remain an important spokesman for
research. By 1919, the growth of the Engineering Department called for another reorganization, which
transformed the Research Branch into the “Department of Physical Research Engineering” (Reich 1985,
181).  Its  scope  continued to widen after  a  decision to diversify  research,  while  the  accumulation of
telecommunications-related  patents  served  to  protect  core  markets  (ibid.).  With  Jewett  at  the  helm,
restrictions  on  interactions  with  outside  scientists  were  relaxed.  Prior  to  WWI,  attending  but  not
presenting  at  conferences  and other  meetings  was  the  norm.  Jewett  cultivated a  somewhat  academic
atmosphere  at  the  laboratory,  encouraging  his  staff  to  join  scientific  or  technical  organizations,  yet
keeping  certain  restrictions  on  publishing  (ibid.,  191ff;  see  also  Lipartito  2009,  138ff).  The
interdisciplinary teams of physicists,  mathematicians,  engineers  and technicians helped the company's
lawyers build claims in patent cases, by surveying scientific literature, and working on projects geared
towards  patentable  inventions  (Reich  1985,  198f).  Interestingly,  the  Research Branch's  methods  and
ideas  had  spread  outwards  to  the  other  branches  of  the  Engineering  Department  soon  after  its
foundation, more deeply ingraining a culture of science in the company (ibid., 201). 
Soon, management decided to make research itself into a corporate entity,  in part for the company's
public image, but also to find a home for long-range research projects (Wasserman 1985, 40). The Bell
Telephone Laboratories were incorporated in 1925 and actively promoted as “a kind of national research
laboratory,  where  the  fruits  of  pure  research  benefited science,  technology,  and American economic
interests” (Reich 1985, 184). Jewett was chosen as Bell Labs' president, Arnold its director of research (cf.
Hoddeson 1980, 432, fig. 1), and 3500 people were under their employ in Bell Labs' first year (Reich
1980, 525). With a budget of about $12 Million, Bell Labs quickly became the largest and best-known
corporate laboratory in the United States (Carlson 2007, 62). The laboratory kept branching out and
diversifying its research (cf.  e.g.  Hoddeson 1980; Russo 1981),  with its forays into solid-state physics
culminating  in  receiving  the  Nobel  Prize  for  physics  for  the  development  of  the  transistor  in  1956
(Hoddeson 1977; Carlson 2007, 61ff). With such highly visible successes, Bell Labs cemented its place in
the public consciousness as the “Idea Factory” (Gertner 2012; Ross 1931).
1912: Eastman Kodak
The last of the pioneers is Eastman Kodak. Compared to the previously discussed companies, there is
considerably less scholarship on the topic (Dennis 1987, 486), as the Kodak Research Laboratory lacks
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the historical scrutiny that the other three went through regarding its genesis, staff, and practices. As will
be seen, the story of Kodak's laboratory, and Kodak's organizational history itself,  is  less a struggle of
coalitions of actors vying for resources and interpretative dominion, but rather a narrative of the vision
and leadership of a strong company founder. This section follows a similar format: first, the business and
technological  environment  and  challenges  of  the  company  will  be  explored  and  the  relevant  actors
introduced, before shifting to the birth of the laboratory itself and its first two decades leading up to
1930.
George Eastman, Kodak and the History of Photography
Unlike GE and AT&T, whose early corporate history is characterized by a series of mergers and a various
cast  of  actors,  the  history  of  Eastman  Kodak17 is  inextricably  tied  to  one  man:  its  founder,  George
Eastman. Born in 1854, and having no scientific background, Eastman soon started to experiment with
photography, filing a patent for a plate-coating machine in 1879 (Collins 1990, 38). The following year,
Eastman started his own dry-coating business, and in 1881 formed a partnership with the businessman
Henry A. Strong to form the Eastman Dry Plate Company (ibid., 42f). After the successful manufacture
of dry-plate cameras, Eastman wanted to move into smaller “hand cameras” (ibid., 54), with the company
soon debuting the first Kodak camera in 1888 (Coe 1976, 50ff). The novelty trademark18 found its way
into  the  company name  in  1892,  when the  Eastman Kodak Company of  New York was  organized.
During all those years, Eastman's initial partner, Strong, served as the company's president. Rochester,
NY, home of Kodak Park, soon became known as the photography capital of America. 
While the initial founding and growth of Kodak as an organization was a rather straightforward affair, the
business of photography proved turbulent, specifically due to two major innovations that reshaped the
American photographic market in the late nineteenth century: the roll film system, and gelatin emulsions
for developing film (Jenkins 1975, 176). The introduction of the roll film system created a mass market
for  photographic  materials  and  apparatuses  between  1889  and  1894,  rapidly  expanding  the  young
industry until roughly 1909. Kodak soon found itself in a dominant position (Jenkins 1975, 178, table
8.1).  To  defend  this  powerful  position,  Kodak  pursued  a  strategy  of  both  horizontal  and  vertical
integration, while a powerful patent position was built. Moves of horizontal integration can be seen in the
acquisition of  Boston Camera  Manufacturing  (acquired  in  1895),  American Camera  Manufacturing
(1898), and Blair Camera (1899). 
17 From here on, unless necessary to denote a specific subsidiary or previous incarnation of the company, it shall simply be 
referred to as Kodak. 
18 The trademark “Kodak” was coined by Eastman in 1888, chosen due to its brevity, easy pronunciation, and lack of 
association with any other companies or products in the photography business (Collins 1990, 55).
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Due to Kodak's commanding patent position in roll film cameras, as well as their technological troubles
with any further development of the camera, many inventors chose to work on dry-plate cameras. Lots of
small manufacturers began competing in a market that peaked around 1898, afterwards characterized by
intense price competition. In a move to broaden the company's base of products and improve focus on
not only amateur photographers,  but also professional ones,  Kodak moved into this  market  in 1900,
purchasing  many  of  the  small  manufacturers  (ibid.,  215).  Instead  of  out-competing  the  many  small
competitors in technical innovation, Kodak chose to outperform them in marketing and supply (ibid.,
192).19 Interwoven with horizontal integration were moves to integrate vertically between 1890 and 1910:
forward into distribution systems for the roll film camera, and backward into raw materials. Interestingly,
Kodak  chose  to  construct  their  own  plants  and  manufacturing  capacities  instead  of  relying  on
acquisitions (ibid., 242ff; cf. A. Chandler 1977, 297). 
What  role  did  innovation  and  research  play  in  the  organizational  structure  prior  to  1912?  George
Eastman himself was a strong believer in “one man management”, viewing the Board of Directors' value
only as an “advisory instrument to a good manager” (Ackerman 1930, 98), and making many important
decisions himself. The company was essentially still a partnership between Eastman and Strong, with the
Board  of  Directors  representing  a  “cross  section  of  socially,  culturally,  and  financially  prominent
Rochester families” (Jenkins 1975, 234) and the company structure remaining rather simple until  the
mid-1890s.  Yet  the  following years  can be  seen as  a  gradual  relinquishing of  many of  the  functions
Eastman initially performed himself,  moving towards the construction of capacities  for technological
innovation within the company (ibid., 179). 
One early pivotal figure at Kodak was Darragh de Lancey, a mechanical engineer and Kodak's first MIT
graduate, who supervised the materials production, proving to be an excellent organizer and innovator
(ibid., 180). In 1920, Eastman credited de Lancey with having “switched Kodak Park from the empirical
to the scientific path” (George Eastman Correspondence, GECP Jan 29 1920). Using his connections to
MIT, de Lancey hired Frank W. Lovejoy in 1894, a recent graduate in chemical engineering, brought in
to oversee the crucial film support department (Jenkins 1975, 182). In the following years, de Lancey and
Lovejoy led Kodak's development efforts, in close cooperation with Eastman, who played the part of
advisor and assistant. Indeed, Eastman displayed a surprising attitude and commitment to science and
research, as evidenced both by his words and action. In describing his company, he depicted how “special
chemical  and  mechanical  departments  with  a  staff  of  skilled  hands  are  maintained  for  experimental
19 Indeed, Kodak's marketing efforts would go on to become both successful and famous, coining well-known slogans such as
“You press the button, we do the rest”, “Take a Kodak with You” (Coe 1976, 125ff; Collins 1990, 45ff, 157), and terms 
such as the Kodak Girl (Collins 1990, 156f) or the Kodak Moment (Munir & Phillips 2005). 
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purposes in order to keep in advance of all demands for improvements in every branch of photography”
(Eastman, quoted in Ackerman 1930, 145, emphasis in original). At the same time, he reached out to
professors  at  MIT, Johns Hopkins,  Columbia,  and Cornell  University to recruit graduates willing to
work on photographic  chemistry,  while  having a PhD chemist  do contractual  research work for  the
company (Jenkins 1975, 182).
Lovejoy  soon  found  a  home  at  Kodak's  Experimental  and  Testing  Department,  founded  in  1890,
amongst a group of college-trained chemists. The laboratory became the center for development work
related  to  the  company's  backward  integration,  exceeding  its  analytical  tasks  by  also  improving  on
products and processes (ibid.,  185ff,  301ff).  With the company conquering new markets in the early
twentieth century, a growing group of university-level chemists worked not only under the auspices of de
Lancey  and  Lovejoy,  but  also  in  other  parts  of  the  company.  Many  of  the  plants,  shops  and  other
organizational  units  under  Kodak's  roof  did  their  own  developmental  work  due  to  organizational
constraints  or  completely  different  practical  problems  posed  by  the  production  of  a  wide  range  of
different products, efforts that went largely uncoordinated with the Testing Department. In fact, Kodak's
staff proved to be a very heterogeneous group, including graduate-level scientists and engineers, as well as
technicians, designers, and craftsmen, often retained from acquired competitors in an effort to cultivate a
group of highly skilled and creative technical and supervisory personnel (ibid., 235, cf. 180, 219). 
The Birth of the Kodak Research Laboratories
Until 1912, two strategies for innovation had gradually formed at Kodak: Mechanical issues were solved
by relying on the skills and creativity of the in-house staff, whereas chemical problems were tackled by
purchasing  patents  generated outside  the  firm,  with the  Experimental  and Testing Department  then
working on adapting the new product or process to Kodak's existing technological base (Jenkins 1975,
304).  But  towards  the  1910s  a  threat  emerged  that  troubled  George  Eastman  and  Kodak's  existing
arrangements  for  innovation:  color  photography.  In  1910,  Eastman  had  already  established  a  color
laboratory at Kodak Park following a European trip where he witnessed the competition, but this venture
ultimately failed. On his next trip to Europe in 1911-12, Eastman was again made aware of the many
German,  French,  and British inventors  and chemists  working on color photography within chemical
firms.
At this point, the historical literature on the topic likes to relate the telling anecdote of George Eastman
visiting Bayer, one of the leading companies of the German chemical industry at the time (ibid., 305f;
Hounshell 1996, 25; T. James 1990, 50; Eastman Kodak Company 1989, 5). During conversation, he was
asked – some sources  indicate by Carl  Duisberg,  a  famous German chemist  – how many people  he
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employed in his research facility. Embarrassed, Eastman made up a number and later remarked to Joseph
T. Clarke, his European correspondent, that “if Bayer can afford a research laboratory, we can” (T. James
1990, 50).20 Eastman consulted with Clarke, certain that the success of any research venture was strongly
dependent on the man leading it (Jenkins 1975, 107, 306; T. James 1990, 50). Clarke suggested C. E.
Kenneth Mees. Mees, having graduated from the University of London in 1903 and received his PhD in
1906,  worked  at  the  English  dry  plate  company Wratten & Wainwright  as  a  partner  and  managing
director while doing a considerable amount of consulting work on the side (T. James 1990, 36ff). When
Eastman made his offer, Mees saw it as an opportunity to do proper laboratory research on problems of
photography, a matter he valued highly, especially since he saw that little basic research had been done on
the  photographic  process  in  industry  at  all  (ibid.,  49).  Agreements  were  made  pertaining  to  the
laboratory's basic operating principles. No developments of major commercial significance in the first ten
years were to be expected of the laboratory, and it  would be operating independently from the other
departments. Mees would report directly and exclusively to Eastman and Lovejoy, who would allow the
researchers  to publish their  results  unless  they ran contrary to business  interests  (Jenkins 1975,  308).
Taking two of his former colleagues from Wratten & Wainwright to Rochester, Mees went on to build
his laboratory, modeling it after two templates. His first guide was William Rintoul, who established a
famous  laboratory  at  Nobel  Explosives  Ltd.  in  England,  and  his  other  major  influence  was  Willis
Whitney, whom Mees had encountered on a visit to GE in 1912 and later cited as inspiration on how to
run a laboratory (Mees 1956, 28).
Mees' Laboratory over the Years
Initially,  the  primary  goal  of  the  research  laboratory  was  to  gain  a  scientific  understanding  of
photographic processes, coupled with the conviction that a deeper, more thorough understanding would
lead to new or improved materials and processes that could be commercially beneficial to the company
(Jenkins 1975, 310). To tackle these tasks, the laboratory was organized in different departments, covering
not  only  physics  and  organic  and  photographic  chemistry,  but  also  motion  pictures  and  color  and
practical  photography  (Kodak  Historical  Collection,  Series  7,  fol.  10).  These  departments  brought
different people with widely varying perspectives and skillsets together. The laboratory officially opened
its gates in 1913 with the completion of the laboratory building, staffed by 17 people, four of whom held
PhDs  (Kodak  Historical  Collection,  Series  6,  fol.  15).  The  laboratory  grew  quickly,  employing  40
scientists,  technicians  and  service  personnel  by  1915,  88  by  1920  and  142  by  1928,  with  research
20 The historical validity of this story is not clear, since there is no definite source. Jenkins (1975, 306n15) makes a rather 
convincing case that it likely happened: Eastman was touring Europe during that time, and interviews with Mees 
corroborate that Eastman's decision for the laboratory was influenced by a visit to the Bayer chemical company. 
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expenditures  increasing  about  tenfold  between  1913  and  1928  (Jenkins  1975,  312;  cf.  also  Kodak
Historical Collection, Series 6, fols. 15, 16). Mees instituted a conference system to encourage discussion,
and soon the laboratory published its own Abstract Bulletin so its researchers could keep updated on
current developments (Jenkins 1975, 311). 
According to Mees,  whose research interests  were reflected in the early  laboratory work, most of the
laboratory's capacities were used for the development of new products and processes, and about one third
were used to gain a fundamental understanding of the photographic process (ibid., 312). The laboratory's
scientists provided advice to Eastman and the board in matters of patent purchases (T. James 1990, 75).
Antitrust became a concern for Kodak, due to its numerous acquisitions of competitors  in the early
twentieth century.  The Taft  administration's  1912 antitrust  suit  was  ultimately  dropped,  because  of
changeovers in the administration, as well as a softening of attitudes regarding big business after the giants
had used their intense efforts made during the war for political leverage and public relations.
As illustrated by this episode, WWI played a pivotal role in Kodak's organizational structure, which was
also felt strongly in the laboratory. Eastman was an enthusiastic supporter of the United States' entry into
the war, and much of Kodak's production capabilities were geared towards aiding the government. The
laboratory  was  fully  supportive  as  well,  especially  after  Mees  made  an  emphatic  plea  regarding  the
advantages that research could bring (T. James 1990, 79ff). Soon, the Science and Research Division of
the  Signal  Corps  worked  closely  with  the  laboratory,  which  contributed  in  areas  such  as  aerial
photography,  camouflage,  or  colloidal  fuel.  The  most  important  contribution  proved  to  be  in  fine
chemicals, which had developed into a crisis due to the embargo on German synthetic chemicals. The
production of such chemicals was institutionalized after the war in the Department of Synthetic Organic
Chemicals (Jenkins 1975, 313). 
Following the war, Mees kept adding new departments, which coincided with a general broadening of the
research being done, with organic and physical chemistry especially beginning to play a bigger role (ibid.,
314). Decision-making and leadership structures for the whole company began gradually to change as
well, as Eastman slowly transferred competencies to his successor Lovejoy. Up until and including the
war, the board of directors had still reflected company ownership, making Kodak a highly centralized
corporate  entity.  When  Eastman's  old  partner  Strong  died  in  1919,  steps  were  taken  to  reform  the
organizational structure towards decentralization, a strategy that was acted upon in some areas, yet cut
short when a multidivisional structure similar to Du Pont was proposed. Still, the 1919 reorganization
created a functional structure (cf. ibid., 329, fig. 14.10), and the board of directors was soon comprised by
a  new generation of  leadership  personalities.  The  laboratory  was  a  secure  and  reputable  department
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within the company by this time. Mees served on the board of directors since 1923, and many of his
former employees held important positions in the company due to Mees' habit of transferring laboratory
staff into leadership positions (ibid., 314). Mees pushed for further extension of the laboratory, strongly
advocating for it as soon as 1927 (T. James 1990, 136ff). When he made requests two years later, he was
initially turned down, 1929 having been a bad business year for Kodak, and only succeeded after repeated
queries.  This  episode illustrates that even while research had found its way to the core of the Kodak
organization,  and  Mees  was  deeply  entrenched  and  connected,  the  ups  and  downs  of  business  still
influenced the research organization. 
By  the  late  1920s,  the  laboratory  had  arguably  become  the  world's  leading  photographic  research
institution (Jenkins 1975, 318). Mees was highly respected in- and outside of the company as a spokesman
for industrial research, making his research philosophy widely known in a series of speeches and articles. 21
It could be argued that he even managed to become the second most famous research director – after
Whitney – being helped by his penning of an influential guide on the organization and management of
industrial research (Mees 1920). 
General Themes & Concepts
At this point, several similarities and differences in the pioneers' experiences of laboratory foundation can
be seen, illustrating how the early spread of research laboratories was much more than a simple process of
adoption.  The  explanations  for  the  creation  of  these  four  laboratories,  as  synthesized  from  historic
literature,  can be found in Table 3.3.1.  In the following, some key points shall  be highlighted in the
existing explanations for laboratory emergence.
In  the  literature  on the  GE  research laboratory  it  is  generally  acknowledged  that  the  laboratory  was
founded  as  a  result  of  competitive  threats  caused  by  GE's  eroding  patent  position  (Birr  1957,  30;
Hounshell 1996, 21; Kline & Lassman 2005, 604; Reich 1985). In a move to insulate the company from
technological uncertainty brought about by the rapidly changing market, choosing the laboratory as a
solution was painted as the managerial strategy of the times. The rationale involved directly referred to the
need to solidify market control through winning the patent race, and no implications at all were made
regarding how the laboratory could transform the need to acquire competitors, a strategy that was made
precarious under the new legislation. Indeed, with the Incandescent Lamp Manufacturers Association
allowing for tight grips on the market, both European patents and the threat of market upsets due to
21 Amongst these are speeches read before the American Physical Society, at MIT and Cornell, as well as organizations such as
the Rochester City Club (cf. C. E. Kenneth Mees Correspondence, box 10, 12). He published in journals such as the 
Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, and Science. 
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disruptive new technologies that made old lamps obsolete seem to have been major motivators in the
creation of the GE laboratory. 
Table 3.3.1: Overview Pioneering Laboratories
Company Year Laboratory Founded By Main Reasons
GE 1900 Coalition of actors:
Steinmetz (chief engineer)
Davis (patent attorney)
Rice (vice-president)
Thomson (inventor-entrepreneur, 
company founder)
• Defense against competitive threats due to 
eroding patent position
• → Buying patents more expensive than 
own development work (Davis)
• → Need to understand + discover new 
principles underlying patents (Thomson)
Du Pont 1902
1903
Eastern Laboratory:
managers of Repauno (Du Pont 
subsidiary), amongst them Barksdale & 
Haskell
Experimental Station:
Experimental Committee led by Moxham
and other members of Executive 
Committee
Eastern Laboratory:
• Defense against competitive threats
• Improvement of product yields + quality
• Keeping in touch with industry 
developments
Experimental Station:
• Product improvements
• Improvement of relationship with 
government
• PR: creating a “progressive” company 
image
AT&T 1907
1911
Reversal of Research Policy:
Vail (president)
Establishment of Research Branch:
Carty (research director)
Vail (president)
Thayer (president of Western Electric)
Reversal of Research Policy:
• Panic of 1907
• Vail's goal of building national system
• Threat of radio technology
Establishment of Research Branch
• Threat of radio technology
• Failure of previous research 
Eastman Kodak 1912 Eastman (company founder, president) • Competitive threat of color photography
• “Fashion” of having a laboratory
Especially in later historical literature on the topic, a strong Chandlerian perspective can be identified, as
Dennis (1987, 486) notes in his deconstruction of these new “organizational histories”. While important
in helping us understand how the market and corporations intertwined to influence structures, and how
managerial  strategies  manifested  and  reshaped  the  organization,  such  a  perspective  must  remain
incomplete, since it takes for granted the emergence of the idea of the research laboratory (ibid., 487), as
well as the symbolic struggles of translation that made implementing the idea possible in the way that can
be witnessed in the case of GE. 
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Similar to GE, competitive threats are generally acknowledged as the main reason for Du Pont's need for
research (Hounshell 1996, 24). But instead of other manufacturers – Du Pont controlled a large share of
the explosives  market and the pace of technological  change seems to have been different than in the
electrical industry – the company faced the government as main competitor, in the form of Army and
Navy embarking on their own explosives research venture. Moreover, Du Pont had to tread lightly facing
anti-big-business sentiments and the possibility of antitrust suits, a fate that could not be averted in 1912.
Regarding the organizational shape of the laboratories, it has to be noted that much of the work on the
early  Du Pont  company has  been done by Chandler  himself  or  from a  Chandlerian perspective  (A.
Chandler  1977;  A.  Chandler  1990a;  A.  Chandler  &  Salsbury  1971),  emphasizing  corporate
transformations of the era under the tenet that organizational structure follows strategy. Thus, in this
view, the establishment of the laboratories and their later reorganizations followed simply from the du
Pont cousins' provisions to centralize and integrate vertically. The efforts to diversify during and after
WWI led to the need for departmental laboratories that served as expert consultants for a varied portfolio
of chemical products. 
At AT&T, competitive threats played an important role as well (Hounshell 1996, 24). Yet many authors
cite either increasing technological complexity or technological needs as the main factor that transformed
research at AT&T (Carlson 1997, 216; Dennis 1987, 486; Hoddeson 1980, 23; Laporte 1983, 96; Reich
1985, 177). The mounting challenges posed by increasing the telephone's range proved too difficult for
craftsmen and technicians, and staff that could investigate the underlying – that is, scientific – basis of the
technology  were  needed.  Lipartito  (2009,  134f)  bases  his  explanation on a  somewhat  related line  of
reasoning: The mitigation of risk caused by technological changes as the prime reason for research that
would help reduce uncertainty. But a detailed analysis paints a more nuanced picture, as Reich (1985,
178f) notes: The successful example of GE's laboratory surely influenced AT&T's leadership, while the
replacement  of  top management  in 1907 brought  a  group to the  head of  the  company that  viewed
organized, scientific research very favorably, underlining the role leadership played in the implementation
of organized research (Lipartito 2009, 134). It is evident that the external shock provided by the 1907
Panic was imperative in laying the groundwork for a culture of research. 
Securing  the  patent  position  also  holds  true  for  Kodak (cf.  Carlson  1997,  216),  with  the  emerging
technology of color photography about to shake up the market. At the same time, while hardly playing a
part in Jenkins' detailed coverage, Hounshell and Sturchio both mention the looming specter of antitrust
investigations brought about by the Sherman Antitrust Act that were increasingly enforced in the new
century's first decade (Hounshell 1996, 25f; Sturchio 1985, 8f), causing a decisive change in company
strategy, by having innovation be generated within the firm. A last factor, connected to the anecdote
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related above, is what one might call a fear of missing out to the competition, especially in Europe, and a
growing “fashion” of laboratory research in industry (Dennis 1987, 486; Sturchio 1985, 7). Eastman was
most certainly aware of European laboratories, as illustrated by his alleged discussion with Duisberg, and
realized  that  a  laboratory  employing  scientists  had  become  necessary  not  only  to  keep  up  with
competition,  but  also  to  keep up appearances.  This  is  further  spelled  out  by  several  features  of  the
laboratory, such as the permissive attitude towards publication that directly translated into the visibility
of the laboratory's efforts. It stands to reason that Eastman also intended the laboratory to garner prestige
for his company (T. James 1990, 50), building a bridge towards a seemingly growing appreciation for
science in American culture as a whole – a highly interesting facet of the industrial laboratory's history
that shall be explored further in this thesis. 
As  can  be  seen,  for  all  four  companies  competitive  threats  played  the  most  important  part  in  the
executives'  decisions  to  build  laboratories,  with  antitrust  reduced  to  a  minor  role.  But  the  detailed
histories allow for a much more nuanced understanding than simply relegating laboratory emergence to
clear-cut managerial strategies of the time as the organizational histories might suggest. In fact, at GE it
took several attempts and a coalition of different actors within the company to convince management of
the need for organized research, a move apparently not self-evident to managers. These actors used their
respective positions to influence the Board of Directors, utilizing different legitimizing strategies: Davis
mentioning the costs of falling behind the competition, Steinmetz outlining the practical implementation
of  such  a  venture,  and  Thomson  stressing  the  shortcomings  between  departments  and  the  need  to
investigate  underlying  principles.  As  Carlson  (1995)  shows,  the  strategy  and  structure  of  TH  and
therefore GE were strongly shaped by a variety of interest groups bargaining with each other, the birth of
the laboratory being no different (cf. Dennis 1987, 487). Both the necessity of the laboratory to prove its
own worth, as well as its standing and relations within the company, can also be understood through this
lens (Reich 1985, 107f; Carlson 1995, 89). 
At  Du Pont,  the  different  places  in  the  company's  structure  where  the  Eastern  Laboratory  and  the
Experimental Station originated underscore the need for a detailed view. While the Eastern Laboratory
came from the needs and experiences of practical work on the Repauno shop floors, the Experimental
Station arose from Moxham, a member of the Executive Committee. Threatened by the new laboratory,
the  Eastern  Laboratory's  proponents  managed  to  dramatically  trim  the  Station's  purview,  and  only
external  factors  –  Du  Pont's  relationship  to  the  Navy  –  bolstered  Moxham's  claims,  returning
competencies to the Station. Similar struggles are evident in the following years and decades through
reorganization  and  diversification,  illustrating  how  tasks,  duties,  scientific  freedoms  and  even
organizational setting were sometimes shaped by outside intervention, but mostly by individual interests
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and the rivalry between the two laboratories that was made especially obvious in the attempts to quantify
the value of research. Furthermore, the venture into “fundamental research” happened because of Stine's
entrepreneurial  actions:  “selling”  science  to  Du  Pont's  leadership,  and  drawing  upon  a  coalition  of
supporters inside the company (the industrial departments and advertisers) and outside (experience by
Whitney and others, as well as utilizing metaphors for scientific progress that were supplied by Hoover). 
At  AT&T,  the  move  towards  scientific  research  and  ultimately  Bell  Labs  may  be  seen  as  a  gradual
evolution of science and engineering in the Bell System (Hoddeson 1981, 542). The laboratory did not
grow  from  scratch  (Kline  &  Lassman  2005,  605)  but  was  yet  another  branch  of  the  Engineering
Department, with much of its initial staff, and especially its leadership, already present at the company.
From this vantage point, the place that the laboratory took in the organization for the most part – from
the  way  research  was  structured  to  the  tolerance  that  individual  researchers  were  granted  –  can  be
understood as an organizational trajectory. It required individual attitudes towards science and taking
advantage of managerial moods, to establish the organizational unit (cf. Lipartito 2009, 135ff). In Carty
we also find an actor playing the part of a “salesman” who transformed the promises of science into a
rhetoric that could persuade directors and decision-makers, whereas company president Vail was ready to
shift AT&T towards a new path. 
Contrary to GE, Du Pont, and AT&T, where top management had to be persuaded to make such a
commitment and was expecting returns that justified the expenses, the Kodak Research Laboratory had a
strong supporter in the company's highest office: George Eastman. Due to the tradition of technical
innovation at  Kodak as  illustrated  by  the  work  of  engineers  and  chemists  since  the  1880s,  Eastman
appreciated the support that scientifically trained men could give his company, which was articulated
plainly by him crediting de Lancey for switching Kodak to a scientific path (Jenkins 1975, 180), and by
his  many  supportive  statements  in  regard  to  the  scientific  approach  and  funding  (George  Eastman
Correspondence, letters from Jun 21 1910, Jul 9 1920, Dec 21 1921). With such a strong endorsement, it
was possible for Mees to negotiate the policy of having no expectations for ten years, as mentioned above,
when setting  the  groundwork for  the  laboratory.  Thus  Eastman structurally  occupied  the  roles  that
Steinmetz or Carty played at GE and AT&T, respectively. 
One final question remains: Why were scientific laboratories established, and why were scientists hired? As
evidenced  before,  depending  on  outside  inventors  for  new  products  was  standard  proceedings  for
corporations at that time, and GE even had their own inventor, Thomson, working in-house. This shift
in strategy is generally explained through reference to an increased output in scientific manpower on the
one hand (Carlson 1997, 214), but on the other a change in perception of scientists vis-à-vis inventors,
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that is, a cultural transformation (ibid.,  214f; cf. also Carlson 2007, 56). Inventors were said to work
based on genius, such as Steinmetz (see Friedel 1992, 23), depending on the crucial “eureka moment”,
whereas  scientists  projected  predictability  and  continuity,  “a  language  that  made  sense  to  managers
struggling to protect big firms in the face of uncertainty” (Carlson 1997, 215). This can also be seen in the
vague boundaries drawn between scientists, engineers, inventors, and so on (Reich 1985, 149; see also
Reich 1977a,  19).  Clearly,  there was  more  to those roles  than simply  the  functions  they  performed,
especially  since  those  tasks  were  often  conflated  as  well,  with  the  differences  between  invention,
engineering and science being muddled. Here we can see early glimpses of the need to account for a
discursive dimension that shaped and supplied cultural images of the inventor, the scientist, and so on,
that informed actors' decisions in those days and allowed actors such as Steinmetz or Carty to build a
legitimate, supportive base that would convince management to act upon their plans for laboratories.
3.4) Preliminary Findings from the Research Pioneers
In the following, some conclusions shall  be drawn from the existing research on the four pioneering
laboratories, especially regarding the cultural value of science. To conclude, the question of what made
the four companies pioneers – their efforts themselves, or subsequent scholarship on them – shall be
discussed.
General Explanatory Notions
Explanations for the birth of the industrial research laboratory can generally be grouped into two broad
categories, differentiated by the explanatory mechanism. On the one hand, older literature often hinges
on technological change, whereas newer studies from the late 1970s onwards see organizational changes as
the main factor that brought about corporate R&D. 
Technological change as an explanatory mechanism focuses on the objects at the heart of the corporate
endeavor, the things that were produced and sold: light bulbs, explosives, chemicals, cameras and so on.
From this perspective, these objects grew increasingly complex with time, and subsequently it became
increasingly complicated to make improvements to any of them, a precondition for staying competitive in
an ever-changing,  highly competitive marketplace (Bartlett 1941; Hall  1954; Birr  1966; Birr  1979; K.
Taylor  1976,  274).  The methods  and knowledge – craft  knowledge gathered by years  of  experience,
oftentimes characterized by a hands-on, cut and try, tinkering approach – utilized by those who worked
on those objects no longer sufficed to tackle the problems posed by technological advancement. That is to
say that the craftsman, the inventor, or the machine shop worker could no longer cope, thus industry
turned  to  scientists  who  promised  solutions  for  the  problems  facing  corporations  seeking  stability.
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Implicit in this view is a fundamental difference between the knowledge types that the untrained or self-
taught inventor used and the academic pool of knowledge with highly codified methods that were drawn
upon by the professional scientist. Subsequently, a clear division is made between the scientist and the
inventor, with the scientist seen as the next step in the corporate quest for innovation, thereby making the
inventor  obsolete.  Moreover,  another  implicit  assumption  within  this  perspective  is  a  teleology  of
technology: that technology necessarily grows increasingly complex with time. 
What  questions  are  not  answered  or  even  touched  upon  by technological  change  as  an  explanatory
mechanism? First, it does not explain why the organizational entity of the R&D laboratory, was placed
inside  the  firm instead of  contracting  for  it,  a  practice  previously  followed as  outlined above:  many
companies relied on a variety of independents for patents, testing, and quality control. Then why hire a
group  of  scientists  and  put  them  inside  the  firm?  Second,  this  perspective  struggles  to  explain  why
scientists were chosen at all.  It  hinges on the fundamental assumptions that methods and knowledge
differentiate scientists from their competition, and that a general supply of scientists were available for
industrial work. But why did corporate leaders turn to scientists? Were the efficacy of science and the
promise  of  the  scientific  method apparent  and  diffused throughout  executives'  offices  to  sway  their
decision-making? Had science built up such a rapport with the turn of the century that any corporate
leader would want to spend large sums on a laboratory? And why, then, did the early laboratories have to
prove themselves in the eyes of the managers? 
Further problems arise with this  explanation when it  is  probed thoroughly.  Next to the assumptions
regarding the nature of scientific and non-scientific knowledge, as well as the nature of technology, a
problematic  science-technology  relationship  is  posited:  that  science  could  solve  all  technological
challenges faced in the fields of chemistry and electrical engineering, with the application of the scientific
method immediately leading to better technology. From a sociological perspective, such assertions need to
be read with care, since ideas about the nature and relationship of science and technology, as well as their
practitioners, were strongly informed by ideologies of science, its uses, and its place in the society of those
times. Furthermore, the lines drawn between the practitioners of science and technology seem clear and
selective today, yet they were hotly contested and subject to argument in the late nineteenth century, with
the professional identities of the scientist or the industrial scientist only just emerging, in part through the
advent of industrial research. As outlined above, the inventor did not simply disappear, unable to cope
with  complex  technology,  but  rather  continued  to  play  an  important  if  shrinking  role  in  corporate
innovation. Lastly, as Smith notes, mid-century accounts were strongly informed by the popular images
of  industrial  research:  “scientists  inventing new technologies  in a  systematic and predictable fashion”
(Smith 1990, 122). Once again, it is evident that not only ideologies of the time when R&D laboratories
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were  established  played  an  important  part  in  their  advent,  but  also  today's  understanding  of  these
processes  is  heavily  dependent  on contemporary  ideologies  of  science  and progress.  Accordingly,  the
simple substitution of inventor for scientist, clearly motivated by technological concerns was far more
complex than assumed, and blind to any transformations in the environment of the corporations that
established laboratories, especially legislative changes. Of course, this criticism is far from disclaiming any
change in the nature of the technological challenges facing the pioneers, especially since newer scholarship
scrutinizing what happened within the laboratories – focusing on the technologies themselves – mapped
the changing demands and problems (cf.  Carlson 1997, 216; Dennis 1987, 486; Hoddeson 1980, 23;
Laporte 1983, 96; Reich 1985, 177), while others, focusing on the inventors, show a distinct change in
patenting activity and educational background (Lamoreaux & Sokoloff 2009, 61ff). Yet explaining the
advent  of  industrial  R&D  through  the  factor  of  technological  complexity  alone  falls  far  short  of
accounting for the complex interweaving between science, business and politics at the time. 
The organization sits at the heart of the second explanatory mechanism. This mechanism is often invoked
in more recent literature. From this perspective, the R&D laboratory as an organizational entity was born
once it corresponded with the dominant organizational logic of the time. This logic came about with the
birth of big business: the large, centralized business organization featuring integrated structures, guided
by elaborate managerial hierarchies, and taking advantage of massive economies of scale and scope. In
addition to the structural prerequisites, big business also made available the resources – in the form of
capital – necessary for costly undertakings such as in-house research (Carlson 1991, 286ff). The dominant
organizational  logic  also  prescribed  the  strategy  of  integration:  forward  into  finished  products,  and
backward into raw materials, one of these being knowledge (Dennis 1987, 487; Carlson 1997, 214). In
this way, new inventions could be developed all the way from their inception to the finished product,
ready for the market and escorted through every stage in-house. The large corporation at the turn of the
century  moving  suppliers  and  wholesalers  into  its  bounds  can  be  understood  by  following  the
organizational logic of pulling insecurity inside the firm in order to be able to better control it. The sale of
the finished product was now under direct control of the corporation, as well as the supply and quality of
the  raw  materials.  It  was  no  longer  necessary  to  depend  on  fickle  suppliers.  Similarly,  technological
uncertainty brought about by new inventions and destructive innovation could supposedly be controlled
by in-house researchers. The oftentimes related topics of antitrust and other legislation, as well as the
complicated networks of patent rights and patent sharing agreements, need to be understood from this
vantage point, as attempts at controlling external risk, with these field-level factors finding a response in
organizational structures – such as the R&D laboratory. 
Many of the later accounts of the early years of the pioneer laboratories are informed by this perspective
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(e.g. Reich 1985; Wise 1985). These two authors especially, but also the whole of the literature focusing
on  this  explanatory  mechanism,  are  heavily  influenced  by  Chandler's  work  on  organizational
development: “In Reich and Wise, we are reading the influence of Alfred D. Chandler's work on business
organization in nineteenth- and twentieth-century America.” (Dennis 1987, 486). While it is certainly a
very powerful framework for understanding how and why business organizations changed and converged
to similar forms of organizing, there are also some problems with adhering too strictly to this perspective.
As the only analytical framework utilized to understand big businesses of the time, the result is too often
predetermined, reduced to just a logical conclusion: The industrial research laboratory simply becomes
“another exemplar of the line-and-division managerial structure to which Chandler sought to attribute
the success of firms such as Standard Oil, General Electric, and DuPont” (Mirowski & Sent 2008, 645).
Too many questions go unanswered when over-emphasizing this framework, such as the employment of
scientists  working  in  groups  rather  than the  tried-and-true  method of  solitary  inventors  as  discussed
above, how managers willingly made such a risky gamble in the quest for corporate security, as well as
why they did so in organizational fields that saw the adoption of very similar strategies and structures for
large organizations. The similarities stopped here, and seemingly every corporation had to “re-invent” the
corporate setting for organized science,  instead of relying on proven templates.22 Additionally,  as  the
histories related above indicate, individual or rather entrepreneurial agency most certainly played a large
role in how the pioneer laboratories came to be – a key factor that hardly plays any part in Chandler's
framework.23 
As  Mirowski  and  Sent  note,  a  more  nuanced  view  is  needed,  “supplemented  by  legal  and  political
considerations, which Chandler largely shunned” (Mirowski & Sent 2008, 645). One possible extension
can be found in Fligstein's work on the transformation of corporate control in that era (Fligstein 1990;
Fligstein 2008). Fligstein stressed that not only environmental or field-level changes lead to transformed
organizational  structures,  but  also  added  an  ideological  level  with  the  so-called  “conceptions  of
managerial control” as collective managerial styles emerging in organizational fields, which were highly
dependent on and in interplay with the political context of business. The outgoing nineteenth century
saw direct  control  as  the  main conception of  control,  in  which competition was controlled through
22 In a perspective that relied so strongly on environmental factors bringing about a dominant organizational logic, which in 
turn influenced organizational structures, it is surprising how little of a role successful templates of the organization of 
research (the famous GE laboratory and the German example of successful research in the chemical industry, serving as 
possible answers to just these problems faced by the large corporations) played in the early years of industrial research 
laboratories. 
23 Of course, this lament is informed by works (e.g. Reich's and Wise's) using the Chandlerian framework and showing in 
detailed historical analyses the part that individuals played. My concern is not to disregard or object to their contributions, 
but rather to use their detailed insights and include them on a higher, analytical level for diffusion and organization theory 
on the one hand, as well as the historic case of the industrial research laboratory on the other. 
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patents, pricing, cartelization, and monopolization. After the first wave of antitrust legislation put limits
on this way of controlling competition, the next conception of control emerged: manufacturing control.
Here, firms relied on size and economies of scale and scope to threaten potential competitors and hinder
new market entries. Stabilizing the production process by controlling inputs and outputs became a major
priority.  This  strategy  was  first  achieved through  horizontal,  and  later  vertical,  integration.  Growing
corporations, due to their size, could then, ultimately, control the market and the competition through
oligopolistic pricing strategies. The emergence of the industrial research laboratory coincided with this
conception of control, as its rise resonated with attempts to stabilize production with better products and
to supervise  the creation and development  of  new products  until  they  were market-ready.  Fligstein's
model follows the lines of the organizational logic outlined above, but includes the complex interplay of
business and politics into the way that managerial decisions are made. 
To summarize, several explanations have been proposed throughout a century of study on the topic, and
they  all  add  valuable  perspectives  to  explain  the  emergence  of  the  industrial  research  laboratory  in
American manufacturing. While it is certainly a “combination of these factors – economic, institutional,
technical and intellectual” (Sturchio 1981, 85f) that influenced the way the laboratory was conceived and
the eventual shape it took in the large corporations, explanatory models focusing too strongly on only one
facet of the whole picture fall  short of accounting properly for the phenomenon, and often also lack
proper analytical frameworks that go beyond that proposed by Chandler (cf. Mowery 1981, 42ff). As
Mowery notes, a distinctly quantitative angle is lacking from all these contributions – granted, detailed
case studies of the pioneers may not be expected to put forward any type of quantitative analysis, yet
broader overviews do lack such a perspective, failing to add any layer of not only the spread of industrial
research,  but  also  the  development  of  large  corporations  and  their  respective  industries.  Thankfully,
necessary  groundwork  is  done  by  Mowery  and  others  (Mowery  1983a;  Mowery  1984;  Mowery  &
Rosenberg 1989; Mowery & Teece 1996) to expand on what happened after the pioneers' laboratories
were established. 
After these detailed descriptions of the current state of research in the historical and business literature,
and the overview of general explanatory models that seem to cover a lot of ground, one might ask why
another  book answering  this  question  is  needed.  In  regard  to  this  study's  conception  as  one  of  the
diffusion of innovations,  the detailed look at  the pioneers  reveals  that  the diffusion of  the industrial
laboratory can not simply be treated as the spread of the innovation from one corporation to the next,
who  were  compelled  to  establish  their  own  organizational  home  for  scientists  due  to  isomorphic
pressures.  The situation can better be described as  one of  similar  yet  not identical  conditions  in the
science-based industries  (Smith 1990,  124)  leading  to the  establishment  and  spread of  the  industrial
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research laboratory.  Yet  the laboratory itself  took many different  forms,  heavily  depending upon the
actors who pushed for its realization, as well as the specific corporation and industry (cf. also Galambos
1979,  275).  Thus,  when analyzing the industrial  laboratory we must conceive of it  as  an instance of
translation shaped by struggles for legitimation, and not as a fixed construct that diffused unchanged
throughout a set of industries. With this focus on translation, what role did individual action, which so
far has taken only a minor part in existing explanations, play?
The Role of Agency
All  the  factors  related  above  offer  important  insights  into  the  changing  environments  of  business,
technology, and politics at the time. Needless to say, different explanatory levels feature varying degrees of
fuzziness and necessarily fade out some parts of what happened. When drawing upon the very thorough
accounts of the R&D pioneers,  the importance of actors,  and with them, agency,  becomes instantly
apparent.  As  the  discussion of  general  themes and concepts  regarding the pioneers  has  shown, these
corporations can hardly be described as rational, decision-making machines when broken down to such a
level. At each corporation, group of actors struggled for the dominance of their goals, each drawing upon
different resources and building coalitions to bolster their agendas (Galambos 1984, 489f; Dennis 1987,
488; Carlson 1995), as evidenced at GE in the struggle to establish a laboratory in the first place, at Du
Pont in the competition between the laboratories, and at AT&T in the new executive group's vying for
power, just to name a few key instances. In a way, these actors functioned as translators – translating their
goals  and  claims  into  a  perspective  that  was  both  relevant  and  understandable  for  the  companies'
decision-makers (cf. Galambos 1984, 490), and emphasizing the complexity of the networks of power and
decision-making of such organizations.
Glimpses from other corporations support this conclusion. The history of the Dow Chemical Company
sounds reminiscent of Kodak, since Herbert H. Dow was a strong company leader who, as a graduate of
the Case School of Applied Sciences, valued the nature of scientific inquiry, leveraged the connection to
his Alma Mater to staff his laboratories, and used the chemical expertise concentrated at the school for
consulting work (Haynes 1939, 259ff). While there is no grand history written of the Dow laboratories,
making  it  difficult  to  pinpoint  when  exactly  the  organizational  unit  existed,  what  can  be  found  in
ancillary works supports the hypothesis that the company was engaged in research from a very early point
that  was strongly supported by the company leadership (see Whitehead 1968; Karpiuk 1984; Dalton
1995; Levenstein 1998). The story of Corning Glass further emphasizes the need to keep agency in view:
the  Houghton brothers,  founders  of  Corning,  experimented  with  various  approaches  to  innovation,
hiring their first professional scientist in 1904 (Carlson & Sammis 2009, 48), and in 1908 turned to their
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consulting scientist at Yale when the question arose of establishing a Chemical Department to deal with
challenges posed by resistant glass. The story of Corning illustrates once again the gradual evolution of
corporate R&D, as well  as the importance of the various approaches to innovation – especially craft
knowledge and science-based methods as differing approaches with a variety of advocates – experimented
with by the company's founders to bring about a research laboratory (Carlson & Sammis 2009). The
experience of the Aluminum Company of America (Alcoa) underscores how coalitions of actors pushing
for change may face insurmountable roadblocks. While boasting three laboratories in the first decade of
the twentieth century that were tasked with analysis and testing,  company founder Hall remained in a
commanding  position  of  their  technical  direction  (Graham  &  Pruitt  1990,  67).  Hall's  negative
experiences  with  in-house  technological  development  and  doubts  about  its  profitability  led  to  him
standing  in  opposition  of  establishing  a  proper  research  laboratory,  which  was  presented  to  him  as
fulfilling the functions of a technical authority for various company branches,  as well as delving into
research  on  the  company's  core  technologies  (ibid.,  73).  Only  in  1919,  after  Hall's  death,  and  with
competitive threats intensifying after their initial patents expired, was R&D put on a stable basis within
the Alcoa organization (ibid., 101ff).
This key insight further underscores the role of translation, emphasizing the way actors can bring about
change in organizational environments. Furthermore, the actors' various translations reframe their goals
(establishing laboratories) in a way that fits the companies' structures and situations, while ascribing to
what  Galambos  (1984, 490) calls sources of authority that are drawn upon to bolster claims and elicit
support. These sources of authority explain how the actor coalitions in these corporations substantiated
their claims and pushed through their preferred agendas, while weakening those of competitors fighting
for a different course of action. And it is these sources of authority – as institutionalized resources for
legitimation to stick with the term of  the  organizational  literature  – that  are  of  main interest  to the
questions posed in this book. The case histories related above strongly support drawing the conclusion
that one source of authority became more and more important with the outgoing nineteenth century:
science. 
The Move Towards Science
My argument is that the “scientification” of American society can help understand how actors within the
pioneers pushed for their goal of organized, science-based laboratory research within the confines of the
corporation, and how their arguments gained momentum and vigor in the eyes of the executives. This –
as of now hazy – move towards science can analytically be disassembled into two components.
First,  on the level  of  an organizational  field,  it  means the growth of  science  in both manpower and
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organizations. Whereas in the mid-nineteenth century those that wanted to do research in science went to
Germany to pursue their  scientific interests,  by 1900 the expansion of university capacities fueled by
federal monies and philanthropy had lead to an increased supply of scientists boasting advanced degrees,
often at the PhD level, in the natural sciences (Kohler 1990). The demand for university professors and
other academic positions did not keep up, effectuating an oversupply of scientific manpower – many of
those ready to take up positions in industry (Carlson 1997, 214). But organizational growth also means
the differentiation into a variety of sub-disciplines, the establishment of specialty journals and regular
conferences as a means of scientific communication, the expansion of science publishing, as well as the
foundation of organizations such as the American Chemical Society (ACS) and the American Physical
Society that not only focused their disciplinary activities, but also allowed subgroups of scientists to act in
a unified manner, giving their positions and policies a voice for the first time (Bates 1945; Shils 1979;
Owens  1997;  see  also  Reingold  1964;  Kevles  1995).  Yet  only  speaking  of  the  growth  of  science  in
measurable  terms  could  simply  be  added  as  a  further  layer  to  the  organizational  explanation  above
without accounting for the cultural, more indiscernible changes that took place. In fact, this would risk
oversimplifying  the  phenomenon  as  a  simple  relation  between  supply  and  demand:  industry  had  a
demand, while science supplied the manpower, and the scientist in industry suddenly becomes a simple
corollary.  Furthermore,  any  explanatory  model  that  posits  the  spheres  of  industry  and  science  as
completely separate societal subsystems, and sees the industrial laboratory as the result of a convergence of
both spheres (cf. Sturchio 1981, 84ff; K. Taylor 1976, 274), risks conflating process with result as well as
locating agency at the wrong levels.
Which is why the second component needs to be added: the cultural attributes of the organizational field
as expressed in discourse. This component is concerned with ideas about science, technology, innovation,
and the source of expertise in the American society – called discourse in my theoretical framework. It is a
consequence of the growth of scientific manpower and institutions, but also feeds back into them. Hints
of this cultural shift can – so far – be seen in the gradual evolution, not revolution (Carlson & Sammis
2009, 38), from inventor to scientist as purported in the literature, reportedly fueling the slow reduction
in significance of independent invention. According to Carlson, inventors were generally seen to possess
unique personal  knowledge and skills,  oftentimes called “genius”,  with their  basis  for  expertise  being
personal  and  their  successes  reyling  on  unpredictable  “Heureka”-moments  (Carlson  1997,  214).  In
contrast, scientists were portrayed and portrayed themselves as working in a clear, methodical manner,
making nature tamable, being able to predict the behavior of natural processes and as such reducing risk
and unpredictability – those facets that business managers of the time attempted to minimize in their
restructuring  of  big  business  (cf.  ibid.;  see  also  Hughes  1989,  138f).  Enhancing  the  organizational
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perspective with a discursive one makes it possible to understand how the cultural shift resulted in the
replacement  of  individual  genius  as  the  source  of  technological  progress  in  the  dominant  discursive
construction –  genius  had  been  replaced  by  expert  knowledge  (Friedel  1992,  19ff;  on  the  complex
relations of professionals and scientists cf.  Lucier 2009),  with the myths of the sole inventor without
regard for  science  and the  research  scientist  attacking  problems in  systematic  ways  now battling  for
symbolic hegemony (Reich 1985, 145f; Reich 1987, 344; Carlson 1997, 208). The organizational makeup
of the field influenced the discursive battles,  since, as Hintz notes,  scientists had strong “pro-research
associations like the American Chemical Society” (Hintz 2011, 737) and later governmental agencies,
such as the NRC (post-WWI), on their side, which led to their side being able to afford “far more ink
than the  independents,  and the  public  was  left  with only  one side  of  the  story” (ibid.,  738;  cf.  also
Hounshell  1980  and  1984  for  a  detailed  look  at  Edison's  relations  to  the  scientific  community).
Independent inventors, lacking any umbrella organizations, thus lost the symbolic battle. This discursive
evolution was further strengthened with science boosterism during WWI, which brought the “gospel of
industrial research” (Rhees 1987, 15ff; see also below) to the fore. 
Of course framing the emergence of organized R&D as concurrent with a cultural shift is not entirely
new and has been hinted at by a variety of authors, yet it has not gotten enough attention. While Carlson
speaks of the “cultural efficacy of science” (Carlson 2007, 69; see also 1991, 347; 1997, 214), Shils notes
that “larger movements of society where favourable” to the goals of scientists (Shils 1979, 35, also 30),
Birr speaks of a “felt need for science” (Birr 1979, 179), and Reich of a “progressive spirit” (Reich 1977a,
16), whereas Sturchio refers to a less abstract “rhetoric of utility” that influenced science and industry at
the time (Sturchio 1981, 84). But these brief glimpses illustrate how societal discourses on innovation and
expertise saw fundamental changes from the Gilded Age to the postwar era, and I argue that precisely the
discourse of the organizational field of corporate R&D served as a source of authority for actors within
the pioneering corporations, legitimizing their ambitious plans for the firms' futures, while also needing
to be translated to fit corporate objectives and the managerial worldview. 
It is precisely this cultural, discursive dimension that has not been decidedly included in any analytical
framework attempting to draw theoretical conclusions from the advent of industrial research. This shall
be done in the course of this book – framing the spread of the industrial research laboratory as a case of
diffusion in an organizational field. The historical literature offers hints at where to look when mapping
the field's discourse and especially the crucial shift in discourse that supposedly happened around this
time. The goal of this book is not to access and reconstruct the exact wordings and rhetorical strategies of
argumentation that actors such as Steinmetz or Carty drew upon, since this work was thoroughly done by
historians such as Reich, Wise,  and Hounshell and Smith, but rather to look at the other side of the
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equation: the constructions they drew upon as informed by the discourse on science, the scientist, the
professional, the laboratory, and so on. These fickle terms being constructed in discourses that are far
more complex than plain references to notions  such as  utility  and the taming of  nature  can broach,
especially considering the symbolic battles fought for science and its applications within the scientific
community at the time. What did practicing science at the time mean, what promises and claims did the
scientific  community  make  regarding  the  abilities  of  the  scientific  method,  and  what  roles  were
discursively constructed for (industrial) scientists? Systematically charting the field's discourses, as textual
expression of the institutions that were regulating organizational reality, will serve to  complement the
historical perspectives on the origins of organized research in industry.
The Status of the Pioneers
One question remains that, while not central to this analysis, will hopefully be further elucidated in the
process of the discourse analysis. The designation of the laboratories of GE, Du Pont, AT&T, and Kodak
as “pioneers” needs to be questioned with regard to whether this is due to actual pioneering efforts, or
organizational and historical story-telling that raised them to the status of pioneers through an abundance
of  literature.  The detailed descriptions  of  those four laboratories  show that  most  certainly they were
amongst the first to establish industrial research laboratories, and did so with hardly any or no templates
to draw on, sounding out on their own the most productive and efficient ways of having scientists work
in an industrial setting, often through trial-and-error. But within the literature there is often mention of
other corporations that early on used scientific methods to their gain. Standard Oil is sometimes reported
as having organized research from 1890 onwards (NRC 1940a, 259; Hounshell 1996 indicates 1906),
Dow Chemical  reportedly did laboratory  research starting in 1897,  1900,  or  1901 (NRC 1940a,  83;
Hounshell  1996,  21;  Sturchio  1981,  88),  General  Chemical  in  1899  (Sturchio  1981,  88),  Monsanto
starting in 1904 (NRC 1940a, 191), and Goodyear in 1909 (Hounshell 1996, 21; Sturchio 1981, 88).24 If
reported correctly, all these companies started their research ventures at the same time, if not earlier, than
the pioneers. This raises the question of why their laboratories did not receive the same panegyric if any at
all, possibly transforming our understanding of how the industrial laboratory came into being and how it
spread. 
The reasons for this  can only be speculated.  There is  little  systematic historiography on some of  the
companies mentioned, and while Standard Oil received a lot of attention due to its complex legal history
24 Given dates varying widely for these companies may in part be due to the complex notion of “research” and at what point 
it was designated as happening in a “research laboratory”, instead of any kind of product innovation and development 
happening at various places in the company. Especially the NRC surveys need to be regarded with skepticism as outlined 
above.
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(Larson 1969; Gibb & Knowlton 1976; Dedmon 1984; Scott & Henderson 1996; Hidy & Hidy 1995),
others received no historical scrutiny at all apart from self-published accounts of their own histories (e.g.
General Chemical Company 1919; American Cyanamid Company 1937; Dow Chemical Company 1947
and 1997; Union Carbide Corporation 1976).25 One possible  answer may concern the availability  of
company archives and the continuous existence of the company as a distinct unit: Some, such as General
Chemical, closed their gates or merged into other companies, while the four pioneers kept existing as –
more or less – distinct organizations with a clear organizational core. Continued existence plays a big role,
of course, in keeping archival material and making it available for researchers. Furthermore, each of the
pioneers had certain characteristics that may have made them more interesting for historical scrutiny.
Simplifying  intensely,  GE essentially  grew out  of  Edison's  workshop,  Edison being  one  of  the  most
venerated figures in American history. Researchers at Du Pont invented nylon and neoprene, outcomes
of their ambitious program for fundamental research, and both products became ubiquitous in American
society. AT&T connected the East and West Coast for the first time, while also doing groundbreaking
and nobel-laureated research work on the transistor in its later years. Kodak, at last, boasted a storied
founder in George Eastman, as well as a strong grip on the American unconscious with its marketing
campaigns and pervasive cameras making any moment a Kodak moment. Of course, these suggestions are
to  be  seen  as  highly  speculative,  tracing  possible  answers  of  how  the  pioneers  got  their  status.  To
conclude, in the course of this analysis it needs to be remembered that the experiences of the pioneers
were not the only experiences that we know of. Their histories are the most scrutinized and glimpses from
other  firms  seem  to  confirm  the  broad  environmental  factors  at  play,  as  well  as  the  need  to  better
understand the surrounding discourse of science and its uses as sources of authority for those actors who
pushed for change within the companies. 
4) The Organizational Field: US Chemistry, 1870-1930
The organizational field of chemistry from 1870 to 1930 was chosen as research site to analyze the effects
of  discourse  on the  diffusion of  innovations  in  organizational  fields.  The  field  of  chemistry  itself  is
defined  here  as  those  actors,  organizations,  and  discourses  in  the  environment  of  chemical  firms
establishing R&D efforts. That is, the organizational field comprises not only other chemical firms, but
organizations from other industries, academia, and on the federal level. 
25 There exist studies for several other companies focusing on research laboratories as central unit of analysis (Corning: 
Carlson & Sammis 2009; Alcoa: Graham & Pruitt 1990; Merck: Gortler 2000; Galambos & Sewell 1995; RCA: Graham 
1986). They do help illustrate the lack of clear templates for laboratories, and how strongly driven by individual agency the 
establishment of laboratories was, informing the further direction of this study, but since this chapter focused on what the 
historical literature considers the “pioneers”, they were not discussed in detail. 
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But before the field's layers can be unpacked, two questions need answering: Why chemistry, and why the
years 1870 to 1930? In regard of the first question, as the detailed history of the pioneers showed, the two
main industrial fields in which the early industrial research laboratories were established were related to
and drawing upon either chemistry or electrical engineering: DuPont and Kodak can be grouped closer to
chemistry, while GE and AT&T fall closer to the electrical engineering side. Of course it can be argued
that the latter firms' research involved chemistry as well, such as Langmuir's work at GE (cf. K. Taylor
1976, 274). Both fields, chemistry and electrical engineering, certainly possess their own identities and
trajectories – electrical engineering in relation not only to engineering, but also science, feeding from a
multitude of influences such as physics and chemistry. Chemistry on the other hand can be regarded as a
scientific field that came into its own in the nineteenth century. While analyzing the discourse in relation
to both fields would surely be fertile, charting the development of only one of those fields proved to be an
extensive undertaking, since understanding an organizational field requires one to go farther than simple
quantitative listings of actors, and more towards a decoding of cultural changes and their relation to larger
societal patterns and transformations. Thus, chemistry was chosen, and not least because the history of
the discipline proves interesting, as the nineteenth century, sometimes called the “century of chemistry”
(Nielsen & Štrbáňová 2008, 328), saw chemistry set out on a path of professionalization, differentiation,
and popularization, culminating in the pivotal role it played during WWI. 
As for the second question, the timeframe of 1870 to 1930, roughly 30 years prior to and after the birth
of the first laboratories, was chosen since such a periodization allowed for assessing discourse before and
during the establishment of the early laboratories, as well as changes within discourse in the following
years.  1870  itself  serves  as  a  reasonable  starting  point,  since  the  transformation  of  chemistry  into  a
national scientific discipline started roughly at that time, and was concurrent with important changes in
the  landscape  of  higher  education  such  as  the  foundation  of  new  universities.  1930  was  chosen  as
terminus since it can reasonably be assumed that by then, industrial research laboratories had become
firmly established within organizational discourse, with R&D laboratories having become “en vogue”.
WWI is often seen as a “watershed” moment in regard to attitudes towards science. By carrying on into
the late 1920s, it is possible to see how discourse changed once normalcy had returned after WWI, and the
United States' system of science funding, heavily modified during the war, was in place. Terminating in
1930 the great economic and political changes brought about by the Great Depression – causing layoffs
in even the most successful R&D laboratories (see e.g. Wise 1985, 283) – will not form part of the sample.
Eventually, the goal of this chapter is to establish a timeline of important actors, events, texts, and topics,
and to paint a multilayered picture of the development of the organizational field of chemistry in which
the first R&D laboratories were founded.
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4.1) Chemistry as Academic Science: Scientific Societies, Journals, and 
Chemical Education
Scientific Societies and Related Organizations
Before diving into the history of scientific societies that pertained to chemistry, let us take a brief look at
the landscape of the most important general scientific societies in the United States  (cf. Dupree 1976).
The American Academy of Arts and Sciences was founded in 1780, and more than half a century later the
American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) was born in Philadelphia in 1848, with
its stated goals being to promote scientific communication and foster collaboration. Membership in the
AAAS was open to “all friends of science, whatever their actual attainments in research” (Reingold 1964,
200),  with  a  fellowship-system  established  to  decorate  the  eminent  scientists  of  the  time.  After
postponing  their  meetings  during  the  Civil  War,  the  AAAS  resumed  activity  in  1866  and  grew
considerably. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) was founded in 1863 (Cochrane 1978; Dupree
1979). In contrast to the AAAS, the founders of the NAS aimed at creating a highly selective group of
“leading scientific savants” (Reingold 1964, 200) that would come together to establish standards for the
professional scientist, as well as seeking funding from the federal government. Together, the AAAS and
the NAS became the two most important general scientific societies after the Civil War, shaping discourse
and science policy in their wake.
Turning to chemistry,  Table 4.1.1 readily  illustrates that there were and are relatively few specialized
societies, since the increasing specialization of chemistry is covered by the elaborate divisional structure of
the American Chemical Society (Thackray et al. 1985, 176). The “prehistory” of chemical societies starts
in the late eighteenth century, with the birth of the Chemical Society of Philadelphia (1792),  a local
group of  chemists  that  disappeared around 1809 with the  death of  its  founder  (Bogert  1908,  166f).
Similar fates awaited the Columbian Chemical Society of Philadelphia (1811) and the Delaware Chemical
and Geological Society (1821) (Bogert 1908, 167ff). The Committee of Chemists at the Convention of
the Friends of Domestic Industry (1831) proved short-lived but important, since it was the first time
chemists  as  a  group  influenced  policy,  securing  congressional  legislation  for  preserving  unprotected
chemical industries against foreign interests (Browne & Weeks 1952, 8). As these cursory fragments show,
while attempts were made at organizing within the chemical profession of America, they were still highly
localized, as well as strongly dependent on their founders, whose deaths were often the reason for societies
vanishing.
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Table  4.1.1:  Foundations  of  Chemistry-related  Scientific  Societies  and  other  Professional
Associations, 1870-1930
Organization Year established 
AAAS Subsection C (Chemistry) 1874
American Chemical Society 1876
Association of Official Agricultural Chemists 1884
Chemical Society of Washington 1884
Chemists' Club 1898
American Society for Testing Materials 1898
American Ceramic Society 1899
New England Association of Chemistry Teachers 1899
New York Section, Verein Deutscher Chemiker 1900
American Electrochemical Society 1902
American Society of Biological Chemists 1906
American Institute of Chemical Engineers 1908
International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry
1919
American Institute of Chemists 1923
Sources: Bolton 1902; Bates 1945; Beardsley 1964; Bogert 1908; Lovelace 1919, 1920; Reese 1976; Thackray et al. 1985; own 
research. 
Within our timeframe of 1870 to 1930, the first proper organization of chemists can be found with the
creation of a purely chemical branch of the AAAS, Subsection C: “Chemistry”, a request granted in
1874. Yet both AAAS and NAS were often seen as lacking in key aspects, making them a far cry from a
proper  home  for  scientists,  with the  AAAS doing  little  between their  meetings,  and the  NAS being
described  as  “even  more  ineffectual”  (Kevles  1979,  140).  Thus,  the  ACS  was  founded  through  the
recognized need for an independent society that would “unite in one active, aggressive organization the
chemists of the country” (Bogert 1908, 170), as well as provide systems for indexing literature and setting
standards for analytical methods (Beardsley 1964, 23). At the “Centennial of Chemistry” in 1874, the first
steps toward establishing the organization were taken, and the ACS was officially founded in 1876 (K.
Reese  1976a  and  1976b).  The  founding  members  were  mainly  New  York  chemists,  which  led  to
discussions about how national the society should become. Prominent chemists were absent from the
group of founders (Browne & Weeks 1952, 22). 
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Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 249ff, table 2.4.
The  ACS'  early  years  were  characterized  by  struggle:  many  chemists  saw  it  as  purely  a  New  York
organization, leading to a decrease in membership during the 1880s. A rival emerged in the Chemical
Society of Washington (1884), launched by several members who had seceded from the ACS, while the
Chemical  Section of  the AAAS prospered between 1877 and 1887 (Beardsley 1964,  26).  Within the
AAAS Subsection for chemistry, attempts were made to organize local groups into a national society, in
turn triggering much-needed reform and the reorganization of the ACS (Browne & Weeks 1952, 31; see
also Bohning 1989, 1990, 2001).  The ensuing success of the ACS as a national  home for chemists is
attributed to it adopting similar organizational structures to those of the British Society for Chemical
Industry, characterized by local sections and national meetings at different venues, thereby covering the
whole country and fostering communication between widely dispersed chemists, with the federal scheme
also  aiding  to  avoid  concentration  of  control  in  one  place  (Saltzman  2006,  24;  Beardsley  1964,  29;
Browne & Weeks 1952, 81ff).  Without a doubt, by the start of the twentieth century, the ACS had
become the overarching organizational home for American chemists. 
Figure 4.1.1: Annual Membership of the ACS, 1876-1930
88
Table 4.1.2: Specialty Divisions of the American Chemical Society, 1870-1930
Division Year established
Industrial and Engineering Chemistry 1908
Agricultural and Food Chemistry 1908
Fertilizer and Soil Chemistry 1908
Organic Chemistry 1908
Physical Chemistry 1908
Medical Chemistry 1909
Rubber 1909
Biological Chemistry 1913
Environmental Chemistry 1913
Carbohydrate Chemistry 1919
Cellulose, Paper, and Textile 1919
Dye Chemistry 1919
Leather and Gelatin Chemistry 1919
Chemical Education 1921
History of Chemistry 1921
Fuel Chemistry 1922
Petroleum Chemistry 1922
Organic Coatings and Plastics Chemistry 1923
Colloid and Surface Chemistry 1926
Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 443ff, table 6.33.
While  other  chemical  societies  sometimes  proved  dangerous  for  the  ACS,  control  was  further
consolidated through specialization in divisions. The creation of the first divisions in 1908 is generally
seen as a reaction to the establishment of the American Electrochemical Society (AES) on the one hand,
as well as the American Section of the Society of Chemical Industry (SoCI) and the American Institute of
Chemical Engineers (AIChE) on the other (Thackray et al. 1985, 181; see also below). Concerns about
industrial science and the industrial chemists in particular became a pressing matter in these years, with
the ACS Division of  Industrial  and Engineering Chemistry being an attempt to unify academic and
industrial chemists under one organizational roof, and to tend to the interests of industrial chemists who
had not had any representation in the ACS before (Browne & Weeks 1952, 83). The first chairman of the
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division was Arthur D. Little, the famous consulting chemist. Looking at the further creation of ACS
Divisions  illustrates  the  changing  makeup of  the  American chemical  profession,  the  advancement  of
chemical knowledge, and the complex interplay of scientific, political, and industrial interests in such an
organization. 
The next chemical society after the ACS was the Association of Agricultural Chemists, with attempts to
organize such a group starting in 1880 and coming from the AAAS Section C. After these efforts failed, a
push in 1884 lead to the founding of the society, with its main goal being the creation of standards in
methods and procedures for agricultural  chemists  (Bogert  1908, 174f).  The outgoing nineteenth and
early twentieth century saw an explosion of organizations, not all of them being academic societies strictly
speaking,  with some  of  them being occupational  unions  of  chemists  in  various  fields:  the  American
Society  for  Testing  Materials  (1899),  the  American  Ceramic  Society  (1899),  the  New  England
Association of Chemistry Teachers (1899), and the American Leather Chemists Society (1903). One of
the more interesting organizations created at that time was the Chemists' Club (1898), a New York City-
based  society  which  set  out  to  “provide  both  a  sense  of  community  and  a  collaborative  forum  for
corporate executives, entrepreneurs, academics, and others concerned with serving and supporting the
growth of science-related industries” (Records of the Chemists' Club, Board of Trustees Minutes, 1896-
1914).  Boasting  a  well-stocked library,  explicitly  wanting  to  serve  the  chemicals  and  allied  industries
(Records of the Chemists' Club, Board of Trustees Minutes, 1909-1916), and being used by both the
ACS and the SoCI as a meeting place, the Chemists' Club soon counted prominent industrial chemists,
such as GE's Whitney and Langmuir, but also Edison, among its members. 
As mentioned, the American Section of SoCI as well as the AES (founded 1902) were seen as competitors
to the ACS. The AES brought together not only chemists, but also engineers and metallurgists. At the
time,  electrical  engineers  were  not  granted  full  membership  at  the  ACS  (Bogert  1908,  177).  The
establishment of a specialized, dedicated society illustrates the growing importance of electrochemistry
and the electrochemical industry (see also Trescott 1981). 
Another very important organization on the field level that illustrates the changing environment and
struggles for differentiation within chemistry is the AIChE, created in 1908. The Institute was born out
of rivaling traditions: those of industrial and applied chemistry, and mechanical engineering (Reynolds
1983, 1; see also Olsen 1932). The newly developing discipline of chemical engineering led to tensions
between chemical engineers, industrial chemists, and university chemists within the ACS, especially with
regard to the relationship between chemistry and chemical engineering – some favoring chemistry, other
emphasizing  the  engineering  element.  The chemical  engineers  struggled  to establish  themselves  amid
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“lower” chemical analysts and mechanical engineers, and the chemical engineer's professional identity was
one of the main reasons for the birth of the AIChE (Van Antwerpen & Fourdrinier 1958, 27; Furter
1980b). The founder of the Chemical Engineer Journal, Richard K. Meade, eventually chose to establish
the Institute, despite opposition from the ACS, who reacted with the creation of their own Division of
Industrial and Engineering Chemistry and its respective journal (see above). In the early meetings, the
pressing need arose to clarify how chemical engineering was to be defined, as well as the necessity to avoid
conflict  with  the  much  more  powerful  ACS.  The  early  AIChE  members  chose  a  strategy  of  very
restrictive membership in order to not draw away membership from the ACS, as well as underline the
Institute's role as complementary to the ACS (Reynolds 1983, 6). AIChE members had to be at least 30
years old, have engaged in “applied” chemistry, and have at least 5 to 10 years of industrial experience.
The strict membership provisions made the AIChE attractive to executives in the chemical industries,
who were malcontent with the ACS' academic dominance (Van Antwerpen & Fourdrinier 1958, 31ff).
The early years were characterized by slender resources and limited meetings26, but over time, chemical
engineering  separated  somewhat  from  chemistry  with  its  own body  of  scientific  knowledge  and  the
central intellectual concept of “unit operations” around which the field was organized (Reynolds 1991b,
184;  Van  Antwerpen  1980).  A  strong  focus  on  chemical  engineering  education  was  used  to  gain
legitimacy  as  a  subdiscipline  of  engineering  (Van  Antwerpen  &  Fourdrinier  1958,  50ff).  By  1930,
chemical engineering can be seen as an established and legitimate discipline that was perceived as a fifth
classification of basic engineering (Reynolds 1983, 20), encompassing both chemistry and engineering,
which was often at the heart of industrial chemical concerns and due to such an interdisciplinary position
of special interests to this study. 
After  the  American Oil  Chemists  Society  (1908)  and  the  American Association of  Cereal  Chemists
(1909)  were  founded,  the American Institute of  Chemists  (AIC) was organized in 1923 – originally
envisioned  as  a  economic  organization  of  chemists,  over  time  it  shifted  focus  towards  questions  of
professional ethics and conduct. This can be seen as an attempt to place the chemical profession upon a
“real  professional  basis”  similar  to that  of  doctors  or  lawyers  (Records  of  the  American Institute  of
Chemists, file 1-14; Nov 28 1928 letter from chairman to C. H. Strong). For admission to the Institute,
both chemical training and work experience was expected (Thackray et al. 1985, 32; see also Carmichael
1974). Next to its professionalization-related activities, the AIC also eventually awarded the AIC Medal
for  chemists  in  governmental,  academic  and  industrial  chemistry,  with  George  Eastman  being  the
recipient in 1930. After WWI, especially in the wake of the horrors of chemical warfare, the tendencies
towards international cooperation grew stronger, leading to the formation of the International Union of
26 For a comparison of ACS, AIChE, AES, and AIC membership over the years, see Thackray et al. 1985, 185, fig. 6.4-1.
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Pure and Applied Chemistry (IUPAC) in 1919, and taking the place of previous organizational attempts
at  coordination  beyond  national  borders.  The  IUPAC's  aims  were,  amongst  others,  to  coordinate
scientific  and  technological  activities  of  adhering  member  countries  and  their  respective  chemical
associations,  to  set  standards  for  symbols,  notations,  and  constants,  to  provide  documentation  for
industrial  products,  and to contribute to the advancement of chemistry in general (see Fennell  1994,
35ff).
In summary, the field of US academic chemistry saw a strong organizational growth from 1870 to 1930
that  illustrated  the  specialization  of  the  discipline,  some  of  which  was  absorbed  by  the  increasingly
branched divisional  structure of the ACS, while the creation of new divisions was often triggered by
either scientific developments or rival organizations. But the ACS is not the only organization we need to
keep in mind when assessing the field,  since chemistry at the beginning of the twentieth century had
become too complex in its dispersal throughout society to be adequately covered by an academic society.
Furthermore,  the interrelations of chemistry with engineering and metallurgy led to different  groups
pursuing different aims, as well as contested professional identities and lack of representation within the
ACS often causing new organizations to be born. Thus, the first layer in this timeline of chemistry offers
valuable  clues  about  relevant  actors  and interests  within the  field,  especially  concerning  the  growing
importance of the industrial chemists and their corporate advocates. 
Chemical Journals
To further assess the development, and especially differentiation, of American chemistry, one needs to
account for scientific publications as indicators of not only the expansion of knowledge, but also the
growth of the discipline in general. Books – be they monographs or edited volumes – certainly played a
role in American chemistry as well, but they will not be included in this analysis. Evidence from reference
works taking stock of chemical publications (Lovelace 1919, 1920; Crane et al. 1927; Bolton [1899] 1967,
[1903] 1967b, [1893] 2005) suggests a growth in the amount and intensity of chemistry-related books
being published,  yet no quantitative analysis of the time period in question exists to my knowledge. At
this point, we shall investigate how scientific journals and related periodicals were established, since they
are commonly regarded as the central avenue of scientific communication (Fyfe 2016), and thereby make
it  easy  to  chart  growth  and  changes.  The  history  of  American  chemical  journals  follows  a  similar
trajectory to that of scientific societies: one can perceive a trend from the personal to the organizational,
that is, early journals were highly dependent on the founder/publisher and often ceased publication once
funds lacked or the founder died, while the late nineteenth century saw an increasing number of journals
established that served as organs of organizations, giving them a more stable footing. 
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Chemists who wanted to publish their findings before 1870 had a variety of options. They could publish
in journals  such as  the American Journal  of Science (AJS) formed by the famous American scientist
Benjamin Silliman, or they could choose the proceedings of the national science organizations such as the
AAAS or the American Academy of Arts & Sciences. Furthermore, in the 1860s new journals, e.g. the
Journal of the Franklin Institute, entered the field (Beardsley 1964, 35). Yet many chose to look past the
United States  and publish abroad,  mainly in Germany,  for  the lack of  dedicated American chemical
publications at the time (Saltzman 2006, 23; Thackray et al. 1985, 176). In Germany, a variety of journals
existed that tended to different specificities of chemistry: Annalen der Chemie, Journal für praktische
Chemie, Zeitschrift für Chemie, and the Chemische Berichte, to name the most relevant ones. The total
amount of publications in foreign journals tripled between the time periods of 1879-91 and 1892-1914.
This effect must be seen as a consequence of both the differing lengths of the time periods, and the strong
growth of American chemical publications. As Crane's analysis of statistics based on Chemical Abstracts
shows,  chemical  publications  took off with a steep trajectory,  curtailed only temporarily  by the war.
Throughout  WWI,  American  shares  of  chemical  publications  grew  steeply,  further  boosted  by  the
German defeat, though these effects tapered off during the 1920s. Yet Germany was not able to reclaim
its dominant position, with the United States and Germany now settling at about level in publications.
The absolute numbers show a powerful increase in articles abstracted, from 11455 in 1909 to 29082 in
1929 (Crane 1944; see also Thackray et al. 1985, 401f, table 6.8).
It  appears  that  the Boston-based Journal  of Applied Chemistry was one of if  not the first  dedicated
journal for chemistry, established in 1866 and ceasing publication in 1876 (Thackray et al. 1985, 177), yet
there is hardly any evidence of its distribution reaching further than the confines of the city of Boston.
Lacking  national  and,  most  importantly,  stable  organizations  that  could  serve  as  centers  for
communication and to suppliers  of  the necessary funds for printing and distributing periodicals,  the
landscape for chemical publications remained chaotic until 1870, when the situation changed and it had
become  clear  that  general  scientific  journals  would  no  longer  suffice  for  the  increasingly  specialized
interests of the chemists. The American Chemist was established as a supplement to the American reprint
edition of the British Chemical News by the Chandler brothers (Thackray et al.  1985, 177; Beardsley
1964, 36; Crane et al. 1927, 69). While the journal encouraged the professional interests of the chemist, it
failed to establish relations with industry, and financial  losses led to its end seven years later,  in 1877
(Beardsley 1964, 37). With the birth of the ACS, the Proceedings of the ACS started publication in 1876,
and only three years later  came its main organ:  the Journal  of the ACS (JACS, established in 1879).
Lacking contributions  in its  early  years,  the Journal  experienced a similarly  bumpy start  as  the ACS,
which discouraged many chemists from publishing there (Beardsley 1964, 39; Kevles 1979, 143). 
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Table 4.1.3: US Chemical Journals, 1870-1930
Journal First Year of 
Publication 
Ceased Publication / 
Still Active in 1930
Journal of Applied Chemistry 1866 1875
American Chemist 1870 1876
The Laboratory 1874 1876
Proceedings of the ACS 1876 -
American Chemical Journal 1879 1914
Journal of the ACS 1879 -
Journal of SoCI (UK) 1882 -
AOAC Methods 1884 -
Bulletin of the Chemical Society of 
Washington
1884 1895
American Analyst 1885 1892
Journal of Analytical Chemistry 1887 1893
Journal of Physical Chemistry 1887 -
Electrochemical Industry 1902 -
Transactions of the American 
Electrochemical Society 
1902 -
Chemical Engineer 1904 -
Journal of Biological Chemistry 1906 -
Chemical Abstracts 1906 -
Journal of the American Leather Chemists 
Association
1906 -
AIChE Transactions 1908 -
Journal of Engineering and Industrial 
Chemistry
1908 -
Chemist-Analyst 1911 -
Journal of AOAC 1915 -
Chemical & Engineering News 1923 -
The Chemist 1923 -
Journal of Chemical Education 1924 -
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Analytical Chemistry 1929 -
Sources: Bogert 1908; Crane et al. 1927; Beardsley 1964, 34ff; Bolton [1899] 1967 , [1903] 1967b, [1893] 2005; Ihde 1964: 
270ff; Thackray et al 1985, 176ff. 
1879 also saw the first edition of the American Chemical Journal, established by the eminent chemist Ira
Remsen, who used the journal as an outlet for his own and other chemical research at Johns Hopkins
(Saltzman 2006, 24; on Remsen at Johns Hopkins cf. also H. Hawkins 1960). His journal “outclassed”
(Beardsley 1964, 40; see also Crane et al. 1927, 69) JACS in the 1880s, existing in parallel for three decades
until  1914 when the two journals merged. Indeed, it  was a merger that helped establish JACS as the
strong, central voice of American chemistry: the Journal of Analytical Chemistry, established in 1887,
merged with JACS in 1893 and boasted JACS' subscriber base considerably (Thackray et al. 1985, 177).
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw a differentiation of journals, similar to that evidenced
by chemical societies, e.g. with the establishment of the Journal of Physical Chemistry (1896) and the
Journal  of  Biological  Chemistry  (1906).  Furthermore,  newly  founded  societies  and  professional
organizations  of  chemists  created  their  own  organs,  such  as  the  Transactions  of  the  American
Electrochemical Society (1902) and the Journal of the American Leather Chemists Association (1906).
Journals occupying a position somewhere in between science and industry,  or catering to the special
interests of the chemical engineer, found their audiences after 1900: Electrochemical Industry (1902),
Chemical  Engineer  (1904),  and  Chemist-Analyst  (1911);  with  chemical  engineers  adding  another
publication with the foundation of AIChE (AIChE Transactions, 1908). The struggle for professional
identities, especially by the industrial chemist, as outlined above, that lead to the founding of the ACS
Division of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry, also brought with it a dedicated journal: the Journal of
Engineering and Industrial Chemistry (1908). As a reaction to the explosion of chemical research and
publications, the ACS started its abstracting service, Chemical Abstracts, in 1906, as a means to keep
abreast  of  the  developments  in  the  discipline  (Thackray  et  al.  1985,  180).  The  increasing  local
differentiation and professional pride intensified by WWI saw a slew of local sections launching their own
bulletins, such as the Syracuse Chemist (1908), the Chicago Bulletin (1914), the Detroit Chemist (1915),
Catalyst (1916),  Accelerator (1916),  Eastern New York Chemist (1917),  Octagon and Crucible (both
1918), and Indicator (1919) being the last of the initial wave (Rhees 1987, 231ff). In the 1920s, the ACS
added its  own “news” service,  with Chemical  & Engineering  News (1923),  a  weekly  news magazine
(Thackray et al. 1985, 181). In summary, similar to the differentiation seen on the level of scientific and
professional societies, the available platforms for periodical publication in chemistry exploded with the
turn of the century.  A variety of journals were created not only pertaining to different specialties  of
chemistry, but also to industry and different professional groups of chemists. Concurrently, the amount
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of chemical publications grew by several magnitudes, and the United States became a major player in
chemistry. 
Chemistry in Higher Education 
To conclude this assessment of the academic/scientific layer of the field of chemistry in the United States,
we shall take a look at chemistry graduates and the centers of American chemistry.
Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 257ff, tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.
Degree Definition see Thackray et al. 1985, 40n4.
Taking stock of  graduates  is  a  good way to illustrate  the  growth of  the  discipline,  and to obtain an
understanding  of  the  way  that  academically-trained  chemists  flooded  into  industry,  an  argument
sometimes found in explanations of the birth of the industrial research laboratory, as outlined above. The
numbers regarding graduates with chemical degrees, be they a Bachelor, a Second-level degree or a PhD all
show a similar trend between 1890 and 1930: absolute growth but relative decline. Thackray et al. find
exponential growth on all levels for all subjects during this time period, not just for chemistry (Thackray
et  al.  1985,  40;  see  also  Weart  1979  for  a  detailed  analysis  of  the  growth  of  physics  in  America).
Population growth is  part of the reason, but it  is  outpaced by degrees:  When calculated as  a  unit of
Figure 4.1.2: Bachelors, Second-level Degrees, PhDs in Chemistry, 1890-1930
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population, chemistry degrees quadruple, from 1200 degrees per million of the population aged 20 to 24
in 1890, to 4800 in 1930 (Thackray et al. 1985, 45; see also tables 3.4, 3.5), making the United States an
“increasingly academic nation” (ibid.). 
Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 257ff, tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3.
Shifting  from  an  absolute  perspective  towards  a  relative  one,  the  decline  of  chemistry  degrees  as  a
percentage of all  degrees,  beginning roughly in 1910,  is  intriguing,  especially for the Bachelors.  Only
Second-Level degrees increase their share, while PhDs remain stable until the 1920s, then slowly decline.
This effect is not caused by new, chemistry-related disciplines such as biochemistry, or a rise in chemical
engineering  degrees.  Instead,  a  similar  decline  can  be  perceived  for  all  the  sciences,  while  the  social
sciences, education, and administration see a marked increase (Thackray et al. 1985, 50f). Thus, while the
number of graduates with a chemistry degree increased, indeed creating a pool of manpower that was
available for positions in industry, the relative importance of chemistry at American universities declined. 
Next, some data is available regarding not only a population level, but also an organizational level, namely
doctorates awarded by different universities over the years. Thackray et al. (1985, 147ff; see also table 6.2)
cover the period from 1861 to 1899, whereas Kevles (1979, table 9) compares the years prior to 1897 with
Figure 4.1.3: Bachelors, Second-level Degrees, PhDs in Chemistry as Percentage of all Degree 
Conferrals, 1890-1930
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those between 1898 and 1915, covering the most important part of the period of interest for this study,
and right up until WWI. Even a glance at Figure 4.1.5 reveals striking differences between the reported
totals, but there are some interesting trends that can be found in both sources.27 
Johns Hopkins University is the clear leader in doctorates awarded, a fact explained by its heavy focus on
research (Beardsley  1964,  47;  Thackray  et  al.  1985,  148),  but  possibly  also  influenced  by the  strong
chemistry program built up by the influential chemist Ira Remsen. Johns Hopkins leads in both time
periods, seeing a market increase in doctorates especially during the 1890s, with its relative share declining
at the beginning of the twentieth century. Even though they show growth in absolute numbers, the shares
of degrees conferred for many of the universities in the first period, such as Harvard, Yale, and Columbia,
decline  when  compared  to  the  second.  This  is  due  to  the  period  from  1989  to  1915  that  saw  the
ascendancy of several universities. Columbia University and Cornell University in particular cement their
places in the American field of chemical education, even though the number of degrees Kevles gives prior
to 1897 varies greatly from those reported by Thackray et al. (1985). But even with these inconsistencies a
rough picture of the landscape of American higher education, and academic research in chemistry in
particular,  emerges,  especially once compared to the steep decline of doctorates awarded abroad. The
common practice of doing PhD-level research in Germany ended with the gradual build-up of capacities
for teaching and reearch in the US: Prior to 1897, 116 degrees in chemistry were awarded abroad, but
only 32 were awarded between 1898 and 1915 (Kevles 1979, table 10). The University of Berlin's decision
to accept graduate work done at a member institution of the Association of American Universities as
equal to work done in residence at a German university further consolidates this finding (Beardsley 1964,
22).  Chemical  faculty increased concurrently with the growth in graduates  and universities  awarding
doctorates as well. Reliable estimates are hard to come by or gauge, mostly due to the vagueness of the
categories of “faculty” or “college teacher” (Thackray et al. 1985, 141), yet some inferences can be drawn,
mostly based on ACS surveys. In absolute terms, chemistry faculty grew considerably in the 60 years
between 1870 and 1930, while remaining mostly stable in the years before and after 1900 when calculated
as a percentage of the total faculty, and rising after WWI (Thackray et al. 1985, 141f, fig. 5.3-1, 5.3-2).
The number of chemists appointed to college presidencies reached a peak during the 1910s and remained
strong throughout the 1920s, surely a result of WWI and chemical boosterism (see below) (ibid., 153, fig.
6.1-4). 
27 The differences in numbers must be due to differing data sources: Kevles' study is based on a list of publishing physicists, 
mathematicians and chemists from 1870 to 1915 (Kevles 1979, 158n1), while Thackray et al. base their analysis on the 
Comprehensive Dissertation Index, 1961-1972 (Thackray et al. 1985, 379, table 6.2).
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Sources: top left/right: Kevles 1979, table 9; bottom: Thackray et al. 1985, 379, table 6.2.
4.2) Chemistry in Industry: Companies, Products, and Processes
Sketching  the  growth  and development  of  the  American chemical  industry  is  a  harrowing task  that
requires a clear definition of what “chemical industry” means in the first place, which is not easily arrived
at:
Unlike industries which sell a limited variety of products (e.g., automobiles or cigarettes) or serve 
common markets (like household appliances or medical supplies), the chemical industry is an 
Figure 4.1.4: Doctorates Awarded by Universities, in Per Cent
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amalgam of highly diverse enterprises, manufacturing an astonishing array of intermediates and 
final products for a multitude of markets … . (Thackray et al. 1985, 84)
Two general terms often found divide the chemical industry into “chemical process industries” on the
one hand, and “chemicals and allied products” on the other (ibid.). The former designates a group of
industries that use chemical processes for creating their goods, such as the paper, petroleum, and rubber
industries, whereas the latter denotes a very diverse group of industries that produce chemical products,
“ranging from pesticides to perfumes” (ibid.). The most important developments in industrial chemistry
from 1870 to 1930 can be traced along these lines.  Two of the main transformation of the chemical
industry as a whole fall on the side of processes: First, processes for the artificial production of natural
chemical substances were developed, for example making the production of synthetic indigo possible.
Second, existing processes were made more efficient – the production of soda ash was revolutionized by
the Solvay Process, to name one example. Regarding products, the main change in this industry surely
was the ability to create artificial chemicals not found in nature, such as synthetic dyes (Murmann 2002,
401f; Aftalion 1991, 32ff; Haynes 1954a, 244ff). “Chemicals and allied products” have been covered by
the United States Census since 1890, and following Thackray et al., along with the availability of the data,
the discussion of the quantitative developments of chemistry utilization in industry shall mainly focus on
chemicals and allied products and be extended to the chemical process industries where information is on
hand – with the usual caveats applying to the historical data. 
The Development of the Chemical Industry
Between 1870 and 1930, the number of establishments in the American chemical industry grew steadily,
a marked uptick especially notable after WWI, when the number of firms almost doubled between 1914
and 1919. Even though direct comparisons of the early decades with those post-1900 are to be taken with
care28, a general trend of continuous growth can be perceived. 
The chemical outputs of the entire industry grew uninterrupted from 1899 to 1930, with a similar uptick
of  pace  visible  after  WWI  corresponding  to  the  number  of  chemical  firms,  with  chemical  outputs
eventually overtaking total manufacturing at the beginning of the 1930s. 
28 As Haynes (1954a, 401na) emphasizes, the early years up to 1910 need to be treated with care, as classifications of “general 
chemicals”, which the number of establishments is based on, changed repeatedly. Furthermore, “general chemicals” 
excludes sulfuric-nitric acids and other industries such as dyestuffs or fertilizers. 
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Sources: Haynes 1954a, 401; 1954b, 277; 1954c, 450. 
Of course, this rapid growth needs to be seen against the backdrop of the fundamental transformation of
American industry and society outlined above (Haynes 1954a, 244). Looking at capital investment to
gauge the relative growth of the chemical industries, the chemicals and allied product industries increased
their  share  from  4.3%  in  1879  to  6.7%  by  1929  as  the  percentage  of  capital  invested  in  total
manufacturing. Similarly, though less dramatically, the chemical process industries increased their share
from 41% to 55%. While in the early years food and primary metals accounted for most of the capital
investment in the chemical process industries, by 1929 chemicals and allied products, and petroleum had
grown considerably (Thackray et al. 1985, 89f). 
With the start of the twentieth century,  the chemicals and allied products industry had grown to be
increasingly controlled by oligopolies, with the product value that was controlled by these oligopolies
almost doubling between 1909 and 1927. Both the chemical process industries and chemicals and allied
products made up a considerable amount of the top 100 industrial corporations (Thackray et al. 1985,
90, 319, table 4.6), with the petroleum industry's rapid expansion again being illustrated here. Firms such
as Du Pont and Kodak, as well as other chemical firms, continuously stayed in this group, making up an
increasingly large share of American big business (see also A. Chandler 2005, 41ff). 
Figure 4.2.1: Number of Chemical Establishments, 1870-1930
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Base Year: 1929
Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 313, table 4.1.
Lastly, how was the American chemical industry positioned in a global context? Even though for the
decades prior to the start of the twentieth century data is lacking and the data available needs to be treated
as estimates (Murmann 2002, 400), it is clear that by the eve of WWI the United States already occupied a
large share of the world's chemicals production, which further increased after WWI being fueled by the
demise of the German industry. The seizing of German patents after the armistice (K. Taylor 1976, 273;
see also below) was key in breaking German dominance, especially in the production of synthetic dyes (cf.
Murmann 2001). The share of chemical exports show growth for the US chemical industry, from 11.2%
in 1913 to 18.1% in 1929. In exports,  Germany still  led the field after the war, even though German
dominance had been reduced by almost ten percent of the world's chemical exports, from 40.2% to 30.9%
between 1913 and 1929 respectively. On a grand scale, industrial leadership can be roughly described as
having moved from Britain to Germany, then to the United States (Murmann 2002, 405).
Figure 4.2.2: Outputs of Chemical and all Manufacturing Industries, 1899-1929
102
Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 314, table 4.2. 
Employment Trends of Chemists in Industry
After outlining the changes in the American chemical industry, be they process or product-related, let us
now focus on the chemist themselves and how they fared in the business environment. Taking stock of
the  average  number  of  wage  earners  in  the  chemical  industry  supplied  by  the  United States  Census
(Haynes 1954a, b, c), steady growth before WWI is supplanted by a steep jump that more than doubled
the number of chemical employees by 1919, followed by a decline in the immediate aftermath of the war.
How many of those wage earners in industry were actual, academically-trained chemists, in contrast  to
shop workers or administrative personnel is unfortunately harder to assess. For this purpose, Fig 4.2.4.
also shows the Census estimates for the number of chemists between 1870 and 1930, which once again
was subject to changing classifications with new disciplines emerging such as chemical engineering, and
the grouping of chemists with metallurgists and assayers (Thackray et al. 1985, 13ff, 204ff). The lower
numbers of Census Chemists compared to wage earners in the chemical industries indicate the reliance of
industry on non-chemically  trained personnel,  especially during its early years  and later  during WWI
when the wartime demands made an influx of untrained, temporary personnel likely. Contrarily to wage
Figure 4.2.3: Capital Investment in the Chemical Industries and in Total Manufacturing, 1879-
1929
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earners in the chemical industry, the rising trajectory of chemists did not see a drop after WWI, which
suggests that while industry scaled back after the intensity of the war effort, chemists still found homes in
academia and the emerging field of federal support for science and specifically chemistry (see below).
As the discussion of research personnel in industrial research laboratories above (see Fig. 3.2.3, Fig. 3.2.4)
has shown, chemists made up the largest share of industrial researchers from the earliest NRC surveys
onwards. Their ranks grew in absolute numbers, but compared to engineers the chemists lost some of
their share of total research personnel, from one in three in 1921 to roughly one in four in 1931, yet they
still maintained their central position (Thackray et al. 1985, 120). 
Sources: Haynes 1954a, 401; 1954b, 277; 1954c, 450; Thackray et al. 1985, 247, table 2.2.
Trade Associations and Other Organizations in the Chemical Industry 
No overview of the developments in the chemical industry would be complete without a thorough look
at the professional associations and other organizations shaping the field during the period of interest.
The Manufacturing Chemists'  Association (MCA) is America's oldest trade association.29 Founded in
1872 by a group of sulfuric acid manufacturers to protect chemical manufacturers against problematic
legislation and unjust freight discrimination, as well as to promote and aid the general interests of the
29 The MCA still exists today, but with a different name: American Chemical Council. 
Figure 4.2.4: Average Number of Wage Earners & Census Chemists, 1870-1930
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chemical  industry (Manufacturing Chemists'  Association,  Inc.  1972,  7),  its  ranks  soon swelled to 41
members by 1908 (Bogert 1908, 168).
Table 4.2.1: Foundations of Trade Associations and Other Professional Organizations, 1870-1930
Organization Year established 
Manufacturing Chemists' Association 1872
American Section of Society of Chemical Industry 
(UK)
1894
American Leather Chemists Society 1903
American Oil Chemists Society 1908
American Association of Cereal Chemists 1909
American Dyes Institute 1918
Société de Chimie Industrielle (FR) (American 
Section)
1919
American Association of Textile Chemists and 
Colorists
1921
Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers' 
Association
1921
Directors of Industrial Research 1923
Association of Consulting Chemists and Chemical 
Engineers Inc.
1928
Sources: Bogert 1908; Thackray et al. 1985; Haynes 1954a, b, c; own research.  
In subsequent years,  the MCA not  only conducted scientific  and technical  studies,  but  also lobbied
congress in tariff matters (Manufacturing Chemists' Association, Inc. 1972, 30ff). Its foundation can be
seen  as  the  first  signs  of  organized  action  by  chemical  industry  and  the  establishment  of  a  field  of
industrial  chemistry  in  the  nineteenth  century  (Haynes  1954a,  251).  As  indicated  above,  industrial
chemistry and the interests of chemical manufacturers were not of strong concern in the early years of the
ACS,  which  lead  to  the  creation of  the  American  Section of  SoCI  in  1894,  which  in  turn  sparked
reactions by the ACS to further the inclusion of industrial chemistry in their own ranks with the Section
of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry (see also above). The birth of SoCI in America was especially
fueled by a perceived discrimination by the ACS against articles submitted for publication by industrial
chemists,  as well as the admittance of manufacturers only as associates and not full  members (Bogert
1908,  175).  Over  the  years  a  plethora  of  professional  organizations  were  established,  some  already
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mentioned above, yet some of them became important players in the industrial field by representing their
particular branches of industry, such as the American Dyes Institute (1918), the American Association of
Textile Chemists and Colorists (1921), and the Synthetic Organic Chemical Manufacturers' Association
(1921). In particular, the American Dyes Institute, with Du Pont as a leading member, was very active in
lobbying Congress to enact an embargo on synthetic dye imports, which shaped the industry in the post-
war years (Rhees 1987, 265ff; Steen 2014). 
One newly formed organization that was of special interest not only to the business of chemistry, but to
the business of chemical research in industry, is the Directors of Industrial Research (DIR) group. The
idea appears to have been conceived when the Nela Park Laboratory's director (National Lamp Work)
visited Du Pont, with the DIR being officially founded in 1923 upon invitation from Robert Yerkes of
Yale and the NRC (see below), as well  as Reese of Du Pont and Alfred D. Flinn of the Engineering
Foundation and the NRC (David A. Hounshell  and John K. Smith Research Notes for Science and
Corporate  Strategy  (Accession  1850),  box  2).  Many  of  the  early  DIR  members  had  gotten  used  to
exchanging ideas through the war effort, and wanted to continue the fertile association and sharing of
information (cf. Hoddeson 1977, 26). The founding members were, amongst others, the corporations
Western  Electric  (AT&T's  engineering  arm),  Kodak,  Du  Pont,  Westinghouse,  and  GE,  as  well  as
organizations such as the NRC, the National Canners' Association, and the National Carbon Research
Laboratory (ibid.).  Committed to scientific  research,  the DIR had the interests  of the application of
research to the aims and needs of industry at heart, and was subsequently concerned with question of
how best to organize research in an industrial laboratory setting. Besides monthly luncheons, the DIR
also organized tours of their respective laboratories. Hardly acting in any collective way aside from the
monthly meetings, the DIR became active on the political field only briefly in the 1930s, lobbying for
several science and patent related bills. The founding of the DIR not only extends our understanding of
the field that chemical corporations found themselves in between 1870 and 1930, but also serves as a clue
to how the diffusion of  the industrial  research laboratory  transformed the organizational  field.  After
WWI, the laboratory had become an expected element of chemical corporations of a certain size, with the
existence  of  a  variety  of  laboratories  now requiring new means  of  communication and exchanges  of
expertise as well as giving birth to special organizations that furthered a research-focused agenda within
the chemical industry, such as the DIR. As a conjecture, the leadership of the four pioneers may also have
been amplified by such organizations, since the archetypal research directors, such as Whitney and Mees,
could spread their vision of science in a corporate setting. 
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4.3) Chemistry and Politics: World War I, Boosterism and the New 
Landscape of Federal Support for Science
Before diving into the relations between chemistry and politics – focusing first on the place of the chemist
in governmental employ and the organizations supporting them, and second on the effects of WWI – a
brief quantitative look at how chemists fared in federal government is in order. As before, reliable data is
hard to come by for the early years. The chiefly responsible factor is the large variety of classification
schemes  used  by  federal  departments  prior  to  1923.  Thackray  et  al.  chose  a  “pragmatic  criterion”
(Thackray et al. 1985, 26) to deal with these idiosyncrasies: They relied upon the government's definitions
of “chemist” as a distinct bureaucratic category (ibid.). While some generalizations are possible based on
this data, precautions are necessary when trying to compare these figures to the Census numbers. 
Source: Thackray et al. 1985, 358ff, table 5.13.
As can clearly be seen, the number of chemists on a federal level only grew slowly leading up to and
including the early decades of the twentieth century. With the adoption of “many novel regulatory and
service functions” (Thackray et al.  1985, 130; see below) by the federal government to cope with the
economic and societal transformations since the Civil War, more chemists were needed as well. The years
leading up to WWI and the United States' entering of the war in 1917 proved to be catalysts for a stark
Figure 4.3.1: Chemists in Federal Government, 1879-1930
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increase in the number of chemists employed on the federal level. In particular the creation of an entirely
new organizational landscape of science funding and support for science that was brought about in the
wake of WWI will  be discussed below as major factors not only in rapidly increasing the number of
chemists in government, but also in securing a novel position for chemists and chemistry in national
politics that was sustained in the interwar years.
Table 4.3.1: Foundations of Governmental Organizations Related to Chemistry, 1870-1930
Organization Year established 
U.S. Department of Agriculture 1862
National Bureau of Standards 1901
Bureau of Mines 1910
Naval Consulting Board 1915
National Research Council 1916
The Chemical Foundation 1919
Science Service 1920
National Research Endowment 
(National Research Fund)
1925
Sources: Beardsley 1964; Thackray et al. 1985; own research.
Chemists in Federal Employment 
As Beardsley (1964, 55) notes, the relationship between chemists and the (federal) government before the
twentieth century can roughly be divided into three phases. In the first phase, before the Civil War, most
chemists who did not pursue academic careers would find employment at the United States Geological
Survey and,  to a  much lesser  extent,  at  agricultural  boards and assaying offices.  These chemists  were
expected to be skilled in metallurgy and geology at a time when the specialization of sciences had not
proceeded  very  far  (ibid.,  49ff).  Apart  from the  surveys,  few notable  exceptions  existed,  such as  the
Smithsonian Chemical Laboratory (ibid., 55; see also Dupree 1957, 91ff; Pursell 1966; Kevles 1995, 10ff).
The second phase began after the Civil War. With the passage of the Morril Act of 1862, the Department
of Agriculture (USDA) was founded, which came to be one of the main employers of chemists in the
following decades  (see  Dupree  1957,  149ff).  But  the  Morril  Act  also  laid  the  foundations  for  many
agricultural experiment stations in a variety of states, which sought out the skills of the chemists and over
the year slowly transformed into chemical research centers (cf. Rosenberg 1976, 135ff). With the 1880s,
the third phase came and was designated by a more stable organization of the federal relationship with
science. New surveys such as the Coast and Geodetic Survey were conducted, the Weather Service was
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founded, and the Naval Observatory rose to further prominence (Kevles 2013, 15; Pursell 1966, 224ff).
The  agricultural  experiment  stations  were  further  strengthened  by  the  Hatch  Act  of  1887.  The
Geological  Survey  established  chemical  laboratories  in  San  Francisco,  Denver,  and  Washington,
supporting  not  only  routine  work  but  also  chemical  research  (K.  Taylor  1976,  276).  According  to
Beardsley, it was in this phase that the services of the chemists found increasing appreciation, as well as
permanence in positions (Beardsley 1964, 57). 
With the beginning of the twentieth century, the demand for chemists intensified. In 1901, the Bureau of
Chemistry was founded as a department of the USDA – its aims being the establishment of standards, as
well as the employing of chemical theory and methods to the testing of foods and drugs. This Bureau was
instrumental in the passage of the Pure Food and Drug Act in 1906 and was subsequently tasked with the
inspection of products via chemical analysis which had grown into a much greater role on the national
level.  By 1908, 425 chemists were employed in the Bureau (K. Taylor 1976, 276).  Up to and during
WWI, the USDA maintained its centrality as the employer of chemists within the federal government,
even though the share of chemists employed declined relative to other government agencies, especially
because of the rapid expansion of the Department of War and the Navy during and after WWI (Thackray
et al. 1985, 131, 132, fig. 5.2-3; Rae 1979, 257). Further opportunities for chemists arose with the creation
of new governmental organizations, such as the Bureau of Standards. Founded in 1901, it was tasked with
the testing of steel  and structural materials,  as well  as the promotion of accurate methods of analysis
(Thackray et a. 1985, 130; Pursell 1966, 233; Dupree 1957, 271ff). Seeking new research functions in the
prewar years,  it  acted as a “sort of bridge between government and industry” (K. Taylor 1976, 276).
Chemists also found a range of employment opportunities at the Bureau of Mines (est. 1910; Dupree
1957, 280ff). Oversight of the activities of the Bureau of Standards, the Patent Office,  the Bureau of
Mines, and some other agencies was moved to Herbert Hoover's Department of Commerce in the 1920s,
who sought to promote industrial research and incentivize research projects as well as cooperation within
industry (Dupree 1957, 336ff). Of course, chemists were not only active at a federal level, but also at the
state  and  local  governmental  levels  that  were  also  offering  jobs,  such  as  with  the  Boards  of  Health.
Unfortunately,  prior  to 1950,  data  on the  quantity  of  chemists  engaged at  this  level  is  not  available
(Thackray et al. 1985, 135). 
As  can be  seen,  the  pace  and  intensity  of  federal  support  for  science  increased  after  the  Civil  War,
spawning a wide number of bureaus and agencies. Many of these, especially those established prior to the
Civil War, continued to exist with altered missions when their original purposes lost importance, leading
to a “bewildering multiplicity” (Dupree 1957, 289) of governmental agencies by the time WWI started.
As federal support for science increased, a variety of governmental agencies hired chemists in one way or
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another, often tasking them with routine functions and making use of their skills in testing and analysis.
Yet the biggest shakeup came with WWI not only when the federal government began drawing heavily on
the  fruits  of  science  for  the  war  effort,  but  also  when  chemists  began leveraging  their  positions  for
increased political power and support of their own agendas.
The Effects of World War I
Without question, the Great War served as an important watershed moment for chemistry (cf. Kevles
1972, 7ff). The chemists' role in it was so eminent that in the aftermath and up until today WWI is often
touted  as  being  the  “chemists'  war”  (see  e.g.  Rhees  1993a,  41;  LaFollette  1990,  9).  Through  the
experiences of war, new areas of contact were created between politics, science, and industry, not only
restructuring the organizational  field,  but also modifying the perceptions and understandings of each
other (cf. Pursell 1966, 236f). Following Rhees (1993a), the effects of WWI, while in reality complex and
multilayered, can be analytically divided into five areas: industrialization, militarization, nationalization,
politicization, and popularization.
Industrialization
Gearing up for war caused a strong increase in industrial  activity that eventually reached unparalleled
levels (Thackray et al. 1985, 99). In particular, the increased demand for explosives, munitions, and other
chemicals was notable, as well as trained chemists available for work in plants and factories. Embargoes on
German chemicals led to severe shortages and to the so-called “chemical famine” (Haynes 1954b, 36)
(sometimes also called the “dye famine”, cf. Rhees 1993a, 41) that was due to an over-dependence on raw
and intermediate materials from abroad, and specifically from Germany who had been the world's center
for the production of synthetic dyes (Steen 2014, 30). Thus, the American chemical industry transitioned
from producing finished products to also incorporating raw materials into their production, a capital and
knowledge-intensive  process.  In  order  to  further  coordination  and  mutual  action  by  chemical
manufacturers, the Chemical Alliance was formed in 1916 (Haynes 1954b, 50ff). Legislative efforts were
made to protect and Americanize the chemical industries:  The Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917
restricted  trade  with  Germany  and  its  allies,  while  the  end  of  WWI  brought  with  it  the  dye  tariff
campaign (Rhees 1987, 263ff;  Steen 2014, 172ff), pushed for by a coalition of chemical manufacturers
and other organizations, which sought a tariff to protect the newly built industry against re-awakening
German competition, culminating in the passage of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff Act (1922). Indeed,
with the armistice  the  transformations  of  the chemical  industry had not  yet  ended,  as  the dye  tariff
campaign illustrates. American industry was further bolstered by the seizing of several thousand German
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chemical patents by the Alien Property Custodian. The seized patents were sold – for a nominal fee – to
an organization founded for just this specific purpose: The Chemical Foundation, Inc. (1919). Acting as
a hybrid organization that combined the tasks of a government agency, trade association, and private
foundation, it leased the seized patents to American firms (Rhees 1987, 272; K. Taylor 1976, 273). 30 This
competitive  advantage  allowed  the  American  chemical  industries  to  break  free  of  the  commanding
position of the German chemical manufacturers. The Chemical Foundation spent royalties on former
German patents to lobby for additional protection that was granted by Congress – this is exemplified
especially by the “steep barriers” erected to protect the domestic synthetic organic chemicals industry
from a return of German firms to the American market (Steen 2014, 203). 
In summary, WWI's effect on the American chemical industry was a strong growth in capacities, firms,
and products (see also above:  Chapter 4.2), the creation of strong legislative protection, as well as the
foundation of organizations aimed specifically at aiding and/or representing the industries and eventually
leading to the United States emerging as the leading nation in industrial chemistry (K. Taylor 1976, 273). 
Militarization
The militarization of American chemistry can be traced in two ways: corporations doing research and
development for the military on the one hand, and the foundation of new organizations building bridges
between the military and academic/industrial chemists. All of the research pioneers, as well as other firms,
were engaged to support the military during the war via research and development, such as AT&T's work
on radio and other signaling equipment, and Du Pont's involvement in the development and production
of poison gas – with the use of chemical warfare cementing itself in people's minds, thereby testifying to
the destructive power of science, and furthering the perception of chemists being instrumental to the war
effort. 
Chemical warfare research was spread over a couple of military and civilian agencies, such as the Bureau
of Mines, the Ordnance Department, the Medical Corps, the Signal Corps, and others (Rhees 1987, 168;
see also Dupree 1957, 302ff). Furthermore, several military organizations were founded to coordinate
activities, such as the Naval Consulting Board (NCB). Organized in 1915 by Josephus Daniels, Secretary
of the Navy, at the proposal of Edison, the NCB brought together a variety of members of scientific and
engineering societies to provide advice to the Navy and gear the nation toward war. The ACS chose GE's
Whitney as their representative on the Board (Birr 1957, 63ff; Wise 1985, 169ff). The NCB was the chief
30 Interestingly, A. Mitchell Palmer and Francis P. Garvan, the former and current Alien Property Custodian in 1919, saw the
main value of the Foundation as a center of research: “… These activities will furnish valuable aid in what is perhaps the 
most important work now before the country, the advancement of chemical science in the industries, and particularly in 
medicine” (Palmer & Garvan 1919, 70). 
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promoter of  the industry  preparedness  campaign prior  to the  United States  entering the  war.  Other
organizations  sought  to build  bridges  towards  academia  and industry  as  well:  The Army's  Chemical
Warfare Service undertook gas research on an unprecedented scale. By the end of the war, one third of all
American chemists were serving, or had served, in some federal agency, and 5400 chemists served in the
Armed Forces by the end of 1918 (Rhees 1993a, 41f). During demobilization, the ACS even lobbied to
keep the Warfare Service alive, since chemists had learned to appreciate the benefits of military patronage
(ibid., 42; Rhees 1987, 199). Bringing the power of science, and specifically chemistry, to bear in the war
led  to  academic  and  industrial  chemists  working  in  close  cooperation,  and  encouraging  “an
unprecedented degree of unity and cooperation in the American chemical profession which continued
into the postwar era, helping create a new sense of disciplinary identity and solidarity” (Rhees 1993a, 42).
Furthermore, important relationships between academic/industrial chemistry and agencies of the Armed
Forces were built, and proponents of industrial research, such as Whitney, were placed in key positions
that amplified their reach and visibility (Rhees 1987, 175ff).31 
Nationalization
Following Rhees (1993a), the American chemical community grew increasingly nationalized by the late
1910s. While this development is less important when accounting for the reshaping of the organizational
landscape of chemistry up through WWI, any analysis scrutinizing discursive positions needs to be aware
of nationalistic tendencies in chemistry from the outbreak of WWI onwards. On the one hand, these
tendencies manifested as chemists starting to account for their own history through the ACS Division for
the History of Chemistry, and the ascendance of Priestly to the “patron saint” of American chemistry
(Rhees 1993a, 44). On the other hand, anti-German acts such as the Chemists' Club prohibiting the use
of the German language were testament to such currents of thought (ibid.; Records of the Chemists'
Club, Board of Trustees Minutes, 1915-1929). 
Politicization
The politicization of chemistry is meant as a general descriptor of the activities undertaken by chemists in
industry  and  academia  to  influence  policy  and  legislation,  thus  placing  themselves  in  an  important
position within or vis-à-vis the federal government. During WWI this happened in a variety of ways,
transforming chemistry as a profession both in academia and industry. Industrial lobbying efforts and
31 As Lazby (1966, 262ff) argues, the relationships built between scientists and the military were only temporary and vanished
during demobilization and ensuing isolation, with the main outcome of the war being organizations such as the NRC, 
scientists' activities in international scientific organizations that sought peaceful cooperation, as well as “exertions to 
enhance the prestige and value of science at home.” (Lazby 1966, 263; cf. also Dupree 1957, 324f).
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military service have already been touched upon, but the effects of the war reached much further: As
Rhees notes,  the war was the first  time the ACS – and other chemical  societies  and organizations  –
became involved in “matters of national policy” (Rhees 1993a, 42f). The main goal was not to secure
government funding for research, but rather to ensure the protection of the chemical industries, which in
turn were seen as a provider of jobs and funds for chemists (ibid., 43). It is from this perspective that the
dye tariff campaign and other lobbying efforts need to be understood. 
But there were also other pivotal developments brought about by the politicization of chemistry, namely
the creation of an institutional framework that would administer support for science serve to mobilize the
power of science (Dennis 1987, 507ff), and act in relation to the federal government, such as the NRC or
the National Research Endowment.32 The NRC was organized at the behest of George Ellery Hale –
astrophysicist, strong advocate of research and member of the NAS – who urged his fellow members to
offer the Academy's services to President Wilson, who accepted the offer in 1916, establishing the NRC
as  an  agency  of  the  NAS  (Kevles  1968,  431;  Cochrane  1978,  209ff).  The  NRC's  mission  was  to
“undertake a national inventory of available scientific equipment and men, establish special committees
to  survey  important  problems  for  research,  and  promote  cooperation  between  investigators  in
government  bureaus,  universities,  research  institutions,  and  industrial  laboratories”  (Cochrane  1978,
211).  The NRC was essentially a federation of representatives from scientific societies,  industrial  and
government laboratories, and universities (Kevles 1971, 185), and its Executive Committee was staffed by
leading academic and industrial figures, including AT&T's Carty (Cochrane 1978, 214f) and the former
ACS president Arthur A. Noyes. Next to the Chemistry Division, which was one of the “most energetic
and effective sections” (Haynes 1954b, 40), and amongst the NRC's many committees geared towards
mobilization and support of the war effort,  was also the Committee for the Promotion of Industrial
Research, headed by Carty (ibid., 215). Preceding the end of the war, the NRC was put on a permanent
basis by executive order of President Wilson (Kevles 1968, 432ff; Cochrane 1978, 233ff), with its goals
now tilting away from putting the sciences in the service of the military, and towards the promotion of
science, the servicing of industry, and the securing of funds for academic science (Hintz 2013, 47). Even
though the NRC initially struggled to redefine its mission, it eventually came to act somewhat like a trade
association lobbying for the sciences (Mirowski & Sent 2008, 648). In the 1920s, its main purpose became
the coordination of research between the government, industry, and academia (Bugos 1989, 2), especially
32 As mentioned before, the lines between the five analytical areas boosted by the events of WWI are highly permeable. Here, 
it was chosen to discuss the NRC as liaison between scientists, industry, and the federal government, illustrating the 
increasing agency of scientists and specifically chemists on the political field. Many of the NRC's programs are obviously 
efforts to popularize science, which will be discussed below. 
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fostering relationships between private patrons and universities.33 Industrial research played a major role
in these schemes, as is illustrated by one of Hale's measures to achieve his goals of supporting research: the
Industrial Advisory Committee. Founded in 1918 and staffed with – amongst others – George Eastman
and Pierre S. du Pont, its sole purpose was to lend prestige to a “propaganda program for science” (Kevles
1968,  435;  Davis  &  Kevles  1974,  209).  Struggling  for  organizational  reasons,  the  Committee  was
reanimated in 1923 with the creation of the Division of Engineering and Industrial  Research, led by
Jewett of AT&T/Western Electric (Cochrane 1978, 288ff), and subsequently launched a campaign to
“extol the virtues of industrial research to industrial executives and the general public” (Hintz 2013, 47).
The Industrial Advisory Committee can also be seen as a precursor to another organization that boosted
the arsenal of science in the transformations following WWI: the National Research Endowment (NRE,
later renamed to National Research Fund). Organized once again at the urging of Hale, the NRE's goal
was  to  solicit  funds  from  industry  for  scientific  research  at  universities  (Cochrane  1978,  294ff).
Authorized by the NAS in 1925, the initial sponsors of the Endowment were a mix of industrialists and
politicians, chaired by Hoover, Secretary of Commerce. After a promising start with pledges by US Steel,
AT&T, George Eastman and the Rockefeller Foundation, by 1930 the NRE could not recover following
the withdrawal of a major contributor. Part of the failure can be attributed to the onset of the Great
Depression, as well as lingering leeriness regarding the uses of academic research and the dangers of the
fruits of research being made available to competitors (Davis & Kevles 1974, 214ff). 
To summarize, what can we learn from these episodes about the politicization of chemistry during WWI?
Similar  to  militarization,  the  politicization  can  be  interpreted  in  two  distinct  layers:  agency  and
organization.  Not  only  did  professional  chemists  become  active  in  the  political  field,  lobbying  for
protection and funding, but also chemistry as a discipline found new patrons. These patrons were not
only industrial in nature, as laboratories and fellowships undoubtedly existed before the war, but also
military agencies and newly founded organizations such as the NRC, which – as a quasi-governmental
entity – brought the needs of science and chemistry into the heart of the political field. Many of these
organizations  built  bridges  between  academia,  industry,  and  politics,  put  important  proponents  of
industrial  research in efficacious positions,  and had one common goal at heart:  the popularization of
science. 
Popularization
As illustrated above, WWI transformed the relationship of chemistry – in all its facets, be they at home in
33 Private patrons were of importance to the NRC itself: as Hintz points out, while operating as “quasi-government entities”, 
the NRC depended on private funding by e.g. the Carnegie Institute and Rockefeller Foundation to endow its programs 
and even give it a physical home on the National Mall in Washington, DC (Hintz 2013, 47; cf. also Kevles 1968, 436).
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academia or in an industrial laboratory – with industry, the military, and federal agencies. Another area
that saw significant changes during these years were the relationships between chemistry and the public
(Rhees  1987,  72ff;  Rhees  1993a,  45).  This  phenomenon,  the  popularization of  science,  and  with  it
chemistry,  had its roots even before the onset of mobilization and war.  At beginning of the century,
several  spokesmen for research emerged that  would preach the “gospel  of industrial  research” (Rhees
1987, 15), such as Robert K. Duncan, the director of the Mellon Institute, a private research institution
founded in 1913, and Arthur D. Little of the chemical consultancy service. Both attempted primarily to
reach industrial circles and to bolster support for chemical/scientific research in industry by publishing
books  such  as  Duncan's  “Chemistry  for  Commerce”  (Duncan  1907a)  and  “The  New  Knowledge”
(Duncan 1907b), as well as Little's Journal and newsletter (Rhees 1987, 23ff, 43ff). Interestingly, these
early “educational” efforts came from industrial or industry-related chemists, and not academia (ibid.,
51). 
Similar efforts picked up intensity, reach, and patronage with the beginning of WWI. For the first time,
chemistry made national headlines, “due to the publicity generated by the use of high explosives, the dye
famine, and chemical warfare.” (Rhees 1993a, 45). The chemist was now in the limelight of a public that
often confused them with the arcane alchemist (ibid.). Criticism was leveled at the profession, with some
writers wondering how the problems of chemical shortages following the embargo were not anticipated
(LaFollette 1990, 8; Rhees 1993a, 45). To address their public image, the ACS, the Chemical Foundation,
and other organizations started what Rhees called a “massive crusade to popularize chemistry” (Rhees
1993a,  45).  Their  experiences  with  the  dye  tariff  campaign  in  particular  made  the  ACS  realize  the
importance of public perception and the need to cultivate relations not only with congress and industry,
but also with the media, viz. journalists and editors (Rhees 1987, 65). 
Amongst the arsenal utilized in this crusade was the National Exhibition of Chemical Industries (the
“Chemical Show”), held for the first time in 1915, which offered experiments and exhibitions to the
public (Rhees 1987, 112). The Exhibition was held the next year in conjunction with the ACS meeting,
making the “Chemists' Week” a broad success by reaching tens of thousands of people and illustrating
and glorifying the power of chemistry and the status of the chemist as an expert (ibid., 125ff, 132ff).34 
Whereas  earlier  efforts  at  creating  and  distributing  a  popular  journal  had  failed,  1919  saw  the
establishment of the ACS News Service under the guidance of former ACS president Charles Herty, one
34 The Chemists' Week also shows the growing power of industrial chemists within the ACS. Tensions existed as to the 
direction and methods to be used for popular education (if at all) between academic and industrial chemists. The exhibits 
at the Chemists' Week were primarily showing the technical, daily work of industrial chemistry and not the “pure 
chemistry of the university professor” (Rhees 1987, 131), suggesting a shift in power within the ACS (ibid., 126ff). 
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of the key actors in popularization efforts. The News Service was seen as a means to “to keep the public
informed  of  chemical  developments  and  more  seriously  to  restore  public  confidence  in  chemistry”
(Bensaude-Vincent 1997,  323).  The bulletins,  written not by chemists themselves,  but by journalists,
were sent weekly to over 900 daily newspapers in an effort to keep the public informed on events in the
world  of  chemistry (Thackray et  al.  1985,  79).  With the  foundation of  the News Service – the  first
publicity  service  of  any  American  scientific  society  (Rhees  1993a,  45)  –  a  new  era  of  science
popularization had begun, wherein large institutions became active in the communication of science to
the masses (Rhees 1987, 249). A similar organization, the Science Service, established in 1920 with the
defined purpose of promoting a positive image of science (LaFollette 1990, 10; LaFollette 2006, 70ff),
was founded by the AAAS, the NRC, and the NAS along with the support of the newspaper publisher E.
W. Scripps. Utilizing newsletters and radio broadcasts, the Science Service successfully reached a broad
audience  after  a  few years,  and helped cultivate  the  emerging  field  of  science  journalism (Bensaude-
Vincent  1997,  324;  see  also Bennet  2013;  LaFollette  2006).  Next  to these  and similar  organizations,
individual spokesmen were also very active in the popularization efforts, such as the aforementioned A.
D. Little and Charles Herty, chemical journalists such as Harrison E. Howe and Williams Haynes, as well
as  the Science Service's  Edwin E. Slosson,  who together “produced cascades of celebratory literature”
(Thackray et al. 1985, 100f). Seminal works include Slosson's “Creative Chemistry” (Slosson 1919), and
Hendrick's “Everyman's Chemistry” (Hendrick 1917) (see Rhees 1987, 212). Slosson's book became a
central element of the Chemical Foundation's dye tariff campaign, and the organization served as one of
the  main  funding  and  disseminating  agencies  of  popular  literature  on  chemistry  (Rhees  1993a,  46;
Thackray et al. 1985, 101). The activities of Garvan, the head of the Foundation, and the other chemical
popularizers  came to be known as “chemical boosterism” (Thackray et al.  1985,  101).  The dye tariff
campaign in particular indicates how, with the beginning of the 1920s, the gist of popularization shifted
from  underscoring  the  importance  of  chemistry  to  national  defense,  and  towards  the  necessity  of
chemistry for economic progress. Concurrent with the need for chemistry, a need for industrial research
was communicated by Maurice Holland, head of the Division of Engineering and Industrial Research
within the NRC. Holland's plan included “bringing about an appreciation of the value of research to the
public, and popularizing the results of research which will reach the man in the street” (Holland, quoted
in Hintz 2013, 47). But Holland did not just aim at the public, but at the industrial scientists themselves,
clarifying  the  necessity  to  translate  their  research  into  understandable,  appropriate  terms  (ibid.,  48).
Similar to the Chemical Foundation's use of books, the NRC published volumes to support their claims
of the wonders of industrial research, such as Holland's “Industrial Explorers” (Holland & Pringle 1928).
As can be seen by the variety of organizations, actors, and communication channels, no definite “genre”
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of  science  popularization  existed  following  WWI  (Bensaude-Vincent  1997,  330),  with  the  chemical
boosters utilizing a variety of means to reach and influence industry, politics, and the public.
To  conclude,  some  brief  notes  on  the  popularization  of  chemistry  remain.  Once  again  the  deep
interconnectedness  of  the  layers  of  politics,  the  military,  and industry  is  evident  in the  popularizers'
plight.  Popularization  being  a  reaction  to  the  public  perception  of  shortcomings  in  the  chemical
industries, or an eminent part of the dye tariff campaign that brought together industrial and academic
interests in their efforts to lobby Congress. Even though it was seemingly personified in only a few pivotal
figures, the “crusade” had many constituencies and could only be successful by touching ground with
federal agencies and industrial patrons, as well as journalists and the public. Certainly the campaign to
enhance  the  public  image  was  successful,  not  only  for  the  increased  perception  of  chemists  as
professionals, but also for the chemical industry itself (Rhees 1993a, 46). This can also be interpreted as a
sign  of  the  successful  maturation  of  chemistry  as  a  discipline  in  the  United  States,  having  been
transformed from a “marginal branch of arcane knowledge into a key national resource” (Rhees 1987,
347). It remains to be seen how the efforts to alter the reputation of chemistry and those preaching the
“gospel of industrial research” were linked – most likely it was a complex relationship regarding questions
of where research should take place, as well as the boundary struggles of academic and industrial chemists.
All  the  efforts  to alter  the  public  perception of  chemistry  need to be  seen in relation to the  greater
backdrop of the popularization of science in general, which changed the position of science in American
culture. While not anchored within American life around the times of the Civil War, science came to be
seen  as  the  machine  fueling  progress  and  prosperity  in  the  following  decades,  further  boosted  and
complicated by the events of the Great War, with many scientists increasingly  finding their way into
popular  culture.35 Science  popularization  is  not  a  linear  process,  but  a  complex,  multidimensional
phenomenon drawing upon a variety of sources: “The various images of science are never definitively
outmoded or obsolete. Like the layers of a collective imagination, they can be reinvigorated according to
circumstances”  (Bensaude-Vincent  1997,  336).  Now that  we have  charted the  organizational  field  of
chemistry and its multitude of interrelations and layers, it is these residual, lingering images of chemistry,
of  science,  and of  culture  that  need to  be  discovered and accounted for  discursively  when trying to
understand how the growing clout of science legitimized and shaped the industrial laboratory. 
35 See LaFollette 1990, 51, table 3.1 on Scientists Prominent in Popular American Magazines, 1910-1955. Leading the chart is
Edison, a remarkable indicator of his continuing legend. But there are also several industrial scientists/chemists who made 
their way into popular accounts, such as Kettering of General Motors, Steinmetz of GE, and Baekeland of the Baekelite 
Corporation. 
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5) Capturing the Discourse about Industrial Research in US 
Chemistry, 1870 – 1930
5.1) Methodological Considerations
The relevancy of the concept of discourse to the study of the diffusion of innovations, as well as to the
legitimation and institutionalization of new organizational forms, was introduced in Chapter 2. While
our theoretical model covered what discourses are – bodies of texts – and what they do – construct and
structure social reality – the goal of this part is to get a methodological handle on the concept and to
illustrate its  operationalization in relation to the organizational  field of chemistry.  First,  some general
considerations as to the varieties of and approaches to discourse analysis will have to be made, followed by
a discussion of organizations as “speakers”, or text-generating entities in the field of US chemistry. Lastly,
methodical issues and heuristics for the assembly of a corpus of texts will be discussed.
How to Capture Discourse & Where to Start
The question of  how to capture discourse puts  a  few problems in the way of  the intrepid discourse
analyst.  The  notion  of  discourse  always  exists  in  the  area  of  tension  between  discourse  theory  and
discourse  analysis  as  a  method,  resulting  in  a  series  of  theoretically  informed  clues  that  aid  in
operationalizing the concept.  One of the central tenets  of discourse analysis is  that  discourses simply
cannot be found in their entirety or studied directly, but only through texts that serve as indicators or
material manifestations of a larger discourse (Chalaby 1996, 688; Phillips et al. 2004, 636). A text can be
regarded as the basic unit making up a discourse, with a relatively loose underlying definition of “text”: It
includes not only written material but also any symbolic expression with a material component, such as
written documents, artwork, recorded words, pictures, symbols, or other artifacts (Phillips et al. 2004,
636). But texts are not meaningful individually, “it is only through their interconnection with other texts,
the different discourses  on which they draw, and the nature of their  production,  dissemination,  and
consumption that they are made meaningful” (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 4; cf. also Chalaby 1996, 687;
Wodak 2001, 66; Schmidt 2008, 310). So to perform a discourse analysis – to capture a specific discourse
– one has to analyze bodies of interrelated texts. 
The next question, then, would be – which texts? Assembling a selection of texts into a corpus to be
analyzed is one of the first efforts of a discourse analysis, as well as a methodical task without clear-cut
instructions. As any cursory look into introductory books to discourse analysis will reveal, there exists a
large variety of ways to conduct discourse analysis, all informed by research traditions of a similarly large
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variety of disciplines (e.g. van Dijk 1985a; Potter & Wetherell 1987; van Dijk 1997; Keller et al. 2010;
Hyland & Partrige 2011). Variations of discourse analysis such as genre analysis, narrative analysis, and
critical  discourse  analysis,  or  approaches  informed  by  the  sociology  of  knowledge,  the  analysis  of
hegemony, or more formalized procedures relying on simple coding schemas all offer their own ideas
about assembling a corpus and analyzing texts (cf. Phillips & Hardy 2002, 18ff; Phillips et al. 2004, 637;
van Dijk 1985b; Wodak & Meyer 2001; Klincewicz 2006). Inevitably, every discourse analysis is unique,
depending  on the  theoretical  emphasis  and  the  choice  of  methodical  toolbox  – decisions  necessarily
informed by research question, site, and availability and type of material (compare the different types of
texts collected and the different ways they are used, though starting from the same theoretical premises, in
Munir & Phillips 2005; Maguire & Hardy 2006; Maguire & Hardy 2009; and Maguire & Hardy 2013).
As Keller (2010, 218) argues, neither the criteria for the selection of texts, nor the textual analysis can be
completely standardized (see also Schwab-Trapp 2010, 171f). Accordingly, any serious discourse analysis
needs to make all those decisions involved in the assembly and analysis of a corpus of texts as transparent,
documented and traceable as possible, presenting well-founded reasoning at all of the critical junctures
that come up when faced with the tasks of selecting or omitting texts, developing heuristics for analysis,
and generalizing interpretations. 
From Field to Speaker
These  preliminary  observations  illustrate  the  lack  of  clear-cut,  step-by-step  guides  on  conducting
discourse analysis. Which brings us back to our initial question – Which texts should be looked at to
understand the discourse surrounding the early industrial research laboratories? As outlined above, the
research site (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 66ff) of this study is the organizational field in which the early R&D
laboratories flourished. Utilizing the notion of organizational field aids in steering clear of preconceived
notions of academia or industry and their respective organizations, instead allowing the assembly of a
hybrid  field  of  organizations  at  the  intersection  of  academia,  industry,  and  government.  The
organizations  described  in  detail  in Chapter  4  are  considered  “speakers”,  i.e.  text-generating  entities
contributing to the discourse on industrial research laboratories (cf. Keller 2010, 210). Of course, not all
of the organizations found in the tables of the preceding chapter generate discursive texts of relevance or
at all, as was the case for e.g. MCA and NCB. Other reasons for trimming the list of possible speakers exist
as well: some organizations were considered too local or regional such as the NY Section of the Verein
Deutscher Chemiker; while others were eventually subsumed under the umbrella of larger organizations
such as the ACS, as was the case for the Chemical Society of Washington. And again, others, like the
American  Association  of  Cereal  Chemists,  were  upon  scrutiny  considered  of  minor  interest  to  the
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organizational  field  that  saw  the  genesis  of  the  R&D  laboratory.  Furthermore,  those  organizations
founded during the war in particular brought together authors from academia, industry, and other fields
whose positions were doubtlessly put to print in general journals. In this way, historical knowledge of the
organizational field aids in generating a list of speakers, particularly in determining which speakers are
relevant and in what publications the perspectives of a variety of less “vocal” speakers may converge or be
covered at all. 
What kind of texts are these organizations producing? In the case of the ACS, publications such as JACS
or the Proceedings can be regarded as texts, with the same holding true for the Journal of the American
Section of SoCI or the Bulletin of the NRC, to name but a few examples. These texts can be considered
“naturally occurring” (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 70ff), as opposed to researcher-instigated discourse such as
interviews. Thus the organizational field of chemistry offers a rich collection of texts from a variety of
sources in the time frame of 1870-1930. But the thick description of the historical development of the
field served not only to identify speakers,  but also to provide context,  allowing the construction of a
timeline of events and chronicling “'who did what, and when.'” (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 153, emphasis
in original). As outlined, I am interested not only in the texts themselves, but also their conditions of
production, dissemination, and consumption – a task only made possible through the context that the
historical trajectory of the field provides: “... if we are to understand discourses and their effects, we must
also understand the context in which they arise ...” (ibid., 4; cf. also Van Dijk 1997, 3). The positions and
interrelations  of  text-generating  organizations  can only  be  understood  if  looked at  in  their  historical
context, and especially with concern for the entrance of new organizations to the field, as is the case with
the AIChE for example – the relation of its texts vis-à-vis those of the ACS can only be properly assessed
when understanding the conditions surrounding its foundation. As Fairclough (1992, 71ff) puts it, it is
important to situate discursive texts within a three-dimensional conception of discourse (ibid., 73, fig.
3.1),  to place texts within surrounding discursive as well  as  social  practices,  and to connect “texts  to
discourses, locating them in a historical and social context, by which we refer to the particular actors,
relationships,  and practices  that  characterize  the situation under study.”  (Phillips  & Hardy 2002,  4).
Coupled with the event timeline, this added layer of discourse captures “'who  said what, and when.'”
(Maguire & Hardy 2009, 153, emphasis in original). Such a discursive-historical approach can also serve
as a triangulation, with the variety of empirical data and contextual information being used to check for
analyst biases (cf. Wodak 2001, 65) – but more on this later. Similar perspectives on how discursive texts
and contextual material inform and supplement each other can be found in studies that use  an ODA
framework (e.g. Lawrence & Phillips 2004; Munir & Phillips 2005; Maguire & Hardy 2009). 
Two questions have to be answered before moving on to corpus assembly – How does one make sure the
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timeframe  is  adequately  covered  and  no speakers  of  importance  are  omitted,  either  in  outlining  the
boundaries  of  the  organizational  field,  or  in  the  trimming process  of  speakers?  And what  about  the
individual scientists writing texts, giving speeches, and in this way influencing discourse? As to adequate
coverage,  a  wide  variety  of  historical  works  on  the  early  laboratories,  the  history  of  chemistry,  and
American culture in the post-Civil War period in general (e.g. Woodlief 1981) were read and included in
the contextualization, as detailed in Chapters 3 and 4. Furthermore, numerous reference works were used.
In regard to publications pertaining to chemistry, Bolton's Select Bibliography of Chemistry and Crane et
al.'s  Guide to the Literature of Chemistry were used in particular to find additional possible speakers by
way of produced texts (Bolton [1899] 1967, [1903] 1967, [1893] 2005; Lovelace & Thomas 1919, 1920;
Crane et al. 1927; also Whitrow 1976), while lists of scientific, technical, and other societies (e.g. NAS
1971)  generated  organizations  that  could  be  possible  additional  text-generators.  To  find  additional
industrial  corporations,  trade associations,  and other speakers possibly overshadowed by the pioneers,
publications such as West (1930) and the Annual Records of Science and Industry (Baird 1872-79) were
scoured  for  details.  Information on newspapers,  trade  and popular  science  journals  (Mott  1957a,  b;
Elfenbein 1960; LaFollette 1990) were used to account for more general speakers. Eventually, what can be
regarded  as  “saturation”  occurred,  leading  to  what  can  be  considered  rather  robust  coverage  of  the
organizational field from 1870-1930. The relation of text to discourse aids in theoretically informing the
conclusion of such a robustness check: No text reproduces a discourse in its entirety, but not all texts are
needed to properly analyze a discourse. So, while it surely would have been evident during the analysis of
the  texts  themselves  if  important  events  or  speakers  had  been  omitted,  “omission  by  saturation”  of
possible minor speakers (e.g. local and regional scientific societies) does in no way impinge on the capacity
to analyze the discourse. 
Finally, what about the individual actor? Of course, most texts are produced by individual authors and
not organizations. But, their ability to produce and disseminate texts is always mediated by organizations.
In this way, authorship by Willis R. Whitney becomes meaningful through his position as the eponymous
research director of the GE Laboratories, while A. D. Little's paeans of praise for industrial research need
to be understood with regard to his position as a famous scientific consultant for AD Little, and eventual
president of the AIChE and SoCI, etc. Similar premises apply for the presidents of scientific and technical
societies, which are positions warranting “voice”, i.e. the ability to be perceived as legitimate contributors
to the discourse, the resources to be heard, and the centrality to reach many actors in the field (Phillips et
al.  2004,  643).  Any  meaningful  analysis  needs  to  take  account  of  the  subject  positions  created  and
transformed  by  discourse  (cf.  Van  Dijk  1997,  19ff),  and  these  legitimized  roles  can  be  attached  to
individuals (or at least their public personae), as will be discussed in Chapter 6. By situating the research
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question within a framework of  the  sociology of  organizations,  assembling a  field  of  speakers  means
looking  at  organizations  first  and  always  framing  text-production  and  authorship  within  the  three-
dimensional context of the field. 
From Speaker to Corpus
The last step after assembling a list of text-generating organizations as speakers of discourse is to collect
these texts that are understood as an interrelated body or “corpus” (cf. Phillips & Hardy 2002, 5). Of
course, in a discourse analysis of this size – spanning sixty years and a multitude of speakers – choices have
to be made, both in regard to the speakers  and the selection of texts.  Since my research interest was
focused primarily on scientific discourse, several types of texts such as company statements and reports,
were excluded from the analysis to assure a certain comparability of discursive texts – ideas, statements,
and comments from scientists and managers of the firms in question would still come up in scientific and
trade journals. Such materials were instead used for the further framing of events and trajectories within
the  field,  as  indicators  for  establishment  of  laboratories,  etc.  Contributions  of  this  adjusted  field  of
speakers can be regarded as a set of overlapping genres, that featured certain conventions for creation, as
well as recognizable elements among the texts (Tardy 2011; cf. also Fairclough 1992, 232f; Phillips et al.
2004) – resulting in “a kind of tacit contract between writers and readers, which influence the behaviour
of text producers and the expectations of receivers” (Hyland 2011, 174f). Since the goal of this analysis is
not genre but the constructive functions of discourse, corpus texts will not be subject to a full-fledged
genre analysis. What the notion of genre adds, though, is on the one hand a certain sensitivity to the
conventions  of  (academic or  popular)  discourse  and  how they  were  followed  or  transgressed  within
individual texts – practices which can influence the visibility, reception, and impact of texts (Phillips et al.
2004, 643f).  On the other,  it  serves as a further frame of reference for locating the discursive corpus
within its historical context.36
Why  were  “only”  journal  publications  chosen,  and  not  books  or  other  types?  Far  be  it  to  posit  a
conclusive shift from books to articles as the standard form of publication. In addition to the conception
of journal publications as a genre, field-level and pragmatic concerns played a part in this decision. Since
our point of access to the field is embraced within the speaker, that is an organizational entity, it was
36 Even though the organizational field cuts across delineations normally drawn such as “academia” or “industry”, much of 
the corpus material can be regarded as academic discourse. Today's common practices for this genre (Hyland 2011) bear 
little similarity to those of 1870-1930, yet studies on the genre's genesis (Bazerman 1988, esp. 80ff) aid in adding another 
layer of context to the analysis, especially in understanding how the genre's conventions were shaped by the structural 
developments of science, and in turn influenced its shape through the mediation of legitimate speakers and contributions. 
Similar works exist for popular science writing, helping to place texts contributed by popular science journals (cf. Mott 
1957a; LaFollette 1990).
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sensible  to  utilize  the  normal  avenue  for  communication  of  these  organizations,  which  comprised
journals in which their reports of meetings, announcements, and current discussions were published. The
importance of certain books for the science popularization movement was related above – such books
and other discourse-changing works, while not part of the discursive corpus, still found entrance in the
analysis through intertextual  relations (see below) established within texts,  making it  unlikely to miss
important non-journal texts having an impact on the discourse's trajectory. Moreover, the higher cadence
of journal publishing and the nature of events in question made it more likely to be covered in such
outlets, rather than books which would take much longer to prepare and be received.37
After garnering access to speakers' publications via the websites of organizations, library databases and
archives38, selections had to be made, as was the case for the list of speakers. Analyzing thousands of texts
– most of which may likely have nothing to offer for the research questions at hand – would be a fruitless
endeavor, both from a theoretical and a practical standpoint. To generate a reasonable corpus, a search
heuristic  was  developed  utilizing  a  list  of  keywords  that  was  informed  by  the  stories  of  the  pioneer
laboratories and the happenings in the field. While some search terms were quite self-evident, such as
“research laboratory”, others, e.g. “chemical engineering” or names of specific organizations were added
after the history of the field was mapped and their importance to the history of the R&D laboratory
became apparent. Search terms were applied to the titles, and – if available, which rarely proved to be the
case – the abstracts. In some cases, journal issues could be searched automatically if title information was
extracted in a machine-readable format, like for most ACS journals. In others, the table of contents or
sometimes entire issues had to be manually scanned for relevant texts.39 After titles and abstracts, author
names were used as the last iteration of corpus assembly. Authors' relevance was informed both by the
field analysis, as well as their previous textual contributions – if authors turned up that had repeatedly
written  texts  deemed  important  and  fitting  to  the  discourse,  attention  was  devoted  to  find  other
publications by those authors. Certainly, this course of action is prone to errors that could be termed
both  random  and  systematic.  Random  errors  such  as  overlooking  texts  can  occur  when  manually
scanning large amounts of documents, while errors can be deemed systematic when patterns arise, such as
certain  issues  lacking  from  online  repositories  or  shifts  in  the  meaning  of  search  terms  rendering
37 As a sort of safeguard, as well as a validation of coverage, journals' book review subsections were checked for relevant 
works, yielding little of interest. 
38 Access to some publications were easy, especially in the case of ACS journals which – most of the time – were available as 
PDFs in the ACS journal database, in some cases even with lists of article titles and authors for each issue, which made the 
process of searching for relevant texts facile. Others were accessible only as scanned copies in online archives/digital 
libraries such as HathiTrust, while a few could only be read as physical copies at the Chemical Heritage Foundation in 
Philadelphia, USA. 
39 In what came as somewhat of a surprise to this author, the idea to add a table of contents to journals seems to only have 
taken hold at the beginning of the twentieth century. 
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systematic study based on a thesaurus moot. 
Table 5.1.1: Search Terms Used for Corpus Assembly
Search Term(s) Description
GE Laboratory, Du Pont Laboratory, AT&T 
Laboratory, Kodak Laboratory, and iterations
Various names and descriptors for the pioneer 
laboratories, also their respective subsections 
(Departments).
Science Including variations such as “science-based”, 
“scientific”, “pure/applied science”, “scientist”, 
“man of science”, etc.
Research As a verb and noun, in variations, e.g. “researcher”, 
“research institute”, “research laboratory”, 
“fundamental research”, etc.
Laboratory In variations, e.g. “chemical laboratory”, 
“metallurgical laboratory”, “laboratory methods”, 
etc.
Invention In variations, e.g. “inventor”, “inventive”, etc.
Chemistry Including variations such as “chemical”, 
“chemistry-based”, “chemist”, “chemical analyst”, 
“industrial chemistry”, “chemical industry”, etc.
Chemical Engineering Including variations such as “chemical engineer”, 
“engineering chemistry”, etc.
Industry Especially in relation to terms such as “chemical”, 
“science-based”, etc. 
Proceedings, Annual Meetings, Editorials, … Especially in early years, special attention was paid 
to Proceedings/Meeting Reports of organizations 
as they may offer glimpses of organizational self-
description and current discussions surrounding 
that organization, as well as presidential addresses 
covering current topics of note.
Organization Descriptors Names of organizations, e.g. ACS, AES, but also 
others making up the research landscape such as the
Carnegie Institution. List of organization 
descriptors grew iteratively. 
Random errors can, of course, never be fully ruled out, though attempts at curtailment were made by
carrying out the corpus assembly in iterative steps and re-checking select issues. The more problematic
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dangers that can arise from systematic errors were prevented through the historic-discursive approach of
contextualizing the results, as well as a thorough checks for robustness of search terms.40 
5.2) Dataset Overview
After these methodological considerations detailing an approach to corpus assembly, let us examine the
dataset that this type of analysis yielded. 
Figure 5.2.1 shows both the number of articles per year,  as well  as  the number of journals analyzed.
Subject to some minor gains and losses in the early years, the number of journals steadily rises as the
discipline of chemistry specializes and differentiates with new organizations and subdivisions of the ACS
(cf. Table 4.1.2) – tripling from an initial eight in 1870 to twenty-four in 1930. As can clearly be seen, the
amount of articles published that were identified using the search heuristic detailed above grew rapidly
with the beginning of the twentieth century, reaching an apparent peak around WWI and the postwar
40 To name but one example: Searching for the term “R&D laboratory” would hardly have yielded any results, since the early 
laboratories were not named that – the concept of “development” only occurred several decades later (see above, also 
Godin & Lane 2011). Instead, informed by the detailed accounts on the early laboratories recounted in Chapter 3, the 
proper terms for such laboratory settings used at the time were extracted. 
Figure 5.2.1: Datset Overview, 1870-1930
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reconfigurations of science and industry, and totaling 2992 articles by 1930. 
Table 5.2.1: Dataset Overview
Journal First Year Last Year Access Notes
American Journal of Science (& Arts) 1870 1930
Journal of the Franklin Institute 1870 1930
Journal of Applied Chemistry 1870 1875
Proceedings of the AAAS 1870 1930 1911
Proceedings of the American Academy
of Arts & Sciences
1870 1930
Scientific American 1870 1930 1922
American Chemist 1870 1876
Nature 1870 1930
Popular Science Monthly 1872 1930
The Laboratory 1874 1876
ACS Proceedings 1876 1930 1920
American Chemical Journal 1879 1914 1914 merger with JACS
JACS 1879 1930
Science 1880 1930
JSoCI 1882 1930
Bulletins of the Division of Chemistry,
USDAa
1883 1902 From 1885 onwards in 
Bulletin of Association of 
Official Agricultural 
Chemists
Bulletin of the Chemical Society of 
Washington
1884 1895 From 1893 onwards local 
section of ACS
American Analyst 1885 1892 1891
Journal of Analytical Chemistry 1887 1893 1893 merger with JACS
Journal of Physical Chemistry 1897 1930
Electrochemical Industryb 1902 1930 1922
Transactions of the AES 1902 1930 1922
Chemical Engineerc 1904 1925 1922
Journal of the American Leather 1906 1930 1922
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Chemists Association
AIChE Transactions 1908 1930 1922
Journal of Engineering and Industrial 
Chemistry
1909 1930
Chemist-Analyst 1911 1930 1922
Journal of the Association of Official 
Agricultural Chemists
1915 1930 1922
Bulletin of the NRC 1919 1930 1922
Chemical & Engineering News 1923 1930
Journal of Chemical Education 1924 1930
“First Year” denotes the first year the journal became part of the analysis (not first year of publication); “Last Year” denotes the 
last year the journal was included in the analysis; “Access” refers to issues of accessibility, some journals were published over the
whole period yet no access could be gained to later editions. 
Removed from Analysis: 
• Oil, Paint and Drug Reporter (1903-?): more relevant to pharmacy than chemistry 
• Chemical Week (1914-?): no access options could be found 
• The Chemist (1923-1930), Journal of the AIC: no physical/digital copies prior to 1930 could be located
a The Bulletin was published independently at first, from 1885 in the Bulletin of Official Agricultural Chemist. It changed its 
name to “Bulletin of the Bureau of Chemistry of the USDA” in 1901.
b Formed as “Electrochemical Industry”, this journal underwent name changes: “Electrochemical and Metallurgical Industry” 
(1905-9); “Metallurgical and Chemical Engineering” (1910-17); “Chemical and Metallurgical Engineering” (1918-25). 
Furthermore, “Iron and Steel Magazine” merged with this journal in July 1906. 
c Merged with “Chemical Age” in 1920 and continued publication under the new name until 1925.
It is reasonable to assume that the steep trajectory of articles continues into the 1920s, which could not be
mapped due to copyright/access  restrictions.41 Since  the subsequent analysis  was event-based (see 5.3
below),  with the last event ocurring in 1922, these restrictions proved immaterial to the conclusions of
the discourse analysis. 
In order to give an overview of the journals included in the dataset, they were grouped by organizational
affiliation. Any analysis of this kind, being based on an organizational field that brings together many
different kinds of speakers with varying visibility,  resources and legitimacy (Phillips et al.  2004, 643),
needs to account for these differences. Yet one runs into the grave danger of letting the analysis of texts be
guided by preconceived notions of both position and content. In practice, this would take the form of
assuming any author  publishing  in  JACS  would  be  an  academic  scientist  supporting  ideas  of  “pure
science” as opposed to applications of science in industry. Evidently such an ordering of discursive texts
41 According to US copyright law, publications prior to 1923 are in the public domain, while those published between 1923-
63 are subject to copyright protection for 95 years. 
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would greatly  influence the results,  most  likely  reproducing presupposed ideas about the relationship
between academia and industry in the process. Similar problems would arise if categorization were based
on authors' affiliations. In many cases, an author's affiliation was simply a town or a city, only later being
replaced by organizational affiliations with universities, corporations, and government agencies. But even
the more precise details of the later years run the risk of omitting important aspects in the case of multiple
places  of affiliation,  e.g.  a  chemist at  university  also employed as a consultant.  As Keller  (2010, 221)
emphasizes,  analysis according to fixed attributions must be avoided. Thus, the proposed ordering of
journals – as speakers of discourse – makes no assumptions as to the content of texts, instead attempting
to group speakers according to similar places of publication in the field. These places of publication allow
the  highlighting  of  conditions  of  production  as  well  as  possible  audiences  (cf.  Fyfe  2016,  395ff).
Moreover, it is important to emphasize that the categorization presented here was merely an analytical
tool, used to further reduce and order the size and volume of discourse by introducing rough distinctions
that were derived from informed theoretical assumptions about the nature of the field and probable lines
of argument within, and made possible through the historic-discursive approach. 
Popular Journals 
Two journals that can be considered popular science journals were included in the analysis: Scientific
American (1870-1930), and Popular Science Monthly (1872-1930). As LaFollette notes, both journals
can be considered “science magazines intended for audiences attentive to science” (LaFollette 1990, 24).
Scientific American was a widely read magazine with a circulation of around forty to fifty thousand by
the late nineteenth century, well-known for its announcements of new inventions and a weekly official
list of patents. Publishing “a variety of information of mechanical and scientific nature” (Mott 1970a,
318),  the focus  on invention and patents  gradually  ceased by the twentieth century's  second decade,
making way for articles of a broader scope and communicating news of the sciences to the people: “It was
no longer the inventor's paper, but a periodical of popular science” (ibid., 323). Popular Science Monthly
was founded with the intention of bringing news of scientific progress in Europe to American readers
who had no scientific training (Mott 1970b, 496). Over the years it shifted towards American science,
reprinted addresses  held at  learned societies,  and featured articles  by college and university  professors
(ibid.,  497).  A  change  in  ownership  in  1915  brought  further  adjustments,  with  the  journal  now
presenting scientific information in a “definitely popular fashion”, geared towards hobbyists (ibid., 499).
The inclusion of these two journals can of course in no way account for the entire field of popular science
publishing,  which is  not  the goal  of this  analysis.  Instead,  by including these two journals  that  were
arguably two of the widest circulated popular science magazines, the “popular” reaction to the advent of
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the R&D laboratory – if any such reaction happened – is added to the analysis, giving further context to
ideas on science, chemistry, and laboratories that were constructed and spread by academic and industrial
scientists. Furthermore, such accounts are parsed through the eyes of science journalists, possibly giving
further insight into how the organizational innovation was discussed in wider circles. 
General Science Journals
In order to assess the level and magnitude of discussion, especially in the early years when specialized
chemical societies and journals did not yet exist, several publication organs of important organizations
that played a part in the professionalization of chemistry were included. The Proceedings of the AAAS
(1870-1930)  and  the  Proceedings  of  the  American  Academy  of  Arts  &  Sciences  (1870-1930)  were
included to map discussion in scientific societies devoted to the sciences in general. Especially with the
founding of AAAS Section C in 1882, texts regarding the nature of the chemist, chemistry, and so on
were expected, yet neither journal yielded many hits when scanned for relevant terms. This is cushioned
by the inclusion of Science (1880-1930) in the analysis, the journal acting as the house organ of the AAAS
from 1900 onwards.  It  arguably became the national  periodical  of  the  scientific  community after  its
editorial reorientation in the late 1890s, covering a wide variety of sciences and serving as a forum for
disputes and controversies (cf.  Vandome 2013).  This journal  made up for a large part  of the general
science publications analyzed, covering much of the disciplinary and extra-disciplinary debate on the early
laboratories, the professionalization of the chemist and the applications of science. The British journal
Nature (1870-1930) was added, since cursory analysis showed frequent references to articles published in
Nature, a finding further bolstered by the fact that in the early decades, American discourse may have
lacked places of publication due to a lack of professionalization and specialization. In turn, many authors
went to foreign journals instead (see above),  especially Nature,  which served as a  guide for emerging
American journals of science (Vandome 2013, 174). Nature also played a seminal role in the process of
defining what being a scientist  meant during the ascent of the scientific  community to a position of
cultural authority (Baldwin 2015), a process that doubtlessly played an important part in the emergence
of industrial laboratories. To round out the picture, the American Journal of Science (1870-1930) and
the Journal of the Franklin Institute (1870-1930) were included, the former due to its position as one of
the earliest and most important outlets for scientific writing in the United States, and the latter as the
organ  of  a  well-respected  scientific  institution  documenting  scientific  and  technical  progress  (Mott
1957a, 556ff), with both yielding only a few texts of interest. 
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Chemistry Journals
Journals published by chemical societies or individuals explicitly positioning their publications within
academic chemistry make up the  largest  group within the analyzed corpus.  In the years  prior  to the
founding of the ACS, as well  as during its difficult first  years,  many short-lived publications serve as
homes for chemical thought: the Journal of Applied Chemistry (1870-75), the American Chemist (1870-
75), The Laboratory (1874-76), and the American Analyst (1885-92), which was an attempted offshoot
of the London Analyst. When the ACS entered the scene, it did so by first publishing its Proceedings
(1876-1930), followed by JACS (1879-1930). JACS absorbed numerous small journals over the years,
such as the American Chemical Journal (1879-1914), the Bulletin of the Chemical Society of Washington
(1884-94), and the Journal of Analytical Chemistry (1887-93). The publication landscape was heavily
influenced  by  ACS  publications,  such  as  the  Journal  of  Physical  Chemistry  (1897-1930),  until  the
founding of further specialized societies and their organs: the Transactions of the AES (1902-30) and the
AIChE  Transactions  (1908-30).  Industrial  chemists  received  a  voice  with  the  establishment  of  their
respective subdivision in 1908 (Journal of Industrial & Engineering Chemistry (JIEC), 1909-30). After
the  war,  further  specialization  as  well  as  increased  scientific  communication  is  evident  from  the
foundation  of  journals  such  as  Chemical  &  Engineering  News  (1923-30),  sometimes  called  the
“newsweek of the chemical world” (ACS 1951, 20), and the Journal of Chemical Education (1924-30).
As outlined above, local and regional sections of chemical societies were not included – or only in the
early stages of the period – since it can be assumed that the national discussion that was condensed in
larger publications will  adequately serve as an indicator of discursive topics  and shifts.  Regarding the
journals chosen for analysis here, organs communicating meetings and the current happenings in the field
– Proceedings of the ACS, Transactions of AES/AIChE – make up the bulk of the texts selected, while
the journals that highly specialized in a subdivision of chemistry, e.g. physical or analytical chemistry,
hardly added anything to the corpus. 
Industrial Journals
Amongst journals published by speakers that can be considered “industrial”, such as corporations or trade
associations, the Journal of SoCI (1882-1930) plays an important role, especially with the inception of the
New York Section (1894) of the British society, and presidential addresses that frequently discussed the
achievements and needs of the American chemical industry. After 1900, several journals devoted to the
applications of various branches of chemistry in industry were formed: Electrochemical Industry (1902-
30),  and the Chemical  Engineer  (1904-25).  Whereas  journals  such as  the Chemist-Analyst  (1911-30)
specifically targeted chemists working as analysts employed industry.  Furthermore, the associations of
130
chemists  in  specific  fields  such  as  leather  chemistry  or  agricultural  chemistry  published  their  own
periodicals:  Journal  of  the  American  Leather  Chemists  Association,  1906-30  and  Journal  of  the
Association of Official Agricultural Chemists, 1915-30. 
Governmental Journals
As a last group, two journals that originated in government agencies were included to enlarge the field of
possible speakers and account for the important roles that both agencies played in the development of
chemistry as well as the granting of visibility and status to the chemist. The first of these are the Bulletins
of  the  Division of  Chemistry,  published  by  the  USDA (1883-1902).  As  outlined above,  the  USDA
proved  to  be  an  early  and  important  employer  of  chemists,  especially  after  the  Morril  Act  and  the
founding of  the land-grant universities.  Also included was the Bulletin of the NRC (1919-30) in an
attempt to map the changed attitudes towards chemistry and the chemist in the wake of the “chemist's
war”. As it turns out, while the USDA Bulletin added no relevant texts to the corpus, the Bulletin of the
NRC proved to be a place of discussion regarding the new functions of research and its place within a
newly altered landscape of science in post-war United States – a discussion that is fruitful and highly
relevant to the discursive concepts and shifts that are being sought here. 
5.3) An Event-Based Analysis
Similar to the steps that were necessary to make sense of the organizational field and to order and reduce
the number of speakers to a manageable amount, further condensations are necessary, as – needless to say
– roughly 3000 articles  are too many.  No clear-cut recipes for theoretical sampling of this  kind exist
(Phillips & Hardy 2002, 74), so the decision was made to analyze the data based on events that were
identified as relevant during the construction of the organizational field (cf. Keller 2010, 214f). Events
that challenge existing structures and impact the field in a variety of ways can be understood as socially
constructed, since they are given meaning discursively (Munir & Phillips 2005, 1669). In this way, events
are problematizations,  which leads to discursive texts  trying to make sense of changes or strategically
promoting new concepts  or  subject  positions:  “Actors  inscribe  problematizations  of  institutionalized
practices in texts in order to allow these ideas to travel in space and time” (Maguire & Hardy 2009, 151).
Following  Schwab-Trapp  (2010,  176f),  those  events  that  are  judged  as  particularly  relevant  will  be
chosen, with regard to research interest. So it is not necessarily the events that make the greatest waves that
will be included, but those that may have caused ruptures and shifts in the discourse on chemistry and the
place of science. Approaching a longitudinal discourse corpus not as a whole, but at several points in
time,  also offers  the advantage of comparing shifts in the construction of meaning between multiple
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events: 
Historically oriented analyses can proceed by conducting several synchronic cuts through a 
discourse strand – based on discursive events, for example – and subsequently comparing them 
with each other. Such analyses provide information on changes to, and continuities of, discourse 
processes through time. (Jäger 2001, 52)
Due to the continuous nature of the events, as well as the corpus being made up of journal publications,
it was decided to cover not only the year of each event, but also one year before and after it. This further
reduction  of  the  corpus  yielded  seven  three-year-tranches  centered  around  events  chosen  for  their
theoretical and historical relevance – twenty-one years were analyzed in total. In this way, it was possible
to include texts immediately leading up to an event, as well as reactions – since writing and publishing
takes  time,  and issues  of  journals  appeared at  fixed intervals,  e.g.  monthly  or  bi-annually,  instead of
instantly following an event. 
Events as Focal Points in Discourse
As Table 5.3.1 shows,  seven events were chosen for the analysis  of the discourse.  The first,  in 1895,
concerns the professionalization of chemistry. Of course,  as professionalization is  a process and not a
singular point in time, it is hard to pinpoint a specific year for this. Still, it can reasonably be assumed that
the professionalization of chemistry as a scientific discipline, and a field of employment, showed stable
patterns in 1895. The ACS had established itself as the major organization for chemists in the country
after its tumultuous years, and the early structures for publishing were in place by then. Similarly, several
organizations devoted to chemists in industry were in place. As Figures 4.2.1 and 4.2.4 illustrate, chemists
found employment at chemical establishments in a variety of industries, exhibiting steady growth in the
1890s. Hence, it can be assumed that the role of chemists as scientists, and as industrial chemists, was
soundly in place. Moreover, in order to understand if and how the discourse changed – or had to change
– with the establishment of the early R&D laboratories, it is necessary to capture the discourse before the
first laboratory. This event thus serves to outline discursive concepts, objects, and subject positions before
the pioneering industrial laboratories. 
The second event is the establishment of General Electric's famous laboratory in 1900. As the history of
the early laboratories has shown, GE's research program served as a reference point for many research
directors  in  the  following  years,  with  the  laboratory  having  acquired  an  archetypal  position  in  the
discourse. The GE laboratory became an important part of the organizational (and with it the discursive)
field especially because of Langmuir's chemical work, even though GE was primarily active in the field of
of electrical engineering.
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1902 brings the third event: the founding of Du Pont's laboratories, both the Eastern Laboratory and the
Experimental Station. Following a re-organization, these two laboratories were built within different parts
of the company, overcoming different oppositions and taking on different paths. Since these laboratories
were  the  first  of  the  pioneering laboratories  to have  been established within  the  chemical  and allied
product industries, this serves as an important event for observing what changes, if any, the discourse may
have undergone since the founding of GE's research department.
Table 5.3.1 Discursive Events
Event Year Description # of 
articles 
for year
# of 
relevant 
articles 
# of 
articles 
for year ±
1
# of 
relevant 
articles 
for year ±
1
Professionalization 
of Chemistry
1895 Stable patterns in the field of 
chemistry
35 25 76 31
GE Laboratory 1900 Establishment of GE's 
laboratory
35 22 115 34
DuPont Laboratories 1902 Du Pont laboratory as first lab 
in chemical industry
55 28 139 47
ACS Division 
Industrial & 
Engineering 
Chemistry
1908 Concerns of industrial chemists 
become so pressing that ACS 
establishes a new division, 
journal
70 30 194 60
Kodak Laboratory 1912 Establishment of Kodak's 
laboratory, often seen as the last 
of the pioneers
80 38 256 84
World War I 1917 Mobilization, dye shortage, 
transformation of US science 
landscape 
133 47 313 107
Directors of 
Industrial Research
1922 Establishment of regular 
meeting of R&D laboratory 
directors
142 63 335 107
∑ 543 253 1419 470
The next event, the establishment of the ACS's Division of Industrial & Engineering Chemistry in 1908
showcases interesting transformations in the discourse, especially with regard to the role of the chemist.
The concerns of industrial chemists, who felt they were not heard within the existing structures of the
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ACS,  prompted  the  ACS  to  establish  a  new  Division,  illustrating  that  industrial  chemists  as  a
constituency were significant enough by this time to warrant a reaction by ACS leadership out of the fear
of an organizational split. The Division also published its own journal in 1909. Moreover, several other
Divisions were founded in 1908 and 1909, showing an increased specialization and differentiation within
chemistry – trends that had led to the formation of new organizations (AIChE, AES) only a few years
prior. This event may serve as a pivotal point for the re-definition of the identity of the industrial chemist,
as well as their relation to academic chemistry. 
The fifth event concerns the last of the pioneering laboratories to be built: Eastman Kodak's laboratory in
1912. Figure 3.2.1 shows a peak for lab growth in the years prior to this and a steady increase over the
following  years.  It  can reasonably  be  assumed  that  the  organizational  form of  the  in-house  research
laboratory, both as a concept and an object,  had become perhaps not established but at least known
within the organizational field. Kodak's history also shows the pressures to do research that were apparent
by the second decade of the twentieth century. The texts that were produced before, and as a reaction to,
Kodak's laboratory will further serve to deepen the understanding of the discourse surrounding the new
organizational form. 
By 1917,  the  United States  had entered WWI – the  sixth event.  The years  before  saw the  dyestuffs
shortage,  an  industrial  preparedness  campaign  of  major  proportions,  as  well  as  the  mobilization  of
chemists from both academia and industry to serve in the armed forces. These transformations will have
impacted the discourse significantly, but WWI also caused a transformation of the organizational and
institutional landscape of support for science, with new networks of cooperation and communication
between the military, academia, industry and a host of other groups leading to a certain interpenetration
of spheres that were perviously distinct and undisturbed. It can be expected that both the role of the
chemist,  as well  as  the powers of the laboratory,  had been explicitly and repeatedly problematized in
discursive texts produced during this event. 
The seventh and last event surrounds the founding of DIR in 1922. This meeting place for directors of
research  laboratories  was  launched  in  1923.  Similar  to  the  1912  event,  it  showcases  a  possible
normalization  of  the  research  laboratory,  given  that  new  organizations  for  its  administration  and
improvement – granting visibility as well as structures for communication – were founded in its wake. In
addition, demobilization was over by then, with the industry having scaled back to prewar levels and
chemists increasingly being let go (see Fig. 4.2.4). The new organizational landscape of science funding
was firmly in place, and the popularization campaigns signing the praises of chemistry were in full swing.
Chemists had also become active politically, pushing for legislation in dye tariff matters. Thus, this event
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serves to check what discursive changes the war left in its wake and who the chemist was before and after.
Lastly, 1922 was also chosen for pragmatic reasons: Coverage for many journals ended in 1923 as related
above, so this is the last point in time when reasonable amounts of texts could be easily procured. 
Next, these seven three-year-tranches were analyzed to get a “cleaned” set of texts for each year. The main
reason for exclusion from the discursive corpus was duplication. As it turned out, a wide variety of texts –
such as addresses, announcements, reports of meetings, and comments on policy and the army draft for
the latter two events – were published by numerous journals. In this way, the addresses of the presidents
of the ACS, SoCI, and AIChE were communicated within their respective house organs, but reprints also
frequently  found  their  way  into  Science  or  the  Chemical  Engineer,  and  announcements  of  societal
meetings  were spread far and wide.  Symposia  on the patent situation,  preparedness,  and the need to
popularize  chemistry  were  reported  on  in  many  journals.  While  removing  instances  of  duplication
reduces the discursive corpus by a great degree, they do attest to the visibility of texts and once again
punctuate  the  hybrid  nature  of  the  field,  thereby  strengthening  the  mapping  of  the  field  as  an
organizational field instead of as distinct spheres of academia, industry, and government. Another reason
for exclusion was what may be called “nothing of interest or relevance”, which is related to the lack of
abstracts and the way the search heuristic works. Often, article titles such as “The American Chemical
Society” would lead to inclusion within the corpus,  yet  upon further inspection the articles  revealed
nothing but a  few sentences  announcing the  next  general  meeting,  or  a  list  of  papers  read at  a  past
meeting. Such lists may at least have accounted for shifts in scientific attention and the choice of topics,
but they yielded few things of interest for the discourse analysis. The last reason for exclusion would be
relevance: when a text was excluded because it was not concerned with the guiding research questions of
this analysis. Such texts may have been either misleadingly titled or chock-full of technical information
with little value added to the discourse, such as with market reports and the like. Using these seven events
and their respective years prior and after to construct seven three-year-tranches, a total of 1419 articles
were left in the corpus, of which 470 were deemed relevant and usable for analysis. 
These 470 articles were written by 251 unique authors.42 Charting the distribution of publications per
author, it is  immediately evident that there are few authors overrepresented in the discourse that this
corpus attempts to capture. 
199 authors contribute to the discourse with only one text, while on the other end only two authors
manage to enter the discourse with double-digit  publications:  A. D. Little,  of consulting and science
popularization fame, and E. F.  Roeber,  who authored  thirteen discursive texts by virtue of being the
42 105 texts had either no author or could not be attributed without error.
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editor of Electrochemical Industry and entering the corpus through numerous editorials. Both Little and
Roeber author discursive texts for the first time during the fourth event, in 1908. Even though Little and
Roeber manage to repeatedly contribute to the discourse by way of their positions within the field, they
seem not to have fundamentally guided, influenced, or precluded discursive constructions. Apart from
these two outliers, the absence of frequently published authors indicates both the lack of central figures
around  whom  the  discourse  revolves,  and  those  who  –  by  nature  of  their  visibility  and  volume  in
discursive texts – managed to influence the construction of concepts, objects, and subject positions (cf.
Phillips et al. 2004, 643ff). In-text references to people – be they famous scientists, directors, or others –
mainly  point  towards  extra-discursive  figures,  and not  the  other  authors  within  the  corpus  (see  also
below). 
Breaking  the  corpus  down  by  organizational  speakers  reveals  a  distinct  picture.  Texts  published  in
popular journals remain a small but steady presence, while articles from speakers in the general science
group make up the largest part of discursive texts in the early years, declining towards the later years, and
peaking again during WWI. Publications by industrial  speakers show a strong growth, making up the
largest amount of texts by the last event. This trend is mostly due to an increasing number of issues – and
Figure 5.3.1: Number of Publications per Author 
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with  it,  articles  –  from  the  journals  Electrochemical  Industry  and  Chemical  Engineer,  discussing
industrial  matters,  the  place  of  the  chemist,  and  so  on.  After  the  creation  of  a  special  division  for
industrial chemistry and the subsequent publication of a journal, the share of texts written by chemical
speakers  rises  sharply.  For  the  last  three  events,  almost  all  industrial  concerns  and  discussions  are
transferred  to  JIEC,  with  JACS,  the  Proceedings  of  the  ACS  and  other  specialized  journals  hardly
contributing to the ongoing discussion anymore.  Government speakers initially  make up the smallest
group,  with  only  two  publications  included,  and  do  not  partake  in  the  discussion  at  all  –  their
contributions are either not relevant to the analysis or outside of the seven events. How this will influence
or hamper the results of the analysis remains to be seen.
As a last quantitative overview of the corpus, let us take a look at text types. The journal articles were
roughly categorized into five groups. 
Of these, articles – ranging from reports on scientific discoveries and industrial developments to treatises
on the powers of chemistry and the values of science – make up the largest amount, with addresses at
meetings, symposia, and other occasions the second strongest group. The share of editorials – as clearly
labeled opinion pieces, sometimes commenting on current events and other times welcoming a new year
Figure 5.3.2: Number of Articles per Speaker Group and Event
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and reviewing the last – were a growing presence for the last four events. Meeting reports that summarize
important happenings and decisions at the encounters of scientific and technical societies, and the papers
read at these occasions, similarly increase with the later years, in part due to more organizations holding
more meetings. The residual group, “Other”, comprises different kinds of texts such as Reviews or Letters
to the Editor, representing a small amount of articles for each event. Again, a categorization such as this
shall  not  be  used to infer  anything  about  the  content  of  a  text,  instead it  is  an  aid  for  reaching  an
understanding of the possible audiences and visibility of a text, as well as its genre (or rather sub-genres
within the genre of journal  article).  Addresses follow different rules of composition than a review or
editorial, and possibly construct different speakers and audiences in the process. It is interesting, then, to
compare texts both within a genre – Do addresses at different times presuppose different audiences? – as
well  as  across genres – What does it  mean if  an article exhibits  patterns that were typically found in
another genre? Being aware of such subtle differences is an important prerequisite for any meaningful
analysis.
Figure 5.3.3: Article Types per Event
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Texts as a Unit of Analysis
After  taking multiple  steps to select  speakers  and build  and reduce a  corpus,  470 texts  were  left  for
analysis.  What  now? The  analysis  of  individual  texts  in  a  discourse  analysis  always  exists  within  the
tension of using fixed, rigid categories, veering into the realm of content analysis; and the freedom and
creativity  that  results  from  the  lack  of  standardized  approaches  (Phillips  &  Hardy  2002,  74).  The
multiplicity of ways that discourse is theorized lead to a multitude of ways that discourse is analyzed, and,
as  Potter  and  Wetherell  note,  analyzing  discourse  is  “like  riding  a  bicycle  compared  to  conducting
experiments or analyzing survey data which resemble baking cakes from a recipe” (Potter & Wetherell
1987, 168) – there are no strict step-by-step guidelines,  and much of it  is  learning to get a “feel” for
discourse. Some variants focus on the use of linguistic and grammatical constructs in discursive texts,
others on larger narratives that can be synthesized from a plurality of texts, and still others on intertextual
relations between texts. In the end, it is important to find a style of analysis that fits the type of data,
thereby generating meaningful and justifiable categories that relate to the research questions. Due to the
scope and intensity of such an analysis, it is equally important to check for theoretical saturation and to
know when to stop (ibid., 79; cf. also Jäger 2001, 51).43 
The  research  questions  guiding  the  analysis  where  derived  with  the  aid  of  the  theoretical  basis  in
discursive  institutionalism  and  informed  by  the  historical  approach.  Questions  asked  focused  on
concepts, objects, and subject positions: What is science, what is research, what is chemistry, what is a
laboratory,  who  works  in  a  laboratory,  who  is  the  chemist,  and  the  chemical  engineer,  who  is  the
inventor?, and so on. The set of questions was kept as flexible as possible and open to additions. To relate
one example, at a later point in the analysis the relevance of the placement of the laboratories became
apparent, thus “Where is the laboratory?” was added to the research questions. 
The schema used for analysis was developed through multiple trial readings of discursive texts and guided
by several “discursive toolboxes” and exemplary studies (Fairclough 1992, 225ff; Jäger 2001; Phillips &
Hardy 2002; Maguire & Hardy 2009; Keller 2010; Machin & Mayr 2012; Maguire & Hardy 2013). As
opposed to specifying a wide variety of categories in order to catch all of the layers of meaning, the schema
was kept simple on the one hand, and as open as possible on the other. Thus, instead of for example pre-
selecting a couple of possible argumentative strategies constructing subject positions and noting their
occurrences in texts, the category concerning subject positions was simply used to list roles, and actual
people.  In a  second step,  exactly  how these roles  were constructed and people  were referred to were
scrutinized,  making  it  possible  to  let  textual  meaning  and  structures  guide  the  process  of  analysis  –
43 As Howard Becker wrote in What about Mozart?, a key ability in qualitative analysis is to know when to “finish the damn 
thing, with all its flaws” (Becker 2014, 165). 
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meaning and structures which may have been obscured by categories too rigid and pre-set. 
For each individual text, the analysis began by writing a brief summary that could be used for quickly
reassessing the contents of an entire text or a single paragraph, with later findings sometimes causing a
need  for  reanalysis  by  having  added  attributes  to  a  concept.  Next,  intertextuality  was  highlighted
(Fairclough 1992, 101ff). References to other texts play an important role in ODA, since these textual
relations may add legitimacy by leaning on established texts and evoking “understandings and meanings
that are more broadly grounded” (Phillips et al 2004, 644). Intertextuality can take a variety of forms,
from explicit citations one might expect in the genre of scientific texts, to passing mentions of books,
laws, or current discussions, to the use of recognizable phrasing or terminology associated with specific
texts or people, and all the way to implicit allusions (cf. Tardy 2011, 59). Moreover, references can be
made to either extra-corporeal texts, i.e. texts not included in the discourse analysis, or, of course, texts
within  the  discursive  corpus.  Frequent  references  to  intra-corporeal  texts  can  give  hints  as  to  their
visibility and importance for the discourse. As it turned out, intertextuality played only a minor role in
the  analysis,  as  many  of  the  texts  analyzed  were  not  scientific  papers  per  se,  but  rather  speeches  or
comments, and the standards for scientific writing were not as established and elaborate as today. Only a
few texts made explicit or implicit references, thus few texts within the corpus were elevated to any special
importance.  Still,  the  few  references  made  served  to  add  “weight”  to  the  ideas  referenced,  since
intertextual references showed that they were heard and in this way perpetuated discursively, adding to
their ability to construct and influence reality.
Table 5.3.2: Example of Schema Used for Analysis
Journal Issue Pages Notes
Title Author
Summary
Intertext
Topics
People
Events, 
Locations, 
… 
Notable 
Quotes
Notes
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Third, topics were denominated, in relation to the research questions: Does this text concern itself with
chemistry, or the chemist, and does it talk about science or the laboratory? Of course, most texts had
more than one topic, which proved to be an emergent category, and topics that later turned out to play a
key  part  in  the  definition of  the  laboratory  were  not  part  of  the  original  “list”,  requiring additional
classification  of  earlier  texts.  Interestingly,  for  many  events  there  were  predominant  topics  (later
understood as other, adjacent discourses) that could be identified – topics such as specialization or the
Conservation Movement that were discussed intensely during one event would get a lot less attention
before and afterwards.  Next came the quite openly termed category of “People”,  which worked in a
similar  vein as intertextuality,  but instead of charting references to texts it  searched for people.  First,
people could mean the authors themselves – Did they position themselves in any way in relation to their
subject  matter  and did  they  list  credentials  or  experience?  Second,  people  could refer  to individuals,
ranging from people partaking in current discussions, to research directors of famous laboratories, all the
way to  famous scientists  from the  past.  Third,  people  could  refer  to  roles,  such as  the  chemist,  the
chemical engineer, or the manager and banker. How were they constructed, referred to, and positioned?
Like  topics,  this  category  required  later  detailing,  e.g.  when  the  opposition  of  chemist  and  banker
emerged earlier texts were checked for similar oppositional groups. 
Fifth, events and locations were analyzed. What events, such as societal meetings, scientific discoveries,
and laboratory formations, where mentioned in texts, and how where they described? What places were
mentioned, such as Washington, D.C., Niagara Falls, MIT, and the Kodak Laboratory? In what way were
they invoked: was MIT a place of science, a university, or something else? The next category, “Notable
Quotes”,  was mainly used to ease the workflow of writing up the results,  in that  telling quotes  that
underscored or questioned concepts, objects, or subject positions were selected once the analysis of a text
was finished. Lastly, “Notes” was used as a residual category where ideas, surprises, and interesting things
could be jotted down and early attempts at interpretation or cross-references to other texts could be
made. These notes served as starting points in the second round of analysis, giving tips regarding what not
to miss, what categories to solidify and what additional questions to ask. The omission of “concept” and
“object”, which were central to the interpretation in this discourse analysis, as categories in the schema
was made deliberately. Both are highly fragile categories that emerge by (re-)analyzing texts repeatedly – in
particular, the materialization of concepts in objects is a complex process that cannot be traced by simply
filling out a category in a schema, “checking boxes” for any one single text so to speak. Instead, concepts
and objects were identified in the steps following the initial analysis as the effects of readings of multiple
texts and the relations their contents constructed.
It is important to stress that working on a text and attempting to synthesize its contents into categories
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does in no way involve any “reading between the lines” to find out what the author “really meant”.
Instead, it is about mapping repeatedly occurring statements and probing them for patterns and changes
over time. As Foucault (1981) postulated (and then failed to adhere to in his own discourse analysis work,
as Schwab-Trapp (2010, 180) notes), discourse analysis is a highly positivist method. This needs to be
kept in mind by both the analyst, as well as the reader, when presented with the results of a discourse
analysis. The choice of category system and the inclusion of individual text fragments in these categories
remain, of course, highly subjective. Each individual application of the schema to a discursive text will be
compacted,  first  for  each event,  then as  trajectories  along the  time axis,  with the  resulting concepts,
objects, and subject positions always being a hybrid inscribed within groups of texts, and synthesized and
formed by the interpretive effort of the analyst (Keller 2010, 222). Jones highlights the interpretive effort
through  his  analytical  distinction44 of  resemiotizing  and  positioning,  where  selected  phenomena  are
translated between “semiotic materialities” (Jones 2011, 11) (discursive texts ↔ interpreting analysis) and
then positioned in relation to conceptual knowledge and the prior steps in the process: 
The whole reason for entextualization is not to reproduce the universe, but to re-present it, and, by 
doing so, to understand it better. And it is through these very processes of framing, selecting, 
summarizing, resemiotizing and positioning that which we arrive at these understandings. (ibid., 
20; emphasis in original)
This interpretive effort of translation between two textual realities is guided by contextual and historical
knowledge that  the discursive-historical  approach supplies.  Justifications for  these choices  have to be
highlighted and made as transparent as possible. These choices concern not only field selection, corpus
assembly, sampling, and analysis, but also the way quality is ensured – which will be discussed in the
following part.
5.4) On Quality Control in Discourse Analysis
In the following, I will discuss a topic that often plagues discourse analytic work: how to properly assess
the quality of interpretations developed. First, the idea of quality control in general needs to be outlined
before criteria geared specifically towards discursive work can be developed and their applicability to this
analysis can be shown.
Challenges to Conventional Approaches to Quality Control
When using discourse analysis, or reading studies using such methods, one is quickly confronted with
44 Jones describes the process of discourse analysis in five steps: framing a phenomenon that is to be entextualized, selecting 
particular features to represent the whole phenomenon, summarizing these features, resemiotizing by translating from 
corpus to analytic texts, and positioning in relation to the whole process (Jones 2011, 11). 
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what is often seen as one a central problem of qualitative methods: the lack of a standardized way of
assessing quality like quantitative studies do – or at least purport to do. How do quantitative studies solve
this  problem,  and  do  these  solutions  apply  here?  Criteria  that  are  often  used  to  assess  quality  are
reliability, validity, and objectivity (cf. Flick 2007, 15).
In general,  reliability is concerned with what Stiles (1993, 601) calls “procedural trustworthiness”: how
trustworthy observations of data are. Reliability means that any given method can consistently measure
what it  is  supposed to measure,  i.e.  that  it  can be repeated,  leading to the same results,  by the same
researcher or by someone else (cf. Lamnek & Krell 2016, 163). Of course, as Phillips and Hardy note, the
idea that results can be repeatable is  nonsensical in a discourse analytic context,  since the goal here is
“generating and exploring multiple – and different – readings of a situation” (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 80).
Discourse analysis thrives on making different perspectives visible, that are subject to change depending
on the context and reader. 
Validity as “interpretive trustworthiness” refers to the trustworthiness of interpretations and conclusions
drawn (Stiles 1993, 607). It is centered around the idea of whether a method captures the “real” world
adequately. A variety of approaches were proposed to assess this, ranging from face validity via expert
validity to construct validity (Lamnek & Krell 2016, 148f). Such a criterion goes against the foundational
ontological and epistemological assumptions of discourse analysis. One of discourse analysis' core tenets is
the rejection of the idea that there is a “real world” out there, of which language is only a mirror. Instead,
the many ways that language creates the world in the first place are in focus (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 79).
Of  course,  this  understanding  of  the  nature  of  language  and  reality  radically  questions  other
methodologies  as  well:  “…  when  establishing  knowledge  about  an  aspect  of  reality,  every  research
approach also makes specific assumptions about the nature of reality under investigation (ontology) and
about the nature of knowledge (epistemology)” (Sandberg 2005, 47). From this vantage point, the ways
that quantitative methods attempt to capture the ”real world” are subject to processes of construction
and power,  and can be  highly  fertile  grounds  for  discursive  methods  to elucidate  how knowledge is
created and legitimized. 
This brings me to the last criterion that is often used to assess quality – objectivity – which is based on the
requirement that any given method is bias-free and intersubjective, and that it does not matter who is
using said method. Once again, this criterion is not applicable to qualitative methods in general, and to
discourse  analysis  specifically,  partially  because  of  the  reasons  already  listed  above,  such  as  the
development of different readings of texts. But most notably, the core of the idea that any research may
ever be bias-free is questioned. As philosophers and sociologists of science such as Lakatos and Kuhn have
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shown, science is usually full of biases and “normal science” is a far cry from Popper's positivism, instead
they are often guided by overarching paradigms (cf. Stiles 1993, 613). Furthermore, scientists are in no
way located at some Archimedean point: 
… everyone is situated in a specific historical, cultural, and linguistic understanding of reality, which
is internalized through upbringing, education, and work. The internalized understanding becomes 
to a large extent our framework for making sense of reality. (Sandberg 2005, 51)
Dismissing the effects of observer, context,  and perspective would not only mean to ignore countless
studies of the internal workings of science, but also going against the core ideas of discourse analysis, and
especially the context-focused historical approach developed here.
This  brief  discussion  reveals  why  quality  control  in  discourse  analysis  is  worlds  apart  from  how
quantitative studies evaluate their methods, and thus why the three general criteria do not apply. As Flick
(2007, 15ff) notes, there are three possible strategies for dealing with the shortcomings of conventional
criteria while salvaging the possibility of assessing the quality of qualitative methods: One can either use
the same quality criteria as quantitative studies, translate them, or develop new ones that are appropriate
to the methods used (ibid., 18ff). Due to the fundamental ontological and epistemological differences
outlined above that make it impossible to use the same criteria and near impossible to translate them, the
third strategy is generally chosen in discursive work: the development of new criteria. 
Four Criteria for Quality Control in Discourse Analysis
What criteria are commonly developed in the various approaches to discourse analysis, to solve the quality
control  problem?  The  approaches  to  evaluating  discursive  research  vary  in  parallel  to  the  multiple
possibilities of operationalizing discourse depending on research interest and perspective. As there are few
established norms for analyzing data and presenting the results of a discourse analysis (Phillips & Hardy
2002,  79),  many  different  ideas,  codified  in  many  different  terms,  exist  for  the  problem  at  hand.
Surveying  the  literature  on  discursive  methods  in  general  –  and  organizational  discourse  analysis  in
particular – criteria for quality control can be summarized in the following categories. 
The first, coherence, is a criterion concerned with the interrelation of interpretations amongst themselves,
as well as the larger context. According to Potter and Wetherell (1987, 170), the analytic claims made
throughout a discourse analysis should give coherence to a body of discursive texts, both covering larger
patterns and accounting for micro-sequences found within individual texts. The guiding question here
would be how coherent conflicting interpretations are with the material (cf. Sandberg 2005, 55), and
whether  the  interpretations  developed  in  an  analysis  give  a  consistent  account  of  the  data  at  hand
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(Georgaca & Avdi 2011, 157). Several ways of ascertaining coherence are proposed, many of which are
based upon testing researcher interpretations with actors in the field who produced the original accounts
– an approach not possible in this case and in historical discourse analysis in general. Phillips and Hardy
(2002,  80)  underline  another  avenue  for  safeguarding  coherence:  by  checking  whether  historical,
contextual  understandings  are  incorporated,  and  how  the  interpretations  developed  throughout  an
analysis fit with the events and trajectories of the field analyzed. For example, say an interpretation of the
industrial chemist's subject position had been developed that constructed their professional identity as
non-scientists who misused the scientific method – to be cast out from scientific societies. Yet the analysis
of the organizational field clearly showed the ACS' attempt to house this new group of chemists under its
roofs with the establishment of a new division in 1908. Such discursive-contextual contradictions would
challenge the interpretation's coherence and make re-analysis necessary, while also triggering the search
for indicators that such a combination of subject position and developments in the field may have been
possible. 
The  next  criterion,  rigor,  relates  both  to  method  and  analysis,  while  also  having  an  impact  on  the
presentation of results. Rigor of method refers to sound methodical practice, starting with surprisingly
simple tasks that are often circumvented when using a hazy concept like discourse: the development of
clear definitions of concepts and their relations to each other (cf. Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a, 1195).
What  is  discourse,  and  what  does  it  do?  How  do  concepts,  objects,  and  subject  positions  relate  to
discourse, and each other? – and so on. When rigor of analysis is lacking, a discourse analysis may fall into
the  trap  of  under-analysis  (cf.  Burman  2003),  being  guided  by  pre-conceived  or  unequivocal
interpretations.  A  discourse  analyst  should  thus  probe  for  ambiguity  by  giving  “attention  to
inconsistency and diversity,  analysing  deviant  cases  in  order  to  delimit  the  applicability  of  data,  and
providing richness of detail” (Georgaca & Avdi 2011, 157). Analytical rigor can be achieved by avoiding
“armchair  research”  based  on thin  material  (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a,  1194),  instead aiming for
thicker  descriptions  and  broad  discursive  coverage.  Of  course,  alternative  and  often  conflicting
interpretations are hard to make visible,  since they are necessary byproducts in the development of a
larger, coherent interpretation, which is the one that ends up in the written account of the analysis. This
is due to a text such as this one being the end-product of an analysis, and not a processual one. 
The conflicting demands of rigorous interpretive work and clear presentation lead to the next criterion:
transparency. Here, the goal is to make both the methodical approach to data as transparent as possible,
while  also  reporting  on results  in  a  clear,  accessible  manner.  With regard to methodical  progression,
“researchers must demonstrate how they have controlled and checked their interpretations throughout
the research process: from formulating the research question, … obtaining data … , analyzing the data
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obtained, and reporting the results” (Sandberg 2005, 59).  The need for transparency poses challenges
especially for the presentation of results which can be a daunting task when attempting to concentrate
plenty of material in a few pages. The selection of excerpts in particular, arguably an important way of
grounding an analysis (Georgaca & Avdi 2011, 157), can lead to difficult choices – most notably with an
abundance  of  discursive  texts  as  in  this  analysis  (cf.  Wood  &  Kroger  2000,  183f).  Transparency  in
presentation goes even further, towards what Schwab-Trapp (2010, 184f) calls formulating and reflecting
interpretation (see  also below). In writing up the  report,  it  needs to be  made clear when extracts  or
summaries  of  texts  are  presented  (formulating  interpretation),  when  the  analyst's  (reflecting)
interpretation  generates  grander  connections  between texts,  and  when the  construction  of  concepts,
objects, or subject positions is made visible in an interpretive motion (cf. also Fairclough 1992, 198f; Stiles
1993, 605). 
Making methodical progression and interpretive work visible is, of course, not a tool for feigning any
forms of objectivity. In order to deal with the ways that reality is constructed through the process of
interpreting it and in turn talking (or writing) about it, the last criterion that any discourse analysis needs
to adhere to is reflexivity (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 182ff).  This category is concerned with uncovering
biases. Needless to say, researcher biases may creep in at many points: having a “favored” discourse (Grant
& Marshak 2011, 225) or assuming in advance what elements of social reality are at play and how they
relate to each other (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a, 1995). The goal of reflexivity in discourse analysis is to
develop interpretive awareness, which means to “acknowledge and explicitly deal with our subjectivity
through the research process instead of overlooking it” (Sandberg 2005, 59), i.e. to be aware of one's own
subjectivity  throughout  the  analytical  work.  Of  course,  there  is  no obvious  path  towards  reflexivity.
Instead, it can be understood as an iterative process in which both coherence and rigor play a large part
and a researcher continuously checks their interpretation of discursive material, how the interpretation
was  developed,  and  how  their  “perspectival  subjectivity”  (Sandberg  2005,  59)  may  have  guided  the
interpretation. Phillips and Hardy (2002, 85, table 5.1) offer guiding questions for assessing reflexivity
throughout the research process that emphasize the constructive nature of language both in discursive
text and in the researcher's report. Stiles (1993, 613ff) takes a particularly optimistic position in regard to
reflexivity, noting how, despite biases, expectations are repeatedly disconfirmed, and close engagements
with research material  by means of thick descriptions and (contextual) triangulation may offer a new
response  to  the  idea  that  the  possibility  of  biases  invalidates  any  findings  whatsoever.  Nevertheless,
developing a reflexive approach can be seen as one of the key challenges of discourse analysis.45
45 In discourse analytic literature discussing quality control, one often finds the additional criterion of “usefulness” or 
“fruitfulness” (Potter & Wetherell 1987, 171; Phillips & Hardy 2002, 80; Flick 2007, 21; Georgaca & Avdi 2011, 157), as in
the power of an analysis to reveal new insights about the world or to make theoretical contributions. Since this facet is seen 
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6) Analyzing the Discourse 
After the difficult decisions involved in conducting a discourse analysis, the analyst is confronted with the
next problem: how to present the results. Akin to operationalization and corpus generation, there exist
few established norms or standards for writing up a discourse analysis (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 78f). The
analyst needs to negotiate multiple pressure points: illustrating with examples from texts while not going
overboard and simply narrating the content of the texts analyzed, articulating clearly where texts end and
analytical interpretation begins,  as well  as alternating focus on discursive parts but not losing the big
picture of the discourse. In order to negotiate these tensions, several key ideas shall be followed. First,
writing up the results  of a  discourse analytic  study is  itself,  of  course,  a  discursive activity (Wood &
Kroger 2000, 179), starting with the choice and framing of research and going all the way to the selection
of textual examples that find their way into the study. Discursive effects cannot necessarily be steered clear
of,  especially  since  they  originate  from  the  interaction  between  texts,  as  well  as  their  production,
dissemination,  and  reception  –  activities  which  the  writer  has  little  to  no  influence  on.  Thus  it  is
important to be as transparent as possible, clearly illustrating claims by way of the analytical steps that led
to  said  claim  (ibid.,  182),  as  well  as  making  the  additional  and  contextual  information  affecting
interpretations and decisions as explicit as possible.
Second,  one needs to be aware of  when the descriptions  of  texts  and their  respective  interpretations
merge. This is due to analysis being an iterative process, with interpretations forming from descriptions of
texts that are then re-interpreted in light of discursive features that were not clear before (Fairclough
1992,  231).  Furthermore,  in  these  interpretations  there  is  a  “constant  alternation  of  focus  from  the
particularity  of the discourse sample,  to the type(s) of discourse which it  draws upon” (ibid.).  These
interlocking practices make it difficult to trace the way that an analysis was performed and to present it in
a comprehensible way to an outside reader, especially since simply listing the temporal sequence of the
analysis may not clearly show how some interpretations came about.
Third, in response to these problems, Schwab-Trapp (2010, 184f) proposes two steps for the precise and
comprehensible  presentation  of  the  results  of  a  discourse  analysis.  In  the  first  step,  which  he  calls
“formulating interpretation” (formulierende Interpretation), the manifest contents of the texts shall be
described,  as  close  to  the  textual  material  as  possible.  The  second  step,  “reflecting  interpretation”
(reflektierende Interpretation), will go beyond the text and reconstruct how the textual elements relate to
one another, how they are used, and how they relate to other texts and the broader discourse. In this step,
the way that concepts are materialized in objects will be shown, as well as what roles the actors who are in
as one of the key elements of any science no matter the methodical approach (Whitley 2000), it is not listed as a possible 
criterion for quality here.
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legitimized subject positions play in the process. Of course, with 470 texts in the analyzed corpus, not all
of them will be presented in detail. As Wood & Kroger note, the final report represents a concise and
selective presentation of the analytic work (Wood & Kroger 2000, 186) – by design, some texts and some
findings will have to be left out. Instead, “key texts” that illustrate certain arguments or features will be
discussed, and their relation to other texts, as supporting or dissenting voices, will be made clear. The
reasoning for designating a text as “key” will have to be made transparent as well. Thus, the presentation
of results will follow Schwab-Trapp's distinction, first in describing the key texts, then in opening up the
textual material to interpretation as discursive fragments.
Before we delve into the many ways that the industrial research laboratory was made and remade as a
discursive product, some general remarks on the discourse as a whole are in order. First of all, the texts
representing discursive fragments – parts of a larger discourse that the analysis attempted to reconstruct –
turned out to be surprisingly homogeneous. There were no warring factions of “pure” and “applied”
scientists  contesting  each  other  and denying  the  others'  claims  of  being  scientists  or  designating  the
industrial laboratory as a travesty. There were no industrialists denouncing scientists' claims of scientific
efficacy.  And  there  were  no  groups  utilizing  distinctly  contrasting  argumentations.  Instead,  the
construction of concepts, objects, and subject positions was rather homogenous across texts, with little
variation within events: Changes mainly happened over time, and less so in relation to the position of the
speaker.  In  turn,  the  lack  of  antagonistic  groups  of  speakers  was  similar  to  the  lack  of  antagonistic
concepts.  In  the  discourse  surrounding  industrial  laboratories,  it  appears  that  there  were  hardly  any
competing concepts of who the chemist is or where their place of work may be. 46 Thus, the story of this
analysis is not the mapping of how and why one concept or subject position was victorious and another
vanished from the discourse, but rather how these dominant ideas came to be constructed, what resources
were used in their argumentation and legitimation, and – most importantly – how they changed over
time,  in  an  organizational  field  that  spans  sixty  years,  multitudes  of  institutional  and  organizational
change, and one World War. 
Next, not all categories proved to be as relevant as expected. Fairclough put it quite succinctly when he
stated that “in any particular analysis some of the categories are likely to be more relevant and useful than
others, and analysts are likely to want to focus upon a small number of them” (Fairclough 1992, 231f). As
it turned out, the notions of genre and intertextuality played only minor roles in the analyzed corpus. In
regard to genre,  as mentioned above, texts were not subjected to a full-blown genre analysis,  rather I
looked for structural similarities or peculiarities. As expected, an address differed from an article and from
46 Initially, a more competitive and hotly contested discourse was expected after the history of the pioneers outlined the 
struggles to recruit chemists for the early laboratories and the oft-mentioned discussions on pure and applied science. 
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a letter to the editor in composition and also often in tone or style. Addresses tended to include explicit
invocations of the audience and the positioning of the speaker (which often proved quite interesting),
while the style of letters or editorials would vary from writer to writer, yielding little additional info for
the analysis. Also, few differences in genres between groups of speakers could be identified, possibly due
to the journal-based nature of the corpus.  The minor part  that intertextuality  played may come as  a
surprise, with a good subset of the texts being articles published in scientific journals, where citing would
be part of the practice of scientific writing (cf. Fairclough 1992, 128). Yet many of these texts could better
be described as addresses or essays, negating the imperative of attributing sources. So, in the first place, the
existence of manifest references was noted – occurrences that could usually be related to the genre of the
text. When those texts that used intertextual references were analyzed as a group for patterns – such as
frequent references to certain texts (both intra- and extracorporeal), books, laws, sayings, etc. – hardly any
emerged.  Instead,  a  large group of  references could be collected – ranging from scientific  works and
newspaper articles to books such as the Bible – that were indicative of the absence of accepted, central
texts that could be used for legitimation by mere reference. More revealing than explicit intertextuality
were the less manifest forms, such as recurrent phrasings or turns of expression associated with subject
positions,  e.g.  the  chemist  or  the  banker  (see  below).  Overall,  the  lack  of  central  texts  supplying
argumentations and ideas that served as legitimating resources may be due to the heterogeneous nature of
the  organizational  field,  which  brought  organizations  together  whose  different  cultural  backgrounds
supply different discursive standards.47 In fact, clear patterns did not emerge even when the corpus was
analyzed as distinct groups of speakers with possibly different discursive backgrounds (that is popular,
chemical,  industrial,  and  governmental).  Thus,  intertextuality  played  only  a  small  role  in  the
materialization  of  the  laboratory  and  the  legitimation  of  the  chemist  as  an  important  actor  in  the
corporation. 
What proved more  interesting was what is  generally  called “interdiscursivity” (Fairclough 1992,  124;
Phillips  et  al.  2004,  644).  Interdiscursivity  means  the  drawing  upon  other  discourses  as  support  or
demarcation,  importing  related  concepts  and  their  “particular  way  of  constructing  a  subject-matter”
(Fairclough 1992, 128). Unsurprisingly, the organizational field analyzed here played host to a multitude
of  discourses,  some  pertaining  to  field-level  issues,  with  others  being  more  society-spanning.  Such
discourses  influence  each  other  and  can  be  used  as  resources  for  bolstering  one's  own  discursive
47 It needs to be remembered that the unique organizational field used as an analytical reference point to find access to this 
specific discourse includes a variety of layers of larger discourses (business, governmental, etc.) that can not all be accounted
for in the contextual analysis, but which find entrance through the discursive corpus and will play a part in the analysis (see 
especially 6.1). In this way, relevant texts codifying e.g. prevalent conceptions of control (Fligstein 1990) may serve as 
central, legitimating texts for a business organization, while playing no part at all for an academic organization and its 
discursive background – hence the heterogeneous set of references. 
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constructions (Phillips et al. 2004, 644). This relies on the central tenet that discourses are linked to each
other, hardly ever occurring alone and often in groups: “for example, a discourse on exclusion often refers
to topics or sub-topics of other discourses, such as education or employment” (Wodak 2011, 49), while
the discourse on science popularization was linked to discourses on economic and societal welfare, as well
as the American pioneer (Spero 2014, 127ff).  These other discourses – that texts from the discourse
analyzed  here,  on  the  emergence  of  industrial  research  laboratories,  linked  to  –  were  mainly  found
through  the  topical  patterns  noted  in  the  schema  of  analysis.  As  briefly  mentioned  above,  when
circumscribing topics of each individual text, it soon became apparent that for single (or adjacent) events
one or sometimes several topics were prevalent, which is why the analysis will start with an introduction
of the nine other discourses that were of concern in the field during the time of analysis, outlining their
central concerns and arguments as well as broader, societal framing. This is a prime example and case in
point for using a not-too-rigid categorical system – these topical, i.e. interdiscursive, patterns might have
been missed with a fine-grained schema only looking for highly specialized ways in which the laboratory
was constructed. How concepts, objects, and subject positions were constructed and had to be translated
from event  to event  can only  be  decoded  if  these  dominant  topics,  as  imported  fragments  of  other
discourses, are properly understood. 
The main findings of the discourse analysis are summarized in Table 6.1. For each event, other discourses
emerged, while concepts, objects, and subject positions were translated by a variety of speakers, thereby
building bridges towards said other discourses, reacting to events in the field, and arguing for or against
ideas, all while constructing and re-constructing the idea of the industrial research laboratory in new and
unique ways. How these other discourses, concepts, objects, and subject positions emerged, related to
each other, and were translated over time, will be discussed in detail in the following. 
Table 6.1: Overview of Results 
Event Discourses Concepts Objects Subject Positions Localization & 
Temporalization
1895
Professionalization of 
Chemistry
Chemical Education
Specialization
Science:
• quest for truth
• superiority over nature
• scientific method 
• progress, material wealth & welfare 
through industrial applications
Chemistry: 
• similar attributes as → Science 
• constructed as the fundamental science 
• transformation of matter, closeness to 
nature 
• utility in practical, industrial applications 
Laboratory:
• explicit association with 
attributes of → Science
• scientific method only possible 
in Laboratory 
• practices in laboratory: 
teaching and research 
• staffed by professional 
scientists 
Chemist: 
• man of science 
• university-educated
• applicator of the scientific
method, practitioner of 
→ Research 
• similar relation to truth, 
nature as → Chemistry 
• teacher & researcher
• personal qualities: 
honesty, truthfulness, 
accuracy, … 
• forefathers of chemistry 
characterized as special, 
geniuses 
Localization: 
• Chemical superiority & 
transformation of nature 
only possible in → 
Laboratory 
• Laboratory as physical 
manifestation/place of 
scientific method 
1900
GE Lab
Chemical Education Laboratory:
• the place of employment for →
Chemists 
Chemist: 
• constructed as pioneers, 
surveyors 
Chemical Engineer: 
• first mentions of the term
1902
DuPont Labs
Chemical Education
Specialization 
Research Landscape
Science:
• becomes synonymous with → Research 
Research: 
• practice of „doing science“
• organized, slow, methodical
• similar relationship to truth, nature as 
Science
Laboratory:
• connected to → Research 
Landscape: calls for laboratory 
endowments
• emphasis on industrial 
applicability of laboratory 
findings
Chemical Engineer: 
• discussion whether 
Chemical Engineers are 
chemists or engineers
• need for → Specialization
Localization:
• Place of Research →  
Laboratory 
• Dual Function of → 
Laboratory: not distinctly
academic
Temporalization: 
Research vs. “Old Ways”
• Research as the new way, 
superior to empirical, 
rule-of-thumb way of 
doing things
1908
ACS Division IEC
Specialization
Conservation Movement
Efficiency 
Chemistry: 
• for improved →  Efficiency & → 
Conservation 
• vs. rule-of-thumb methods
• increased distinction: Analytical ↔ 
Research Chemistry 
Laboratory: 
• for → Efficiency 
• increased distinction of 
laboratory types: analytical, 
testing, research, … 
Chemist: 
• increasing distinction of 
types: Analytical 
Chemist, Research 
Chemist  
Industrial Chemist: 
• emergence of the term 
• seen as “technical” 
chemist 
Chemical Engineer: 
• discussion settled: 
chemical engineer as 
chemist with an 
engineering side
• similar attributes as the 
→ Chemist 
• applies → Chemistry in 
an industrial context
• prime actor in → 
Conservation 
Localization:
Laboratory ↔ Factory 
• challenge of transporting 
laboratory findings to 
factory 
• due to difference in scale: 
lab scale = small, factory 
scale = big 
• → Chemical Engineer as 
scale expert 
Laboratory Types: 
• Industrial Laboratories 
characterized by secrecy
• University Laboratories 
characterized by teaching
Chemists: 
• → Industrial Chemist in 
industry 
1912
Kodak Lab
Conservation Movement
Efficiency 
Research Landscape 
Legislation
Industrial Research: 
• similar attributes as → Research 
• foundation for industrial progress 
• linked to → Applied Chemistry 
Chemistry: 
• increased discussion of Pure, Applied 
Chemistry
Laboratory:
• seen as a necessity in industrial 
organizations
• two main types: Analytical, 
Research, relates to → 
Analytical Chemist, Research 
Chemist 
Chemist: 
• → Research as a group 
activity 
• construction of hierarchy:
Research Chemist 
superior to Analytical 
Chemist 
• no clear localization of 
Analytical, Research 
Chemist 
• in opposition to foremen 
(rule-of-thumb methods, 
empiricism) lacking → 
Efficiency 
Localization: 
Places of Science/Research based on 
motive
• Pure: University
• Applied: Corporation 
Places of Chemistry: 
• Pure: University 
• Applied: Corporation
Chemical Engineer:
• between → Laboratory 
and factory
1917
WWI
Research Landscape 
Preparedness
Legislation
Popularization
Science: 
• progress of Applied Science due to 
advances in Pure Science 
• Pure Science: slow, unplanned, gamble
Laboratory:
• for → Preparedness 
• German example: military 
power through laboratory 
Chemist: 
• lack of appreciation by 
managers, need for → 
Popularization 
Localization:
Places of Science/Research: 
• growing more distinct 
Industrial Research: 
• for → Preparedness 
• German example
• need to sell value of IR to managers (→ 
Popularization)
Chemistry: 
• for → Preparedness 
• German example of industrial & 
educational organization
research 
• increased discussion of proper 
setup & equipment of 
industrial laboratories 
• need to educate the 
public on the values of →
Chemistry (→ 
Popularization)
Laboratory ↔ Factory:
• bridging scale difference 
through separate stages
Chemist: 
• calls for the chemist to 
move out of the → 
Laboratory, into 
executive functions 
Temporalization:
• Pure Science happens 
before Applied Science →
Pure Science temporally 
“fundamental” to 
progress 
1922
DIR
Efficiency
Research Landscape
Legislation
Popularization
Postwar Normalcy
Chemical Education
Chemistry: 
• need for → Popularization, → 
Legislation 
Chemist: 
• call for → Popularization 
of the chemist's services 
and achievements 
• → Legislation to 
safeguard place of 
employment 
Links to specific Discourses, Concepts, Objects, or Subject Positions are denoted with “ → ”  
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Figure 6.1.1: Percentage of Texts Referring to Certain Discourses
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6.1) Interdiscursivity
The nine discourses that will now be described in detail emerged through the analysis of the texts and
were initially not actively searched for. That is to say that, prior to the analysis, it was not evident, say,
what role the Conservation Movement would play for the events of 1908 and 1912, but its importance
was revealed since many of the texts of these two events referred to or at least mentioned the movement.
Figure 6.1.1 gives a rough overview of these interdiscursive trends, especially their starts, peaks, and ends
measured as the percentages of articles analyzed for that year that discussed the discourse in any way. 
As one can see, there exists a distinct progression of discourses, with these discussions disappearing after
one or two events and new ones occurring. But there is also overlap and coupling, such as with the case of
the discussions of the Conservation Movement and Efficiency, or Science Popularization and the return
to Postwar Normalcy. The only other discourse that was discussed across all of the years – sometimes not
as vigorously as others, but playing a part nonetheless – was chemical education – how to properly teach
chemists and equip them for their academic or industrial future.
Specialization
The discourse on Specialization is concerned with the increasing differentiation of academic chemistry,
both disciplinary as well as organizational, and was an area of discussion primarily for the events of 1902
and  1908.  Already  lamented  around  1870  (R.  Bruce  1987,  347),  disciplinary  specialization  saw  old
specialties wane and new ones dominate: Prior to 1900, analytical, inorganic, and organic chemistry were
the major subsets of chemistry, whereas after 1900 organic and physical chemistry started to dominate
(Rothenberg 2001, 116; cf. also Ihde 1964, 531), with the idea that one professor could cover the whole
field having disappeared long before (Beardsley 1964, 49).  As the history of the organizational field of
chemistry  has  shown,  organizational  specialization  occurred  not  only  with  the  founding  of  new
organizations  such  as  the  AIChE,  AES,  and  the  American  Society  of  Biological  Chemists,  but  also
through the divisional structure of ACS in its attempts to remain the major chemical organization of the
United States and not lose members to rival organizations. 
Interestingly, the discussion on specialization in the texts analyzed proceeds along similar lines, and is one
of the few topics covered where strong oppositions could be distinguished. On the one hand, there was a
strongly optimistic strand of discussion that saw specialization as a fundamental prerequisite for scientific
progress (Wiley 1902). Specialization in science was often likened to a concept from the industrial world:
the division of labor. These discussions frequently occurred in the context of the establishment of new
organizations, namely the AES and the AIChE, and organizational specialization was seen as running
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parallel to intellectual specialization:
Differentiation and specialization are the watchword, now, of all progress, —industrial, scientific, 
philosophical. The day is past, we all acknowledge, when one man, even be he Newton, can know 
all that is to be known; the day is also past when one scientific society can cover satisfactorily the 
whole field of scientific research. Even more than this, the day is passing when any one society can 
even cover satisfactorily the whole field of any one science, such as physics or chemistry or 
medicine. (Richards 1902, 1)
In  this  way,  the  designated  “age  of  specialization”  (“Why  Not  'The  American  Society  of  Chemical
Engineers'” 1907, 227) and all its positive connotations was apparently used as a rhetorical tool justifying
the need for organizational plurality,  especially with the establishment of organizations  outside of the
ACS divisional structure (cf. Hillebrand 1907). 
On  the  other  hand,  specialization  was  rendered  as  negative  or  even  dangerous  to  the  discipline  of
chemistry  when  put  in  the  context  of  education.  The  dissociation  of  chemistry  into  its  various
subdisciplines was seen as the cause for highly specialized chemists losing touch with other branches and
failing  to  engage  with  or  even  understand  each  other  (Noyes  1908).  Thus,  it  was  stipulated  that
specialization should not interfere with education, which was to be kept as broad as possible (Wiley 1902;
C. Richardson 1908). If the university only produced narrow specialists it was seen as having failed at
reaching  its  ideal:  the  production  of  “broad,  scholarly  minds.”  (McMurrich  1907,  646).  Ultimately,
specialization for employment in industry should come after education in the fundamentals, which was
to be kept as broad and inclusive as possible. Discussion on the advantages and dangers of specialization
wore  off  after  the  1907-08  event  tranche  (even  though  discussion  on  proper  chemical  education
continued,  see  below).  This  may  be  due  to  other  topics  clouding  these  discussions,  as  well  as  the
organization of (academic) chemistry in scientific and related societies reaching a certain saturation at the
end of the decade, with most of the major societies having been established, especially in regard to the
organizational home of the chemical engineer. Furthermore, the ACS established its divisional structure
by 1908, with the intensity of the discourse prior to this event, as well as its diminution serving as an
illustration of how the reality of the organizational field is reflected and reproduced within the discourse,
and in turn how the discourse influences what happens and what is possible in the field, by constructing
specialization as a danger or as an opportunity. 
Conservation Movement
The Conservation Movement was a relevant adjacent discourse for the events of 1907-09 and 1911-13,
with the discussion reaching its apex during the second period. It can be seen as a prime example for other
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discourses finding their way into the discourse on industrial research laboratories (Phillips et al. 2004,
644)  –  concepts,  objects,  and  subject  positions  connected  in  unique  ways  to  ideas  surrounding
conservation. While other discourses, such as Specialization or the Research Landscape, resound in events
and processes on the level of the organizational field such that reflection in discursive texts could be
anticipated to a certain extent, the Conservation Movement can be regarded as happening outside the
confines of the organizational field and as a movement on the larger societal plane, supplying additional
discourses that may find their way into the specific discourse we are interested in. To give some brief
context, the Conservation Movement, anchored firmly in the Progressive Era, grew out of the experiences
of economic growth in the late nineteenth century (cf.  Wiebe 1967, 164ff),  which resulted in crime,
overcrowding, poverty, pollution, and uncontrolled industrial development (D. Taylor 2016, 1ff). While
today terms like conservation and preservation are often used interchangeably, back then conservation
signified “a utilitarian view of natural resources: that is, they should be developed and used for the current
generation.” (D. Taylor 2016, 27). Originally just concerned with irrigation and forestry, at the end of the
twentieth century's  first  decade the conservation idea came to encompass all  natural  resources (Hays
1959, 122). The Roosevelt administration came to be especially linked to the movement, with Theodore
Roosevelt himself being a strong advocate for its aims (cf. Hays 1959, 14; D. Taylor 2016, 73ff, 387).
Arguably culminating in 1908's Governors' Conservation Conference that reflected Roosevelt's vision of
rational planning and the efficient development of resources (D. Taylor 2016, 283f), the Conference put
conservation  issues  in  the  limelight  and  lead  to  the  establishment  of  the  National  Conservation
Commission to undertake an inventory of all natural resources (Hays 1959, 128f, 140). Even though the
leaders of the movement managed to cultivate a certain pro-conservation public  sentiment (involving
strong support by the major engineering societies (Hays 1959, 123f; Daniels 1971, 302)), the movement's
powers were soon drained with the beginning of the Taft administration, as a skeptical President Taft
vouched for policy changes (Hays 1959, 147ff). By the 1910s, conservation had become a highly elastic
term, meaning “vastly different things to different people” in practice (ibid., 175), and the time of an
organized and powerful movement was seemingly over. 
How was  conservation reflected  in  discursive  texts?  The  movement  was  primarily  connected  to  the
discipline of chemical engineering, and especially its subject position in the chemical engineer. With direct
reference  to  the  National  Conservation  Commission,  conservation  as  the  proper  development  and
application  of  resources  was  claimed  to  be  “'almost  a  good  definition  of  chemical  engineering'”
(McKenna quoted in Roeber 1908, 309).  The chemical engineer was seen as playing a pivotal role in
conservation efforts to curtail the wasteful use of natural resources (C. Richardson 1908; Bogert 1913)
and in waste management or reduction (Bailey 1911; Benner 1912). Furthermore, the chemical engineer
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could  aid  in  conservation efforts  applied  to  industry,  such  as  broadening  its  scope  and  pushing  for
stability and permanence (Sadtler 1909, 106f). Next to chemical engineering, electrochemistry was often
mentioned  in  the  same  breath  in  regard  to  the  Conservation  Movement.  Heeding  the  Governors'
Conference's call,  the field's scientific knowledge was to be used in both preserving the United States
national  assets,  and in  an energetic  yet  conservative  utilization of  existing  resources  (Acheson 1909).
Exploring and developing the field would be the duty of the electrochemist, who would “undoubtedly”
play  an  important  role  in  conservation  (ibid.,  21).  Electrochemistry's  contribution  to  conservation
revolved particularly around the generation of hydroelectric power at Niagara Falls, a topic of contention
for the movement, with regard to the question whether conservation was to subordinate aesthetics to
utility (cf. Hays 1959, 127). In the discursive texts analyzed here, the taming of Niagara was celebrated as
one of the brightest chapters in the history of the American industrial revolution, with the electrochemist
having shown the public  how Niagara Falls  could only be perceived as  “beautiful” if  its  humongous
reservoir of power did not go to waste (Roeber 1911a, 1), a sentiment expressed by  Lord Kelvin that
apparently  received  traction  within  the  community  of  electrochemistry  (cf.  Hays  1959,  127).
Conservation's elasticity as a concept is illustrated when turning to some texts in the period of 1911-13,
when political  support for the movement waned. Discussions stopped focusing exclusively on natural
resources  and  the  (electro-)chemist's  or  chemical  engineer's  part  in  the  movement,  and  broadened
towards  conservation  itself  as  a  topic  for  chemical  research  (“The  Conservation  of  Research”  1911;
Cottrell 1912), as well as the application of scientific management as the principles of conservation to
production in chemical industries or even universities (Gillett 1913, 594, 599). In the increased spread of
ideas regarding the proper application of scientific management a central element of the Conservation
Movement's tenets is illustrated: the notion of efficiency, which created such a resonance in discursive
texts that it will be discussed separately.
Efficiency
The notion of efficiency was most certainly the part of the Conservation Movement that resounded the
strongest in the discourse analyzed. Playing a part in the last four event tranches, discussion of efficiency
in  industry,  academia,  and  government  peaked  around  1913.  The  Progressive  Era  “gave  rise  to  an
efficiency craze – a secular Great Awakening, … in which a gospel of efficiency was preached without
embarrassment to businessmen, workers, doctors, housewives, and teachers …” (Haber 1964, ix; cf. also
Galambos  1979,  274f).  Lying  at  the  heart  of  the  idea  of  the  conservation,  the  “gospel  of  efficient
planning” concerned not only the efficient use of (natural) resources, but also all areas of life (Hays 1959,
124). Nothing marked the progressive movement more than this interest in efficiency, with which science
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came to be identified – the application of the scientific method to life being believed to yield greater
efficiency (Daniels 1971, 308). Of major concern to the discourse analyzed here were two readings of the
term in particular: efficiency as mechanical efficiency, or the energy input and output of machines; and
the efficiency of the business enterprise,  as input and output of dollars (Haber 1964, ixf).  Corporate
receptivity to the craze fits well  with Fligstein's assertion that in the manufacturing perspective – the
dominant conception of control during these years – business stability was sought through the internal
control of the production process (Fligstein 1990, 16), with a more efficient process evidently leading to
higher profits (cf. also Barley & Kunda 1992). The application of efficient measures to business and other
areas became associated to a large extent with Taylor's Scientific Management, which set out to apply
scientific  methods  to business  problems (Haber  1964,  18ff),  underscoring  how the  discourse  on the
credibility and efficacy of science lends legitimacy to these linkages of efficiency through science (Daniels
1971, 303; LaFollette 1990, 9). 
Surprisingly,  Taylor  and  Scientific  Management  played  only  minor  roles  in  discursive  texts,  which
focused mainly on efficiency and the ways that it could be fully achieved:
Efficient production and the economic management of our manufacturing plants are essential 
features to our commercial development, and it is in this field that the greatest results are to be 
attained in the conservation of our natural resources. The accomplishment of these results 
obviously depends upon the application of scientific knowledge to the solution of all problems, 
both great and small, in the development, the direction and the management of our factories. 
(Whitaker 1911, 9)
Efficiency was depicted as the means to ameliorate conditions in industry (Duncan 1909), the way to
create greater prosperity (Roeber 1911a; Little 1913) and the answer to the waning of “[t]he days of large
profits,  cheap raw materials  and labor” (Booth 1912,  196).  The orderly  use  of  talents  and especially
research staff (Ferguson 1912) was seen as the path to increased efficiency, with the chemist built up as
the proper actor who could apply scientific insights to industrial processes – a fact which was lamented as
being overlooked by manufacturers (H. Skinner 1911). But the concrete methods to improve efficiency
were  characterized  not  only  by  subject  positions,  but  also  by  the  concept  of  research  and  its
materialization. Efficiency could be achieved through research as the “catalysis of raw materials by brains”
(Little 1913, 644) and the use of chemistry (Little 1911). In fact, some authors went so far as to describe
the industrial  research laboratory as “an extension of the principle of maximum efficiency” (Whitney
1911, 429; cf. also “The Industrial Corporation and the Inventor” 1911), which indicated the spread of
the  concept  of  laboratories  in industry,  and possibly  further  underscores  how nascent  and emerging
entities are legitimized by translating them within the given frame, in this case: a discourse that was crazy
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about  efficiency  (see  also  below).  As  outlined  above,  the  quest  for  efficiency  did  not  cease  at  the
boundaries of the business world. The concept was applied to the training of chemists and engineers, and
questions were asked regarding whether or not contemporary training was efficient enough for employ in
industry  (Burgess  1911;  Whitrow  1911),  with  some  calling  for  an  “atmosphere”  of  efficiency  in
laboratory instruction (Whitaker 1911).  Calls  such as this were often informed by assertions that the
university  chemist  was  not  efficiency-minded  (Bancroft  1912),  and  therefore  limited  in  their
employability in the manufacturing sphere that was only concerned with profits and efficiency (Grosh
1913).  Beyond  teaching,  proper  equipment  was  demanded  to  increase  research  efficiency  (Roeber
1911b). With the beginning of WWI, the way that efficiency was linked to concepts, objects and subject
positions shifted, further illustrating the fluidity of discursive concepts, as well as the approach of using
event-tranches  as  a  reasonable  approach  to  map  changes  of  meaning.  The  war  was  described  as  an
international striving for efficiency, with the German military-industrial war machine being dreadfully
efficient (Noyes 1917). The key to success was depicted, unsurprisingly, as efficiency through science:
“[M]odern warfare is a highly complex problem in applied science and its outcome is decided largely in
the laboratories and factories; … military power is dependent upon scientific and industrial organization
and efficiency” (Bogert 1917b, 1010; cf. also Withrow 1917). Lastly, the craze also produced demands for
field-level cooperation in research: “[C]loser coöperation between our universities and our industries will
go  far  to  assure  increased  efficiency  to  both”  (Bogert  1913,  762).  The  ways  in  which  the  research
landscape may be configured will be discussed next.
Research Landscape
Discussion of the Research Landscape48 occurred mostly between roughly 1903-07 and 1912-22. The
primary concern of this discourse was support for chemical research and its institutional location. In the
early period, proposals for possible and proper support of research were communicated and discussed –
mainly framed as research happening at universities, where it would have to scope out a place for itself
next to teaching duties (Chamberlin et al. 1903). Endowments for research were announced frequently
(e.g.  “The  Endowment  of  Applied  Science  at  Harvard  University”  1903).  The  Carnegie  Institution
emerged as a highly visible actor, with listings of grants made repeatedly reported on the pages of Science
and other journals (“Grants Made by the Carnegie Institution” 1903). 
While the Carnegie Institution remained visible and heralded in the second period, 1912-22 (“Ten Years
of  the  Carnegie  Institution”  1912),  other  ideas  came  to the  fore,  such as  the  Research  Corporation
48 The discourse itself was not termed a “research landscape” in the corpus texts. The name was chosen as an umbrella term 
that catches all the elements of the shifting landscape of support for science in the United States in the early twentieth 
century. 
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(Cottrell 1912; “The Research Corporation” 1917; Robertson 1917), where profits from patents were
utilized  to  fund  research,  and  a  system  of  industrial  fellowships  (Duncan  1912;  Snell  1913),  where
corporations (such as Du Pont) supplied funds for selected research projects at universities. A subtle shift
in direction and emphasis marks the second period, especially with the entrance of the United States into
WWI. Whereas at prior events the discussion centered around the question of establishing systems for
research funding – i.e. how to fund research at all – now the discussion focused on what the best way to
fund research would be, how to facilitate cooperation between universities and corporations, and how to
coordinate laboratories to eliminate duplications of effort, seen as waste of researchers' manpower and
time.  The  difference  becomes  especially  clear  once  the  question  of  independent  laboratories  occurs
(Sharp 1917), as the high costs of establishing an in-house research laboratory became widely known –
these were costs that smaller manufacturers could not afford, hence the need to collectively shoulder the
load (Weidlein 1922):
Industrial scientific research departments can reach their highest development in those concerns 
doing the largest amount of business. … nevertheless conditions to-day are such that without 
cooperation among themselves the small concerns can not have the full benefits of industrial 
research, for no one among them is sufficiently strong to maintain the necessary staff and 
laboratories.” (Carty 1916, 512)
Proposed solutions  were  the  services  of  independent  consulting laboratories,  or  the  establishment  of
cooperative  laboratories  by  trade  associations  or  groups  of  manufacturers.  This  strand  of  discussion
intensified, with the end of the war in sight and speakers setting their sights on the postwar configuration
of the American research landscape (Bancroft 1918; Wardenburg 1922; de Long 1922). In this second
period, the relationship between universities and corporations and the proper place of research was also
increasingly broached. A clear duty of industry to “give back” to academia by funding university research
(through various proposed measures such as endowments, fellowships, etc.) was evoked time and time
again (e.g. Baskerville et al. 1916; Bancroft 1918) (for a more detailed dissection of the places of science see
below). The displacement within this topic can be seen as indicative of an evolving research landscape,
which is further supported by field-level contextual data. At early events, prior to 1912, relations between
universities and corporations were still nascent, with the university still in the process of balancing its
functions of teaching and research and the industrial research laboratory not yet a well-known successful
entity. During and after WWI, places of research became more clear-cut, and it became taken for granted
that  research was  done not  only at  universities,  but also within corporations.  The discussion on the
proper  cooperation  and  coordination  of  research  efforts  nicely  illustrates  how  the  industrial  R&D
laboratory had become a known organizational element within the discourse (see also Fig 3.2.1, 3.2.2), so
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that even those without the means to afford a laboratory needed to find ways to reap the benefits of
research, further underlining how the concept of research gained traction as the foundation of industrial
progress over the years.
Preparedness
The discourse on Preparedness only touched one event, the tranche of 1916-18, but it reframed many of
the established conceptualizations of science, chemistry, and research. With the war already waging in
Europe and the United States' entry looming on the horizon, discussions on how to properly prepare –
not only militarily, but also industrially – for such an event reached heightened intensity. Many different
ideas were espoused, both “genuine and quack” (Jacobson 1916, 456), to counter the state of “deplorable
unpreparedness”  (Carty  1916,  511),  and  research  was  positioned  as  the  foundation  of  proper
preparedness and “America's bulwark of defense” (Parr 1918, 419; cf. also Bacon 1916). This is especially
interesting since the horrors of the war, trench warfare and chemical weaponry, were seen as products of
the (primarily German) sciences and industries (Carty 1916, 511). Nonetheless, research was perceived as
a national duty (Whitney 1916), as the nation's military power was based directly upon the execution of
scientific research and its application in the industries (Bogert 1917a, b; Withrow 1917). Chemistry was
portrayed as the center of these activities, with authors enumerating the ways in which chemistry touched
not  only  agriculture  and  the  military,  but  also  daily  life  (Raiford  1917,  493).  Research  and  the
implementation of preparedness-related requirements were put at the feet of scientifically trained men,
who were seen as natural leaders, and their training came under increased scrutiny (Maclaurin et al. 1916;
“Where are the Leaders?” 1918).  The scientist and especially the chemist were also discussed in ways
connecting to both the topics of the Research Landscape and Popularization. The Research Landscape
was included in the question of the proper place of the chemist (and by extension the scientifically trained
man) in the war effort,  with several  authors lamenting the drafting of highly qualified chemists  into
frontline  duty,  thereby  depleting  research  laboratories  at  universities,  corporations  and  federal
institutions.  Instead,  they saw the chemist in the reserve doing research not only to supply increased
industrial yields and wartime goods, but also to solve problems under the direction of the Army and Navy
(Bogert 1917a), in this way fulfilling their “patriotic duty” (Stieglitz & Parsons 1917, 730). As explained
with the history of chemistry and its relation to politics and the war, the NRC was founded in an effort to
better coordinate research work between academia, industry,  and the military,  in addition to helping
chemists find their “proper place” within industrial and military organizations geared for wartime. The
reason for its organization and subsequent actions is mirrored in discursive texts on Preparedness. With
regard to Popularization, the preparedness campaign and successive transformations of the organizational
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field were seen as indicators of ruptures in the perception of chemists and scientists in general, as well as a
public reckoning of the chemical foundations of all societal life (e.g. Ames 1918; Thompson 1918).49 This
brings me to the next adjacent discourse: Popularization. 
Popularization
The Popularization of Science was discussed during two events,  1916-18 and 1921-23. I  have already
introduced the early popularizers singing the “gospel of industrial research”, as well as the origins of the
ACS News and Science Services (see above, 4.3), so organizational and individual actors are known – but
how were these developments reflected, translated, and enabled in the discourse? This topic is especially
interesting due to the insights it opens up regarding construction and change in subject positions as well
as concepts. With regard to subject positions, ideas about who the chemist is play a central role. Prior to
entry into WWI, during the height of the preparedness campaign the public perception of chemists – or
rather, the perception discursive speakers had of the public view – was critiqued repeatedly. Even though
the preceding years were seen as an upswing regarding popular knowledge of what chemistry is and what a
chemist does, “[t]he popular mind has evidently not yet progressed beyond the age of the alchemist”
(Matthews  1916,  1148).  This  was  perceived  as  weighing  especially  heavy  on  the  opportunities  for
chemists in industry, since bankers were not prepared to invest into chemical businesses due to a lack of
familiarity (“The Chemist and the Banker” 1916). Similarly, the business man was unready to change
processes  and  trust  the  chemist  on the  shop floor  (Maclaurin  et  al.  1916,  65ff)  due to  a  lacking  of
appreciation for science: “The ordinary business man of to-day very naturally thinks that his business
ability is more valuable than the technical ability of the chemist.” (Thompson 1917a, 81). A remedy was
supposedly found in the continued efforts of popularization, of which Duncan's books and the activities
of the USDA and Department of Commerce were especially lauded (ibid., 80). Moreover, the need to
transform public perception was strongly associated with the attribution of blame for the dyestuffs crisis,
originally laid at the feet of the American chemists, who saw themselves wrongly accused and in turn
emphasized the contribution of chemists to turning the situation around (Clark 1917a; Herty 1917; Parr
1918). Many speakers praised the ability of American chemistry to build up the knowledge base for dye
manufacturing so quickly, and shift the blame towards industrialists unwilling to invest in dyestuffs prior
to  the  crisis  (Baekeland  1917;  G.  Bruce  1917).  Thus,  popularization  materialized  in  various  ways  –
through books, newspaper articles, public exhibits, and speaking tours – was regarded as a means for
49 As an interesting aside, in expectation of a conclusion to the war, some authors shifted the discourse from Peparedness for 
war to Preparedness for peace, emphasizing the role (industrial) science should play in industry in the future (e.g. 
“Industrial Preparedness for Peace” 1916; Parr 1918). These and other discursive shifts will be discussed below (see Postwar
Normalcy).
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increasing appreciation of the chemist's subject position in the public eye, as well as popular concepts of
science and chemistry, after the nation's awakening to the needs of a strong national chemical industry.
As  the  discussions  surrounding  Preparedness  have  shown,  science  and  research  were  constructed  as
central  to  the  war  effort,  notions  that  were  echoed  in  the  efforts  of  popularization.  After  the  war,
discursive  texts  show  a  high  willingness  to  exploit  the  war's  “momentum”  with  regard  to  public
knowledge of the powers of science and chemistry (E. Campbell 1921; Slosson 1922; “American Institute
of Chemistry” 1922), and to make it known to everyone how exactly the war was won and how integral
the organized use of science was not only to successful military action, but also to building a strong,
national chemical industry that would be able to compete internationally and supply American markets
independently of foreign suppliers. This is also evidenced by the organizational field, with the ACS News
Service and the Science Service gearing up, and the NRC as well as the Chemical Foundation supplying
their  own  brand  of  “chemical  boosterism”,  especially  in  efforts  to  influence  legislative  efforts.  The
interrelation of Popularization and Legislation, the next topic, are aptly summarized in this quote:  “All
that the dye industry needs is intelligent legislation and a sympathetic public” (Nichols 1918, 769). 
Legislation
Legislation  was  discussed  during  three  events  –  1911-13,  1916-18,  1921-23.  Contributions  gained
intensity especially during and after the war, which is why this topic is intrinsically linked to others, i.e.
Preparedness, Popularization, and Postwar Normalcy. The discussion can be split into two strands: In
one, legislation was seen as a protective mechanism for the American chemical industries, while in the
other, legislation was expected to aid in the consolidation of the professional status of the chemist. The
dyestuffs shortage was frequently invoked as a cautionary tale of what can happen if American industries
remained dependent on foreign powers: the war showcased the need for industrial independence. The re-
awakening of the German industrial powerhouse was painted as the “greatest fear” of American chemical
manufacturers (Noyes 1917, 6). Celebrating the research accomplishments of American chemists who
reacted to the dye crisis and achieved successes in the war, the onus was now put towards legislators to
safeguard what was attained (cf. Herty 1917):
It will depend as much on sound common sense of our legislators as on the skill and science of our 
chemists and engineers whether what we have gained so brilliantly by splendid constructive work 
will be lost again through political bungling and ignorance. (Baekeland 1917, 1021)
Indeed,  it  was stressed that  while  the nascent dyestuffs  industry in the United States  was a  result  of
chemical research in academic and industrial laboratories, chemists could not move the industry into a
permanent  and  independent  state  on  their  own.  Instead,  “independence  is  altogether  a  question  of
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capital,  not  of  science” (Stieglitz  1917a,  2102) – capital  was seen as  a  vital  ingredient,  concurrent to
discursive reasoning in shifting the blame for the dye crisis, where it was not the lack of research, but the
lack  of  will  to  invest  that  was  lamented (see  above).  To  assure  investors  of  the  future  prospects  of
American chemical industries, “wise legislation by tariff and patent laws will insure to capital a return
sufficiently attractive and stable” (ibid.). Utilizing connections built up during the war, the ACS was seen
as being in the ideal position to influence such legislative efforts through advisory committees and other
cooperative activities (Stieglitz 1917b, 1006), illustrating the politicization of chemistry (see above, 4.3) –
not only did individuals get involved, but also big, central organizations in the field such as ACS and the
AIChE. 
The other  strand of  discussion revolved around chemists  as  a  group and their  professional  standing.
While the dye crisis and the war were seen as elevating the chemist not only in the public eye, but also in
those of industrialists, certain speakers noted that the profession was still not well-defined or established.
References were regularly made to other learned professions – medicine and law – and the advantages
that their legislatively mediated existence yielded (Bacon 1917a, 800f; Stieglitz 1917a, 2110; Seidell 1922;
Armstrong 1923).  Thus, recognition by legislation would not only protect the public  from chemical
malpractice, but also further increase the chemist's public standing (McCormick 1921). Some considered
the major chemical societies able to regulate the professional requirements made of chemists to guard
against  the dangers  of “impostors  and unqualified consultants” (Bacon 1917a, 800),  yet  the issues of
professional  cohesion,  perception,  and  legislative  efforts  for  the  stipulation  of  standards  came  up
increasingly surrounding the establishment of the AIC as an economic organization for chemists distinct
from  scientific  or  technical  societies  (Parmelee  1921a;  McCormick  1921;  “American  Institute  of
Chemistry” 1922; “Some Economic Aspects of the Practice of Chemistry” 1922; Eisenschiml 1922b). In
this way, the economic struggles of chemists outlined in the organizational field above are reflected in the
discourse, as questions of legislation for professional status and the organizational mediation of access and
status in the field. The ideas proposed in the context of the AIC saw such an organization not only active
in setting ethical standards for chemists and giving licenses for the practice as consultants, but also in
regulating the supply of chemically-trained graduates (Eisenschiml 1922a), as an answer to the industry
reconfiguring from wartime to postwar production.
Postwar Normalcy
Returning to peacetime industry, the cooperative networks between academia, industry, and the military
and federal agencies dissolving or being put on permanent bases proved to be a topic once the war was
over, during 1918 and the last event-tranche of 1921-23. It can be considered a minor discourse, since
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many currents of discourse were discussed in the context of others: the need to nurture the favorable
atmosphere  towards  science  created by the  war  (E.  Campbell  1921;  S.  Williams  1921),  legislation to
protect the new industries that the war spawned, and the professional status of the chemist in a changed
organizational  landscape  (Armstrong  1923).  These  discussions  formed  part  of  the  larger  discursive
currents on Popularization and Legislation that were already part of the conversation prior to and during
the war,  yet they gained additional  layers in the years  after the armistice.  Still,  the return to Postwar
Normalcy warrants a (small) topic of its own due to the way the role of the chemist and the place of
research were sketched. The unemployment of chemists, having been let go from corporations or agencies
that were scaling back from the “almost insane demand” (Bancroft 1922, 157), was frequently discussed,
to the point that one author noted such remarks as being very fashionable (Eisenschiml 1922a, 139).
Discursive texts mirroring the efforts that ultimately culminated in the organization of the AIC show
how  this  organization  was  conceived  of  as  a  professional  body  not  only  for  the  representation  of
economic interests,  but also to possibly regulate the supply of chemists  available for industry and to
counter the waves of lay-offs after 1918. Even though some only saw the postwar depression as only
temporary  (Bancroft  1922),  others  thought  it  imperative  to restrict  the  supply  of  chemists,  through
educational  campaigns  (Eisenschiml  1922a;  “American  Institute  of  Chemistry”  1922).  Still  others
reframed the problem by reconfiguring the chemist's subject position, calling for fields of activity for the
chemist, who should not “get a job”, but rather for them to go into businesses of their own (“Cogitations
on the Chemist” 1922; Eisenschiml 1922c; “Shall I Educate My Boy to Be a Chemist?” 1922; Burgess
1923) or work as managers – thereby broadening the domain of the chemists as a professional group. In
addition to translating the role  of the chemist,  the discussion on this  topic concerned itself  with the
concept of research and its materialization in laboratories, warning of losing the ground gained during the
war – not only in the perception of science and chemistry, but also particularly in laboratories built and
expenses set aside for research (e.g.  Bancroft 1918; Parmelee 1921b). What can we learn from the issues
presented within this discursive topic? It certainly illustrates how subject positions are constantly in flux,
and how even after the American chemists stepped onto the national stage the meaning of what it meant
to be a chemist was still an area of struggle. Furthermore, while frequently touting how scientific research
won  the  war,  collective  calls  for  more  popularization,  research  expenditures,  and  fear  of  “the
businessman” forgetting the values of chemistry once again may hint at the laboratory being a recognized
organizational element to a certain extent, yet the meaning of research, different types of research, as well
as its local and temporal manifestations were still not fixed as discursive concepts.
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Chemical Education
The only discourse appearing across all events was the discussion of chemical education, which touched
on a series of questions: what are the goals of it, what should be covered, how to educate best, and should
chemical  education  prepare  for  work  in  academia  or  industry?  This  discourse  gives  glimpses  of  the
discursive  construction  of  the  concept  of  science,  and  the  relationship  between  universities  and
corporations. One attribute of the education of all kinds of chemists, including industrial chemists and
the chemical engineer, put forward repeatedly, was the breadth of education. Opinions on this were very
homogenous as a broad consensus felt across all events. The education of chemists should be as broad as
possible, with author after author underlining the necessity of learning the fundamentals of chemistry,
instead of immediately specializing (Duisberg 1896; McMurrich 1907; C. Richardson 1908; Coolidge
1921; Lovelace 1921; Bolling & Maze 1922). While there was a general consensus on the character of
education that a chemist should receive, this issue serves to illustrate a wider point of contention, namely
the relationship between universities and industries, the analysis of which helps us in understanding the
discursive lines drawn between the university and the industrial corporation – a relationship that will play
a role in the objectification of the laboratory, as well as the subject positions supplied for chemists by the
discourse. In the battle for which kind of principles and applications were to be taught, some authors saw
the deeper  question of  the  function of  the university,  resisting the  “seed of  danger” held  within the
commercialization  of  the  university  (McMurrich  1907,  645).  The  necessity  of  an  education  in
fundamentals, then, was coupled with notions of the purity of university science and research (Remsen
1894, 534; McMurrich 1907, 645) – discursive coalitions which will be explored further below. Other
authors denoted the ideal of the university as an institution of learning for learning's sake as being out-of-
date, having made a new conception of the university as a utilitarian organization (Lovelace 1921, 357).
This  perspective understood chemical  education in terms of supply and demand, with the university
supplying the research workers that corporations increasingly demanded (Kellogg 1921), and the primary
function of colleges and universities denoted as the education of chemists (“The Function of Educational
Institutions  in  Research”  1921).  After  the  war,  concurrent  with  Popularization  and  the  Return  to
Normalcy, the notion of “breadth” in education continued to be used, with some authors calling for an
even broader education beyond the boundaries of chemistry so that chemists would be enabled to do
more than laboratory work and thus find their place in marketing, sales, and management (cf. e .g. Bolling
& Maze 1922). The executive's perception of the chemist as being employable only in a laboratory –
chemists having been instilled at university with the idea that this would be their proper place – was seen
as problematic for the chemist's engagement opportunities. Interestingly, for earlier events, the laboratory
was constructed as the central place of education where the instruction of any kind of chemist should
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happen (Remsen 1894;  Whitaker  1912a),  thereby discursively consolidating the physical  place where
chemistry happens. 
At the same time,  the varying places  of  employment for  chemists  are reflected in the discourse.  The
industrial chemist – a label at first still seen as a “rather awkward designation” (Platt 1894, 37) – was
discussed especially in relation to the realities of manufacturing work, the relationship between chemistry
and engineering, and how well university education that was often seen as “pure” would translate to the
shop floor (cf. Palmer 1908; Tingle 1908). The ability to do research, or “original investigation”, was
placed centrally  in  the  array  of  abilities  that  chemical  graduates  should  have,  making  them not  only
capable of but also valuable for industrial work (Tingle 1908). The different types of chemists, such as
analytical,  research,  and industrial  chemists  (cf.  e.g.  W. Richardson 1908a) constructed in these texts
further help as the first clues for substantiating the way the chemist was understood, where the lines
between an analytical and a research chemist were drawn over time, and how they changed with the
increasing importance of organized research in a corporate setting. 
6.2) Concepts
After  this  introduction  to  adjacent  discourses  that  resulted  from  the  events  and  structure  of  the
organizational field and guided discussion in the discursive materials, let us turn towards the analytical
categories that were developed to understand a discourse's constructive effects.50 While the theoretical
foundations of these constructive functions were set out above, let me briefly reiterate why the analysis of
concepts is important. “Concepts are culturally and historically situated frames for understanding social
reality – ideas, categories and theories through which we understand the world” (Maguire & Hardy 2006,
13). The reality-parsing quality of concepts is what is most important to our undertaking here – when
actors spoke of research, of the wonders of science, and of the domain of chemistry,  they drew their
knowledge  of  what  science  and  research  meant  from  shared,  pre-configured,  cultural  notions,  i.e.
concepts, instead of making it up each time one of these terms was used. Thus, in order to comprehend
what science, chemistry, and research signified when discursive speakers evoked these terms, we have to
analyze the ways they were constructed, what characteristics they were attributed with, and how they
changed over time. The choice to analyze the concepts of science and (industrial) research on the one
hand, and chemistry on the other, was both theoretically and empirically informed. For one, ideas about
what science is, what doing research entails, and what products chemistry could conjure have necessarily
50 Of course, the distinction between these other discourses and concepts is a purely analytical one. A differently-focused 
analysis could have probed the concept of “chemical education”, and how this concept was materialized in objects (e.g. 
college courses, classrooms, etc.). The nine discourses presented here are a result of the discourse analysis' unique focus.
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had to play a part in the discourse surrounding the early laboratories. Yet the analysis had to be shaped
openly and attentively enough in case other concepts came to the fore, thereby influencing the discursive
trajectory, which proved not to be the case in the empirical material. 
In the following, I will first present how the interlinked concepts of science and research – research as
doing science – were constructed, and how industrial research emerged discursively around 1912. Then,
chemistry  itself  will  be  scrutinized  regarding  its  meaning,  applications,  and  efficacy.  The  discourse
exhibits two central facets occurring not only in the realm of concepts, but also in the materialization of
science:  locating  and temporalizing.  Locating  illustrates  how demarcations  drawn within or  between
concepts were heavily dependent on the place of the concept – e.g., where did the science happen? –
while relations between concepts were often characterized by ordering them temporally – pure research
being necessarily done before its applied variant, for example. While not attributable to a specific group of
speakers  attempting  to  steer  or  control  discursive  constructions  via  these  tendencies,  locating  and
temporalizing still serve to show how discourse itself operates in its constructive effects. 
Concepts, 1: Science, Research, and Industrial Research
Since industrial research laboratories were places of research – potentially even scientific research – it is
imperative to know the prevailing conception of science and research at the time of the laboratories'
inception. Early on, science was established to signify a quest for truth (Goode 1895; Carhart 1895, 397).
But not just any kind of truth – the truth of nature. It was repeatedly stressed how the scientist's work
meant discovering nature's facts and the underlying laws (Newcomb 1895; L. A. Bauer 1909), which was
often seen as a struggle with nature to uncover its mysteries: “...  literally numberless are the conditions
under which matter is ever anew compelled to yield up its secrets” (Emich 1900, 444). The process of
uncovering – the struggle for discovery – meant getting in touch with nature and as closely as possible.
Remsen  denounced  the  methods  of  philosophers  to  “stand  aloof  and  speculate”,  whereas  (natural)
scientists  learned  that  to  uncover  the  truth  they  would  have  to  come  in  close  contact  with  nature
(Remsen 1894, 533; Coulter 1900, 281), and that meant touching, observing, probing, weighing, and
measuring  (cf. L. A. Bauer 1909, 188) the elements, be they physical, chemical, or otherwise. But how
would  science  go  about  wrestling  answers  from  nature,  once  it  had  gotten  into  close  contact?  The
practice of science was discursively constructed as finding facts through experiments, observation, and the
gathering of evidence.  Science consisted of “weighing evidence and stamping each statement with an
index of its reliability” (Scripture 1895, 350). In fact, the evidence-based nature of scientific practice can
be seen as its core tenet (cf. e.g. Brooks 1895; “The Nature of Scientific Truth” 1895):
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In the pursuit of the higher lines of science, the mind is trained to accurate generalization from 
secure data and to an indefinite suspension of judgment in the absence of sufficient evidence. The 
proper pursuit of science should develop a judicial state of mind toward all problems. (Bessey 1896,
123)
All these parts now laid out before us – the close relation of science to nature and the scientific practice as
gathering evidence through observation and experiment – came to be codified in the concept of the
scientific method:
The scientific method is therefore that intellectual process by which facts are recognized, 
accumulated and arranged, hypotheses framed, tested and exploited and conclusions drawn, 
verified, accepted and applied where they may seem best to fulfil their function in the enginery of 
social progress. (MacMillan 1895, 538)
Science soon came to be identified with the scientific method. When discursive speakers wrote about
science,  they  generally  referred  to  the  ensemble  of  practices  subsumed  in  the  method.  In  fact,  the
scientific method came to be celebrated to the extreme, as the “most satisfactory and satisfying things in
the possession of the human mind” (W. Richardson 1911, 514), the most marked change in educational
history (Carhart 1895, 394), and the means to eliminate errors (Turner 1900, 358). Soon, proclamations
were made that no other method existed for finding truth, for making nature reveal its ways: “Revelation
and prophecy are thus fruits of science. It may perhaps be said, with truth and literally, that we to-day
know no other method of either revelation or prophecy” (Thurston 1902, 402). Indeed, the use of the
scientific  method  can  be  understood  as  not  only  finding  laws  underlying  facts,  but  also  rendering
supremacy over nature possible (Halstead 1895a; Little 1909; Crowell 1909), which further changed the
relationship of both, with science now assuming a dominant position over the natural world, the limits of
which were unknown: “Science knows no ultimate limits beyond which she may not go … nor has nature
yet thrown up her hands as a signal that she no longer resists the uncovering of all her treasure” (Carhart
1895, 402). To take a brief step back from this formulation of results towards some reflective notes, it is
not surprising to see how these ascriptions of the scientific method changed with other discourses coming
to the fore. Around 1912, during the height of the efficiency craze, the scientific method was referred to
as being more efficient than the older ways (in industry); whereas during WWI, German military might
was acknowledged as being a product of widespread application of the scientific method, though in an
unethical way (see also below).  While  texts outlining – or celebrating – the meaning and practice of
science were more frequent for early events, the basic relationships between truth, nature, and science
described here did not change: science meant using the scientific method to uncover nature's truths. 
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From Science to Research
Now that we know the contours of what science signified for the seven events, we need to know how
research was connected to science. It can be argued that research soon became synonymous with science
(Doolittle 1902; Crowell 1909; L. A. Bauer 1909)51, potentially with more emphasis on the practice of it –
research thus meaning doing science, as “diligent inquiry or a search after a desired object” (Weens 1917,
478). Thus research was cast in the same relationship to truth and nature as science was: the method for
finding truth (W. Walker 1911, 17), and the conquest over nature (Robertson 1917, 375). A key element
in the construction of research as the practice of science was the notion of original investigation ( Remsen
1894; Carhart  1895; “The President's  Address before the Society of Chemical Industry” 1900; Baker
1900; McKeen Cattell  1902).  The originality  involved in doing research thus served as  an important
juncture for establishing the characteristics of the scientist  (see below: 6.4 Subject Positions), as well as
stressing the creative forces involved in the practice of science as the “fountainhead of new knowledge, the
vital stimulus of industrial growth, the originator of new industries and sustainer of old.” (Swan 1901,
673). In a parallel to the construction of science, the concept of research connected to other discourses in
various ways over time. It was often discussed with reference to the research landscape, especially in the
context  of  the  emerging  dual  function  of  the  university  in  teaching  and  research  (see  above),  with
teaching duties  often  strongly  impinging  on  the  time  available  for  original  work.  Furthermore,  as
outlined, adequate financial and institutional support for research was repeatedly questioned, with many
ideas  and  models  put  forward  (e.g.  Swan  1901;  Clarke  1902).  Research,  pitched  as  the  solution  to
conservation  problems  (Sadtler  1909),  or  later  preparedness  (Whitney  1916;  Bogert  1917b),  with
lowering profit margins and the quest for efficiency, gained an additional dimension that exceeded simply
being science put to action. Speakers increasingly constructed research in opposition to the traditional
ways of doing things, the rule-of-thumb methods, the old haphazard days of trial and error – “under the
guidance of empiricism with a happy disregard of basic principles” (Little 1913, 644).  The organized
character of research was regularly emphasized, as well as the slow, methodical, and planned character of
doing science (Talbot 1912; Roeber 1913; Clarke 1916) and the idea of research as a cooperative activity
of scientists in a group (Roeber 1913; Bacon 1917a). Summarizing in a reflective motion, the concept of
research as doing science to subjugate nature serves as an important element of the construction of the
industrial laboratory, since – and this is one of the key results of this analysis – both science and especially
research were always located within the confines of a laboratory. This illustrates the discursive tendency
of locating concepts, with the place chosen and changes to such locations giving important clues as to the
51 Due to the small number of texts for the first event (1895), it is possible that science and research were already used 
synonymously, yet simply not covered in the small sample. For the next two tranches, 1900/1902, it became clear that both
terms seemed to have been used interchangeably. 
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discursive ruptures and changes in the organizational field. The antagonism of research vs. the old ways –
accentuating research's slow nature – gives the first glimpses of temporalizing concepts that will be of
importance later. 
With regard to science and research as discursive concepts, two more important dimensions need to be
sketched to understand their materialization: the reasons for doing science, and what exactly came to be
signified when  industrial research was talked about. What were the advantages of science, the claims
made for research – why do it at all? Science and research were constantly put into the context of societal
progress  and  national  welfare,  and  these  were  generally  connoted  as  material  progress  and  welfare.52
Depictions varied from the grandiose – science bringing about “glorious change” (Halstead 1895a, 203)
or an “uplift of humanity, an advance in civilization which cannot be described or measured in words”
(W. Walker 1911, 17) – to more concrete claims: 
In order not to become a mere code of observed and classified facts, a thing to interest men by its 
intrinsic perfection but of no other earthly use, a science must find practical applications which 
increase the comfort, pleasure or wealth of mankind. (Richards 1903, 66)
Comfort, pleasure, and wealth were claimed to be reachable through science not only on a national level
(Carhart 1895; Thurston 1900; Loudon 1902; “Research Institutions” 1913; Roeber 1916), but also for
each citizen – those hungry fed by science in agriculture, those hurting relieved thanks to chemistry and
biology, those freezing relieved by research into fuels. It was made clear how science could impact daily
lives in a concrete and tangible way (“The Nature of Scientific Truth” 1895). Yet it was the applications
of the fruits of science and research that brought these improvements – on the one hand the application
of scientific  facts  to industrial  production in existing industries,  and on the  other  science  laying the
foundation for new industries (McMurtrie 1901, 441; Thurston 1901; Little 1907; Crowell 1909; Bushee
1911; Whitaker 1912a) – guiding industry from “goal to goal and conquest to conquest” (“Industrial
Research” 1911, 62f). Over time, this was even described as a heavy debt that industry owed to science
(Carty 1916; Beck 1917). In this way, the discoveries made by science in the practice of research were
strongly ascribed not only to abstract ideas about the progress of civilization and higher human ideals, but
also to concrete achievements that could be measured and felt. Yet these discoveries, facts, and laws would
not bring about change by themselves, instead, a clear path was laid out: it was through applications in
industry that these fruits could be reaped (cf. Tucker 1908; “Science and Industry” 1917). Interestingly,
when the work of great scientists was referenced, it was usually done in relation to the applications of
52 Progress was sometimes also depicted as “human” progress, i.e. the extension of human knowledge, the perfection of the 
human senses by science, and the full use of faculties for thought made possible by scientific discoveries. These depictions 
were generally dwarfed by the construction of the clear relation of science and material progress. Cf. “The Nature of 
Scientific Truth” 1895; “Address of the President” 1900; Loudon 1902.
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their  work,  meaning the discoveries they brought into specific  industries.  Since the discursive corpus
analyzed here  covered chemistry  in  all  its  varieties,  the  scientists  mentioned were  primarily  chemists.
Liebig was lauded for his advancement of agricultural  methods (McMurtrie  1895; W. Walker 1911),
Pasteur was celebrated for his discoveries in bacteriology and the distinctly application-oriented focus that
his research work took (Halstead 1895b; Maclaurin et al. 1916; Jacobson 1916; Ogden 1918),  while the
work of the forefathers of electrochemistry – most mentioned were Faraday, Maxwell, and Kelvin – was
put in direct relation to any advances in the harnessing of electric power for industrial use (Pupin 1895; L.
A.  Bauer  1909;  Maclaurin  1916).53 Furthermore,  their  triumphs  –  or  the  triumphs  ascribed  to  a
depersonalized concept of science or research – were constantly asserted as being so well-known that they
hardly needed elaboration, and this proved to be true across all events, whereas one might have expected
the prevalence of such knowledge to increase over the period analyzed (e.g. Carhart 1895; MacMillan
1895; “Address of the President” 1900; Wiley 1902; Montgomery 1908). To briefly reflect, science and
research were clearly constructed as the way to material progress and welfare, which could be attained by
industrial applications, with the service of science already acknowledged in 1895 as being so great and
widespread that it hardly needed to be elaborated upon.
From Research to Industrial Research
But what about  industrial research? How was this  descriptor connoted: merely as a different type of
research, or as something completely different? As it turns out, actual invocation of the term “industrial
research” only occurred with the fifth event, 1912. Before, circumlocutions existed that signified scientific
research as not happening within the confines of a university, mostly in relation to the actors who did the
research. In this way, Richards (1903) speaks of investigators in corporate plants, while by 1908 several
authors  wrote  about  the  “industrial  chemist”  – a  chemist  employed by a corporation (Teeple  1908;
Tingle 1908; “Notes and Comments: The German Chemical Industry” 1908). These chemists were often
named  in  discussions  on  the  proper  education of  chemists,  and  how their  knowledge  and  skills  for
original investigation would transfer into a corporate environment. By 1912, “industrial research” was
actually called that, and the discussion broadened. While teaching and education were still written about
(Withrow 1912),  authors started to acknowledge that  research happened in industry and was indeed
necessary  for  industrial  progress  (Cottrell  1912;  Whitaker  1912a)  as  the  “guiding  light  of  chemical
industry” (“Industrial  Research” 1911).  Furthermore,  the establishment of corporate laboratories and
university departments for industrial research were regularly announced (“The New Research Laboratory
Building of the American Rolling Mill Co., Middletown, Ohio” 1911; “Facilities for Industrial Research”
53 The question of whether the status of a scientific great was discursively dependent on applications of their work will need 
to be developed further below, see 6.4, Subject Positions.
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1911;  Benner 1912), indicating a certain normalization of the practice of industrial research located in
special corporate or university laboratories. Similar to “regular” research, a foundational role was ascribed
to industrial research, in the development of manufacturing and engineering industries (“Facilities for
Industrial  Research” 1911,  797):  finding  the  fundamental  truths  or  basic  principles  that  need  to be
understood to progress (Little 1913, 644). Regarding the relationship between industrial research and
chemistry,  it  was  repeatedly  linked  to  applied  chemistry  (W.  Walker  1911;  Little  1913).  Similar  to
Germany  being  the  most  advanced  in  the  science  of  chemistry  (see  below),  the  German  chemical
industries were frequently named when the triumphs and advantages of industrial research needed to be
recounted (e.g. Roeber 1913).  For the next event, 1917, many of the attributes attached to industrial
research  were  repeated  or  deepened.  The  announcements  of  research  laboratories  and  departments
continued (“The  Massachusetts  Institute  of  Technology  and  Industrial  Research”  1917;  “Scientific
Research and the Electrical World” 1917), while the discussion gained a theme related to Preparedness
and the war effort: the question of how to best organize an industrial laboratory (on a corporate, as well as
a national level) (Mees 1916; Norton 1917; Hill  1918).  The achievements of industrial  research were
communicated and celebrated (Little 1916; Bacon 1917a), especially by speakers hailing from the pioneer
laboratories  (Carty  1916;  C.  Reese  1918),  as  its  relation  to  national  welfare  became  an  increasingly
important point even with the end of the war in sight (Hill 1918; Root 1918), since German supremacy
through research needed to be countered by the development of America's own facilities. For this event as
well,  industrial  research  was  described  in  close  relation  to  the  applications  of  science  and  applied
chemistry, or in opposition to its pure form (e.g. Carty 1916; Sharp 1917) – descriptions that could also
be found in the set for texts of the last event, 1922. The industrial research laboratory continued to be a
theme of intense discussion (Parmelee 1922; Wardenburg 1922; Wallace 1922; Little 1923) located in
corporations and working on commercial goals (Hyde 1922; Armstrong 1923). 
As can be seen, the term “industrial research” as a name for the activity was only fixed when the actual
practice of establishing laboratories in corporations took off (cf. Fig 3.2.2). But instead of being described
as something completely different,  industrial  research was clearly posited within the same network of
associations as research, the practice of doing science with similar  – sometimes grandiose – claims to
utility and necessity, as well as similar attributions in the way it was conducted – by groups of trained
scientists, in a laboratory setting. 
What remains, then, is to take a look at the notions of pure and applied chemistry that were increasingly
invoked in discussions of industrial research. The historically elusive distinction between both types was
indeed drawn and frequently discussed, and this happened over the entire period of analysis. While the
signifiers  changed  –  some  authors  proposed  alternative  categories  to  pure/applied,  such  as  “time-
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consuming”/“resources-consuming” or science/technology (Ogden 1918) – one generally recurring detail
was the assertion that both types only differed in motive, and in no way differed in method. That is, both
were exemplars of the scientific method, while the goal – knowledge or profits – might vary (Cameron
1903; W. Walker 1911; Clarke 1916; Carty 1916; Sharp 1917; Parmelee 1921c; Hyde 1922). Of course,
the precise construction and change of meanings of pure and applied science (or chemistry) is not of
central  interest  here.  Instead,  what  soon became  apparent  and  serves  as  a  further  illustration  of  the
tendency of locating in this discursive fragment, is that distinct, separate “places” were assigned to pure
science  and its  applications,  a  distinction already visible  in the placement of  industrial  research.  The
university was seen as the locus of pure science – “the natural home of pure science and of pure scientific
research  is  to  be  found  in  the  university,  from  which  it  can  not  pass”  (Carty  1916,  515)  – while
applications could happen at universities, but were largely done elsewhere: in industry, in consultancies,
in government laboratories, at technical schools, etc. Locating science/research according to type grew
more distinct and clear over time (cf. e.g. the differences between  Bogert 1913; Wilbur 1916; Kellogg
1921). It is interesting to note how the differences between both types were not constructed according to
who did the research and what their scientific credentials were, or what eventually happened with the
knowledge gained in the process. Instead, profit, or more concretely improved products and processes –
being the overarching motive ascribed to industrial organizations – was the reason research located in
industry, which came to be known as industrial research, was aligned with applied science. On the other
hand, the advancement of knowledge was the university's goal, and in this way research done there would
stay “pure”. Even with this tendency of “placing” a concept, the split of research and industrial research,
as well as the opposition of pure and applied research, was not absolute. This is illustrated by departments
of  industrial  research  opening  at  universities  and  the  continuing  discussion of  research funding  and
industrial education (see above), as well as claims of both types of research being done in industry (Flinn
1921), and calls for the need to understand “fundamentals” which could only be solved by doing pure
science  work (Mitscherling 1922; Dahlberg 1922;  Wilson 1922).  “Fundamentals”  nicely  illustrate the
temporalization of pure science by the later events,  with  the distinction of pure and applied research
gaining a recognizably temporal dimension in the linear relationship postulated: pure comes first, and
applied after. The progress of applied science was seen as heavily dependent upon advances made in the
pure sciences (Mees 1916; Jacobson 1916; Stieglitz 1917a; Raiford 1917; Withrow 1917; Coolidge 1921;
Hoskins & Wiles 1921; Bancroft 1922). Pure research was now portrayed as slow, not to be planned for,
and a gamble (Hyde 1922; Derick 1922), further strengthening its organizational location at universities,
which would supply support for goal-less research for a longer time (Nichols et al. 1916). 
To summarize and  reflect,  locating  a  concept  in  time and  space  happened not  only  on the  level  of
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science/research,  but  also  in  regard  to  its  types:  research  happens  in  a  distinctly  physical  place,  a
laboratory, but what kind of research is done depends not on the output or research worker, but rather
on where that  laboratory is  located. University  and corporation served as providers  of the overriding
motive, truth/knowledge or applications/profit, marking the difference between scientific and industrial
research. Yet regardless of the organizational locus, research meant practicing the scientific method in a
pioneering effort for progress, wealth, welfare, and nation. The later addition of a temporal dimension to
pure research, portrayed as slow and unsure but ultimately the basis of any progress, is an interesting lead
that will have to be followed up on – Does it signal academic politics in an attempt to secure funding
during the upheavals of the Research Landscape of WWI, or the ways research directors supported their
demands for more money and time? 
Concepts, 2: Chemistry
Understanding the importance of how the concept of chemistry was constructed in the discursive reality
surrounding  the  early  industrial  research  laboratories,  one  need  only  remember  that  the  pioneering
laboratories were chemical laboratories for the most part, and that chemists were the largest group of
scientists in employ in corporate laboratories (cf. Fig 3.2.4). During the analysis, it soon became clear that
the attributes credited to science as a whole were also invoked when talking about chemistry. Chemistry
was thus the road to truth (McMurtrie 1899), welfare (Richards 1903), and wealth (Clarke 1902; Little
1908; Clarke 1916; Whitney 1921; Burgess 1923), permeating “every field and phase of modern life … the
public mind has hardly yet awakened to its full significance” (W. Richardson 1908b, 810). Furthermore,
chemistry was not only constructed as a science amongst others, but as the fundamental science without
which others – such as physics, pharmacy, or engineering – could not have made advances (Wiley 1902;
Toch 1909; Bancroft 1922). Chemistry's prime position lies in its object of study – matter:
… chemistry is the science of the transformation of matter. Since every phase of our existence is 
bound up with matter, … we find at every turn in life that chemistry is in demand to aid man in his 
effort to assure to himself a safe, scientific control in the supplying of his own needs, where nature, 
from time immemorial, has shown the same impersonal indifference as to his wants, his survival or 
destruction, that she has for every other form of life! (Stieglitz 1917a, 2096, emphasis in original)
The idea of not only studying different forms of matter, but also transforming matter – working closely
with atoms as the basic building blocks of nature itself – occurs frequently (e.g. Vaughan 1912; Little &
O'Reilly 1917; Scholes 1918; Bancroft 1922), with the productive aspect of chemistry thus being stressed
as not only an analytical (breaking down), but a synthetic (building up) science (Brogdon 1912). Similar
to science and research, in the discourse claims regarding superiority over nature were made, superiority
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which chemistry could grant precisely because the properties  of matter were its concern. While some
referred to the reproduction of nature in a laboratory setting (Little 1909), others went so far as to claim
that chemistry could surpass nature and make natural processes less “clumsy” (Matthews 1902, 429), or
find methods of “'making two blades of grass grow where one grew before'” (Burgess 1923, 997). Yet the
chemical focus on tiny particles of matter also carried with it a difference that will be further explored
when talking about  the  chemical  engineer.  This  could be summed up as  being a size  difference:  the
chemical  processes,  reactions,  and  experiments  happening  in  a  laboratory,  working  with  minute
quantities at a time, would need to be scaled up once translated to the shop floor,  and the chemical
engineer  was precisely  the natural  actor  required to undertake  this  (Whitaker 1912a;  “Where  are  the
Leaders?” 1918, see also below).
The Utility of Chemistry
What  about  the  utility  of  chemistry,  and  the  reason  for  doing  chemical  research?  Again,  the  many
practical uses of chemistry were praised, especially in its role as the basis of the industrial production of
wealth, and not limited to the chemical industries but others as well, such as agriculture or manufacturing
in  general  (Mason  1895;  C.  Chandler  1900;  Clarke  1902;  Cameron  1903;  W.  Richardson  1908a;
Duisberg 1912; Raiford 1917). And again, the part chemistry played in fueling industrial progress was
deemed so well-known that it hardly needed to be mentioned: 
I shall not speak in this address of the purely chemical industries, because they have so often been 
described. There the role of chemistry is paramount. It is no longer an aid, but a master. (Wiley 
1902, 846)
The fundamental nature of chemistry, dealing with matter, came to be referred to in claims about the use
of  chemistry  in  the  industries,  underscoring  why  the  applications  of  chemistry,  and  with  it  the
employment of the chemist, should know no bounds. Because all industry dealt with matter in some
form, and chemistry was constructed as the expert science on all kinds and transformations of matter, it
followed that all industry was chemical in some way: “It is next to impossible to imagine the existence of
an industry in which chemical reactions or considerations,  either directly or indirectly,  do not enter”
(Thompson 1913, 800). Moreover, authors claimed that every technical problem had a chemical part to it
(Tingle 1908), and that chemistry and mechanics should be regarded as the “first parents of technical
industry” (Louis 1917, 742). Unsurprisingly, chemistry's utility was constructed and translated in relation
to prevalent  discourses.  During  the  height  of  the  Conservation  Movement  and  the  efficiency  craze,
chemistry (and chemical research) became the means for improved accuracy – scientific exactness, that is
–  and  the  countermeasure  against  the  prevailing  trust  in  empiricism  and  the  rule-of-thumb  on  the
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machine  shop  floor  (W.  Richardson  1908b;  Little  1911;  Talbot  1912;  Clarke  1916).  During  the
preparation for WWI, the wonders of chemistry were praised for this quest, especially citing the German
system of support for science and industry. Some further remarks are required here regarding Germany as
a guide illustrating not only the proper utilization of chemistry in industry, but also how to organize
chemical education. The German system of science and chemical industry were models exalted across the
whole period, as the uses of chemical research gained in argumentative power through frequent reference
to  Germany.  The  reasoning  employed  was  quite  simple:  Due  to  a  great  appreciation  for  science  in
German society and thus industry, the fruits of chemical research were used to the greatest extent, which
made  the  German  chemical  industry  the  world  leader.  These  claims  were  spread  not  only  through
chemistry  PhDs  returning  from study  in  Germany,  but  also  through  addresses  by  eminent  German
figures (e.g. Duisberg 1896) and reports on the German way of doing things (e.g. “Chemical Industry in
Germany in 1901” 1902; “Notes and Comments: The German Chemical Industry” 1908). The German
head-start in chemical manufacturing was widely acknowledged, as well as the fact that the American
industry could not compete yet (Clarke 1902; “Notes and Comments: The German Chemical Industry”
1908;  Comey  1912),  mainly  because  the  United  States  lacked  an  equal  appreciation  for  science,
chemistry, and the chemist. Germany not only served as a paragon of what a collective devotion to science
could yield (cf. W. Walker 1911, 26ff; Thompson 1917a), but also the fact that research chemists were
employed in laboratories within corporate confines in the German chemical industry was seen as proof
that this organizational entity would bring direct benefits to a chemical corporation: 
Valuable information is on record showing how, in numerous cases, the research laboratory has 
been a tremendous profit to industry. In some cases the research laboratory is devoted almost 
entirely to the development of new processes and products, and it would appear that the Germans 
have most successfully applied this method, and that their commercial high standing in chemical 
manufacture has been more due to this than to any superiority in methods or economies in 
manufacturing. (Thompson 1913, 804)
The magic of industrial research, practiced by the research chemist, was thus constructed as the key to
German dominance: “… this success is due to the wise employment of the research chemist” (“Notes and
Comments:  The German Chemical  Industry” 1908, 168; cf.  also Whitney 1916; Norton 1917).  The
combination of research in industry brought about by a respect for science informed the discourses of
Popularization  and  Chemical  Education.  In  the  calls  for  more  popular  appreciation  of  science  and
chemistry, whose necessity the war had laid bare, the simple link of Germany being a scientific as well as
industrial  nation was  invoked frequently (e.g.  Thompson 1917a,  79f;  Hemingway 1917).  Of course,
having become the enemy in a war that revealed the horrors of modern science, Germany's scientific,
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industrial, and military achievements could not be celebrated or used as a prototype to aspire to anymore.
In some discursive texts, Germany was still constructed as a nation highly valuing science and industrial
research,  yet  at  the  expense  of  morals:  “the  object  was  selfish  and  nothing  more  nor  less  than  was
expressed by the motto 'Deutschland über alles'” (Nichols 1918, 771), with the men of science having
fallen under the spell of the debased character of the German leaders (Ames 1918, 402; cf. also Washburn
1916).  While  this  discursive  figure  remains  fragmentary,  it  may  serve  as  an  explanation  of  how  the
German model of scientific education and industrial research continued to be espoused at a time when
Germany was damned as the aggressor and scapegoat of WWI.
To summarize, chemistry and chemical research were constructed in a similar way as science and research
were, with chemistry claiming a foundational role in all other scientific development due to its proximity
to nature, and the study of matter also being the reason why supremacy over nature was a claim chemists
made  from their  laboratories.  Furthermore,  the  utility  of  chemical  research was  found  in  its  myriad
applications  to various branches of  industry,  welfare,  and wealth,  further underscored by Germany's
successes in industrial chemistry since the second half of the nineteenth century. 
Now the last question remains: Whether or not similar oppositions of pure and applied chemistry and the
subsequent  effects  of  localization and temporalization can be  found.  First  of  all,  while  a  distinction
between pure and applied chemistry is indeed constructed, a plethora of other terms for the varieties of
chemistry are used as well, from regularly occurring terms such as “industrial chemistry” (J. W. M. 1900;
Gilfin  1900;  McMurtrie  1901;  J.  L.  H.  1902;  Messel  1912;  Stewart  1912) and  “industrial  chemical
research”  (“Industrial  Research” 1911),  to less frequently used descriptors such as “technical chemical
research” (e.g. Comey 1912). An interesting division opened up around the fourth event, 1908 onwards,
when  chemistry  was  increasingly  distinguished as  either  analytical  chemistry  or  research  chemistry.
Sometimes aligned with industrial chemistry (McMurtrie 1909) or mere control work in industrial plants
(W.  Richardson  1908b),  analytical  chemistry  was  also  seen  as  a  servant  of  other  branches  or  a  less
developed type of chemistry (Talbot 1912) and put in direct opposition to chemical research (Ferguson
1912; Thompson 1917a). This evolving distinction may serve as a hint of the increased practice of doing
research in industry, instead of using chemical knowledge for testing and control purposes, and will be
further discussed below (6.4 Subject Positions), since both types of chemistry were most often put in the
context of actors – that is chemical researchers and analysts – instead of remaining in the abstract realm of
concepts.  But  what  about  the  difference  between  pure  and  applied  chemistry?  The  term  “applied
chemistry” only occurs in the later events, and in 1908 only in relation to the dangers of specialization
that  would  make  chemical  practitioners  lose  touch  with  each  other.  It  was  only  later  on  that  an
opposition was constructed, and it followed similar lines to the one of pure and applied science, with
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applied chemistry happening in manufacturing on the shop floor – in a corporate setting (Wesson 1912;
Withrow 1917).  Several authors stressed the similarities between pure and applied chemistry as being
merely phases of the same science, the only difference existing in their purposes: 
Research in applied chemistry differs from that just described only in this, or I should say it needs 
differ only in this: that when a problem is to be solved, a bridge to be built, the work is undertaken 
at a point where there is a demand for its use, where people are waiting to cross over as soon as it is 
finished. The method of building is no different, the difficulties no less. The fact that the bridge is 
to be used makes the work of building no less dignified, nor is it carried out with less pleasure. (W. 
Walker 1911, 27)
Again, the goal of chemical research was subject to the tendency of localization, as happened with pure
and  applied  science  –  corporations  supplying  an  overarching  purpose  of  profit,  products,  and
practicability, while chemical research at universities, its pure variant, sought for basic principles and an
understanding of nature and truth. It must be noted, though, that pure and applied science were far
larger  topoi  within  the  discussion  of  types  and  places  of  science,  with  chemistry  in  turn  yielding
descriptors and oppositions that went beyond the pure/applied dichotomy, such as the emergence of
analytical and research chemistry sketched above. What can be asserted, though, is that applications of
chemistry  – as  applied chemistry  – to industrial  purposes  were  highly  visible  and constructed as  the
reason for industrial success.
Taking a Step Back: Science, Research, and Chemistry in the History of Science
Before we go on, let us briefly consider the dimensions of the concepts of science, research, and chemistry
in the light of literature from the history of science. The findings fit what was touched upon above (cf.
3.4 The Move Towards Science), namely how the words “science” and “research” acquired a somewhat
magical quality (Daniels 1971, 290, 303) and the scientific method reigned supreme in the progressive
ideology (ibid., 288ff), with the scientist soon portrayed as the hero protagonist in fiction (ibid., 290 ; cf.
also Clareson 1965). Progress saw itself linked to science as a central part of the “dominant American
faith”, with material welfare the results of its applications (Rae 1979, 249; LaFollette 1990, 9). Carlson
similarly sketched how science promised supremacy over nature in a planned, methodical manner in his
explanation for the cultural shift from inventor to scientist (Carlson 1997, 215ff), and Dennis (1987,
495) noted the centrality of the methods of producing scientific knowledge over its contents. Lastly, the
focus on possible applications and the utility of doing science is described by Daniels: mid-century, the
nascent scientific community had to convince the public of the utility of the sciences, a task that became
obsolete  by  the  turn of  the  century,  due  to  the  increased  complexity  and  increased  visibility  of  the
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impactful applications of science made in engineering, chemistry, and geology (Daniels 1971, 271). This
helps in understanding the recurring remarks that the utility of science was so well-known “that it was no
longer necessary to make a point of them” (ibid.), yet recurrent praises of science listing the achievements
of its great names run contrarily to Daniels' assertion that the scientist had commonly become recognized
as useful and that their utility did not need to be stressed anymore since it had now become true (ibid.,
272; cf. also Sturchio 1981, 84).54 Now that the discursive meanings of science, (industrial) research, and
the  varieties  of  chemistry  were  analytically  reconstructed,  interpreted  and  reflected  upon  within  the
contexts of the organizational field and the historical genesis of science, it is important to learn in what
way they were materialized into objects.
6.3) Objects
As Munir and Phillips write, objects are “part of the practical realm made sensible by discourse. … Put
another way, when a concept is used to make some aspect of material reality meaningful, an object has
been  constituted”  (Munir  &  Phillips  2005,  1668),  highlighting  the  essential  connection  that  exists
between concepts as categories guiding thought and perception, and the way they are materialized in
concrete, physical objects. Objects are made meaningful by discourse, and the meanings associated with
these parts of the material world are subject to frequent changes. For our purposes, then, it is important
to  understand  in  what  ways  the  concepts  already  analyzed  were  materialized,  what  parts  or  specific
characteristics were left out, and how attributes of an object – or the whole object itself – changed or had
to change to fit the discourse. Whereas a variety of historically situated concepts emerged in the preceding
analytical category, only one object proved central within both the discursive material and the theoretical
avenue of inquiry, an object basal not only in the realm of science, but also as an organizational entity; yet
an object that was still subject to the discursive effects of place and time.
Objects: The Laboratory
The laboratory emerged as the central element of the analysis. This may be of no surprise to some, since
the main theme of this book surrounds the industrial research  laboratory, yet most of the work in the
history of science surveyed before is concerned with the first part, industrial research, and trying to make
sense of how research made its way into industry – thereby taking its concrete organizational form as a
laboratory  for  granted.  In this  way,  expectations  at  the  start  of  the  analysis  veered  strongly  towards
understanding science, research, the industrial chemists' plight, and so on. But during the analysis the
54 Daniels (1971, 265ff) explains the emergence of the ideals of pure science due to science actually becoming useful by 1900, 
the ideology of utility thus becoming obsolete.
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importance of the laboratory as an object and place of science became more and more notable, findings
that are further underscored by insights from historical studies on the genesis of the laboratory – a place
that we today expect to be the logical, even natural locale of chemistry, but a place that was hardly as fixed
and taken for granted during the outgoing nineteenth century. Thus, in the following, I will describe the
discursive steps that made the laboratory an object  of the materialization of science and the place of
research – constructed not as an element of universities, but one that was transferable into an industrial
context. Moreover, with the value of research and applications of science in industry being well-known,
the reasons for establishing research laboratories were seen within this applicability, becoming a place
where experts – chemists – were under employ. Finally, changes and trends in object construction will be
outlined in the emergence of ideas on laboratory types, laboratory scale as related to the factory, and the
way  that  the  pioneering  laboratories  were  discussed  during  the  later  years.  It  is  especially  of  interest
whether or not the tendencies of localization and temporalization as found in the discursive construction
of science/research and the sequence of pure and applied science can also be found here – and if they run
parallel to those found earlier – or how localization and temporalization were used in creating discursive
junctures and changing trajectories.
The Laboratory as Birthplace of Facts & Place of the Scientific Method
Why can the laboratory be seen as a materialization of the concepts of science, research, and chemistry?
The attributes of science carved out above – the scientific method, progress and welfare, the subjugation
of nature,  and applicability  in manufacturing – came to be  explicitly  associated with the  laboratory.
Experimentation  as  the  core  element  of  the  scientific  method  was  seen  as  only  possible  within  the
confines of a laboratory, since it offered a stable environment and the equipment necessary to unlock
nature's secrets:
You will have guessed already the difficulty with the chemistry of the Greeks. It amounted to 
nothing more than speculation. The hypotheses were never tested in the workshop of science – the 
laboratory; they remained at the last what they were in the beginning – unproven products of the 
imagination. (W. Richardson 1908b, 804)
It  was this possibility of close but controlled contact with nature (Remsen 1894; Coulter 1900),  the
subject matter of the natural sciences, that made the laboratory the physical manifestation of the scientific
method (Carhart 1895, 394f). Understanding the scientific method as the way to establish facts about
nature in the search for its underlying principles meant that laboratories thus became the “birthplace” of
new facts (Richards 1903, 60), and this was asserted not only for facts about nature, but also in the search
for facts that could solve problems in industry (“Facilities for Industrial  Research” 1911, 798).  Many
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authors  lauded  the  value  of  laboratories  for  purposes  of  research  (e.g.  Howe  1902;  Thurston  1902;
Richards 1903; Little 1909; Mees 1917a), in this way further strengthening the discursive association of
the practice of science with the laboratory. Most of the texts that built these associations came from the
early events (1895, 1900, 1902, 1908), whereas later events eschewed the need to outline the purposes of
laboratories as places of science. Such a reduction in argumentative frequency can be interpreted as the
materialization  of  the  concept  of  science  in  the  laboratory  acquiring  a  certain  acceptance  amongst
speakers,  as  the  characteristics  of  fact-creation  and  experimentation  in  the  laboratory  were  now  so
strongly associated with the object that they need not be reiterated any further, with the discussion now
shifting towards laboratory practices, equipment, costs, and other themes (see below).55 Interestingly, the
laboratory was not placed explicitly at universities – that is, no clear link was constructed that would
mean this object would need to be housed in the organizational surroundings of the academic world, a
notion  that  becomes  clearer  when  looking  into  the  relationship  between  teaching  and  research
surrounding the laboratory. From the earliest event onwards, the laboratory was connoted as a place of
teaching, with its essentialness to learning the methods of science recounted time and time again (Remsen
1894; Carhart 1895;  Clarke 1902;  Whitaker 1912a), some authors claiming that laboratory instruction
had revolutionized science learning (Coulter 1900), while one author went so far as to complain about
the “wave of laboratory madness which has swept over the whole educational world” (R. Williams 1901,
102).  But  next  to  its  role  in  the  teaching  of  scientists  the  laboratory  was  always  also  a  place  of
investigation, its dual function so clearly noted (e.g. Remsen 1894; Baker 1900; Clarke 1902; Whitaker
1912a;  Sedgwick  1913)  that  its  value  to  research  was  claimed  as  self-evident:  “...  the  us e  of  these
laboratories, not for purposes of investigation, for which their value is unquestioned ...”  (Howe 1902,
762).  This is  further illustrated in early discussions of the research landscape, where calls for research
endowments were made – these calls clearly meaning the endowment of laboratories: 
On several former occasions I have advocated, as the most urgent need of science, the regular 
endowment of research. … I look rather to the establishment of institutions, wherein bodies of 
trained men should take up, systematically and thoroughly, the problems which are too large for 
individuals to handle. … in the form of a well-built, well-equipped, and well-endowed laboratory 
… . (Clarke 1902, 136)
Reflecting on the duality  of teaching and research,  while  the laboratory in its  teaching function was
55 Early contributions to the materialization of science in the laboratory were mainly from General Science Speakers, which 
poses the question of whether this way of materializing science was a distinctly academic conception of the laboratory that 
was then exported to industry and other spheres. Such an interpretation needs to be handled with caution, though, because
as Fig. 5.3.2 shows, for the early events General Science contributions dwarf all other speaker groups; the journal Science 
serving as a collecting basin for many authors that may not have other organized forms of speaking yet (due to journals only
being established later, cf. Table 5.2.1).
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clearly constructed as a part of the university – the natural and unquestioned place of the education of
the scientist – the recurring emphasis on the dual function of teaching and investigation, often elaborated
upon in the same breath, made it possible for the laboratory to not be seen as distinctly academic, an
entity of the university, but simply as the place where research happens, a place that could probably be
moved  to  other  organizational  boundaries.  To  summarize,  the  early  event-tranches  constructed  the
laboratory  as  the  physical  manifestation  of  science  and  the  place  where  new  facts  are  found,  while
underlining its role in teaching and research. Within the larger universe of discourse reconstructed above
and in materializing science in the form of the laboratory – and not the university,  the mind of the
scientist, nor any other way – the grand promises of science for progress, welfare, and happiness can be
considered extended to the  laboratory.  But  in this  extension the  construction of  the  object  was  not
complete – to further understand how science became materialized in the confines of the laboratory, we
need to consider the reasons for establishing research laboratories and the people who worked inside. 
The Why and Who of Laboratories
Understanding  the  claims  made  in  the  reasons  for  building  up  laboratory  facilities  in  industrial
corporations is  important,  first  and foremost for  examining whether reasons for  doing research were
mirrored here, the laboratory being the manifestation of research, or if other causes could be found. As it
turns out, texts arguing for the need to establish (and further endow) laboratories did so mainly from a
vantage  point  of  the  applicability  of  the  facts  generated  within,  yet  few  overarching,  recurrent
argumentative figures emerged. Discursive figures included reasons for building up laboratories that were
sometimes  described  in  the  rather  abstract  terms  of  progress  and  prosperity  (“The  Status  of
Electrochemical Industries” 1908; Sharp 1917), or as the “experimental and exploring arm of the up-to-
date industry” (Crowell 1909, 563; cf. also Whitney 1911; Thompson 1913), pioneering imagery being a
recurring motive in descriptions of science and the scientist  (see also below). The applicability of the
laboratory's findings to specifically  industrial endeavors was central in many of the texts analyzed (e.g.
Richards 1903; McMurtrie 1907; Whitaker 1912a). Others focused on economic benefits in terms of
profits or the extension of the boundaries of business (Thompson 1913; Bacon 1917a), or posited that a
laboratory's  benefits  were  not  measurable  in  monetary  terms  (Whitney  1911;  Sharp  1917).
Unsurprisingly, discursive shifts played a part in the way that the laboratory as object was reasoned for.
Specialization assumed only a minor role – as Thurston (1902, 415ff) argued, due to the differentiation
into many sciences, it followed that many specialized laboratories were needed. Between 1908 and 1912,
the laboratory became associated with the search for increased efficiency – “The laboratory and its staff of
men and boys are the tools for the efficient carrying out of the chemical control, and the control can only
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be carried out in conjunction with the laboratory.” (Beckman 1911, 194) – whereas Willis Whitney of GE
even claimed that the laboratory was an “extension of the principle of maximum efficiency.” (Whitney
1911, 429).56 Similarly, when the war came, the key to a successful military campaign – as a problem of
applied  science  –  evidently  lay  in  laboratories  (Bogert  1917b,  1010),  whereas  the  German “dreadful
efficiency” could be traced back to chemical research laboratories (Noyes 1917). Overall, even though no
single, dominating discursive figure giving clearly outlined reasons for establishing a laboratory could be
found, the general tenor is similar to the ascriptions made to science and research, yet often in less abstract
or  grand terms,  and not by  invoking societal  progress  or  national  wealth,  but rather  reasons  such as
staying ahead of the game (Thompson 1913), profits, or a better understanding of manufacturing basics,
as  mediated  by  the  relevant  discourse  of  the  day.  This  element  in  the  construction  of  the  research
laboratory as an object does not come as a surprise,  especially after  the careful conceptual analysis of
science as research and chemistry revealed which relationships these concepts were discussed in; yet it was
necessary  to  properly  and  completely  account  for  all  steps  in  the  materialization  of  science  in  the
laboratory. 
A  key  point  in  the  historical  research  arguing  that  the  industrial  research  laboratory  represents  a
fundamental shift in corporate strategies for innovation refers to the employment of scientists in these
laboratories,  with manufacturing organizations moving away from purchasing products and processes
from inventors (even though this shift was not as radical as sometimes proclaimed, cf. 3.2 above). While
the specific subject positions constructed in this discourse will be discussed below, the question of who
would  –  or  should  –  work  in  a  laboratory  remains  an  important  part  in  the  materialization of  the
laboratory  as  an  object.  In  analyzing  this  relationship,  two  distinct  argumentative  periods  could  be
distinguished: an early one, ranging from roughly 1902 to 1912, and a later group of arguments emerging
with the end of WWI that culminated around the last event, 1922. First, during the early events, the
laboratory was clearly constructed as the place of employment of chemists. This happened through the
description  of  the  discoveries  and  triumphs  made  by  chemists  in  laboratories  (C.  Chandler  1900;
Matthews 1902) or by depicting laboratory work as a “tool of the trade” of chemists (Withrow 1911,
626),  with  the  (company)  laboratory  seen  as  a  typical  first  place  of  employment  for  chemists  after
graduating from university or college (W. Richardson 1908a; Burgess 1911). Furthermore, distinguished
chemists and the forefathers of chemistry were often discussed in relation to their laboratories. Berzelius,
for example, succeeded despite lacking proper apparatus: “Berzelius, one of the greatest chemists, pursued
his  simple researches  in a  laboratory established in a  kitchen ...”  (Wiley  1902,  842),  whereas  Liebig's
56 The craze for efficiency did not stop at the walls of the laboratory, with administration and apparatus being a point of 
contention now – adequate leadership and equipment were seen as a means of raising laboratory efficiency (Whitaker 
1911; Bacon et al. 1917).
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laboratory at Gießen “stands for a new epoch in scientific investigation and instruction” (“Justus von
Liebig and the First Laboratory” 1909, 619). Especially after the first decade of the twentieth century,
chemists in laboratories were discussed more and more in relation to manufacturing, the shop floor, and
industrial production. By then they came to be seen as a necessity – “A laboratory is just as essential to a
factory as is an office, and the chemist is just as necessary as the auditor” (H. Skinner 1911, 308) – and the
way that traditional, empirical methods could be replaced with new, chemical knowledge (H. Skinner
1911; Brogdon 1912). Even though the fundamental element in the materialization of the laboratory was
its relation to the scientific method, in the texts surveyed here the laboratory was constructed as a place
for chemists and not scientists as a broader category, with the chemist obviously being a practitioner of
science.  This  is  due  to  the  selection  of  texts  that  are  primarily  discussing  chemical  (and  related)
laboratories, and only a few speaking of scientific laboratories per se – hence the chemist and not the
more generic scientist being placed in the laboratory (on scientists in labs cf. Hyde 1909). Thus, in the
first period a strong link was established between the laboratory and university-trained chemists working
in groups in these laboratories. This link was still present when discursive references shifted to Postwar
Normalcy (Garvan 1921; Layton 1921), but the discussions on unemployment, the role of the chemist,
and the postwar reconfiguration of research institutions found their way into how the laboratory was
materialized. Many industrial speakers problematized this strong link between laboratory as the natural
place of the chemist, urging chemists to broaden their focus from research and analysis to administrative
and executive work.  The “directional  emphasis” (Redman 1922,  292) in chemical  education towards
laboratory work was criticized in efforts to further popularize and strengthen the role of the chemist in
the sphere of learned professions (Bolling & Maze 1922). Whereas earlier on the laboratory was the way
for chemists to enter into industry, it was now seen as confining and a reason for rising unemployment
(MacDowell 1922; O'Brien 1922;  “Cogitations on the Chemist” 1922). To briefly reflect after having
interpreted these findings, the second period's emphasis on getting chemists out of the laboratory further
underscores  one  of  its  central  attributes,  namely  being  staffed by groups  of  chemists  as  experts  and
practitioners of science. Indeed, the only time an inventor's laboratory (as opposed to a chemist's or a
scientist's)  was  mentioned,  it  happened with the  caveat  that  while  such work  may be  revolutionary,
transforming it into commercial results would only work “following strictly the rules of logics” (“The
Status  of  Electrochemical  Industries  1908,  2),  possibly  hinting  at  the  methodical  and  foundation-
revealing aspects of science as opposed to an inventor's work process. The laboratory, then, was strictly in
the hand of chemists. 
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Scale and Scope: Laboratory Relations and Types
The interlocking elements in the laboratory becoming an object as a specific materialization are now laid
out: The laboratory serves as the physical manifestation of the scientific method, wherein close contact
with nature  generates  new facts.  The dual  function of  teaching  and research serves  to dissociate  the
laboratory from the university, opening it to possible translation towards corporations – especially since
the laboratory, staffed by expert scientists, not only produces facts, but also can aid in applying these to
industrial production, generating more or less tangible benefits in profits, the extension of markets, and
staying  ahead  of  competition.  These  attributes  remained  fixed  throughout  the  seven  event-tranches
analyzed, with only minor shifts in discursive references, e.g. laboratories for efficiency or preparedness.
Yet several changes occurred over the years. The first concerns the external placement of the laboratory, in
another display of the tendency of localization. External, since this time it is not science which is placed
within the walls of a laboratory, but the laboratory itself which is placed in relation to other elements of
the  industrial  organization.  The  changing  relationship  between laboratory  and  factory  could best  be
characterized by the notion of scale. Starting with the fourth event, 1908, authors began discussing the
challenges of transporting the findings of laboratory research to the shop floor: “We often hear of the
success of a laboratory method, and its failure when applied on a manufacturing scale” (Parker 1909, 2).57
Such failures were initially attributed to a lack of laboratory equipment and acquaintance with “the raw
materials of the industry” (Sadtler 1908, 37; also Teeple 1908). By later events, solutions were proposed to
replicate industrial-scale reactions and processes (Bogert 1913; Gillett 1913; Little 1913; Sharp 1917),
partitioning the perceived “distance” between laboratory and factory into separate stages, from laboratory
to test-tube to small-scale plant and to regular manufacturing scale (Bacon 1917b; Baekeland 1917; Sharp
1917; Hill  1918; Teeple 1922)  a  frequent  suggestion.  Three specific  parts  in these discussions  are of
special  interest here regarding the object “laboratory”. First,  the relation of scale constructed between
laboratory and factory. As it turns out, laboratories did not discursively fail because of the shortcomings
of  the  scientific  method,  but  rather  because  what  happened  in  a  laboratory  was  so  small  –  atoms,
molecules, mere grams of certain substances, instead of the tons involved in industrial production: “It
makes an enormous difference whether you are manufacturing by the ounce or by the ton” (Baekeland
1917, 1021; also “Where Are the Leaders?” 1918). This applied not only to substances, but to apparatuses
and procedures as well:
It must be remembered that while many discoveries are made by laboratory experiments on a small 
scale, many of these are not applicable to industrial exploitation for the reason that elements which 
57 This bold proclamation of the failures of research laboratories can be found in an editorial on the first pages of the first 
issue of the ACS' “Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry”, outlining the necessity of a specialized journal for 
technical and industrial chemists.
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in small-scale experimentation are of negligible importance, often become controlling factors when 
the scale is changed to correspond to practical production. A chemist in his laboratory may 
effectually close a flask with a cork, a similar procedure does not apply at all to a spouting oil well. 
(Sharp 1917, 168)
As can be seen, the discussion of the laboratory's scale in relation to the factory that intensified from 1912
onwards did not deny the laboratory's credentials as the materialization of science and supremacy over
nature,  but  merely  repositioned it  in  the  industrial  organization.  The  second  part  of  interest  in  this
discussion concerns the subject positions involved, namely the industrial chemists and chemical engineer
(who will be discussed in more detail below). Laboratory scale began to be discussed with debates on the
organizational  home  of  chemical  engineers  ceding  and  the  founding  of  AIChE  (1908),  a  string  of
arguments  that  also caused the  ACS to react,  establishing  the  Division for  Industrial  & Engineering
Chemistry (1908) and a respective journal as  recounted above.  The shortcomings of mere laboratory
chemistry could, according to discursive speakers, be allayed by way of the chemical engineer's combined
knowledge of both chemical reactions and mechanical basics needed to scale ounces to tons and flasks to
tanks (“Why Not 'The American Society of Chemical Engineers?'” 1907; Sadtler 1908; Teeple 1908;
Louis 1917; Carpenter 1917), or, as Parker (1909, 2) put it quite succinctly: “... experiments … met with
success in the laboratory, but were unsuccessful on a working scale … . We would like to know the reason
why; probably the chemical engineer can tell us.” The third interesting aspect to laboratory scale is timing
– these remarks being a reflection of the material world. On the one hand, timing as it relates to shakeups
in the organizational field with regard to scientific and technical societies, but on the other hand also with
the growth of the number of industrial laboratories in mind. As the discussion above showed, by the
1910s laboratories in corporations had earned a certain acceptance and expectedness, which is discursively
reflected in comments regarding their ubiquity and necessity (cf. Hyde 1909, 907; Little 1916, 78; Clarke
1916, 261). Maybe the laboratory, discursively bolstered by claims of supremacy and rationality, had not
produced the  grand  successes  expected by executives  and  managers  (as  the  histories  of  the  pioneers,
particularly the GE laboratory, have shown), and this new notion of scale served as a discursive saving
throw to keep laboratories supported by locating failures outside the laboratory? As with the addition of
the temporal dimension to the distinction of pure and applied science – with fundamental assuming
primacy both in terms of content and sequence – that may have explained why research took so long,
laboratory scale could have served a similar discursive function, with the perceived weaknesses of the
object being a clear connecting point for various subject positions. It needs to be noted, though, that
charges of failure did not only come from industrial speakers, while general science and chemical speakers
rallied to the laboratory's defense; instead problems and solutions were discussed in all groups. 
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The second change that occurred over the years with regard to laboratory materialization concerns the
scope of the laboratory, i.e. its tasks and more specifically its types. It must be noted that after the careful
introduction and dissection of concepts like pure, applied, and industrial research, so far the laboratory
has only been the laboratory, and not the industrial laboratory. This happened for a good reason, as it was
imperative to characterize the laboratory as object before delving into its specific configurations, similar
to science and its variants. Over the entire period analyzed, a plethora of descriptors for laboratories can
be found: from technical and university laboratories (C. Chandler 1900; McMurtrie 1909; Ames 1918)
via laboratories  typified by scientific  discipline (e.g.  Richards 1903; Bigelow 1908),  by sector such as
private and governmental laboratories (McMurrich 1907; Hillebrand 1907), and by activity – analysis,
testing, control, consulting, and so on (“Research Laboratory at Niagara Falls” 1902; Hillebrand 1907;
“Notes and Comments. The Old Question” 1907; Mitchell 1912; Mees 1916; Thompson 1917a; Kellogg
1921).  One  distinguishing  factor  between  laboratories  placed  in  universities  and  those  in  industrial
corporations was the teaching function as touched upon above. Another one was the secrecy of industrial
laboratories being perceived as problematic and manifested in delayed or prohibited publication practices.
The need to keep research results private as trade secrets, in order to not lose competitive advantages, was
a  talking point occurring from 1908 onwards  and intensifying for  the  last  three events  (1912,  1917,
1922). The retention of results was seen as an impediment to the progress of scientific knowledge – and
with it, progress and welfare – and as a reason why scientists might struggle in an industrial laboratory
(e.g. Hillebrand 1907; Burgess 1911; W. Walker 1911; Bogert 1913; Little 1913; Bacon et al. 1917; Mees
1917b;  Kennelly  et  al.  1917;  Weidlein 1922).  Proper  and realistic  publication policies  were discussed
especially during the last two events, in a group of texts that could be considered a new “genre”, namely
instructions  or  “how-to”-texts  describing  proper  industrial  laboratory  setup  and  administration  (e.g.
“The New Research Laboratory Building of the American Rolling Mills Co., Middletown, Ohio” 1911;
Pierce 1916; Mees 1916; Clark 1917a; Mees 1917a; Mees 191858; C. Reese 1918), a further indicator of
the  spread  of  industrial  research  laboratories  not  only  in  physical  objects,  but  also  in  taken-for-
grantedness  as  well.  Subsequently,  this  is  but  one  dimension  according  to  which  industrial  research
laboratories were characterized and especially distinguished from their university counterparts. 
Another highly interesting attribute of industrial laboratories that developed over time into two distinct
types was not in relation to its place vis-à-vis university and corporation, but in the practices it gave room
to: research and analysis. The differentiation between analysis and research appeared fragmentary for the
early  events,  as  Remsen (1894,  533) illustrates  with his  distinction between chemical  laboratories  for
58 C.E.K. Mees of Kodak came to be renowned as one of the best research managers, known not only for his own research, 
but also his frequent publications on laboratory administration and practice. 
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those  devoted  to  work  in  a  factory  or  an  analytical  laboratory,  and  those  who  seek  teaching  and
investigation. By the events of 1908 and onwards, authors saw industrial entry-level positions for chemists
in analytical laboratories (e.g. Burgess 1911), yet also warned of the dangers of only relying on analytical
work in laboratories without the application of chemical principles in interpretation, which would result
in a “farce” (Brogdon 1912, 685). The lines of demarcation around these notions, indicating what exactly
differentiates analytical from research work, are blurry, and from 1912 onwards are increasingly tied to
the subject  positions of  research vs.  analytical  chemists  (see  below).  Yet  especially  with an increasing
amount  of  announcements  of  laboratory  foundations,  emphasis  was  laid  upon  research  “carried  on
exclusively, without being burdened with the necessary daily routine of analysis and test” (“The New
Research Laboratory Building of  the American Rolling Mill  Co.,  Middletown, Ohio” 1911).  Similar
demarcations were drawn in texts discussing the Research Landscape and laboratory setup, e.g.  Little
listing analytical, testing, and commercial labs while lamenting their lack of appreciation for equipment
and  organization  needed  for  proper  research  (Little  1913,  655),  Thompson  casually  mentioning  the
laboratory – “be it analytical or research” – as the chemist's place in a corporation (Thompson 1917a,
183), W. Hale (1921, 460) doing the same (cf. also Mees 1916). 
What  does  this  tell  us?  Has  the  laboratory  as  an  object  not  explicitly  been linked  to  research  as  its
constitutive practice since it is the place where the scientific method happens? The distinction can be
interpreted as a move to position the research laboratory as a distinctly novel part of the organization – a
different undertaking from what was done before. This means novel not only in terms of empiricism,
rule-of-thumb, and trial and error which were discursive antagonists of the new, scientific ways, but also
in  organizational  terms – as  the  histories  of  the  industrial  research  laboratory  and the  pioneers  have
shown, departments of testing and control were doubtlessly parts of industrial corporations prior to the
first research laboratories, and came to be called laboratories as well. In order to underline why research
laboratories mattered, they were constructed differently from mere analytical laboratories, in that they
not only broke things down, but also created the new (Brogdon 1912). The opposition echoes in the
hierarchy of chemists that will be discussed below. Furthermore, the distinction of research and analysis as
laboratory types illustrates a weaker tendency of localization, as differences in object, scope, and funding
between university and corporate laboratories are of course discussed, yet later speakers emphasize the
analytical and investigatory, and not the organizational surroundings. 
One last matter in terms of laboratory types may be of interest here – the question of the pioneers. Above,
the question was asked of whether the four pioneering laboratories were actual pioneers – as in, the first
to build up such facilities – or merely “lighthouses” that were covered favorably and frequently in historic
writing. As it turns out, from 1912 onward, the big four's laboratories were recognized discursively as
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forerunners  of  research in industry and celebrated for  their  “brilliant  practical  and financial  success”
(Armstrong 1923, 606). GE's laboratory in particular, embodied by Whitney, received repeated praise: “…
one of the earliest of its kind in this country, the embodiment of the application of science to industry,
has gained a world-wide reputation by the quality of its  work and the importance of its  results” (C.
Chandler 1921, 160).  Kodak's laboratory featured prominently through Mees'  writings on laboratory
organization  and  administration  (Mees  1916,  1918),  while  AT&T's  and  DuPont's  laboratories  were
mentioned comparatively less frequently (e.g. Comey 1912; Little 1913; Little 1916; G. Hale 1918; C.
Reese  1918;  Ogden  1918).  Often  other  firms  were  recounted  as  having  established  similar  research
endeavors, the National Electric Lamp Association (e.g. Hyde 1909; Whitaker 1911) and Westinghouse
(e.g. G. Hale 1918) featured prominently, while many others were listed in later texts reporting on the
wonders of research (e.g. Bancroft 1918, 1922). How can these findings be interpreted? Of course, such
discursive occurrences do not help in answering the question of whether or not the pioneers were actually
the first, but they do reinforce the notion of the high visibility of their triumphant achievements from
1912 onwards, which may have served as (discursive) prototypes for the establishment of new research
laboratories in other manufacturing establishments. Mees' prominent textual production in the discourse
of 1917 and 1922, as well as Whitney holding positions that warranted a prominent voice such as the
presidencies of ACS (1909) and AES (1911-12), and recognition through awards such as SoCI's Perkin
Medal (in 1921) served to further amplify their message. In this way, the gospel of industrial research was
further perpetuated in concrete instances of the object “laboratory”.
Taking a Step Back: The Laboratory in the History and Sociology of Science
At this point, it is quite elucidating to take a step back from the presentation of the discursive corpus and
interpretations and reflections on the way concepts were made into a specific object, as well as how this
object's attributes – scale and type – and discursive links changed over the years, in order to discover what
insights from the literature on the history and the sociology of science can add to our understanding of
the  genesis  of  the  industrial  research  laboratory,  what  can  be  related  to  existing  findings,  and  what
novelties the discourse analysis uncovered. 
Studies on the emergence and genesis of laboratories underline first and foremost how laboratories were
made places of science and how associations we have today did not hold true centuries ago. For a twenty-
first century observer, of course chemistry happens in a laboratory full of experts clad in white, wielding
test tubes and Bunsen burners – yet not only the equipment and staff, but also the very placement of
science inside the walls of a laboratory are highly contingent and need to be understood as a result of
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social and cultural effects in which the industrial research laboratory eventually played a part as well. 59
How the experiment came to be placed within a laboratory, the relation of nature to the practices within
a laboratory, and the genesis of a distinct place set apart for a laboratory have received particular scrutiny
in historical work (cf. Ophir & Shapin 1991; Livingstone 2003; Crosland 2005; Kohler 2008; Jackson
2016). This is illustrated by a line of detailed case studies of laboratories (or scientific spaces) from the
seventeenth century onwards (cf.  F.  James 1989; also Garcia-Belmar 2014),  of which only several key
aspects shall be mentioned here. 
Shapin's  essay  on  Robert  Boyle's  laboratory  outlines  how  belief  in  the  new,  unfamiliar  methods  of
experimental  science  was  fostered  through  attachment  to  existing  institutions  such  as  gentlemanly
conventions of access  and witnessing, thereby carving out a space for experimentation that  was both
public,  for  bearing  witness  to  experimental  demonstration,  and  private,  for  restricting  access  to  the
laboratory (Shapin 1988;  cf.  also Gooday 1998 on the relation of  space and laboratory  credibility).60
Gooday  (2008)  showed  how  in  the  nineteenth  century  laboratories  moved  out  from  their  parent
institutions – museums – as a result of the specialization of science, higher education, and disciplinary
ambitions for scientists (ibid., 787), while noting that especially in the nineteenth century laboratories
“could be hard to distinguish from such cognate spaces as kitchens, workshops, or museums … . Such
places mattered to our ancestors as sources of knowledge and artifact creation … ” (ibid., 795), further
illustrating how then the lab was merely one of many possible locations of scientific practice (cf. Crosland
2005,  238ff).  Crosland  outlines  how  famous  chemists'  laboratories,  e.g.  that  of  Lavoisier,  served  to
strengthen  the  association  of  chemistry  with  the  organizational  entity  of  the  laboratory,  making
universities  that  wanted to “embrace chemistry for  teaching and/or research” realize  they “needed to
provide laboratories” (ibid., 245). While these studies illustrate the troublesome genesis and struggle of
the scientific method, of places of science, and of scientific practitioners, we can be sure that by the late
nineteenth century institutional  laboratories  had become defining features  of  all  scientific  disciplines
(Jackson 2016,  300),  with the  chemical  laboratory  transformed during the  century  “from a  place  of
59 A striking illustration of the contingency of the association of science with a laboratory setting can be found in Secord 
(1994), who shows how existing class structure in England of the nineteenth century placed artisan botany in a rather 
surprising place – the pub. 
60 It needs to be noted that the relationship of the laboratory to the experiment is highly complex and can only be outlined 
cursorily here (cf. Knorr-Cetina 1992; Weingart 2003, 67ff). Klein contests Shapin's clear equation of experimental 
practice with a laboratory, emphasizing instead how early laboratories, although distinctly chemical in nature, were also 
artisanal workplaces (Klein 2008); or, as Jackson notes, the “laboratory was not, in the first instance, a place of experiment. 
It was the particular space in which the technical hazards of chemical practice, whatever its purpose and setting, could be 
made to conform to social norms” (Jackson 2016, 299). Of course, the “prehistory” of (chemical) laboratories are not in 
focus here (since by 1900 laboratories were firmly established) and what interests us is the production and reflection of 
cultural conventions in and around laboratories, both of which are further underscored by Klein's and Jackson's 
arguments.
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specifically chemical labor into a site of academic training and experimental research” (ibid., 302). One
feature of the modern laboratory that was a result of these struggles for place and credibility that needs
further discussion here is “placelessness”. As Kohler (2002) argues, the power of laboratories lies in their
separation from nature: “Labs are all the same (more or less) and constitute a universal cultural space; that
is why we trust the knowledge produced in them to be universally true” (Kohler 2002, 473). His study on
the need to “renaturalize” microscopic and evolutionary morphology by building field stations, vivaria,
and  farms  after  the  trust  in  what  happened  in  these  laboratories  was  eroded,  illustrates  how  the
conventions  of  placelessness  can fail  and  how the  relationship  between nature  and  the  laboratory  is
mediated. Thus, placelessness “marks the lab as a social form that travels and is easy to adopt, because it
seems rooted in no particular cultural soil, but, rather, in universal modernity” (Kohler 2008, 766). We
could see the trajectory of the laboratory then as moving from specific spaces that lend credibility to a
cultural unit  – an organizational form that today has become a non-place,  a template,  whose powers
depend  not  on  genius  or  method,  but  cultural  practice  and  extension  of  the  “boundaries”  of  the
laboratory, as argued by Latour (cf. Latour 1983).61 The construction of the laboratory as a placeless space
of science that could be housed at universities, corporations, or private institutions is also commented
upon by Dennis, who remarks that the key accomplishments of entrepreneurs such as Steinmetz (GE)
and  Jewett  (AT&T)  was  the  realization  that  the  laboratory,  the  heart  of  the  research  school,  was
“portable” (Dennis 1987, 505).
How does this  relate  to and extend our discursive findings? These briefly  sketched concepts  serve to
illustrate the importance of place in the development of the laboratory, a category that can be found
twofold in the way that the laboratory is made into a discursive object: on the one hand as the physical
manifestation  of  the  scientific  method  and  experimental  practice,  and  on  the  other  in  placing  the
laboratory  in  relation  to  the  factory  as  a  matter  of  scale.  The  early  contributions  to  the  discourse,
establishing the laboratory's attributes as outlined, certainly fit the category of placelessness, locating the
laboratory  neither  at  the  university  nor  in  the  corporation,  but  instead  as  an  abstract  space  of
experimentation where nature could be reproduced and subjugated – in this way, the laboratory became
the materialization of a concept with all that it entails. Yet, as Kohler perceptively notes, “placelessness,
like all cultural conventions, runs in cycles and is dependent on prevailing – but fickle – cultural weather”
61 Of course, the laboratory is scrutinized not only in the history of science literature, but also in Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) (Knorr-Cetina 1995). Here, while also asking questions about the power of locales, what happens inside the 
laboratory is in focus, i.e. the cultural practices involved in what we call “science”. Since the unique focus of this book is 
trying to understand the diffusion of a special type of laboratory as a discursive product by way of what was said about 
these laboratories, and not of what happened in them, many of the categories introduced by proponents of STS do not 
apply here, yet some features of the laboratory introduced by this literature can still serve to extend and inform the object 
carved out here. On the troubles of accounting for what actually happened in laboratories, cf. also Gooding 1989.
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(Kohler 2002, 495). Perhaps the questions of laboratory scale can be understood in this way, as analogous
to the  troubles  of  morphology he  described.  When the  ability  to reproduce nature  in  the  industrial
laboratory was questioned (not only discursively, but also possibly by executives demanding results in the
form of products and processes, which the early laboratories could not produce as fast as those believing
discursive  claims  may  have  believed),  its  placelessness  –  i.e.  the  cultural  conventions  governing  the
credibility of science – was under attack. Positioning the industrial research laboratory in relation to the
factory, from small to large, can perhaps not be seen as re-naturalizing, since it did not necessarily change
the laboratory's relation to nature, but as repositioning the laboratory within the industrial organization.
In this  way,  its  claims of  control  and  supremacy were  safeguarded,  but  by  adding  distance  –  literal
distance, since early laboratories made it a point to be exempt from routine and shop work, as well as
conceptual distance, in the need to scale the small laboratory world to the large factory, thereby opening
up the cultural practice of laboratory research to the entrance of the chemical engineer, and transforming
subject positions in the process. Furthermore, the key examples from laboratory history cited (and many
more) help us in understanding the laboratory in its physical setting, its apparatus and equipment, as well
as the reasons put forward for establishing laboratories as a cultural product. With regard to laboratory
type, the existence of works or testing laboratories (cf. Van Rooij 2011, 435; also Israel 1992; Gooday
2008, 794) may have further strengthened the shift towards research laboratories, as the organizational
form was already known and now merely “filled” with a different practice, that of science, bolstered by
the larger emerging organizational field of consulting laboratories, cooperative laboratories, and so on.
With  regard  to  the  “whys”  of  laboratory  establishment  probed  above,  an  interesting  hypothesis  is
proposed by Kohler:
An analogous argument may explain why labs and lab science came to have such a prominent place 
in modern industrial corporations: the analytic categories and practices of lab science were 
congruent with the new managerial hierarchies and procedures of large-scale industrial capitalism, 
whereas those of the older shop culture were not. As well, scientists proved useful allies for 
modernizers striving to transform the traditional business firm into the modern managerial 
leviathan. (Kohler 2008, 768)
The rationales outlined above – utility, application, profit, and a certain security against the forces of the
market by pioneering efforts – as well as the construction of the laboratory as filled with scientifically
trained experts certainly fit the analytic categories of corporate control introduced by Fligstein and others,
including the historically enriched case studies on the pioneers.  Of course, such conjunctures are still
cursory at best,  which is  why as a last dimension of discourse,  the subject positions constructed and
modified across the events need to be probed.
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6.4) Subject Positions
After scrutinizing the notions and categories guiding the thought and interpretation of reality, and how
they make material reality meaningful in a specific way actors are of interest as a last analytical category.
Not just any actors in any capacity, but those assigned special positions in the discourse, termed subject
positions.  They  come  into  play  in  two  ways:  On  the  one  hand,  they  are  constructed  as  legitimate
contributors to a discourse, “allowing agents to participate in a discourse in particular ways” (Munir &
Phillips  2005,  1668),  in our  case those who are  allowed to say anything about  what  science  is,  how
research should be conducted, and where laboratories should be located, to name but a few examples.
They feature also in questions of who will be heard discursively (visibility) and whose constructions of
concepts and objects are spread and perpetuated – those coming from legitimate speakers. On the other
hand, and this is the component highlighted primarily here, subject positions are constructed as actors –
to offer  locations  for  agents  to participate  in (Maguire  & Hardy 2006,  13)  there  first  needs  to be  a
discursive construction of what it means to be a chemist, a scientist, or a chemical engineer. So, instead of
focusing on the ways that a subject position offered the means of different levels of participation in the
discursive  corpus  and  the  respective  kinds  of  texts  involved  (i.e.  who  is  allowed  to  say  what  about
something or other), questions were asked about how these subjects were constituted, and how these
characterizations changed over time as the results of discursive rifts and events in the field. Instead of
analyzing the plethora of subjects mentioned in the discourse – ranging from chemists to managers, and
politicians to popularizers – only the chemist and the chemical engineer shall be presented in detail, since
the object laboratory clearly showed how it was materialized as a place staffed by chemists. Furthermore,
opposition and coalitions towards other relevant groups can be analyzed as part of the attributes of these
two subject positions. 
Subjects, 1: The Chemist
What did it mean to be a chemist between 1870 and 1930? What part did the conceptions of science,
research, and chemistry play in the attributes constructed of these men of science? Did the tendencies of
placing or temporalizing concepts and objects come into play in the construction of this subject position,
what role did the types of chemists differentiated over time play, and how were relations to opposing or
supporting groups laid out?  But  first,  why is  the  chemist  analyzed here,  instead of  the  more  general
subject position of “scientist”? This is due to the way laboratories were constructed as objects – staffed
with men trained in the science of chemistry. In this way, characteristics of the scientist were reflected in
how  the  chemist's  identity  was  constructed.  Provisional  analysis  of  the  “scientist”  showed  that  the
chemist was an instantiation of the scientist, in some cases even going beyond characteristics attributed to
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the scientist,  such as in relation to material  things. In order to keep the presentation of the discourse
analysis'  results  as  comprehensible  and  concise  as  possible,  a  detailed  discussion  of  the  scientist  was
eschewed here, opting instead to focus on chemists in their function as scientists. 
The Chemist as Man of Science
The  subject  position  of  the  chemist  is  strongly  related  to  the  way  that  the  concepts  of  science  and
chemistry were constructed. First of all, the chemist was a man of science, with all of the connotations
that followed from association with the concept. Several key features are of note here, beginning with the
identification of the chemist as the one who applies the scientific method and uses it in the quest to gather
knowledge and ascertain the truth (e.g.  Carhart 1895; Coulter 1900; Fullerton 1900; Cameron 1903;
Nichols 1918). Due to the nature of their scientific specialty, chemists are similarly positioned vis-à-vis
nature,  as  the  concept  of  chemistry  was.  Thus,  the  chemist  is  the  one  finding  the  laws  of  nature
(“Editorials.  The Chemist and the Public” 1909),  and “it is  the chemist who must discover the truth
about the  changes that  occur  or  may be  made to take place  in the  composition and constitution of
material things” (Scholes 1918, 390). Here, we find again the relation of chemistry to the material world
outlined  above  and  the  chemist  as  the  one  subjugating  nature  through  his  mastery  of  “the  atomic
structure and the arrangement of matter” (Vaughan 1912, 225).  Moreover,  emphasis was laid on the
chemical education any chemist received, in this way extending the notion of the man of science: Those
who apply the scientific method can do so because they were trained at university, in a laboratory, as
opposed to tinkering or learning on the job. Ripples emanating in the discourse on chemical education
are of course reflected here, e.g. in calls for chemical education to be broad instead of specialized (“The
Career of a Chemist – A Rejoinder” 1895; J.  W. M. 1895; McMurrich 1907;  Whitney 1909; Messel
1912). The university chemist was of course a teacher, yet many authors underlined that to be a good
teacher  one  would  also  have  to  do  original  investigation  –  research.  Already  in  1895  a  university
instructor  was expected to “add something to stock of  knowledge by his  independent  investigation”
(Carhart 1895, 395; cf. also C. Chandler 1900), with investigation in a laboratory seen as a method of
fostering  independent  thinking  and  creativity  instead  of  memorizing  formulas  (R.  Williams  1901).
Interestingly, research by chemists early on was already hardly seen as a solitary activity, rather conducted
by a group of investigators. Speaking of the proper endowment of research, Clarke condemned support
by paying the salaries of men “working at random”, and attacking their small problems in their own ways.
Instead, he advocated for “… the establishment of institutions, wherein bodies of trained men should take
up, systematically and thoroughly, the problems which are too large for individuals to handle” (Clarke
1902, 136). This notion of research as a cooperative activity gained strength in later years, when more and
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more laboratories  came to be established,  and with reference to the  formidable successes  of  German
research laboratories (Herstein 1912; Roeber 1913; Little 1913 and 1916). This also signaled a change in
the perception of how knowledge and progress was generated – a shift from individual genius towards
collective effort: 
The personal element, previously so large a factor, has gradually been eliminated to a great extent 
and the noteworthy achievements of to-day in science, and in industry as well, are the results of 
many brains focused upon the same object, sometimes working together, often working 
independently, but always influencing one another. (Herstein 1912, 331)
In  a  similar  vein  is  the  “Edison  method”  (Little  1916,  645),  lauded  in  a  description  of  genius  and
individual achievement by A. D. Little, after which he applauds the “other and even more significant
phase of our industrial research, namely, that which involves the coordinated and long-continued effort
of many chemists along related lines” (ibid., 648). Perceptions of genius will be scrutinized below, but
what remains important for this description of the subject position is  how the chemist was seen as a
creative investigator, the one manipulating matter and, at a later point, the most effective in a group. As
mentioned,  a  strong  discursive  shift  towards  group  research  occurred  over  time,  and  the  notion  of
research gained even further visibility when discussed in relation to the discourse on Preparedness and
questions  of  how  the  chemist  could  serve  the  country  best.  Unsurprisingly,  authors  argued  for  the
chemist to be placed in the reserves instead of the frontlines due to their unique ability to undertake
research and solve the war's challenges, from dyestuffs to ammunition (Bogert 1917a and b; Stieglitz &
Parsons 1917). Another feature of the chemist's subject position that recurred repeatedly was the idea of
the chemist as a discoverer or pioneer. While especially during WWI other metaphors surfaced briefly –
for example chemist and engineers as Army and Navy (Louis 1917), or as physicians and surgeons of
industry  (Carpenter  1917)  – the  idea  that  chemists  as  researchers  were  discoverers  akin  to  pioneers,
surveyors, and settlers of the days of the Western frontier remained stable over the whole period (e.g.
Clayton  1902; Mitchell  1912; Thompson 1913; Washburn 1916; Parmelee 1921c).  Discoveries  to be
made were likened to “a country rich with undeveloped possibilities” (“Notes and Comments. Room for
Research Work in Chemical  Engineering.” 1908) and a “territory which has not yet  been traversed”
(Cannon 1911, 66). Such metaphors were also used to delineate differences between pure and industrial
researchers, as this pivotal quote by AT&T's Carty shows:
The investigator in pure science may be likened to the explorer who discovers new continents or 
islands or hitherto unknown territory. He is continually seeking to extend the boundaries of 
knowledge. The investigator in industrial research may be compared to the pioneers who survey the
newly discovered territory in the endeavor to locate its mineral resources, determine the extent of its
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forests, and the location of its arable land, and who in other ways precede the settlers and prepare 
for their occupation of the new country. (Carty 1916, 514)
Of course, the blurred lines between purity and applications were described in detail above, and will play
a part in the differentiation of the chemist's subject position below. Hence there is no need to go into
detail here – instead, Carty's quote further illustrates another facet in the many ways the chemist was
described. Placing the chemist (or the scientist in general) in the context of discovery, within the larger
framework of the American frontier experience of less than a decade ago, further elucidates the remarks
describing  the  laboratory  as  keeping  a  company  ahead  (see  above)  –  laboratories  could  serve  as  the
pioneering  arm of  industry,  since  they  were  staffed with pioneers.  Furthermore,  it  serves  as  another
exemplification of how concepts, objects, and subject positions are bolstered by association with other
discourses. While not as pronounced as ties to the Conservation Movement or the efficiency craze, “going
west” certainly can be understood as a relevant cultural reservoir of ideas during that time (cf. also Spero
2014).
In the chemist,  the central  attributes  of the concepts  of science and chemistry were connected to an
associated subject position. Ascriptions of who the chemist was could mainly be found in the early years,
and primarily came from speakers of the General Science group of journals. Of course, this group made
up the largest proportion for the early event-tranches, as other publication outlets hardly existed around
the turn of the century. Furthermore, while the occurrence of texts discussing the philosophy of the
scientist or the life of the chemist declined during later events, no contrasting or contradicting subject
positions could be detected, indicating how the characteristics of the chemist remained stable over the
years. Instead, the types of chemists and their respective competences and places of work became more
interesting to discursive authors, as will be shown later. 
But the chemist as university-educated scientist doing pioneering research was not the only attribute that
the subject position was constructed with. From 1895 on, and over the whole period, a multitude of
authors thought it necessary to underscore important traits of character and attitude, thereby making the
chemist special. To cite but a few telling examples, in a reply to an out-of-work chemist in the Scientific
American, an anonymous author offers a scalding critique, enlisting a variety of people, ranging from
Ulysses Grant to successful chemists such as Siliman, Remsen, and Chandler, in order to illustrate what it
means to “be a  chemist”:  “There  are  men,  yes,  and worse,  who have not  succeeded in the life  work
planned for them, not because they were incompetent, but because they were lacking in that peculiar
ability of persisting in spite of obstacles that is typical of the best Americans” (“The Career of a Chemist –
A Rejoinder” 1895, 211).  Next to  persistence and grit,  truthfulness,  honesty,  morality,  diligence, and
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accuracy were central characteristics of the scientist, and by extension the chemist (Carhart 1895; Turner
1900; Pritchett 1900; Fullerton 1900; Washburn 1916). The scientific method, then, is used successfully
by those with a fitting mental attitude, who are special and stand out from common men (Coulter 1900;
McKeen Cattell 1903). Such notions did not lessen over the years, as W. Richardson's list of qualities
necessary for being a chemist or chemical engineer shows: “He must have inventive ability,  profound
knowledge, keen insight, imagination, initiative, tireless energy and that wonderful faculty of elimination
of the non-essential” (W. Richardson 1908b, 809). A certain element of genius certainly played a part in
this subject position as well, being an essential element for research (Roeber 1913; Bacon 1917b; Bacon et
al.  1917) that  needed to be developed in the student (McMurtrie  1907) and was a key factor in the
discoveries  and  developments  of  the  greatest  chemists  and  scientists  (e.g.  Pupin  1895).  Though  no
consensus  existed  of  whether  or  not  great  scientists  were  born or  made  –  i.e.  whether  these  special
qualities  of  tenacity  and  insight,  of  morality  and  freedom  from  prejudice,  could  be  learned  (e.g.
McMurrich 1907; Washburn 1916; Weens 1917; Whitney 1909) – one feature of this surprising element
in the construction of the chemist's subject position needs further discussion: how great scientists and
specifically  great  chemists  were  described according  to the  sketched subject  position.  How was  their
method, their process described, and what role did genius or anything similar play in it? 
In  the  discursive  texts,  a  large  group  of  eminent  and  widely  known  and  appreciated  chemists  are
mentioned, sometimes in passing, sometimes in detail. Amongst them are the (European) forefathers of
chemistry  such  as  Lavoisier,  Liebig,  Pasteur,  Faraday,  Davy,  and  Ostwald,  and  later  even  American
chemists  such as  Remsen,  Whitney,  and Langmuir (Little  1913; Reid 1922; Binns  1922).  Yet  several
figures  stand  out.  The  German  chemist  Justus  von  Liebig  certainly  is  one  of  these  figures,  and  is
frequently mentioned in discursive texts (Carhart 1895; W. Walker 1911; Noyes 1922). Acknowledged as
the  founder  of  the  first  chemical  laboratory  and  the  one  who  transformed  university  teaching  in
Germany, these feats were made possible due to his special traits, as constructed in the discourse: “... a
reading of the biography of Liebig makes clear what difficulties had to be overcome and how largely this
was accomplished by the energy and personality of the great chemist” (“Justus von Liebig and the First
Laboratory” 1909). The accomplishments of Louis Pasteur were invoked even more frequently, and, as
outlined above, often in relation to the applications of his discoveries to industrial progress, welfare, and
wealth (Halstead  1895b;  Wiley  1901;  Maclaurin  et  al.  1916;  Ogden 1918).  Pasteur,  a  “great  savant”
(Mason  1895,  851),  and  one  of  the  “great  modern  masters  of  science”  (Maclaurin  1916,  43),  was
acknowledged to have been guided by “higher aims”, and it would be from special men like him that a
“progressive betterment of human character, the final, most precious result of evolution on this earth”
would stem (Halstead 1895b,  612f).  Michael  Faraday, as  one of the founders  of the subdiscipline of
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electrochemistry, was recognized as a genius of special mental facilities: “Unless the scientific investigator
has the proper genius for his work, no amount of financial assistance, no apparatus or laboratories, … will
enable such a mind to discover new truths or to inspire others to do so” (Carty 1916, 515). Pupin (1895,
862)  describes  Faraday  as  a  rare  combination of  discoverer  and  philosopher,  while  Carhart  cautions
against degrading the genius of Faraday and Hertz by reducing them to the level of the “greatest living
inventors” (Carhart 1895, 399). As a last actor in this overview of the great minds of chemistry – as retold
in the discourse – let us take a look at Leo Baekeland, a chemist and prolific inventor, as well as himself an
author  of  some of  the  discursive  texts  analyzed.  Baekeland  is  interesting  since  he  is  not  a  European
scientist  and not a forerunner of chemical research,  but instead someone inhabiting the demi-monde
between chemical research and commercial activity – How was he discursively perceived? Some authors
place him in line with other famous figures such as Edison, who were typical examples of “genius of
strong individualities of superman size” (Roeber 1913, 665), that is, individual workers achieving success
due to specialized, intense research they do on their own (cf. also Little 1916). Thus Baekeland was a
“modern miracle worker of science” (Sparkes 1923, 31). 
Changing Conceptions of the Chemist over Time
As  we  have  seen above,  the  distinctions  of  pure  and  applied  according  to  motive  and  place  played
important parts in how the concepts of science, research, and chemistry were constructed. Furthermore,
these issues found outlets in the tendency of localization as far as the materialization of science in the
laboratory was concerned – the laboratory being a place of science, and its place having a strong influence
on objectives. Especially in the industrial laboratory, we already found differences of type, i.e. research
and analytical laboratories. What about those working in laboratories? What about the chemists? Did
their subject position change over the years similarly to how laboratory types evolved and how research
gathered the additional meaning of industrial research? 
Generally, a multitude of descriptors could be found in discursive texts, further denoting the types of
chemists.  Few trends over time could be identified, yet the overall  movement within the discourse is
indicative  of  certain  effects  that  the  establishment  of  industrial  research  laboratories  had  regarding
attributes of the subject position “chemist”. Of the various ways chemists were grouped and typified –
ranging from, for example, the opposition of scientific and technical chemists (Duisberg 1896), all the
way to research versus service chemists (Russell 1923) – the eventual emergence of the industrial chemist
stands out. While in early texts talk focused solely on “chemists”, by 1908 authors deemed it increasingly
necessary to speak about industrial chemists, first and foremost in relation to the discourse on Chemical
Education (e.g.  Palmer 1908;  G.  Walker  1922).  The industrial  chemist  was  often also described as  a
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technical chemist (Hillebrand 1907),  and descriptions of this  type of chemist  made it  clear that they
meant chemists under industrial employ, as opposed to those at a university: “Let it not be said of the
Technical Chemist that he loves his science any less than his brother, who devotes his time to research or
teaching” (Parker 1909, 1; cf. also Teeple 1908). While clearly connoted as a man of science, the mention
of the tasks of the technical chemist's “brother” that denote the dual function of the university – teaching
and research – clearly illustrate my point. Indeed, frequent calls for closer cooperation between these two
types of chemists were made, one author going so far as to describe the teaching and research chemist as
the “exciter”, and the industrial or technical chemist as the “dynamo”, with their cooperation bringing
“whatever power is to be derived from the science of chemistry, to the industrial world” (Richardson
1908a, 396). It needs to be noted how discussions of the tasks and challenges of industrial chemists were
often discussed in relation to the chemical engineer, a subject position that will be further scrutinized
below. That the term “industrial chemist” emerged around 1908 comes as no surprise when one considers
the organizational field of academic chemistry, and the changes made to the organization of the ACS'
divisional structure in 1908 – traces of which can be found in the discourse. The lack of representation of
the technical chemist in the ACS is even lamented (Hillebrand 1907) and explicitly referenced in the
founding editorial of JIEC (Parker 1909). As such, the discursive uncertainty of terms can be interpreted
as  resulting from increasing opportunities  for  chemists  in  the  chemical  industries,  and this  group of
chemists progressively demanding a “voice” amongst the established subject positions of chemists. 
A further distinction within the subject position of chemist that gained a more prominent role on the
discursive stage was one already foreshadowed in the ways the laboratory was materialized: research versus
analysis. First of all, who the analyst was perceived to be is summarized by Richardson, who wrote that an
analyst  is  a  “chemist  who,  by  various  devices  called  methods  of  analysis,  endeavors  to  ascertain  the
composition of substances” (Richardson 1908a, 398). Analytical work was generally seen as the basis of
all chemical work, being undertaken in industrial establishments, seen as primarily analytical (Richardson
1908a and b; Burgess 1911; Little 1916), and often equated with routine work: “There is undoubtedly a
tendency for the college chemist to regard his technical brother as one immersed in routine work and to
whom chemistry has become a trade rather than a profession” (Burgess 1911, 617). Indeed, analytical
work  was  termed  as  less  exclusive  and  pioneering  than  research,  and  while  all  plants  would  require
chemical analysts, not all could do their own research: “Not all plants can lead” (Richardson 1908b, 809).
What is of special interest in analysis as a subtype or attribute of the chemist's subject position is twofold:
First, the relation to the research chemist constructed during the later events. In contrast to the analytical
chemist doing the routine work of breaking down substances, the creative research chemist was instead
busy  originating  and  developing  new  fields  (Whitaker  1911).  Over  time,  a  clear  hierarchy  was
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constructed, that saw the analytical chemist (or mere “analyst”) as inferior to the research chemist, who
was schooled in analytical methods but could interpret analytical results and go beyond these in their
work (Brogdon 1912; O'Brien 1922). A second interesting facet of this discursive fragment is how the
analytical  chemist  was described to be perceived by employers.  The position of an analyst  was often
described  as  an  entry-level  position  for  recent  university  graduates  (Burgess  1911;  Little  1916).
Subsequently, authors made critical observation about employers' perceptions of analysis as being easy or
of low quality (Auchy 1909), and the analytical chemist as being seen as an inferior type: “In the minds of
the general public, to be sure, a chemist is essentially an analyst but, in the minds of employers, an analyst
is too often an inferior grade of chemist who can be readily displaced by a reasonably intelligent boy, and
whom  boy's  wages  should  satisfy”  (Talbot  1912,  403).  The  hierarchy  of  the  research  and  analytical
chemist bleeds over into this point, as the lack of appreciation for research was partially attributed to
employers confusing both types of chemists (Bacon 1917a), or having bad experiences with analytical
chemists pretending to be research chemists (Watkins 1913). Interestingly, while lines of delineation are
clearly drawn between the research and analytical chemist as shown here, these two types can not clearly
be linked to university and industrial chemists. On the one hand, analytical work is clearly placed within
the  confines  of  the  manufacturing  plant  –  the  routine  work  of  the  university  chemist's  “technical
brother” (Burgess 1911) apparently only the practice of industrial chemistry – and the lamentation of
false perceptions often linked to questions regarding the elevation of professional status. On the other, the
troubles for research chemists caused by their analytical brethren, and calls for needing to go beyond
analysis during the later event-tranches, point towards this type – the research chemist – also having a
place in industry. 
As it turns out, the internal lines of the subject position of the chemist are more muddled, as one might
expect, and less subject to the tendencies of localization and temporalization.  The field of discussion is
not reigned over by the global opposition to pure and applied science workers as one might have come to
expect. Instead, the discussion of types highlights how changes and incidences in the organizational field
– be it the establishment of laboratories, the increasing employment of chemists in industry and their
expanding domain, or the revamping of the ACS' mission – were reflected in the discourse, and how the
subject position had to be modified in turn. Understanding how chemists became industrial chemists,
and how research and analytical chemists  related to one another discursively helps us in charting the
internal  characteristics  of  the  subject  position.  But  what  about  the  external?  Employers  featured
prominently in what was recounted here: What other groups were of relevance, and how did relations
built with these influence the subject positions' attributes?
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Opposition and Constituencies over Time: Foremen, Managers, and the Public
The chemists' struggle for legitimacy and recognition occurred not only in relation to their professional
standing  vis-à-vis  the  other  learned  professions  of  lawyers  and  physicians,  which  found  its  strongest
occurrence during early questions of specialization and during the postwar reconfiguration discussing
legislative efforts geared towards the chemist's status and the foundation of the AIC, but also in more
nuanced ways – which can be highlighted in the discursively constructed ties to other groups, three of
which took prominent places in the corpus analyzed.
Surprisingly,  the  inventor  hardly  features  in  the  discourse  analyzed.  Since  one  of  the  results  of  the
historical studies on industrial research laboratories was that scientists asserted themselves and their claims
to innovation and mastery over inventors, who served as prior sources of corporate innovation, it was
expected  that  such  arguments  would  surface  in  the  events  scrutinized.  Even though  inventors  were
explicitly targeted in the search heuristic for corpus assembly, only a few texts concern themselves with
inventors.  If  anything,  what  could  be  stated  is  that,  regarding  the  inventor,  a  certain  conceptual  or
semantic  fuzziness  between the inventor  and the  scientist  is  evident.  Especially  early  on,  a  variety of
ascriptions are made: Inventors are seen as geniuses and pioneers (Thurston 1900; Baekeland 1912), they
work in laboratories (“The Status of Electrochemical Industries” 1908), and are born, not made (du Puy
1912), with some accomplished men of science also being described as inventors, most notably Baekeland
(Sparkes 1923). For later event-tranches, emphasis was laid on groups of scientists, instead of inventors,
being  under  corporate  employ  (Herstein  1912),  with  growing  technological  complexity  phasing  the
inventor gradually out (Mees 1916). In this way, discursive arguments were replicated in the explanations
of the emergence of industrial laboratories. Only a few texts equate inventors with a lack of scientific
training, trial-and-error methods and experience-based expertise (“The Industrial  Corporation and the
Inventor” 1911; Ames 1918; Armstrong 1923). That is why the first group analyzed in the following is
not merely deemed the “group of inventors” that chemists had to assert their discursive dominance over.
Instead, true to the interpretive validity of the discursive texts, the analysis proceeded as closely to what
was  written  as  possible,  and  authors  spoke  of  superintendents  and  rule-of-thumb  men  much  more
frequently than of the inventor. Thus, a clear discursive struggle of scientists and inventors62 could not be
identified, instead, tentative links between untrained men and inventors can be asserted.
The first group of interest here are foremen, factory superintendents, and “practical men”, and how their
62 It needs to be noted, however, that inventors have no voice here – since the discourse analysis focused specifically on 
discourse surrounding chemists and scientists, possible speakers for inventors were not included in the field. Their 
triumphs were of course celebrated in the popular press, giving us a glimpse through the pages of Scientific American and 
Popular Science Monthly, but technical journals where inventors could undertake similar forms of discourse as scientists 
did – with regard to professionalization, subject positions, etc. – did not feature in the analysis. 
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relationship to the chemist was constructed as one of opposition. Mentions of this group started in 1912
and continued for  the  later  events,  though less  frequently.  With scientific  research standing in strict
opposition to the  old  ways  of  tradition and untheoretical  empiricism,  the  chemists  who entered the
industrial  corporation  and  their  methods  were  antagonized  by  factory  workers,  foremen  and
superintendents – “… superintendents look upon the chemist as a kind of necessary nuisance whom they
tolerate rather than seek” (Brogdon 1912, 685) – with the results of research not appreciated at all: “ What
a mass of promising research work has been ruthlessly beheaded by conscientious superintendents, and
directors in the name of 'practical' results!” (Jacobson 1916, 459). A. D. Little even accused foremen and
the  like  of  not  having  emerged  from  the  “penumbra”,  resulting  in  their  lack  of  appreciation  and
utilization of the research chemist (Little 1913, 653). This group was frequently identified with rule-of-
thumb methods and a lack of formal training, and their successes attributed to hands-on experience and
years of service (cf. Little 1911; “Factory or Laboratory” 1911; Hadfield 1916; Ames 1918; Noyes 1922).
Yet their traditional knowledge came to its limits in a time when efficiency became a growing concern –
the  description  of  chemists  being  received  in  a  hostile  way  coincides  with  questions  of  efficient
production,  waste  management,  and  product  innovation,  outdated  and  inefficient  ways  that  only
persisted due to the old guard (cf. Maclaurin et al. 1916, 65). Soon after the concerns over efficiency,
preparedness and war became the watchwords connected to the conflict between the old methods and
the  new,  scientific  knowledge  and  their  respective  practitioners.  Often,  the  relation of  the  practical,
untrained man to the university-educated scientist was seen as a linear displacement: “The day of the
typical 'practical man' is passing and there is dawning the day of the efficient scientific man” (Washburn
1916, 1150; cf. also Roeber 1912; Clarke 1916). Even after the war, complaints about ignorant foremen
continued: “Far too many of our plant and department superintendents do not yet comprehend how the
prosperity of their companies can be augmented by a greater use of scientifically trained men – men from
the technical high and manual training schools as well as from the universities” (MacDowell 1922, 431).
To summarize, the distinction found in the concepts of science/research as different and better – more
efficient, better for the war effort, and the solution for the postwar economy – can also be found in the
subject position of the chemist as the antagonistic relation towards them from a group best condensed as
“practical men”. To reflect on this, why did this oppositional relationship only occur from 1912 onwards,
if chemists were widespread in industry years before? One possible interpretation runs parallel  to the
introduction  of  laboratory  scale  –  chemists  in  their  laboratories  lagged  behind  in  producing  their
promised results, leading to the construction of an opposition group that discarded their knowledge of
underlying principles and their improvements to tried and tested processes. Another perspective takes
into account how research laboratories gradually became established as a new and distinct part of the
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industrial corporation that was not troubled with the daily, routine concerns of the shop floor. Due to
this  distance,  ideas  from the  research laboratory  may not  have  met  manufacturing  reality  (university
chemists'  lack  of  practical  experience  being  a  frequent  concern  within  the  discourse  on  chemical
education and a connecting point to the  subject  position of  the  chemical  engineer),  instead meeting
opposition and “ruthless beheading”.63 One last topical interpretation lies in the chemist (and especially
the chemical engineer) being in the position of efficiency expert, with the old ways failing in the race for
greater efficiency, and the development of the scientific method, which was employed by chemists in the
laboratory as an answer for these troubles. Thus their natural enemy in achieving greater efficiency were
foremen and the like.
The second group is a combination of actors in leading positions in the industrial corporation, variously
called businessmen,  executives,  or  managers,  and those  with the  means  to finance  research ventures:
capitalists  and  bankers.  In  contrast  to  the  way  that  discursive  speakers  characterized  foremen  and
superintendents, the relation to this group was denoted as one lacking in appreciation, mainly due to
absent knowledge of who the chemist is and what their laboratory research could accomplish. Tenuous
relations to this group were mentioned starting in 1912, with the discussion gaining speed and visibility
from 1917 onwards.  A lack of appreciation was often identified with inadequate compensation,  and
many authors lamented little pay for chemists when the worth of the services of lawyers – as recognized
members of a learned profession – was evident, appreciated, and thus appropriately compensated for by
executives  (e.g.  Watkins  1913; Stieglitz  1917a;  Burgess  1923).  The source of  the perceived erroneous
valuation lay in false perceptions of chemistry which at times was regarded as either simple, the chemist
being only a day laborer (Stewart 1912; Watkins 1913), or too impractical,  the chemist coming from
university  halls  being perceived as  an “impractical  man” (Hemingway 1917,  354;  cf.  also Thompson
1918).  Interestingly,  these  lamentations  were  often  made  with  respect  to  a  lack  of  appreciation  for
research chemists, with manufacturers being blind to the value of doing organized research, whereas the
services  of  chemical  analysts  were  commonly  acknowledged  (and  regarded  as  simple  and  routine)
(Watkins 1913). Generally, the missing knowledge of what research is and what it can do was supported
by the notion of the special mind of the chemist – “The mind that finds the way to do new and improved
things must see visions that are entirely obscured to the minds that finance, direct,  manufacture and
market” (Choate 1917, 244) – and chemistry and research proving to be a mysterious province for many
63 One needs to remember that, although the discursive net was cast as wide as possible, including a variety of organizational 
speakers, few if any of those “practical men” have a voice in this discourse; most authors quoted here were university-
trained chemists/scientist under the employ of a university, a corporation, or a research institute. Including the perspective 
of superintendents, foremen, tinkerers, and so on would surely add an interesting dimension to the chemists' subject 
position and their apparent lack of appreciation.
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executives and bankers (Matthews 1916; Little & O'Reilly 1917; Roeber 1917). The lack of knowledge
about research and those doing it  was connected to the efforts of Popularization after WWI, finding
expression primarily  in appeals  to learn how to “sell”  chemical  research:  “Selling research consists  in
convincing all with whom the research worker has to do, that his research is worth while doing, and that
the results will show a gain in quality or cost or performance over the methods with which the user is
familiar” (C. Skinner 1922, 168). Due to the inherent foreignness of the laboratory and chemists, with
executives  and  bankers  essentially  speaking  different  languages,  the  chemists  would  need  to  learn  to
translate  laboratory  results  into  a  language  that  corporate  decision-makers  could  understand  (Clark
1917b;  Teeple  1922;  C.  Skinner  1922;  Hyde  1922;  Burgess  1923).  A  campaign  to  “evangelize”  the
business  world  (Hyde  1922,  291)  was  seen  as  the  solution  to  inadequate  salaries,  professional
compensation,  and  the  closing  down  of  research  laboratories  after  the  war  (Bolling  &  Maze  1922;
Eisenschiml 1922c). This also connects to calls for leaving the confines of the laboratory, becoming active
in  other  corporate  functions,  and  rising  to  the  executive  level,  as  outlined  above.  In  summary,  the
difference is striking in the relations constructed between chemists and the first group, foremen, and this
mélange of executives, managers, and capitalists as the second group. Instead of interpreting the lack of
status and compensation as hostility, it was merely put down to different languages and the ignorance of
many, while few manufacturers had already seen the light (e.g. Stewart 1912). Moreover, while the time of
the “practical man” was deemed over, in turn heralding the chemical age, it appears that for discursive
authors it was obvious that executives were here to stay and needed to be swayed in their support for
research laboratories, with the idea of putting chemists in other positions than the laboratory only gaining
traction during the last event-tranche analyzed, 1921-23. Thus, the relation constructed here is one of
bridgeable  differences,  which became  a theme of  discussion once  the  object  laboratory  had gained a
certain foothold in industry, many research chemists were under industrial employ, and the relationships
between chemists an other groups (the military, politicians, and executives) had been reconfigured due to
the war.
The third and final group is the public, discussed during the last two events (1917, 1922). It is strongly
connected to the discourses on Popularization and Legislation, and fragments of this relation were also
touched upon during the analysis of the materialization of the laboratory. This connection is interesting
because it provides an inside-view of how chemists viewed themselves, how they wanted to be perceived
and where they saw their societal place – especially since the above analysis has depicted the importance of
place in the discursive genesis of the industrial research laboratory. Similar to the relationship between
chemists and businessmen, the public was painted as unappreciative due to their ignorance (e.g. Clarke
1916; Maclaurin et al. 1916; Raiford 1917):
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There is still that idea, however, prevailing that chemistry is a hodge-podge of mysterious secrets, 
the discovery of which is made by accidental and haphazard methods. … In things chemical the 
public has still the innocently receptive mind of a child; it will accept as gospel truth the most 
absurd and illogical statements of supposed discoveries. … Fortunately, however, I think the public 
and the press are becoming perceptibly educated to a saner idea of chemistry. (Matthews 1916, 
1148)
Solving the dye crisis and the mobilization of the chemist during the war effort were perceived as starting
points for spreading the gospel of chemistry (Withrow 1916), and for making the public perceive for the
first time the myriad achievements of the chemist that they came in touch with every day: “How many …
think of the chemist when they pour their 'Karo' on their hot cakes for breakfast … ?” (Raiford 1917,
490). The perceived solution would be educational campaigns of popularization (Herty 1916; Cornell
1922; Slosson 1922) in order to make the layman attentive to the chemist's triumphs, elevate them above
craftsmen,  and build a  well-meaning,  supportive constituency that  would aid the chemists'  efforts  in
achieving a higher professional status and economic organization as a profession on an individual level, as
well  as  in  safeguarding  the  chemical  industries  (see  also  above:  Popularization,  Legislation,  Postwar
Normalcy). Again, different languages and the difficulty or otherness of the subject matter was lamented,
and ways of translation were proposed (e.g. Burgess 1923).
What can we learn from this in an attempt to map the changes to the subject position over the years? For
one, it further illustrates how chemistry was materialized in the laboratory, and how the subject position
of the research chemist was associated with it – chemists were now asked to move out of the laboratories,
branching out and spreading knowledge of chemical wonders (Bolling & Maze 1922).  It  also aids in
understanding how the discursive level probed  here is interconnected with the organizational field and
the events in the field: Professionalization and popularization are reflected in the establishment of for
example the AIC and popular campaigns already discussed, with our knowledge of these happenings now
supplemented by a thorough understanding of the way that the relations of the subject position of the
chemist were constituted and how they were transformed. Around 1900, there was hardly any mention of
an unappreciative public and the ways to elevate the profession, since the competitors were of a different
nature  –  discursive  shifts  that  can  only  be  understood  if  one  knows  the  impact  of  WWI  on  the
organizational and institutional landscape, the many university chemists moving into industry, and the
laboratory as organizational entity slowly becoming widespread.
Subjects, 2: The Chemical Engineer
One might wonder why, after such an exhaustive scrutiny of who the chemist was and what it meant to
practice chemistry in a variety of contexts at the beginning of the twentieth century, there is still need to
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talk about the chemical engineer. This second subject position to be outlined here is, of course, a minor
one  compared  to  the  (research)  chemist,  yet  still  relevant  by  nature  of  the  material  analyzed  itself:
Discussions  of  chemical  engineering  came  up  frequently,  and  ignoring  them  would  render  any
meaningful analysis of the discourse only fragmentary. Moreover, such discussions informed the way that
science was seen to be applied in industry – through the materialization and location of the industrial
laboratory – while also sharpening our understanding of the chemist's profile. Thus, in the following, two
themes  shall  be highlighted:  On the one hand how the construction of  the “chemical  engineer”  was
undertaken and how it relates back to events in the organizational field. And on the other, in what way
the Conservation Movement, the efficiency craze, and WWI transformed the subject position, in turn
repositioning the laboratory vis-à-vis corporations and the shop floor. 
Who is the Chemical Engineer? Between Engineering and Chemistry
Discussion  about  this  subject  position  started  with  the  earliest  event,  1895,  and  intensified  in  the
following years, peaking around 1908-12, when it was primarily discussed by the chemical and industrial
speaker groups. But with each event, the focus of the discussion seemingly shifted. Around 1895, the
chemical engineer – a term not yet coined – was discussed in relation to necessity and demand, with
various authors calling for an industrial worker that would combine a knowledge of chemistry and of
engineering  in  one  person,  as  both  specialties  were  acknowledged  as  necessary  and  foundational  to
modern industry: “In connection with the working force of the German color factories … that experience
has led directors to employ educated engineers alongside the research chemists and so to recognize the fact
that engineering capacity is necessary to the practical and industrial application of chemical reactions”
(McMurtrie  1895,  293;  cf.  also  Platt  1894;  Mason  1895;  C.  Chandler  1900).  The  term  “chemical
engineer” was coined around that time, and the focus of discursive texts moved towards the question of
where on a scale between chemistry and engineering the new subject position should be placed. While
many  authors  emphasized  the  ability  to  combine  both  sides  equally  (e.g.  “A  Proposed  Society  of
Chemical  Engineers”  1907; Parker  1909;  “Industrial  Research”  1911;  Thompson  1917b),  general
consensus  claimed  the  chemical  engineer  to  be  a  chemist  first,  and an engineer  only  in  a  secondary
capacity:64 
In my opinion, a chemical engineer is, primarily, a chemist, but essentially a man of affairs and 
executive ability who is engaged in the application of the principles of chemistry in the arts and 
industries, with special reference to the commercial development of the industries and 
establishment of new ones, to perfecting the arts, and by his advice and cooperation, assisting other 
64 Indeed, only a single text located the chemical engineer in the sphere of engineering: “A chemical engineer is not a chemist, 
but rather an engineer with some chemical knowledge” (McCormick 1921, 416). 
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engineers in the practise of their professions. (C. Richardson 1908, 82)
The necessity of proper chemical training for the chemical engineer, instead of merely hands-on chemical
knowledge picked up on the  job,  was  stressed (W.  Richardson 1908a,  401;  cf.  also “Why Not 'The
American Society of Chemical Engineers?'” 1907; Sadtler 1908; Palmer 1908). In this way, the subject
position of the chemical engineer was clearly and distinctly constructed as one belonging to the domain of
chemistry, and not represented by engineering societies. To refer these findings back to the organizational
field, it is highly illustrative how questions of professional identity were especially prominent prior to and
during the establishment of AIChE (1908), as also illustrated by the discursive texts cited above: Almost
all  of  them were  found  in  the  event-tranche  1907-09.  These  questions'  pertinence  is  framed  by  the
boundary-work  necessary  to  establish  the  AIChE,  which  was  explicitly  positioned  not  as  a  rival
organization to the ACS, but as an organization with a narrower scope, membership, and mission, as also
reflected in discursive texts debating whether such an organization should be established (“Why Not 'The
American Society of Chemical Engineers?'” 1907; “A Proposed Society of Chemical Engineers” 1907;
“Some Thoughts on the Organization of the 'American Institute of Chemical Engineers'” 1908; “The
AIChE” 1908; “Constitution of AIChE” 1908). The need for the specialization and professionalization
of chemical engineering was often supported with reference to the successes of the German chemical
industry  (McMurtrie  1895;  Sadtler  1908;  “Notes  and  Comments.  The  German Chemical  Industry”
1908;  Palmer  1909; “Notes  and  Comments.  Latest  Achievements  and  Problems  of  the  Chemical
Industry” 1912), further illustrating how concepts – the German chemical supremacy – were utilized in
discursive constructions and as legitimations,  in this instance to bolster the case for an organizational
home of the chemical engineer. 
Several attributes are of note in the subject position of the chemical engineer, that underline its relevance
to the industrial laboratory. First of all, many of the texts outlining who the chemist is supposed to be
often also talk about the chemical engineer, extending categories and attributes –  mastery over nature,
rationale  and training,  the  use  of  the  scientific  method,  higher  education,  etc.  –  towards  those  with
chemical training, be they chemists or chemical engineers, as is evident in a variety of texts on chemical
engineering  education  (e.g.  McMurtrie  1901;  “Notes  and  Comments.  Room  for  Research  Work  in
Chemical Engineering” 1908; C. Richardson 1908). The chemists' struggles for public appreciation were
mirrored in those of the chemical engineer (e.g. Matthews 1916; Withrow 1916), and untrained workers
or business men were occasionally invoked as oppositional groups (e.g. “Engineers, Practical Men, and
Theories” 1913; Thompson 1917a). But whereas the chemist's subject position sprouted a variety of types
– from the analytical chemist, to the industrial chemist, and to a pure research chemist at a university –
the chemical engineer was always distinctly placed in an industrial context. The chemical engineer's tasks
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were  seen  as  ranging  from  overseeing  production  work  to  interpreting  results,  in  turn  altering  and
improving processes and machinery on the shop floor (Platt 1894; Palmer 1908), while also applying the
principles of chemistry in an industrial context (C. Richardson 1908; W. Richardson 1908; Booth 1912;
Whitaker  1911,  1912b;  Bacon 1917a).  This  positioning  came  to be  important  once  the  tendency of
localization shifted towards  matters  of  laboratory  scale  that  had found their  way into the  discourse.
Furthermore, strict lines of delineation were drawn between the chemical engineer and both the analytical
and industrial chemist during the formative years of the AIChE:
The mere technologist or industrial chemist is often confused with the chemical engineer, but 
should be sharply distinguished from him. … He [the technologist] does not originate, nor does he 
study them from the point of view of the chemical investigator. He is more nearly an empyric. He is
unable to meet the demands which are made upon the chemical engineer, or to take a leading part 
in the affairs of the world. (C. Richardson 1908, 83)
The  chemical  engineer's  field  of  activity  was  constructed  as  being  much  broader  than  that  of  the
industrial  chemist  – who stayed confined to chemical  manufacturing (Roeber  1908,  309) – and the
chemical engineer's methods were going farther than those of the analyst, due to a close acquaintance
with the problems of chemical manufacturing (Sadtler 1908, 35). Such descriptions could also be found
in the formative texts of the AIChE (cf. e.g. “The AIChE” 1908). But, while more than an analyst, the
chemical engineer was also clearly not a research chemist. The chemical engineer would utilize chemical
knowledge but in a different way – in a diffuse space between scientific chemistry and its applications to
machinery and production processes. Even though the improvement of processes was seen as an essential
part of the chemical engineer's work, laboratory research was deemed the research chemist's domain (cf.
W. Richardson 1908a; Bacon 1917a), while the chemical engineer applyied the outputs of the industrial
research  laboratory  to  manufacturing:  “…  and  the  research  results  furnish  the  foundations  for  the
industries  which  the  chemical  engineer  organizes  and  administers”  (Whitaker  1911,  9).  Thus,  the
emerging subject position scrutinized here  is  located not only between the domains of chemistry and
engineering,  but  also  between the  research  laboratory  and  the  shop floor.  In  this  way,  the  chemical
engineer  serves  to  further  inform  our  analysis  of  the  discourse  surrounding  industrial  research
laboratories,  especially  their  materialization  and  struggles  as  an  organizational  entity,  which  is  best
illustrated by the quest for efficiency and matters of scale that will be discussed next. 
From Conservation to Efficiency and the Laboratory
As already touched upon in the discussion of  the Conservation Movement and the  efficiency craze,
connections  to  other,  adjacent  discourses  played  a  major  role  in  the  construction  of  the  chemical
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engineer's  subject  position.  They  illustrate,  especially  from  1908  onwards,  how  discursive  shifts
influenced and were used to modify existing subject positions, and by extension concepts, in this case the
concept of chemical engineering (which was of lesser interest to our inquiry on industrial laboratories
than those  doing the chemical engineering, hence only the chemical engineer being discussed in detail
here).  Moreover,  intertextual links were especially prevalent in this  context.  Once the term “chemical
engineer” was coined and its meaning – a chemist with engineering knowledge – was discursively fixed,
authors started associating the subject position with the Conservation Movement that was just about to
gain momentum. These associations primarily happened through references to Roosevelt's address for his
appointment  of  the  Commission  for  the  Conservation  of  National  Resources.  The  Commission's
mission  as  outlined  by  Roosevelt  –  conserving  material  resources,  reducing  waste,  and  properly
developing and using these resources – was seen as “almost a good definition of the work of Chemical
Engineers”  (“The AIChE” 1908,  5;  cf.  also Roeber  1908;  C.  Richardson 1908;  Bailey  1911;  Benner
1912). In this way, the chemical engineer gained an important area of responsibility in addition to aiding
industry in best utilizing its resources:
… what is still more important is his part in counseling and indicating how the wholesome 
influence of conservation can be applied to broaden and extend the scope of the industry, to 
maintain and add to its remunerative character and to give it stability and promise of permanence. 
(Sadtler 1909, 107)
This  extension of the subject position, which was also heavily used in arguing for a professional and
organizational  home  that  ultimately  came  to  be  the  AIChE,  was  only  possible  due  to  the  chemical
engineer's position between chemistry and industry, and between the research chemist and the analyst.
With the Conservation Movement's thrust waning by 1912, these new attributes as claims to the domain
of  chemical  engineering  and  the  skills  of  its  practitioners  could  readily  be  applied  to  the  need  for
efficiency:  “Efficient  production  and  the  economic  management  of  our  manufacturing  plants  are
essential features to our commercial development, and it is in this field that the greatest results are to be
attained in the conservation of our natural resources” (Whitaker 1911, 9). The focus on production and
business  efficiency  was  already outlined above,  as  well  as  how science  and research  formed  essential
elements  in  the  discursive  arguments  over  how  to  improve  efficiency.  Subject  positions  played  an
important part here as well, as the trained man using the scientific method was distinctly positioned as an
efficiency saver – either by doing research in a laboratory in the case of the (research) chemist, or by aiding
in bringing together  the  different realities  of  laboratory  chemistry  and industrial  production (cf.  e.g.
Booth 1912; Brogdon 1912). And it is exactly here that we find the issues of laboratory scale again. To
briefly reiterate, these issues occurred from 1908 onwards, purporting that the findings of chemists in
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laboratories failed in the factory due to the differences of quantities of substances involved, as well as size
differences  of  machinery  an  apparatuses.  The  “small”  world  of  laboratory  chemistry,  atoms  and
molecules, needed to be translated into industrial production in a double sense – in a tangible, material
way, and in a discursive way. Discursively, issues of scale served to reposition the laboratory vis-à-vis other
parts of the company, while also supplying a role for those who did the material translating, the chemical
engineers. Material translation as an accepted part of the subject position was only possible through the
unique combination of chemical and engineering knowledge that every chemical engineer was supposed
to have. It was this second part, engineering, that played a pivotal role in arguments found in discursive
texts.  Teeple  (1908),  for  example,  claimed  that  the  university  training  of  chemists  could  not  cover
everything,  and  hence  that  they  had  a  lack  of  familiarity  with  factory  apparatuses,  materials  of
construction, and common chemicals used – an area of knowledge imparted to the chemical engineer as
part of their engineering training. Similar arguments can be found in Sadtler (1908) and Parker (1909),
who attributed laboratory failure to the research chemists' lack of knowledge about machinery, whereas
Louis  (1917) and Carpenter (1917) explicitly point towards a need for engineering knowledge. Then
again, authors are careful to not concede this domain to the engineer, by reiterating how it is still chemical
processes being moved from laboratory to factory (“Where Are the Leaders?” 1918), and how essential
fundamental chemical knowledge is to this task:
The chemical engineer is sorely needed at this point to take chemical principles and engineer them 
just as the mechanical engineer engineers the physics of heat, or the electrical engineer engineers the 
physics of electricity. … Furthermore, our researches, where industrial application is sought, must 
be transferred from the beaker to the tank, from the funnel to the filter press, from the evaporating 
dish to the vacuum pan, from the distilling flask to the still, and so on, … . (Whitaker 1912a, 154) 
While  the  analysis  and  reflection  on  laboratories  above  was  focused  mainly  on  the  attributes  and
localization of the laboratory, here – with a special interest in subject positions – the specific features of
both the chemist and the chemical engineer are highlighted, as well as how ideas of scale and translation
changed them. The example also serves to reinforce the notion that discursive events always need to be
related to the greater context of the organizational field, the transformations of organizational reality, and
the positions of voice rendered possible. Issues of laboratory efficacy and credibility converged with the
emerging professional identity of the chemical engineer, two discursive strands harnessed especially by
speakers  surrounding  chemical  engineering,  i.e.  published  in Chemical  Engineer,  Electrochemical
Industry, and the Transactions of the AIChE. This case can be regarded as the clearest example of special
interest groups forming and utilizing positions of voice to get their message spread, in contrast to many of
the other facets of the discourse – be they conceptual transformations or the specific materialization of
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the laboratory at various places – where interpretations held much more stable over different groups,
often  by  virtue  of  many  authors  publishing  in  a  variety  of  journals,  and  influential  texts  –  such  as
presidential addresses and controversial editorials – being referred to by many others. While laboratory
scale issues were discussed in the general science, chemical, and industrial groups of speakers, mostly in
regard to what science and the laboratory could achieve, the reconfiguration of the chemical engineer's
subject  position  happened  via  chemical  engineering  journals.  Only  when  accounting  for  this
organizational field-level context and the history of the various groups involved, can quotes such as “The
manufacture of chemical products on a  small scale in a laboratory is a relatively simple operation, but
when this manufacture is conducted on a large scale, involving the investment of considerable capital,
then the problem is much more complicated and much more difficult to solve” (Thompson 1917b, 1007)
be accurately classified – in this case as a eulogy on chemical engineering by the president of AIChE
himself. 
To sum up these reflections on the subject position, we not only add another piece to the discursive
puzzle  surrounding  the  industrial  research  laboratory,  but  also  see  how  other  discourses  and  events
influenced discursive constructions and further our understanding of the process  by which discourse
feeds  off  and  in  turn  becomes  perceived  reality.  Moreover,  only  by  carefully  reconstructing  subject
positions – the scientist and the chemist – and staying alert and open to additional features of discourse
occurring in the analysis – the importance of the chemical engineer – can explanations of the industrial
laboratory based on the scientist's  claim to superiority be probed for their  accuracy. As it  turns out,
scientists did assert their mastery of nature and rational methods as opposed to those untrained, but not
without also laying claim to being geniuses and having special minds. The implications of this, as well as
the demarcations and transformations mapped in the discourse here will be put into a broader context in
the next part.
Taking a Step Back: Scientists and Chemists in the History and Sociology of Science
As we have seen, the various features and transformations of the scientist's and chemist's subject positions
form a complex whole that can only be understood against the background of the organizational field and
the larger developments within the professionalization of science. Indeed, the pace of professionalization
towards the end of the nineteenth century was ever increasing, with professional societies proliferating
and  patrolling  the  boundaries  of  their  respective  disciplines  (Mody 2016,  164),  and  the  vocation of
science having become a career by then (White 2016, 154). Science had begun to permeate all life by the
early twentieth century, as can be seen on the pages of newspapers announcing new scientific feats, or in
books, where the scientist was now cast as the hero in stories of science fiction (Daniels 1971, 290; cf. also
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Clareson  1965  &  1976).  But  the  “usefulness  of  knowledge,  and  the  relationship  between  science,
commerce, and industry, were vexed and controversial” (White 2016, 155), especially with old ideas of
genius and the powers and proper role of science challenged and transformed with the beginning of the
Progressive Era (cf. Daniels 1971, 288ff). Thus, while we can certainly see an achievement of professional
autonomy in academic chemistry by the turn of the century reflected in institutional and organizational
arrangements (Daniels 1976, 77f), it is not that simple in the sphere of ideas and concepts, where larger
societal master narratives conflict or correspond with new notions fueled by the entry of more and more
chemists into the industrial workforce, and the creation of the subject position of the industrial chemist. 
Understanding  these  developments  purely  as  a  linear  extension  of  academic  chemistry's  plight  in  a
different domain (i.e. a focus on questions of purity and applications) would fall short of the empirical
reality observed in the discursive texts above, while oversimplifying or suppressing the actual groups of
actors involved. Instead, we could see how scientists needed to legitimize and safeguard their expertise
from rival  groups  using  not  scientific  but  craft  knowledge (cf.  Mody 2016,  167),  or  the  mysterious
practices involved in alchemy. In keeping with the imagery of localization and places of science carved out
above,  a  useful  way  of  understanding  such  conflicts  and,  subsequently,  why  a  subject  position  was
constructed in a certain way, is to look at struggles for authority and the lines of demarcations drawn
within them. The concept of boundary-work with its special focus on the “maps” drawn of (and around)
science helps in assessing the discursive reality described above with its focus on “understanding the role
of  symbolic  resources,  e.g.,  conceptual  distinctions,  interpretive  strategies,  and  cultural  traditions,  in
creating,  maintaining,  contesting,  or  even  dissolving  institutionalized  social  differences”  (Lamont  &
Molnár 2002, 168). In introducing the concept of boundary-work, Thomas Gieryn is not interested in
some abstract, universal quality of science from which it receives its epistemic authority 65, but rather how
the boundaries drawn around and within science time and again account for the legitimacy of science-
based knowledge in modern societies (Gieryn 1999). Instead of looking at the specific contents of science,
Gieryn proposes analyzing science's representations that occur “downstream” (Gieryn 1999, 27), i.e. every
time the authority of science is called into question:
Boundary-work would be expected in settings where tactit assumptions about the contents of 
science are forced to become explicit: where credibility is contested, … and – most important – 
where allocations of epistemic authority are decided and consequentially deployed. Legislative and 
judicial forums, along with the media and corporate boardrooms, are ripe spots … . (Gieryn 1999, 
24). 
65 “Epistemic authority” here meaning “the legitimate power to define, describe, and explain bounded domains of reality” 
(Gieryn 1999, 1), one of the central characteristics of modern science. 
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Boundary-work,  then,  denotes  the  specific  practices  of  creating,  maintaining and repositioning  those
demarcations drawn around science, which mainly happens through discursive activity, to put it into our
language.  In doing boundary-work,  actors  connect to previously established “maps” of  science (here:
other discourses) and utilize this repertoire of familiar characteristics for further legitimacy (c.f. Gieryn
1983,  783;  1995,  407).  Gieryn distinguishes  three  types  of  boundary  work:  expulsion,  protection of
autonomy, and expansion.66 Expulsion designates a conflict of competing authorities both claiming to be
scientific, resulting in drawing boundaries around science and thereby excluding the other by claiming
they are pseudo-science (Gieryn 1983, 787ff; 1995, 432ff; 1999, 15f). Discursive texts drawing boundaries
that protect autonomy occur when outside interests attempt to exploit science “in ways that compromise
the material and symbolic resources of scientists inside” (Gieryn 1999, 17). Lastly, and most importantly,
expansion “takes place when two or more rival epistemic authorities square off for jurisdictional control
over a contested ontological domain” (ibid., 16). Such an expansion of territory needs to be legitimated,
obviously, by drawing upon boundaries drawn by previous generations (“objectification by attributing
authorship elsewhere”, Gieryn 1995, 431, emphasis in original) to show how science differs from “one of
the less reliable, less truthful, less relevant sources of knowledge about natural reality” (Gieryn 1999, 17). 
Episodes in the construction of the chemist's subject position can be regarded as a case of the expansion of
boundaries, with chemists now claiming to know better than the alchemists of old (Nummedal 2016, 59),
or the late nineteenth century's foremen, craftsmen, inventors, and other actors involved in industrial
innovation  and  production.  In  this  way,  the  characteristics  of  the  concept  of  science  needed  to  be
attached to the subject position to illustrate its epistemic authority: domination over nature, the use of
the scientific  method, and especially higher education and expertise.  The episode analyzed by Gieryn
(1983, 784ff) on how Tyndall struggled to delineate science from religion and mechanics in Victorian
England points us towards a key element in boundary-work, namely how different boundaries were (and
needed to be) constructed towards different groups, since arguments working to outline science as not-
religion were of no aid to show how science was not-mechanics (for another example cf. Gieryn et al.
1985). The discursive reasoning involved with the different groups that the industrial chemists found
themselves faced with can be understood along similar lines. Thus, scientific instruction yielding insight
into fundamental principles  was emphasized vis-à-vis  those hostile  foremen and plant managers,  who
were  “mere” practical  men.  On the  one hand,  only whoever  mastered the theoretical  architecture  of
nature could hope for improvements in products and efficiency. On the other hand, managers seemed
leery of “impractical” chemists with their heads full of theory, far from applications and any feeling for
66 In Gieryn 1995, he outlines four types (or “genres”) of boundary-work (monopolization, expansion, protection, and 
expulsion) that are reduced to three by Gieryn 1999. One could argue that monopolization and expulsion are very similar, 
hence the reduction.
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costs and profits – which is why the boundary was drawn differently in this case. Here, the need to “sell”
the  value  of  research  was  recognized,  to  translate  it  into  the  language  of  business,  while  claims  to
theoretical  knowledge  were  downplayed.  In  a  way,  this  case  could  be  regarded  as  a  mixed  case  of
expansion –  chemists  should  become managers  themselves,  due  to  the  scientific  method  permeating
everything, even management – and the protection of autonomy from managers not content with the
output of research laboratories. The oft-repeated attributes of character such as tenacity, persistence, hard
work, and even genius in the subject position that made the chemist “special” left us somewhat puzzled
above, but the ideas put forward here can help. One could argue that notions of chemical genius were
needed in order to discursively encroach on the territory previously held by the inventor, connecting to
larger cultural conceptions of industriousness and hard work generally coupled with genius (White 2016,
156),  while  communicating to the scientific community that the (industrial)  chemist was definitely a
scientist, since to do proper, successful research one needed to be, after all, a hard-working genius. Later
claims proudly outlining the lack of genius in industrial laboratories could then be understood as the use
of a different repertoire for a differently positioned boundary, namely espousing the virtues of research
laboratories in industry towards managers.
Lastly, the notion of boundary-work also furthers our understanding of the chemical engineer's subject
position.  Chemical  engineers  expanded  their  domain  over  territory  previously  claimed  not  only  by
engineers, but also by industrial chemists and analysts, sometimes emphasizing their chemical training (vs.
engineers),  or  their  engineering  and  managerial  abilities  (vs.  industrial  chemists  and  analysts),  while
drawing upon other, established discourses – or as Gieryn would probably call them, easily recognizable
repertoires (Gieryn 1987, 783) – such as conservation or efficiency. In the genesis of chemical engineering
organizations one could argue that another type of boundary-work becomes visible, acting as the opposite
to expulsion, which – instead of delegitimizing another's claims to scientificness – stresses how both are
sciences with their respective places in the field, as was needed in the case of chemical engineering with
regard to chemistry, to not act hostile against the larger and more powerful ACS. 
To conclude, how does boundary-work help us in furthering our understanding of the subject positions,
instead of the many other concepts and insights from the sociology and history of science? While many of
the findings above can (and were) put in the larger framework of the development of American science in
the  nineteenth  and  early  twentieth  century,  especially  with  regard  to  professionalization,
institutionalization, and the genesis of an American research landscape, boundary-work was chosen to
further elucidate and place the findings for several reasons. First, it highlights how there is and was never
any  fixed  idea  of  science  that  was  transformed  (or  even  perverted)  with  the  advent  of  industrial
laboratories;  the  discourse analyzed above serves  instead as  an instance of  one of  science's  numerous
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struggles  for  demarcations,  drawing  boundaries  differently  from  case  to  case.  Boundary-work  also
highlights  agency  in  the  role  of  different  kinds  of  rhetoric  and  discursive  contribution  involved  in
constructing concepts and especially subject positions, as in legitimate members of science. Lastly,  by
pointing towards different repertoires used to delineate different boundaries, Gieryn helps to classify the
(industrial) chemist's and chemical engineer's constructive struggles in their different environments facing
different oppositions, going far beyond the mere presupposed notions of pure scientists at university and
applied scientists in industry. With our interests and research question in mind, the empirical – discursive
– material could be probed for constructions and transformations, for boundaries drawn and re-drawn,
without being guided by preset notion of purity and applications.
6.5) Summarizing Results
Let me now summarize the results of the discourse analysis chronologically and with a special focus on
the interrelations constructed between the categories: how concepts, objects, and subject positions not
only changed over time, but also vis-à-vis each other (cf.  Table 6.1 for an overview). A chronological
summary  will  also  illustrate  which  events  –  chosen  not  only  as  methodical  aides,  but  following
assumptions regarding their influence on discursive construction – resonated discursively, and why. 
1895, the event called “The Professionalization of Chemistry”, was chosen as it was assumed that clear,
established conceptions  of  chemistry,  science,  the  chemist,  etc.,  would  have  emerged  at  this  time  of
stability for chemical societies and other professional organizations, and of increasing recognition of the
chemist as a profession.  In that year,  Chemical Education and Specialization were topics of frequent
discussion. The question of how to best prepare students of chemistry at universities and colleges for a
future of unclear places of employment – be they university, private laboratories, or within corporations
– evoked the expression of many different ideas. Similarly, the increasing specialization of the scientist
and the chemist in particular, towards a highly-trained specialist who would not be able to understand
current developments in other sciences or even other branches of chemistry, was frequently met with
concern or indifference in the name of progress. In both these discourses, ideas about what science and
chemistry meant at the time could be found. Science was a quest for truth, leading to superiority over
nature  and  material  welfare,  by  applying  what  could  be  recognized  as  the  discursive  “core”  of  this
concept: the scientific method. Chemistry, as a science, boasted similar attributes along with a special
relationship to the material world, as it  allowed the transformation of matter which lead to utility in
industrial  applications.  Science  and  chemistry  were  materialized  in  the  object  “Laboratory”,  as  the
physical manifestation of the science, thus the laboratory became the place of the scientific method, with
chemistry's  subjugation  of  nature  only  becoming  possible  within  the  walls  of  a  laboratory.  The
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laboratory, staffed by professional scientists, allowed for both teaching and research. The subject position
of interest  at  this  early  event was that  of  the chemist.  The chemist,  as  a  university-educated man of
science,  came  to  be  regarded  as  the  applicator  of  the  scientific  method  –  imbued  with  honesty,
truthfulness,  and accuracy and in line with the forefathers  of chemistry who were often described as
geniuses, or of special character at least. Thus, for the event of 1895, we find the expressions of that time
of what science meant to discursive speakers, what a laboratory was to those who talked about it, and who
would be employed in a laboratory. Of course, many of these ideas would go on to be challenged and
translated over the years, but especially the clear, unquestionable construction of the laboratory as  the
place of application of science – instead of, say, the university or the scientist's place – proved to be key in
understanding why, when industrial leaders brought science within their walls, they did so by setting up
laboratories. 
1900 was the year of the foundation of the GE Laboratory, chosen to see if and how this event resonated
within the discourse.  In fact,  it  did not.  The discourse on Chemical  Education still  proved to be of
concern for many speakers, yet neither the concept of science nor chemistry changed in its discursive
construction, remaining a quest for truth embodied in the scientific method. Though the laboratory, as
science's materialization, became increasingly codified as the place where not only men of science were
employed, but also chemists worked; thus chemists were clearly discursively located within the confines
of a laboratory, wherever said laboratory might be located – at a university, within a corporation, as part
of a foundation, etc. The chemists themselves increasingly came to be depicted as pioneers, surveyors, and
frontiersmen,  pushing ahead into the unknown. Interestingly,  around 1900,  another subject  position
entered  the  discourse:  the  chemical  engineer.  Still  diffuse  in  its  boundaries,  oscillating  between
engineering and chemistry, the chemical engineer's domain, place of employ, and education came to be
increasingly discussed. In the end, 1900 did not bring a revolution in how concepts and especially the
object  of  laboratory were  discursively constructed,  and the newly minted GE laboratory was neither
heralded as a the corporate revolution it is at times seen as today, nor frequently discussed at all.
The  next  event,  in  the  year  1902,  saw the  establishment  of  DuPont's  two  laboratories:  the  Eastern
Laboratory  and the  Experimental  Station.  As  a  newly  adjacent  discourse,  the  Research  Landscape –
meaning how to fund the quest for science, and where that quest should be located – started to be of
concern. In these discussions, it became obvious how the concept of science essentially functioned as a
synonym for the concept of research, which started to be discursively named and used more and more
from 1902 onwards. Research, then, meant the practice of doing science, which was characterized as slow,
methodical,  and organized,  while  also leading towards superiority over nature,  progress,  and material
wealth.  Often,  research  was  described  as  belonging  to  a  historical  trajectory,  as  the  logical  step  to
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surpassing the “old ways” of trial-and-error and rule of thumb empirical investigations – the organized,
methodical manner of research being obviously more powerful and appropriate for the times. The object
of laboratory as  the place of research was often linked to the discourse on the research landscape by
discussing calls for the endowment of (costly) laboratories. Here again we can see the discursive function
of localizing: Research was placed within the laboratory walls, while the laboratory itself kept its dual
function as the place of teaching and research, safeguarding its “placelessness” between university and
industry.  Furthermore,  these  calls  were  underscored  by the  utility  –  i.e.  industrial  applicability  –  of
laboratory  findings.  The  construction  of  the  chemist,  ever  present  as  the  person  working  in  the
laboratory, did not change for this event. The discussion of whether chemical engineers were chemists or
engineers intensified, though, and was connected to the discourse on specialization – “mere” chemical
knowledge not being enough anymore,  and the specialization of  education being necessary to imbue
chemical engineers with knowledge of machinery and engineering basics. 
In 1908, the year that saw the foundation of the ACS Division of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry,
specialization was still a relevant discourse.  This time, though, it  was mainly discussed with regard to
organizational specialization – in ACS subdivisions or dedicated societies – instead of in a disciplinary
context, i.e. pertaining to the various branches of chemistry. With the Progressive Era in full swing, both
the  Conservation  Movement,  and  with  it  corporate  quests  for  efficiency,  were  regularly  occurring
themes.  These  new discourses  saw shifts  in  the  construction of  concepts  and  objects.  Especially  the
concept of chemistry was now positioned as the solution to efficiency troubles and issues of conservation,
in  contrast  to  traditional  and  failing  rule-of-thumb  methods.  Furthermore,  within  chemistry  the
distinction  between  analytical  and  research  chemistry  grew  stronger,  paralleling  an  increasing
differentiation  of  laboratory  types,  such  as  analytical,  testing,  or  research  laboratory,  and  types  of
chemists, further illustrating how the three analytical categories of concepts, objects, and subject positions
are interrelated. Needless to say, a similar relation regarding efficiency was constructed discursively for
both the laboratory and chemistry. In 1908 for the first time the term “industrial chemist” emerges, a role
which was  seen primarily  as  a  technical  chemist.  An end point  was  reached in the discussion of  the
education and proper location of the chemical engineer, with those claiming chemical engineers to be
chemists first taking a semantic victory by associating them with attributes established for the chemist's
subject position. The chemical engineer, then, would apply chemistry in an industrial context, making
them prime  actors  in  conservation.  Furthermore,  the  chemical  engineer  was  also  constructed  as  the
solution to an impasse reached (also) by the laboratory's placelessness: Discoveries made on a small scale
in a laboratory needed to be transported to the large-scale world of the factory floor, a size relation utilized
discursively to explain laboratory failures. The task of associating the world of molecules with that of
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barrels and tons was seen as the domain of the chemical engineer. 
The next event, 1912, saw the establishment of the last of the pioneer laboratories: Eastman Kodak. In
addition  to  the  Conservation  Movement  and  increases  in  efficiency,  the  discourse  on  how to  fund
research – called “Research Landscape” in my analysis – came to be discussed again, as well as legislative
efforts surrounding the chemical industries. In the realm of concepts, “industrial research” came to be a
widely used term, associated with the same attributes as the more general term “research”. It was also
constructed  as  a  necessary  foundation  for  industrial  progress,  and  was  strongly  linked  to  applied
chemistry. The occurrence of the term illustrates not only how it is discourse shaping the organizational
field, but also how it in turn shapes discourse, as the emergence of a concept discursively delineating the
practice of research in industry shows. By 1912, having a laboratory was seen as a necessity in industrial
organizations,  either  as  an  analytical  or  a  research laboratory,  where  analytical  and  research  chemists
would respectively do their  duties.  Interestingly,  while no clear localization of analytical  and research
chemists happened in the discourse – they could work in industry, at university, or elsewhere – a clear
hierarchy emerged, with research chemists seen as being superior to “mere” analytical chemists. Yet, by
their association with the concept of chemistry, chemists as a group were positioned in clear opposition to
foremen and other traditionalists who favored empiricism and rule-of-thumb methods, a clear discursive
move to associate chemistry and chemists with the quest for efficiency – which could only be guaranteed
by the use of  rational,  planned,  scientific  methods,  and not by clinging to the old ways,  as  chemists
accused their  opposition of  doing.  Paralleling the  distinction of  research and industrial  research,  the
concept of chemistry split increasingly into pure and applied chemistry, the location of which proved to
be an interesting result. Localization happened according to motive, and not the actual practices involved.
Thus, pure chemistry searching for truth happened within a university, whereas its applications found a
home in corporations. 
1917 saw the United States enter WWI, which resonated widely on the discursive level. Topics such as
preparedness for war, legislation to shelter American chemical industries, as well as the popularization of
the achievements of science and the role scientists and chemists played in the successful war effort were
regular occurrences. Unsurprisingly, this also resonated in the way that concepts were constructed, e.g.
for industrial research. Industrial research (and chemistry) was now seen as a prime factor in preparedness,
and to catch up with Germany, one would have to follow their example of intertwining industry and
chemical research, as well as the system of German higher education. Many authors discussed not only
how to popularize the triumphs of science, but also how to sell industrial research to those managers and
executives not yet convinced of its powers – a task greatly aided by the associations made with the war
effort,  i.e.  industrial  research being essential  for victory.  The laboratory became the place where said
220
preparedness was “made”. The difference of scale between laboratories and factories that came to the fore
around 1908 still played a role, now concerned with the mammoth task of supplying an industry geared
for war. Hence, discussions of proper laboratory setup and equipment intensified, while differences of
scale  were  proposed  to  be  bridged  via  different  stages  of  research.  The  discourse  on  popularization
distinctly resonated with the chemist's subject position. Instead of progress-averse foremen and inventors,
managers and bankers were now in opposition due to a lack of appreciation of the services of the chemist.
This is why the popularization of both executives and the general public was deemed an appropriate tool
to ensure chemists taking their proper place – or at least the place constructed as proper in the mirror of
discourse. Thus chemists were called to move out of the laboratory, their localization now expanding, and
towards executive functions. 
The  last  event,  1922,  was  chosen  to  assess  the  post-war  return  to  normalcy,  which  also  saw  the
establishment of DIR, a meeting group of industrial research directors. The founding of DIR itself did
not appear textually in the discourse, probably due to a lack of journal coverage from 1923 onwards. With
only a small number of texts available, few discursive shifts could be gleaned, but new and continuing
discourses slightly modified existing concepts and subject positions. Several discourses returned to the
discussion, such as the Research Landscape – how to organize a national system of research in the United
States post-WWI; as well as legislation, how to keep the US chemical industry ahead of the possibly soon
to be resurgent German one; chemical education; and the return to postwar normalcy, along with the
structure of the organizational  field having changed and new networks having been spanned by new
organizations founded in the war. Lastly, concerns of greater efficiency in all walks of life as well as the
popularization of science appeared as related discourses linked to this discourse. The concept of chemistry
was strongly connected to these discourses, especially popularization and legislation, since they directly
concerned the perceived powers of chemistry. The successful war effort had proven the value of chemical
(and industrial) research in the eyes of many speakers, however the public was not yet aware of the many
ways that chemistry touched their lives. Popularization was deemed an effective way for enhancing the
chemists' standing, as well as for convincing political actors of the need for safeguarding all of the new
branches of chemical industry that arose during the war. 
In this summary, the way that concepts, objects, and subject positions were constructed and changed was
in prime focus.  The discourse analysis  clearly illustrates how other discourses – be they field-internal
(such as Research Landscape) or society-spanning (e.g. Conservation or Efficiency), inspired by external
events (e.g. the beginning of WWI) or by events on the field level (e.g. discussions on specialization and
chemical education brought about by the professionalization and differentiation of chemistry) – were
picked up discursively and subsequently influenced the construction and translation of concepts, which
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is one of the prime tenets formulated in the discursive perspective on the diffusion of ideas: Ideas need to
build bridges to larger discourses and happenings in the field to become and stay relevant. Furthermore,
the minute and precise ways that concepts, objects, and subject positions were constructed and resonated
with each other shows how the level of discourse and that of the organizational field relate to and feed off
of each other. By locating science not at a university or in a genius scientist's head, but within a laboratory
that could be established anywhere, moving research into industry became possible on a discursive level.
Moreover, once the practice of establishing industrial laboratories had spread in the 1910s the discursive
concept of  industrial research emerged, to make sense of the new reality in the organizational field –
industrial research that needed to be delineated from the other ways of doing science, placed in temporal
succession to its pure variant, and so on. Lastly, strategies of localization and temporalization came to
effect discourse in interesting and at times surprising ways, such as the “placelessness” of the laboratory,
the expansion of the chemist's proper place after WWI, and the temporal sequence on which pure and
applied research were aligned – not only creating and safeguarding spaces for both variants,  but also
possibly explaining the failures and shortcomings (e.g. the trouble of applying laboratory findings in a
factory context). 
6.6) Ensuring Quality in the Analysis of the Industrial Research 
Laboratory
How did  this  analysis  incorporate  the  four  criteria  for  quality  –  coherence,  rigor,  transparency,  and
reflexivity – introduced above? They were included on two levels: in the methodical approach, and in the
interpretations  developed.  With regard to the  methodical  level,  the  historical  approach  that  uses  the
organizational field as a delineating tool offers a highly fertile, transparent, and structured way of gaining
access  to  discursive  contributions,  by  outlining  speakers,  their  positions,  and  their  interrelations.
Moreover,  the  field  ensures  a  three-dimensional  understanding  of  discourse,  by  clearly  connecting
speakers and their discursive texts, while also locating them in the timeline of events. Special rigor was
applied to understanding and charting the history of the field, and subsequently gathering all relevant
texts  in  the  discursive  corpus.  Necessary  concepts  such  as  discourse  and  its  operationalizations  were
defined and developed as astutely as possible, resulting in a theoretical framework that gave clear guidance
for the next methodical steps. Lastly, the methodical procedure was transparently documented in clear,
successive steps – from the beginnings where the field's  edges were only hazily  visible,  to the sizable
corpus,  necessary  exclusions,  and  possible  omissions.  By  way  of  deep  immersions  into  the  existing
literature on R&D laboratories  from many viewpoints  – history,  sociology of  science,  and economic
sociology – an attempt was made to reflexively check the diffusion-based approach for possible biases and
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blind spots. 
With regard to safeguarding the  quality  of  interpretations,  two strategies  were employed beyond the
demands of coherence, rigor, transparency, and reflexivity that were put on the analytical work. First,
historical  literature  was  used  to  insert  the  dominant  and  most  coherent  interpretations  that  were
developed  into  a  larger  picture,  and  to  check  the  findings  with  what  is  already  known  about  the
development of the laboratory, scientist's boundary-work, and the meanings of science in the Progressive
Era. The interpretations developed here were consistent with larger historical developments for the most
part. The congruity of results on this higher level was then assessed for the field: How do the dominant
interpretations fit with the trajectories of the field? Of course, this can be regarded as a circular process to
a certain degree, since the discursive texts were accessed by means of the field in the first place. Yet, the
way that other discourses, concepts, objects, and subject positions were discursively disputed matches the
reality of the organizational field in many ways. In order not to fall prey to a favored discourse, such as the
guiding idea that a cultural shift towards “science” as a source of authority happened prior to the birth of
the early laboratories, the discursive texts were probed for ambiguity, and counterfactual interpretations
were developed in attempts to understand the happenings of the field in a different way. In the end, the
interpretations that made the most sense of the surrounding field-level changes also proved to be the most
coherent, ending up as the dominant interpretations that were presented in the report above. 
7) Discussion & Conclusions
7.1) Summary
In this last chapter,  the ramifications of the discourse analysis' results will  be discussed: How can the
results be tied back to the highly detailed knowledge of the field found in Chapter 4, and how can the
results be assessed in light of said knowledge? What are the ramifications of the discourse analysis for the
established history of R&D laboratories as retold in Chapter 3? And lastly, how do the results fit with and
potentially modify our theoretical understanding of how ideas are translated and connected to grander
cultural schemata in order to spread successfully? 
The Industrial Research Laboratory as Seen through Discourse
What do we know about the emergence and spread of the industrial research laboratory, and what do we
know  now,  having  been  enriched  by  reframing  the  story  through  the  lens  of  diffusion  analysis?  As
historical scholarship showed in convincing detail, around 1900 American corporations in the electrical
and chemical industries began to establish in-house research laboratories as a fixed and stable entity of the
223
organization, and staffed by university-trained scientists. Amongst those corporations, several stood out
for various reasons, with their famous laboratories receiving intense scholarly scrutiny: GE, Du Pont,
AT&T, and Eastman Kodak. As their individual histories show, these pioneers – as they are called here –
established their laboratories in different ways, at different times, and for different reasons. The labs were
established at differing parts within the organizational structure, sometimes built from the ground up,
sometimes  supplanting  already-existing  testing  or  development  setups.  The  precise  timing  of  when
organized research started at these four companies varied by more than a decade. In addition, the efforts
made by actors within the firms, pushing for the establishment of laboratory facilities, illustrate different
reasons – from expiring patents and intensifying competition to what may be called fashion, while also
taking different paths.  At GE, a  coalition of various actors  enacted a bottom-up push for laboratory
research, while at Kodak Eastman himself decided in favor of research. Du Pont's unique configuration of
two laboratories is due to rivaling groups within the company fighting for hegemony. It is evident that
the whole process of the R&D laboratory spreading throughout American industry can be regarded as
one of diffusion. But these four cases illustrate how “the research laboratory” as an organizational entity
was made to fit local variations in individual acts of translation-in-action, reshaping the laboratory, its
mission,  and practices  according  to  local  requirements.  Understanding  diffusion as  translation,  what
spread here is the “form” of doing organized research in a laboratory setting, while the “content” of what
actually happened in those laboratories varied considerably. 
Even though reliable statistics are hard to come by, surveys such as those published by the NRC show
that the industrial research laboratory diffused successfully from 1900 onwards (see Figure 3.2.1, 3.2.2),
indicating that by the end of WWI the research laboratory had become an expected, normalized part of
the  modern corporation.  Now,  it  would greatly  oversimplify  the  diffusion of  the  industrial  research
laboratory by assuming that many firms set up laboratories at roughly the same time and only by way of
the efforts of individuals – especially since the detailed case-studies of the pioneers and other firms show
how they were not inspired by each other. Thus the spread of R&D can not be regarded as a case of
simple mimesis. The hunt for conditions mutually shared by these companies points to firm-level and
environmental factors playing a part, such as firm size, sector and assets – research is expensive! – as well
as patent and antitrust legislation influencing corporate strategy, and an increasing number of university-
trained  scientists  moving  out  of  a  growing  academic  system.  As  Sturchio  (1981,  85f)  notes,  it  was
certainly  a  “combination  of  these  factors  –  economic,  institutional,  technical  and  intellectual”  that
brought about the birth of the industrial research laboratory and the eventual shape it took in the giant
corporations of the early twentieth century. 
However, these factors on their own can neither explain the shift to laboratory-based research carried out
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by scientists, nor the successful diffusion-translation of the laboratory. Existing explanations – based on
business strategy that was geared to fend off competitive threats, or scientist-entrepreneurs within the
corporations putting their ideas into practice – mostly fail  to successfully account for all  these layers
combined and what I call the cultural layer. As research in the tradition of the diffusion of innovations
shows, the cultural attributes of a social system and the environment wherein a new idea is spreading play
a pivotal part  in successful  diffusion. Thus,  while past research informs us that the R&D laboratory
certainly fit within business strategies of the time that stipulated pulling insecurity inside the firm, and
within a legal environment of antitrust and patent legislation being enforced even more strongly, what my
analysis adds is an analysis of the cultural attributes of these corporations' environments. The idea of the
culture  surrounding  science  and  the  scientist  figuring  greatly  into  the  diffusion  of  the  industrial
laboratory  is  not  only  informed  by  diffusion  research  emphasizing  the  necessity  of  cultural  fit  or
appropriateness, but also by historical scholarship indicating a cultural shift from inventors to scientists as
the locus of truth, progress,  and expertise in the public perception.  Hence science became important
beyond  the  mere  manpower  supplied  by  the  US  academic  system  gaining  strength  and  professional
identity with the outgoing nineteenth century. The meanings ascribed to science and the scientist formed
another layer in the puzzle of understanding how the industrial research laboratory went from being a
novelty in 1900 to an institutionalized part of the modern corporation by the 1930s. 
My  analysis  adds  to  the  characterization  of  a  corporation's  environment  by  understanding  it  as  an
organizational field, which offers the means of drawing boundaries around those companies establishing
laboratories, without resorting to simplifying designations such as sector or industry, thereby capturing
the totality of relevant actors in the field. Due to the detailed inspection of the field of US chemistry from
1870 to 1930, several important puzzle pieces in the R&D lab's early history could be found. First, a
“laboratory” was not a radically new concept to many companies, since testing and control laboratories
had  long  been  in  use,  as  well  as  a  few  independent  laboratories  sometimes  specializing  in  product
development.  Instead,  the  practice  of  placing  a  laboratory  inside the  company  was  new,  and  these
laboratories doing some kind of research was a novelty, as well.
Second, US academia as a whole, and especially the discipline of chemistry, expanded and professionalized
considerably in the nineteenth century's last decades, as several proxies show. Membership of the ACS
(Figure  4.1.1)  expanded rapidly  after  its  initial  struggles  were  over,  establishing the  organization as  a
central, national association for academic chemists, with its internal specialization into divisions (Table
4.1.2) demonstrating the increasing disciplinary differentiation of chemistry.  The growing number of
scientific societies and other associations (Table 4.1.1) also led to a surge in publications such as journals
(Table 4.1.3),  while the number of degree conferrals in chemistry (Figure 4.1.3) further supports the
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claim of the rising university-trained manpower that was available for work outside of universities. But
these  indicators  not  only  show  the  growth  of  academic  chemistry  in  numbers,  but  also  hint  at  the
ongoing process of the professionalization of the academic chemist. 
Third, when shifting focus from academic to industrial organizations in the field, similar growth trends
are visible. The industry as a whole expanded strongly from 1900 to 1925 (Figures 4.2.1, 4.2.2, 4.2.3),
which is mirrored in the growth of professional associations and other organizations for chemists (Table
4.2.1),  who formed the largest share of the staff  of research laboratories in their  first  decades (Figure
3.2.4).  Chemists  thus  gathered  not  only  visibility  in  industry,  but  also  representation  through
professional organizations. Representation in federal organizations, while growing steadily, only increased
in  the  1910s  when  the  nation's  scientific  resources  were  mobilized  for  warfare,  also  leading  to  the
establishment of organizations such as the NRC and others (Table 4.3.1), thereby slowly transforming
the environment of (federal) support for science. My detailed analysis of the organizational field provides
the groundwork for accessing the cultural layer surrounding the early R&D laboratories, not only by
properly charting the environment of the pioneers,  but also offering avenues for finding speakers,  as
producers  of  units  of  discourse,  that  need  to  be  mapped  in  order  to  account  for  the  cultural  shift
surrounding the locus of expertise, which is part of the cultural attributes of the organizational field in
question. 
Organizational institutionalism illustrates how a field's institutions – going beyond rules and norms to
the very definitions of concepts and categories that make up social  reality – condition organizational
behavior, such as the decision to establish a laboratory. It happens in the first place by supplying notions
of what a laboratory is and what it can do, who works in it, and so on to the players in the organizational
field  of  corporate  R&D.  Furthermore,  due  to  field-level  dynamics,  organizations  are  subject  to
isomorphic pressures in their quest to make not only rational, but also legitimate, decisions. Institutional
isomorphism manifests concretely in the mimesis of other organizations that are perceived as successful
and in professional standard-setting. Hence, to understand and properly model the cultural layer that
plays such a large role in the successful diffusion of the laboratory, and the way it was translated within a
variety of firms, the makeup of the institutions in the field that was staked out needs to be assessed. For
this, the analytical notion of discourse was introduced. Institutions are then understood as discourses –
textual entities that construct reality. Discourse and the discourse analytic methods of ODA allow for
perceiving  institutions  –  the  cultural  attributes  of  a  field  –  beyond  the  vague  conceptions  that  are
assumed to exist in a field, manifesting via isomorphism somehow in organizational behavior by tying its
contents – texts as basic discursive units – to speakers within the field. Which is to say that with the
organizational field as a starting point, the question of how (and by whom) the laboratory, organizational
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success, and profession – as key elements of institutional isomorphism – are constructed in the first place,
can be answered. Thus my analysis offers theoretical and methodical ways of understanding the cultural
attributes – as discourses – that played such a large part in the way that the industrial research laboratory
spread.
The  key  findings  of  the  discourse  analysis  supplement  the  field-based  perspective  and  present  the
meanings involved in the cultural shift towards science, while also tracing changes to their construction
over the seven events from 1895 to 1922. First of all, the discursive perspective illustrates how it is not
only field-level action that plays an important part in how concepts, objects, and subject positions are
constructed,  but  also  their  construction  is  influenced  by  events  and  overarching  discourses  (called
interdiscursivity).  Field-internal  discourses  such  as  disciplinary  and  professional  specialization,  the
structure of the research landscape, the best way to educate chemists, and the development of chemical
engineering all impacted the construction of science, chemistry, the laboratory, and its associated actors
over the year. Similarly, external events – like WWI – and larger discourses, such as those of conservation,
efficiency, preparedness, or the popularization of science, were all used as reference points by discursive
speakers,  and mostly  as  points  of attachments for  discursive constructions:  the chemical  engineer for
conservation, laboratories for efficiency, science for preparedness, and so on. This finding lends support
to the hypothesis in translation theory that spreading ideas need not only be changed to fit into new
contexts, but also that they are changed in ways that render them similar to said contexts (Czarniawska &
Joerges 1996; Røvik 2002; Solli et al. 2005). In this way, widespread and legitimized discourses can be
used to reinforce new or emerging ones (Phillips et al. 2004, 644), as was done with the bridges built
towards the conservation or preparedness discourses. 
A second key finding concerns the way that science, research, and chemistry were constructed. Their
main attributes can be regarded as superiority over nature and a quest for truth that would lead to societal
welfare  and  material  progress  –  through  the  industrial,  practical  applications  of  science  in  industry.
Science, research,  and chemistry were all  condensed in the scientific  method as the practice of doing
science, while chemistry came to be regarded as the fundamental science due to its proximity to the basic
building blocks of matter. While the basic attributes that made up these concepts stayed constant over the
period analyzed, some features came to prominence when attached to a specific discourse, such as the way
that the scientific method could ensure efficient production, or how chemistry was key to preparedness
for war due to the German advantage in all matters chemical. In the early years, the practical applicability
of scientific truth was emphasized, while for the later years a simple sequential model was claimed, with
pure science creating the necessary building blocks that would be put to practical – industrial – use by
applied chemistry and industrial research. Especially in their clear relation of superiority to traditional
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rule-of-thumb methods  as  carried out  on the workbenches  of  machine shops and factory floors,  the
construction of these three concepts shows clear evidence of them being positioned as sources of expertise
and the locus of innovation. 
Instead of  keeping  inventors  in  their  workshops  on retainer,  or  hiring  individual  scientists,  chemical
corporations established laboratories within their organizations, which becomes understandable once the
construction of the laboratory as a discursive object is known. The laboratory's attributes were clear and
remained largely fixed over the whole period: It is the place where the scientific method was carried out by
university-trained men.  Thus,  if  one  wants  to harness  the  proclaimed powers  of  chemistry,  it  is  not
sufficient to simply hire chemists – they need to be placed in a laboratory where they could properly
apply the scientific method. Moreover, the laboratory was not conjoined discursively with the university.
While it was continuously emphasized that not only research, but also teaching was a laboratory-based
activity,  its  whereabouts  remained  nonspecific,  making  it  possible  for  industrial  organizations  to
transport the object discursively into their organizations without contradictions that local actors in those
corporations had to bridge in their translations. With the laboratory gaining not only discursive but also
organizational acceptance via increasing diffusion, the object began to be differentiated into different
types, such as analytical, testing, and research laboratories. Widespread acceptance is further underscored
by more and more  discussions broaching the issue of  proper  laboratory setup,  equipment,  workflow
organization, and so on. Understanding what “laboratory” meant to the actors in the field around 1900
adds to the puzzle  of the emergence of industrial  R&D, especially by highlighting why a laboratory-
setting  was  chosen – a  decision that  may seem obvious  today,  but  was  not  in  the  realities  of  those
organizations more than one hundred years ago. 
Third, the hypothesis of the cultural shift posits a deferral of expertise from inventors and craftsmen to
scientists. How were the subject positions of scientists and chemists constructed discursively? Consistent
with the attributes of concepts and objects, the scientist and by extension the chemist were regarded as
men of science who were trained at universities,  and it  was only them that could apply the scientific
method in research and pass this knowledge on as teachers. They were cast as possessing special personal
qualities such as truthfulness and accuracy, and were often rhetorically depicted as pioneers and surveyors
– a recurring motif in the American consciousness – of the still unknown expanses of truth. While an air
of genius was often attributed to the forefathers of chemistry, its current practitioners were seen instead as
methodical  practitioners  of  science.  Chemists,  and  especially  the  research  chemist  once  the  subject
position began to differentiate internally, were constructed as greatly superior to foremen, craftsmen, and
factory workers whose improvements to products and processes could only be quick fixes, since they were
ensnared by tradition and craft knowledge. Interestingly, the inventor – an opponent that may have been
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expected – hardly featured in the discourse for reasons that will be further discussed below. Discursive
attachment to the discourse on science popularization saw the chemist in opposition to managers and
executives, who would not value their work, which led to a managerial side being added to the chemists'
possible  roles  in  industry.  Subject  positional  boundary-work  is  especially  visible  in  the  case  of  the
chemical engineer, whose discursive “home” was discussed over several years until their role as a chemist
who could fill the gap between laboratory and factory became fixed. Clearly, the discursive fragments
analyzed show how with the  scientist,  the  chemist,  and the  chemical  engineer,  the  discourse  offered
subject positions that could be imported into industrial employ, later leading to the creation of the new
subject position of industrial chemist. 
Fourth  and  last,  is  a  finding  that  relates  to  discourse  theory:  The  analysis  uncovered  two discursive
mechanisms  – localization and temporalization – that  served to relate  concepts,  objects,  and subject
positions to each other. In the case of localization, the scientific method was materialized in a specific
place: the laboratory. The laboratory itself was further set into a specific relationship with the factory
characterized by differences of scale, as the lab dealt with the tiny world of molecules, and the factory
with the large quantities of materials involved in industrial mass production. Localization also touched
upon the motives and outcomes of the places of science, i.e. while the practices – the scientific method –
were the same, what was pursued within laboratory walls could vary according to location: university or
corporation.  Temporalization primarily  served to set  up lines  of  demarcation against  the  traditional,
obsolete craft knowledge and the empiricist trial-and-error methods of nonscientists, while also leading to
compartmentalizing the process  of  science into pure  and applied,  with pure  necessarily  coming first.
Interestingly, these discursive mechanisms or tendencies can be regarded not only as relating concepts and
objects to each other, but also as reactions to events and developments in the field. For example, the heavy
emphasis  on  scale-differences  between  laboratory  and  factory  can  also  be  interpreted  as  a  discursive
safeguarding of the laboratory's claim to superiority over nature by way of localizing, in an organizational
field where industrial laboratories did not immediately turn out to be houses of magic, as evidenced by
the pioneering laboratories. Additionally, the temporalization of the stages of research may have helped in
discursively  carving  out  support  for  university  research  producing  the  “raw  products”  necessary  for
industry to thrive. The implications and possible desiderata concerning localization and temporalization
will be discussed below. 
In summary, the organizational discourse analysis on the meanings assigned to science, the laboratory, the
scientist,  and  related  concepts  surveys the  oft-neglected  cultural  layer  of  the  organizational  field  of
corporate R&D, and lends credence to the hypothesis of a cultural shift that put science in a position of
epistemic authority in the United States of the outgoing nineteenth century. It further illustrates the parts
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played by fit and appropriateness in a diffusion process, by stressing how the idea of corporate research
was translated with a dependence on the organizational environment (as shown in the histories of the
pioneers), events, and overarching discourses in efforts to build and reinforce legitimacy of the new idea,
as  theorized  in  diffusion  theory  and  Scandinavian  Institutionalism  (Czarniawska  &  Joerges  1996;
Czarniawska & Sevón 2005). Especially by supplanting the notion of diffusion for translation, the hybrid
and constructive elements of diffusion processes are highlighted. By nature of investigating the processes
of social construction, the organizational field's institutions are not relegated to hazy, distant rules and
norms; instead, their very makeup as definitions of reality that influence organizational decision-making
by defining what is perceivable and sayable is shown. In addition, the foundations of the institutional
effects of mimetic and normative isomorphism are revealed. Mimesis works as the imitation of practices
perceived as successful in order to attain legitimacy, whereas normative isomorphism operates through
the development of professional standards that come to be expected. While the discourse analysis did not
reveal the construction of any distinct vanguards of the field in terms of specific organizations – not even
the R&D pioneers – the way that the scientific method and the laboratory were constructed and came to
be  expected  elements  of  the  organizational  structure  in  the  1910s  illustrate  how  practices  such  as
establishing a laboratory came to be normalized and charged with notions of rationality, efficiency, and
superiority, in order to be made fit for widespread diffusion through mimetic isomorphism. The building
blocks for normative isomorphism, in turn, can be found in the subject positions of scientists, chemists,
and  chemical  engineers  and  their  positioning  vis-à-vis  foremen  and  managers.  Lastly,  analyzing  the
emergence of corporate R&D through a lens of diffusion studies expands previous work on the topic by
making parts  of  the  cultural  layer  visible  longitudinally  and relating it  to  relevant  actors  and events,
thereby  highlighting  how  the  idea  of  the  industrial  research  laboratory  could  travel  successfully
throughout this organizational field.
7.2) Discussion
Implications for the Diffusion of Innovations, Sociology of Organizations, and 
History of Science
This study used a combination of theory from the diffusion of innovation and organizational sociology,
methodical insights from discourse theory, as well as historical data that informed key junctures in the
ways these diverse parts were put together, yielding new insights on the genesis of corporate R&D. But
the results of scientific research should not simply be used to enhance knowledge about a specific subject.
Instead, going back to theory and method, results gathered here shall be used to assess the interplay of
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theoretical components. What the research design and findings mean for their respective approaches will
be discussed in the following.
Recontextualizing Diffusion
What does the unique union of methods and theory employed here add to studies  of  diffusion and
translation? In this  brief discussion I want to focus on  theoretical contributions made by combining
diffusion with institutional and translation theories, and on the role of history in diffusion analysis. 
The history of the industrial research laboratory further underscores the need to analytically incorporate
the environment or social system that a given innovation is diffusing in. Framing the research laboratory
as an innovation offering some perceived advantage to potential adopters could not have explained its
spread  and  subsequent  institutionalization,  especially  since  –  looking  at  the  history  of  the  early
laboratories – breakthroughs were lacking as the labs were falling far behind the claims of their founders.
Instead, by shifting focus towards the cultural attributes of the organizational field, my analysis shows
how  the  perceived  advantage  of  laboratories  and  scientists  was  institutionally  enacted  in  a  collective
process of discourse construction. Supplementing diffusion studies with some form of cultural analysis –
which is not limited to organizational institutionalism, of course – will also aid in probing the thin line
between innovations spreading, and innovations staying, or understanding why some remain fads, while
others become standards. As Colyvas and Jonsson (2011, 29, table 1) outline, the intersection of diffusion
and institutionalization may lead to innovations that diffuse and become ubiquitous but are not accepted
institutionally, contrasted with those that diffuse and become institutionalized resulting in widespread
acceptance  and  appropriateness.  The  authors  stress  that  legitimacy  is  not  sufficient  for
institutionalization, instead, they theorize that the modes of reproduction and the diversity of links of a
spreading innovation are of prime importance (ibid., 43ff). My analysis shows how through the collective,
organizational  “voice” of chemists  and scientists  in general,  the discourse on science and laboratories
could  be  reproduced  time  and  time  again,  leading  to  a  normalization of  the  practice  of  establishing
laboratories.  Furthermore,  the diversity of links – as an embeddedness with “higher- and lower-order
frames,  rules,  and  routines”  (ibid.,  44;  see  also  Alasuutari  2015)  –  was  achieved  through  various
translations of the spreading practice. 
On that note, let me turn to the advantages of substituting a rigid understanding of diffusion for one of
translation. The case of organized R&D in the American chemical industries illustrates why it is rarely if
ever fixed entities that spread in a diffusion process. Instead, ideas, practices, and things change while
moving through a field in an active process of editing (Sahlin & Wedlin 2008; see also Creed et al. 2002).
This not only allows for bringing the actor or groups of actors back in, beyond groups of adopters such as
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innovators, early adopters, and laggards, but also enables the analysis to include the positions that actors
inhabit,  and their  respective interests and  Lebenswelten by staying alert to different motifs,  goals,  and
social realities that various actors or groups may have that account for translating an idea in a certain way.
In addition, the spread of industrial research laboratories also shows how translation acts on different
levels: the local and the global. For the local, it is the different ways the laboratory was carried into the
corporation,  different  laboratory  setups,  places  within  the  organizational  structure,  different  staffing
strategies,  and  different  research  policies  exhibited  by  the  research  pioneers'  labs.  From  a  macro-
perspective, it can be seen that the entity “R&D laboratory” diffused, but only detailed case histories
inform the  varied  ways  that  it  had to  be  translated in  order  to  fit.  In  the  many  associations  of  the
laboratory (and other relevant concepts and subject positions) with larger discourses and other events, the
practice of establishing R&D laboratories was translated on a global scale, changing its scope, mission,
form, raison d'être, and so on. 
These  findings  also  add  to  the  theoretical  ensemble  put  forward  by  Scandinavian  Institutionalism.
Scholarship utilizing the translation metaphor often proposes some form of shared, higher-order cultural
resources that set rules for editing and that local translations have to abide by, in order to make the further
spread of  a  specific  translation possible  (Sahlin & Wedlin 2008).  These resources are generally  called
“master ideas”, as they are higher order cultural accounts that provide collectively shared resources for
legitimation (Czarniawska & Joerges 1996, 36; see also Meyer 1996). Though often assumed in studies
understanding diffusion as translation (e.g. Berglund & Werr 2000; Näsie & Rohde 2007), what these
master  ideas  are  and  how they  are  used  remains  sketchy  at  best.  Using  the  organizational  field  as  a
boundary-setter and discourses as the content of a field's culture, my analysis supplies clear means to get
these master ideas in focus, while also providing hints as to how they are translated in practice, as the
various ways that other discourses  were utilized in the construction of concepts,  objects,  and subject
positions  have  shown.  As  can easily  be  seen,  diffusion theorizing  is  greatly  enriched  by  substituting
diffusion  for  translation,  and  by  combining  its  insights  on  the  relevance  of  cultural  variables  to
institutional theory that further elucidates what said culture is made up of, and how it is enacted. 
Lastly, what about the role of history in diffusion studies? As Djelic (2008) outlines, there are several
approaches within diffusion studies towards historical data. This data can either be used as objectified and
measurable “chunks” that form a succession of events, these “'stones and bricks'” (ibid., 548) constituting
the building blocks with which pre-existing theoretical frames are tested. Such an approach emanates
from a very positivistic understanding of history. Next, starting from an understanding of historical data
as thick, continuous, made up of complex narratives, and informed by interpretive approaches such as the
Annales school (Burke 2015), history is used to generate theoretical propositions (Djelic 2008, 549). But
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essentially, Djelic argues that historical data needs to be used in a third way in diffusion studies, where
translation and the importance of culture is taken seriously by making acts of constructions visible: “[W]e
cannot understand diffusion without understanding historical construction” (ibid., 551). Only by being
aware of the constructive nature of language and the necessary plurality of narratives involved at any
historical  juncture  can diffusion studies  properly  utilize  historical  data.  Historians'  interpretations  of
events and trajectories can then be used as starting points to access primary data – the actions and voices
of actors at the time – that forms the basis for making conflicting narratives and with it the construction
of social reality itself visible. Due to the increasing digitalization of large amounts of historical material,
the methodical arsenal will have to be developed much further to cope with the amounts and types of this
data, especially to be able to exceed highly detailed historical reconstructions by making more general
mechanisms visible,  such as  in this  case,  where the constructive functions  of  discourse  impacted the
diffusion of an idea in various ways. 
Organizations as Texts
Organizational discourse has become more and more relevant to the study of organizations in the last two
decades, partly due to a “growing disillusionment” (Grant et al. 2004, 1) with conventional theorizing,
and partly due to the incorporation of the linguistic turn in the social sciences and organization studies
(Deetz 2003). A growing number of publications and special issues of journals (e.g. Grant et al. 2004;
Grant et  al.  2005)  are testament  to this  trend.  Of course,  as  the  definitional  struggles  in theory  and
method discussed above revealed, neither clear definitions nor common approaches exist in ODA so far.
Organizational discourse studies are loosely connected by the general idea that there is such a thing as
discourse – made up of texts – that composes organizations,  while  these texts are in turn created by
organizations (Hardy 2001, 26). Coming from this base definition, two approaches can be distinguished:
analyses  of  discourse  within organizations,  such  as  memos,  plans,  or  reports  (Hardy  2001,  34);  and
analyses of discourse that surrounds organizations and shapes not only their possibilities of action, but
also their very form and existence itself, such as the discourses on business reengineering or total quality
management (e.g. Hardy et al. 2005; Green et al. 2009). The analysis undertaken here falls firmly within
the second group, even though organizational text-production was in focus, the functioning of discourse
uncovered how relations between texts, events, and other discourses (intertextuality and interdiscursivity)
shape the space of what is sayable and doable, as manifested in discursively constructed institutions. How
do these findings relate to the larger field of ODA? 
I believe the way that my analysis relates to and enhances the current work in ODA is twofold, based on
the fundamental assumptions of discursive research programs. Alvesson and Kärreman (2000b, 1135, fig.
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2) describe the area of conflict in which studies of organizational discourse reside: casting discourse as
either determining, or having only a softer effect on social reality, and focusing on the local-situational
context versus zooming out to capture the macro-context through grand discourses. Locating a study in
either  of  the  resulting  quadrants  results  in  theoretical  and  methodical  consequences,  such  as  the
definition of discourse and the nature of the material that is to be analyzed. My analysis brings the macro-
context of corporate innovation into focus via the notion of the organizational field, while utilizing a
strong notion of discourse that is assumed to construct the contents of social reality, such as organizations
and actors in the first place. The theoretical and methodical consequences of this research design can, of
course, be challenged, but they also aid in laying the groundwork and clarifying terms. 
For one, too often the tenet “discourse constructs” is taken for granted, instead of being the starting point
of a sensible analysis of discourse (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a, 1199; Iedema 2011, 1168f), as was also
noted  above.  How  exactly  reality  is  constituted  through  language,  and  how  it  gains  massivity  in
institutional  practice,  should  form  the  basis  of  this  kind  of  research  program.  At  the  heart  of  such
concerns lies  the question of discursive agency (Hardy 2004;  Cooren 2004;  Iedema 2011):  How can
collections of texts do things, and what are the limits to language? Similar to ideas not traveling on their
own, texts do not write themselves – so some form of textual agency is supplied through the connection
to discursive speakers who inhabit certain positions in the field that allow them to spread texts far and
wide and enforce their contents (Phillips et al. 2004). My analysis has highlighted what form of reality –
in the manifestation of concepts, objects, and subject positions – was described and thus constructed by
speakers,  which connected to the subsequent spread of organized R&D as the consequences of these
constructive effects. Of course, the actual effects that these linguistic constructions had could only be
attributed after the fact via indicators such as organizational development in academia and industry, the
proliferation of the laboratory, and the individual shapes the laboratories took. By combining an ODA
approach  with  institutional  theory,  the  case  for  discourse  constructing  reality  is  strengthened  by
understanding institutions and their effects, such as isomorphism, as being made up of and shaped by
discourses. This combination is a powerful one and could be harnessed further by zooming in on the
precise relationship between discursive and institutional effects, solidifying our understanding of how
discursive constructions of reality are enacted in institutionalized practices, and going further and into
more  detail  than  other  approaches  that  combine  institutions  and  discourse,  such  as  discursive
institutionalism (Schmidt 2008).
In addition, regarding the dimensions of micro- and macro-context, what the context of discourse is, how
it influences discourse,  and where it  starts and ends is  often left vague in ODA. Keenoy and Oswick
lament  how by drawing too strict  of  boundaries  around context  and extracting  discourse  from it,  a
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partialized and de-contextualized idea of discourse is reified: 
There is a tendency within discourse analysis to place parameters (that is, create a contained space) 
around a piece of discourse. In extremis, this process involves a robust delineation of text and 
context where the focal discourse is uncoupled and investigated independently of the physical 
surroundings and the wider social context in which it occurs. (Keenoy & Oswick 2004, 139, 
emphasis in original)
In  their  view,  context  is  flattened  to  the  backdrop  instead  of  being  depicted  as  being  in  a  mutual
relationship with discourse, as both shape discursive texts while also being embedded in the discursive
episode itself (Grant et al. 2004, 22). Whereas Keenoy and Oswick propose the somewhat diffuse notion
of “textscape” (Keenoy & Oswick 2004, 140f) to deal with said embeddedness, the concepts borrowed
from organizational institutionalism, namely the organizational field, serve to gain access to discursive
units without drawing too strict of boundaries or negating their embeddedness. This is due to the hybrid
nature of the field as a social space of perception and expectations, instead of being bordered by time and
physical location. Moreover, the three-dimensional approach relates discursive texts to their context of
production and reception, which are elucidated through the field, by pointing out the actors' positions
and their relations to each other that influence visibility and the “weight” of discursive contributions. In
summary, my study extends the notions of organizations and their entities as made up of text and talk (cf.
Brunsson 1997)  while  refining  theoretical  and methodical  notions  through  the  aid  of  organizational
institutionalism – a hybrid approach that opens up many more avenues for theory building and method
development. 
Social Science
The detailed analysis of the organizational field of corporate R&D in the chemical industries, and its
discursive currents, serves as another puzzle piece in the history of one of the most important novelties for
both  science  and  industry  that  shaped  science  as  a  vocation,  as  a  profession,  and  in  its  disciplinary
identities until present day. In this way, my analysis adds insights to both business history and the history
of science. Much of the history of industrial research was viewed through a lens focusing on what science
is and how its identity manifests in who its practitioners are and what they do, often being tied to the
distinction of pure and applied science or later on basic and applied research (Godin & Schauz 2016;
Kaldewey & Schauz 2018). The opposition of pure and applied as cognitively different types of research
was often coupled with the assumption that they correlated with institutional settings – university and
industry.  These  ideas  formed what  might be  called  a  dominant  discourse  in the social  sciences,  only
filtering phenomena through this slant. Coming from an ideology of the purity of science, Mertonian
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norms,  or  the  presumption that  science  as  a  system and a  vocation was  inherently  special,  of  course
researchers would regard industrial science as a challenge to the nature of science and the scientist. Shapin
summarizes these problems aptly (Shapin 2008, 114ff) and remarks how accounts from outside these
laboratories were often “celebrations, denigrations, or expressions of various anxieties” (ibid., 99). Hence
the significant focus of cultural attention that industrial science received by the 1920s (ibid., 95), which is
also mirrored in the discursive texts that show how industrial research and the industrial laboratory came
to be established constructs towards the end of the period analyzed. As the analysis shows, to actors of the
time the distinction of types of science played a minor role in the discourse on science, gaining steam only
towards the 1920s when the laboratory was institutionalized.  That is  why basing the analysis  on the
“dominant  discourse”  was  rejected  here,  in  order  to  develop  a  more  nuanced  view  that  highlighted
constructions instead of preconceiving them.
Two key insights can be taken from these thoughts in the context of the sociology and history of science,
one about how we analyze scientific pursuits, and the other about the narratives constructed about them.
First, the analysis illustrates how what Gieryn calls the “downstream approach” can be a powerful tool to
understand the inner, social workings of science: “Epistemic authority is decided downstream from all
that,  as  claims  float  through  layers  of  cartographic  interpretations  where  credibility  is  attached  or
removed” (Gieryn 1999, 27). Starting at a similar vantage point as the cultural shift towards science, he
questions how science came to be the source of authority it is today. He argues that to find sociological
answers,  instead of  looking into what scientists  do,  their  representations of  science  brought up once
science's credibility is questioned, “downstream” of the actual practices of science, need to  be analyzed
(ibid., 25) – these are epistemic conflicts he calls boundary-work, as introduced above. The early years of
the industrial research laboratory forms such an episode – or many episodes – of boundary-work, clearly
exhibiting how “science” was instantiated discursively and shaped by local and occasional circumstances,
be they topical discourses sweeping through the field, or local opposition within individual corporations.
Players,  stakes,  and  their  interests  are  mapped  with  a  theoretical  framing  added  that  allows  an
understanding of the boundary-work beyond individual actors and their argumentative contributions, as
well as how organizational and institutional arenas shape the forms and contents that claims about science
take. Of course, what science is, why it happens in a laboratory, and what a scientist can do are not the
only topics of boundary-work of interest here. There are other demarcations drawn in this episode, such
as those regarding the individual scientist and the group, or the discursive conflict over scientific discovery
versus invention that resonated strongly in patenting practices and the plight of independent inventors
(Miller 2011). In addition, shifting from the contents of truth-claims about science towards players and
arenas would yield further insights, especially considering industries, as Smith (1990, 122) remarks, whose
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business  does not closely  align with scientific  disciplines.  How would the discursive trajectories  have
looked with many more players vying for epistemic primacy and a much more complex cartography of
the sciences? In this way, understanding science's epistemic authority and the success of the industrial
laboratory through the way it is contested discursively offers more fruitful insights than intense scrutiny
of laboratory practices (from the “inside”) as suggested by approaches informed by STS.
My second  point  is  a  more  nuanced one,  and  concerns  the  stories  we tell  about  science.  Analyzing
independent invention, Whalley argues that its decline is usually embedded within two stories: the rise of
the large, integrated corporation, as told by economists, and the emergence of science-led innovation, as
related by historians of science and technology. In a nutshell, he argues that the inventor was displaced
twice: from the market for innovation back in the late 1800s, and from academic interest through these
convincing “meta-narratives”  (Whalley 1991,  210; see also Dennis  1987).  A related point is  made by
Shapin: 
That the emergence of organized industrial science so intruded itself into American consciousness 
arises partly from the novelty of the phenomenon and partly from the challenge it represented to 
existing understandings about the nature of science and of the scientist. (Shapin 2008, 99)
Thus, any analysis of such a topic needs to be aware of the viewpoints taken, which does not just apply to
the historical material, such as the discursive texts analyzed here. The topics and explanations put forward
by academic scholarship itself – topics denoting the R&D lab as a revolution, an innovation, or a pivotal
shift – are also exposed to definitional struggles, boundary-work, and explanatory fashions, that need to
be considered in  order  not  to fall  prey  to pro-innovation biases  and  only  write  winner's  histories  –
winners that, in retrospect, often seem inevitable (R. Bauer 2006). The whole research design of this study
started with an interest in language and diffusion that was subsequently informed by a hunch about the
cultural shift of epistemic authority towards the scientist – the key “meta-narrative” followed here, even
though others (economic, legal, and organizational) were included for the multiperspectival construction
of  the  organizational  field.  In  the  end,  one  needs  to  be  aware  of  the  narratives  one  partakes  in  (or
subscribes to) when trying to further elucidate such an episode of innovation, be it framed as successful
diffusion, organizational change, or boundary-work. When using a social constructivist ontology that is
aware of the creative effects of language, taking a reflexive stance is key.
7.3) Research Desiderata
Three Questions
As is the case for many scientific works, in the process of finding supporting evidence to answer one's
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research question, new questions turn up and old ones go unanswered or are reformulated in light of new
findings. In the spirit of reflexive inquiry as related above, I would like to take these last few pages to
touch  upon  some  of  the  minor  inconsistencies  and  conceptual  questions  that  remained  after  the
discourse on R&D laboratories was analyzed and the final report written. 
The first question concerns the interrelation of theory and method with regard to the idea of discourse,
and  even  though  the  notion  of  validity  does  not  concern  qualitative  inquiry  in  the  way  it  does  in
quantitative studies, it is about measuring what is purported to be measured: What kind of discourse is
the  discourse  that  was  analyzed?  Could  it  be  labeled  as  “scientific  discourse”,  as  a  general  societal
discourse on “science” as instantiated in the organizational field, or as something completely different?
Theoretically, the question harkens back to Fairclough's interdiscursivity (Fairclough 1992, 124ff) and
the idea, as proposed in ODA (Phillips et al. 2004, 644), that there is more than one discourse at any given
time, and that this discursive multitude relates to itself in certain ways. Subsumed under the broad banner
of  scientific  discourse  or  discourse  on  science,  one  could  easily  presume  the  existence  of  specialized
discourses, e.g. on the politics of science, the natural sciences vis-à-vis the humanities, science funding,
and so on. The relations assumed are generally those of support, i.e. text can gather legitimacy through
reference to other, established discourses. Empirical support for discursive relations exist for example in
Spero 2014, where the discourse on science popularization fed on the discourse of pioneers, while my
analysis shows how the discursive constructions of chemistry, the laboratory, and its various actors drew
heavily upon other discourses such as conservation, preparedness for WWI and science popularization.
Tying these findings back to the theoretical framework, it is evident that an organizational field is host to
a variety of actors, all of whom will also be members of other fields. By way of the interpenetration of
organizational fields, the specific or more general discourses permeating a field will also be transported to
other fields by their various carrier groups. It is imperative to not forget that discourses do not just exist
“out there”, detached from field-level events and interactions, but are always produced and received by
actors  in  fields.  Discursive  change  can  then  be  understood  not  only  as  topical  shifts,  but  also  as
consequences of external events, internal crises, or shifts in field structures. 
These considerations allow for a reformulation of the question: Was the whole discourse or the field (or
rather: discourses) captured by this analysis? In short, no. As discussed above, the historical scholarship
proposed that a cultural shift happened before the emergence of corporate research laboratories, giving
science epistemic authority over innovation and progress, concurrent with a shift in the locus of expertise
from genius (inventor) to expert (scientist) (Tobey 1971, 12; Hughes 1989, 138ff; Friedel 1992; Hintz
2011). This analysis set out to probe said cultural shift further, which focused the analysis on examining
ideas about science, as produced within the organizational field of early R&D in the chemical industries.
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Furthermore, the choice was made to assess constructions of science, the scientist, etc., by “scientific”
speakers in the broadest sense, covering the outlets of scientific societies and science-adjacent professional
associations, as well as popular science journals. This decision further tailored the discourse covered based
on the idea that in order to find out whether any kind of cultural shift happened at all,  it  would be
necessary to find out how science (etc.) was constructed by scientific speakers themselves as the primary
carrier  group  of  the  discourse  on  science,  which  was  then  carried  outwards  towards  industrial
organizations, political appointments, or the public at large. In this way, the analysis undertaken here
makes no claim of covering the entire discursive reality of the organizational field of corporate R&D, as is
also seen by the many other discourses  that  surfaced during the breakdown of  each text:  The field's
speakers were concerned with far more than merely the constructions of science and the scientist, but
rather with disciplinary specialization, how industrial production could be organized more effectively,
and the professional identity of some of its practitioners, such as the chemical engineer, and so on. Thus,
the methodical path taken, especially in drawing the boundaries of the organizational field and the choice
of speakers for corpus assembly, was guided by the decision to focus on the cultural shift towards science,
and its theoretical implications – the need to account for what science meant as constructed by those who
carried it  from academia outwards.  Of course,  by including professional  associations,  popular science
outlets, and more industry-focused publications (e.g. Chemist-Analyst, or Chemical Engineer), I was able
to  investigate  how said  ideas  about  science  were  discussed  once  they  arrived  in  other  organizational
contexts. But other actors or groups of actors in the field will have constructed science differently, since
the line of questioning did not capture them – which brings me to my next open question:
What about other possible speakers? In what ways could their discursive constructions be made accessible
and analyzed? The organizational field as a methodical tool offers a clear path of assembling a collection
of actors relevant to organized R&D. As has become evident in the analysis above, not all organizational
text-production was included in the analysis, i.e. not every possible text and not every organization. This
is, again, due to the analytical thrust of the research question that understands the successful diffusion of
the research laboratory as supported by a cultural – discursive – shift positioning science and the scientist
as the new sources of authority.  Thus primarily  those speakers  working on possible constructions of
science were chosen, which did not limit the analysis to purely academic speakers. 
But what other kinds of speakers may have been included? When thinking of other relevant speakers, it
helps to picture what other possible discourses may have permeated the field (see also Brunsson 1997,
314ff). There surely was talk amongst executives and other businessmen about the proper ways to run a
business, how to deal with antitrust, and other topics, leading to what might roughly be called business
discourse. Indications of such a discourse can be found in the history of the pioneers. To name but one
239
example,  Du  Pont's  troublesome  diversification  into  dyestuffs  during  WWI  lead  to  suspicions  by
managers ofs scientists and their claims. This discourse could have been probed by assembling a set of
business journals or newspapers  and other contributions of business-related speakers,  e.g.  speeches of
CEOs, legal decisions, and so on (Shapin 2008, 129 suggest some useful pointers on where to start, albeit
mostly for the later decades). Furthermore, a political discourse regarding antitrust, patents, the limits of
the power of the business giants, etc., would have been possible, produced by a different set of speakers
and finding expression in for example public distrust of big business (Galambos 1975). Lastly, another
discourse  relevant  to  the  field  and  the  R&D  laboratory  may  have  been  what  could  roughly  be
circumscribed as  “inventor  discourse”,  produced by inventors  and craftsmen and possibly filled with
constructions of heroism, pioneer work, genius, and hands-on knowledge, as could be glimpsed through
some of the literature on the golden age of invention (Whalley 1991; Carlson 1997). But gaining broad
coverage of inventors' texts could prove troublesome, especially because, as Hintz (2011, 737f) notes, part
of the reason that scientists won out over inventors was due to their stronger organizational backing and
greater resources at their command. Scientists were organized in scientific societies and other disciplinary
groups, while inventors lacked such speaking powers, leaving the public with only “one side of the story”
(ibid.), and the resulting perception of the disappearance of the independent inventor, which – first and
foremost – was a discursive disappearance. 
To summarize, coming from the idea that any organizational field is host to multiple discourses – due to
the plurality of organizations within the field – it is evident that the discourse analyzed here does not form
the only discourse in the field of organized R&D, and possibly not the only one where constructions of
science and the scientist were undertaken. Other possible discourses within the field can be made visible
by  utilizing  the  same  methodical  approach,  yet  shifting  away  from  the  guiding  question  of  the
construction of science as  made by scientific  speakers  and towards those coming from other groups.
Broadening  the  set  of  speakers  could  be  useful  for  further  honing  and  contextualizing  the  analysis
undertaken here,  highlighting  possible  differences  and  resistances  against  the  way that  the  dominant
conception  of  science  was  constructed,  and  seeing  whether  the  groups  that  scientists  constructed
discursively – foremen, executives, and the public – had contradictory ideas about what was happening in
the field. When presuppositions were stated explicitly in the process of mapping out expectations for
possible discursive findings, again in the spirit of reflexive work, the cultural shift was expected to have
materialized in the discourse by texts building up the virtues of science and the scientist, while putting
down inventors and their craft. Which leads me the next and final question.
Why is the discourse so homogeneous? As reconstructed in minute detail  above, the field's discourse
surrounding  the  early  corporate  research  laboratories  led  to  clear  constructions  of  what  science  and
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chemistry are, materialized in the object laboratory and staffed by expert practitioners of science: chemists
with various specialties, be they analysis or research, academia or industry. Clearly, these constructions
shifted not only in reaction to field-level events (and the discourses they introduced) such as the advent of
WWI, but also in relation to other discourses, such as the ones on conservation and efficiency. Yet, even
considering these movements of meaning, overall the discourse analyzed appears rather homogeneous –
and different than expected. The historical and sociological literature read prior to assembling the field
and corpus and analyzing the discourse often puts a heavy emphasis on the distinction between pure and
applied science,  and the rhetorical  – if  not actual  – battles  fought  between practitioners  of  the  two
groups. Rowland's “Plea for Pure Science” is oft-cited (Kevles 1972; Hounshell 1980; Dennis 1987), and
the  various  implications  of  the  two  concepts,  be  it  prostituted  science  or  the  linear  model  (see  e.g.
Edgerton 2004; Godin 2006; Shapin 2008; also Lucier 2009), are explored. Prior to the analysis, when
noting down discursive conflicts likely to be found, the dynamic of pure and applied was included. Of
course,  the  whole  theoretical  framework,  and with it  the  main thrust  of  the  analysis,  comes  from a
different perspective, a perspective that tries to evade pre-conceived notions such as the purity of science,
instead opting to make such constructions visible in the first place – How was pure science constructed
(if at all),  and by whom? Still,  even with a theoretical perspective rejecting the standard tropes in the
history  of  science,  the  pure/applied  discussion and  all  that  it  entailed  was  still  expected  to  resonate
discursively.  And going further,  the cultural shift towards scientific expertise as purported by various
authors (Sturchio 1981; Carlson 1997; Lucier 2009; Hintz 2011) was expected to influence constructions
by way of demarcation, with scientists drawing discursive boundaries and keeping untrained men outside.
What  can be  evidenced,  then,  is  that  neither  of  the  expected  rhetorical  battles  shaped  the  discourse
significantly, nor did constructions differ significantly by speaker group. With regard to the distinction of
pure and applied, while present in the discourse, it can hardly be seen as a fierce battle over epistemic
authority,  where  applied  science  is  denigrated  by  pure  scientists.  Instead,  during  early  events,  the
distinction played no role  at  all,  while  the  two concepts  were later  put  into a sequence of  temporal
progression – pure science (or research) happening prior to its applied variant. Concurrently, the main
places of science – university and industry – grew somewhat more distinct, but hardly in a combative
manner. The second expected demarcation – scientists vs. inventors – could be found in the discourse,
but only to some degree.  Discursive speakers only began to construct science and chemistry as more
advanced than traditional rule-of-thumb methods and its practitioners around 1908. Clear actor-focused
opposition only came with the increased distinction of the types of chemist. Furthermore, there were
hardly any put-downs of inventors and their craft. While not completely without conflict, the dominant
constructions on the meanings of science, chemistry, the laboratory, etc., were widely shared.
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Again, is the discursive homogeneity due to choice of corpus, or due to the ways in which science and
research were discussed in the field?67 On the one hand, one could hypothesize that the homogeneity is
due to the choice of speakers, and for more contrarian voices to be heard, other groups – as discussed
above: inventors, businessmen, and others – need to be included in an extended discourse analysis. On
the other, the widely shared dominant constructions may be due to men of science, all trained in a similar
academic  environment,  carrying  their  collectively  shared  ideas  about  science  towards  industrial
laboratories. Extending the analysis not in terms of speakers, but in terms of time may be beneficial. Once
the subject position of industrial chemist was firmly established in the years following WWI, maybe new
ideas of what science is and how it works arose within industrial organizations, challenging the dominant
discourse, while before industrial scientists reproduced the “pure science” discourse (Godin 2006, 643).
Longer analysis could reveal whether homogeneous constructions of what science is and what it can do,
backed by academia, were only necessary in the early stages of industrial research for scientists to position
themselves as experts and claim jurisdictional authority – discursive constructions that were no longer
necessary once the scientist was firmly settled into industry in the 1930s and afterwards. 
In the end, only further analysis can highlight the ways that discourse – as a force both creating and
legitimizing reality – influences organizational reality in its respective fields. On a methodological level,
the discussion of expected discursive formations and their apparent lack underlines the above-mentioned
ability  to be  surprised and the possibility  of  disproving one's  own biases  in an effort  to do reflexive
research. Furthermore, the analysis shows the merit of inspecting discursive dynamics on a grander, yet
more grounded, level, without resorting to hinging powerful claims on only few paradigmatic texts, and
without  assuming  any  identities  (such  as  the  “pure  scientist”)  and  their  respective  interrelations
beforehand, instead showing how said paradigmatic texts are made widely heard, and how said identities
are constructed in the first place. In this way, the pitfall of assuming every meaning to be discursive is
evaded by explicitly scrutinizing how discourses construct meaning (Alvesson & Kärreman 2011a, 1199).
Three Desiderata
After discussing the main questions that occurred throughout the process of discourse analysis, I would
like to present three further avenues of inquiry that could extend this analysis, and with it this approach
of understanding diffusion in organizational fields. Whereas the questions presented above stayed largely
67 One reason for discursive homogeneity lies in the nature of presentation. Some divergent discursive texts and outliers of 
opinion did of course exist, especially with regard to proper chemical education, disciplinary specialization, and later how 
the wonders of chemistry should be popularized. But in writing up the report, omissions have to be made to present a 
coherent account of the discursive findings (Georgaca & Avdi 2011, 157). Due to the outliers being few and far between, 
only the process of the construction of dominant interpretations is shown here. 
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within  the  confines  of  the  analysis,  these  desiderata  are  attempts  to  go  beyond  what  was  already
established. 
First,  as other discourse analyses show, focusing on a few texts  instead of a  large corpus can have its
benefits, especially if one is interested in rhetorical strategies, linguistic styles, and precise wordage, rather
than greater trends and discursive shifts. With discourse analyses always existing within the tension of
context and text (Phillips & Hardy 2002, 20), the layer added here to the general understanding of how
the modern corporation came to establish a R&D laboratory could be further extended by de-focusing
the context, diving deeper into a few select texts – those resonating the most intertextually, or written by
actors of great importance in the field – and scrutinizing precisely their arguments for science and the
scientist and what kind of argumentation (e.g. an appeal to logos or pathos, see Green 2004) was used and
when. Moreover, thanks to the analysis, the overarching societal discourses that lend legitimacy and in
turn translated the discourses of the field are known. Now, after enlarging the group of possible speakers
as outlined above, other discourses, e.g. that of business, should be included in the analysis – and a few
“sticky” texts by actors with “voice” (Phillips et al. 2004, 643). What larger discourses found their ways
into the business discourse, and were they appealed to in the same way? And, on a more general level,
what rhetorical strategies were used and how were arguments constructed – similarly to how scientists
established their source of authority, or in other ways? Do specific discursive strategies (Schwab-Trapp
2001) exist for specific discourses, or can more general textual movements be identified, holding true for
the construction of any kind of concept or object over a variety of discourses? These questions can only
be answered when hunkering down again with a reduced corpus, and diving deep into individual texts
and the systems of meaning they create. Finding answers can add to the understanding of how discourses
construct  reality  in  various  ways,  while  also  connecting  back  to  the  field-approach  by  anchoring
discourses  with  specific  speakers  or  groups  of  speakers  in  the  field,  inhabiting  various  positions  and
pursuing differing goals. 
On the other hand, instead of reducing the sample, one could enlarge it. Since six decades of discursive
texts were mapped, but only seven three-year tranches were analyzed, many texts were disregarded. Of
course, this was done for good reason, grounded in the event-based approach and knowing the limits of
interpretative methods such as discourse analysis.  Nonetheless, computational techniques such as text
mining may be adequate tools for bearing down on the gross sample (as opposed to the “net sample” that
found its way into the analysis). Simple quantitative counts could enhance the interdiscursive trajectories
already charted while possibly finding new ones. Procedures based on co-occurrence or word proximity
may aid in characterizing key concepts, objects, and subject positions by highlighting terms used often in
combination. But overall,  while such computational  approaches can aid in making large text corpora
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more  accessible  by  separating  the  wheat  from  the  chaff,  I  do  not  think  they  can  fully  replace  the
interpretive work of the discourse analyst. Discursive constructions are more than mere word counts and
relations, instead they always rely on context, the knowledge of which the analyst must possess in order to
make  sense  of  constructions.  Subtle  or  highly  complex  discursive  phenomena,  such  as  the  changing
relationships  of  chemists  vis-à-vis  foremen  and  managers,  or  discursive  mechanisms,  can  only  be
reconstructed via thorough analysis. Only through this kind of analysis can discursive phenomena not
only  be  explained,  but  also  understood  – to  follow Weber's  dictum.  In  the  end,  I  believe  discourse
analysis has much to gain from using text mining to deal with larger corpora, but only in the first stages of
accessing, assessing, and ordering, and not as a replacement for the hard task of analysis.
Rhetorical and discursive strategies lead me to the second desideratum: the tendencies of locating and
temporalizing. Due to the nature of the research question, this analysis did not consciously look for them,
rather they can be considered by-products or occurrences during the process of analysis. The designation
of “tendencies” is a consequence of their ambiguous status, with “strategies”, “effects”, or “functions” as
other possible labels. To use the name “strategy” has been deemed problematic though, since the idea of a
discursive  strategy  is  usually  conceptualized as  deliberate  acts  of  construction carried out  by  distinct
carrier groups of discursive meaning (see Schwab-Trapp 2001, 296ff). Localization and temporalization,
in contrast, cannot be tied to single speakers or groups of speakers; rather they can be regarded as effects
occurring  through  the  interrelations  of  constructions  between  multiple  texts.  Localization  impacted
especially the relation of concepts and objects, as in the way science was materialized in the distinct place
of “laboratory”. In addition, objects were also related to each other in a spatial way, such as the laboratory
and the factory that were cast as distinct places separated by a difference in scale. Laboratory types were
primarily  distinguished due to their  location (university,  corporation,  or  others),  and second only by
motive – the actual practices and outputs of the laboratory following the overarching logic of location.
Temporalization affected the relationship built between concepts, such as the hard lines drawn between
science – modern, and in the “now” – and the old rule-of-thumb ways, associated with tradition and the
past.  Science  itself  (and  this  extends  to  chemistry  as  well)  was  differentiated  within  by  a  temporal
sequence: Pure science necessarily happened before applied science, with the applied variant building on
the foundations laid by the discoveries of the pure. 
What is to be learned from this, and how can future analyses proceed from here? For one, these discursive
effects  offer  insights  not  only  into  the  many  ways  discourses  construct  reality,  but  also  into  how
discourses create order by putting concepts, objects, and subject positions into distinct relationships with
each other.  Future inquiry could then put these and similar  discursive functions or effects  front and
center by retooling the research question and focusing on the ways discursive constructions are ordered.
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This could be done by re-analyzing the corpus already assembled, an elongated corpus that traces the
discourse up through today, or an entirely different discourse in order to find out whether effects such as
localization and temporalization are unique to the discourse on industrial research laboratories, or if they
possibly belong to a basic set of mechanisms that allow discourses – and with it, discursive speakers – to
make sense of reality. This should then be tied back to organizational analysis, by scrutinizing if and how
discursive  effects,  by  nature  of  being  textual  expressions  of  institutions,  materialize  in  concrete
organizational behavior, e.g. how localization effects not only how actors in the field perceive reality, but
also how their positions are ordered in turn. 
Lastly, as a third desideratum, the analysis should be extended in time to cover the heyday of corporate
research laboratories in the chemical industries around and after World War II, up until the crisis of the
1970s  and  onwards  (Hounshell  1996;  Mowery  &  Teece  1996;  Carlson  2007).  This  would  include
continuously  redrawing the  boundaries  of  the  organizational  field as  new players  enter,  such as  new
corporations or federal agencies giving scientific grants, while others disappear through bankruptcy or
other reasons. Such an elongated corpus could then be probed at specific events in order to re-assess
discursive construction of concepts, objects, and subject positions. How, for example, did the successes
achieved by Du Pont's lauded fundamental research program resonate discursively? Did they impact the
relationship between pure research and its  applied variant,  and how did they  change the role  to the
researcher in regard of their power vis-à-vis research executives and agenda-setters? How did the chaos of
World War II, and – to name but one pivotal triumph of science – the Manhattan Project, transform the
discourse? What impact did Vannevar Bush's widely received notions about the way science functions in
“Science:  The Endless  Frontier”  (see  Godin 2006)  have  on the  discourse,  and how was  his  position
informed by what was sayable and perceivable through the discourse? Was the apparent delegitimization
of  organized  research  laboratories  in  corporations  purely  tied  to  expenses  and  reduced  returns  on
investment, or was it preceded by a cultural shift that impugned the scientist's expertise? Over the years,
which larger societal discourses had an impact on the field, and how were they translated? Do discursive
constructions  of  the 1970s  still  resemble those  of  the  1910s,  or  did  discursive  strategies  and content
transform fundamentally,  and why? These and related questions could be answered by widening the
coverage of the analysis beyond the 1930s. 
But widening the analytical net has implications not only for discourse analytical theory, but also for
organizational  institutionalism  as  well.  For  one,  it  was  theorized  that  the  successful  spread  of  an
innovation  has  an  impact  on  the  mechanism  of  diffusion,  from  efficiency  concerns  to  isomorphic
pressures  (DiMaggio & Powell 1983, 149; Tolbert & Zucker 1983). As the analysis showed, discourse
analysis offers methods of assessing how normative and mimetic isomorphism manifested textually, in the
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ways subjects and successful corporations or concepts were constructed. A longer analysis could further
probe  the  translations  undergone  by  the  industrial  research  laboratory  while  it  became  the  de-facto
standard of corporate innovation, leading to a better understanding of how exactly isomorphic pressures
manifest  textually  and are in turn transported into organizations.  Also,  while  it  seemed like the early
corporations all had to re-invent the research laboratory for themselves, the early 1920s saw the emergence
of a genre of texts on how to best organize a laboratory, build up facilities for research, etc. Augmenting
the discursive layer with one of floor-plans, guidelines, and hiring strategies – i.e. the ways the laboratories
of the 1920s and onwards conducted their practices – could lend further credence to shifting diffusion
mechanisms  once  an  innovation  has  become  institutionalized  (here:  discursively  “fixed”  in  certain
dominant constructions of what a laboratory is) towards highly predetermined ways of establishing a
laboratory,  as  subject  to  isomorphic  pressures.  In  addition,  keeping  constructive  processes  front  and
center can give insight into how legitimacy is created in the first place – legitimacy being, as organizational
institutionalism tells  us,  a  key  factor  in organizational  decision-making (Walgenbach & Meyer  2008,
63ff). And lastly, with the concept of the institutional entrepreneur (DiMaggio 1988; Barley & Tolbert
1997;  Battilana  et  al.  2009),  organizational  institutionalism supplies  a  type  of  actor  effecting  change
within  organizations.  The  histories  of  the  R&D  pioneers  showed  glimpses  of  this,  with  actors  or
coalitions  of  actors  championing  organized  research  from  within  their  various  corporate  structures.
Analyzing their minute reasonings employed to sway the executives' opinions would give further insight
into how discourses can serve as resources for legitimating individual  action by providing collectively
shared frames of meaning that can be translated into the specific organizational situation – in this case,
casting the scientist as expert and science as the answer to corporate woes. There are still many ways in
which  the  organizational  research  laboratory  can  serve  to  increase  our  knowledge  of  history,  the
poignancy of our theory, and the precision of our methods – or, as Gieryn (1999, 35) put it: “Lots of
work ahead.”
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